The Proceeding OF THE 6TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (ICIS) 2016 'Emerging Contours of World Order: The Challenges Ahead' 20th to 22nd August 2016 Kuala Lumpur

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Foreword

Bismillahirrahmanirrahim

Assalamualaikum Warahmatullahi Wabarakatuh and Greetings.

It gives me great pleasure to write this foreword for the programme book of the 6th biennial International Conference on International Studies (ICIS 2016), organized by the School of International Studies, Universiti Utara Malaysia, in collaboration with the Ministry of Higher Education and Yayasan Minda. Firstly, I would like to warmly welcome all the distinguished speakers, guests, and scholars, who have come from far and near to exchange ideas and share their wisdom at ICIS 2016. Without their enthusiasm and support, this conference would not have been possible. Secondly, I would like to express my gratitude to the members of the organizing committee for their dedicated and diligent efforts in successfully hosting ICIS 2016.

The theme of the Conference, *"**Emerging Contours of World Order: The Challenges Ahead**",* is indeed timely in the context of our globalized world today where the contours are, indeed, changing as evinced by the proliferation of avenues of information flow, the emergence of virtual geographical boundaries, the rapid movement of people and goods across frontiers, and greater economic interdependence among the peoples of the world. The rapid development and extensive reach of information technology through modern print and electronic media have also helped shape world views, as well as the attitudes of the citizens towards the State. The emerging patterns of practice with regard to the conduct of business and diplomacy have taken it beyond the purview of governments and into an arena encompassing multiple sites of authority, power, and influence including, among others, civil society groups. All these new phenomena and their attendant impacts and implications, I am sure, will be critically deliberated upon by the participating scholars at the parallel sessions over the next two days of the Conference. It is gratifying to note that, by providing avenues for constructive exchange of ideas and interaction for scholars from different countries and backgrounds, ICIS 2016 seeks to be a positive force in further broadening the horizons of knowledge.

I strongly believe that ICIS 2016 will succeed in contributing to the scholarly analyses of issues pertaining to Globalization and Nation States and other related fields. I sincerely hope that the mutual exchange of ideas facilitated by the Conference will initiate collaborative partnerships, wider academic networking, and lasting friendship among all present. I wish all participants, presenters, and scholars a very rewarding and memorable time at ICIS 2016.

With warm regards,

Yang Berbahagia Prof. Dato' Seri Dr. Mohamed Mustafa Ishak
Vice Chancellor
Universiti Utara Malaysia

Dean's Remarks

Welcome to the 6th International Conference on International Studies (ICIS 2016). The theme this year is "**Emerging Contours of World Order : The Challenges Ahead",** a topic that is quickly gaining traction in both academic and public discussions because of the relevance of globalization to societal issues such as energy, water, healthcare, diplomacy, security, management and transportation. This has been mainly due to various forms of integration at the political, economic, social, educational and cultural levels, which have brought businesses, governments, cultural organizations and individuals together. It has consequently brought rapid changes to the lives of the people as well as lessening of the probability for open conflict among societies and countries. Their implications are wide and far reaching in terms of issues, programs and policies.

I consider the conference, which is being held jointly by the School of International Studies, Universiti Utara Malaysia and the Ministry of Higher Education, Malaysia to be a venue that will enable the academics and practitioners in Malaysia and abroad an opportunity to come and show one another additional ways whereby we can nurture the generation of 21st- century leaders.

Finally, the success of ICIS 2016 depends completely on the effort, talent, and energy of researchers in various fields related to the theme who have written and submitted papers on a variety of topics. Praise is also deserved for the program committee members and external reviewers who have invested significant time in analyzing and assessing multiple papers, who hold and maintain a high standard of quality for this conference. Additional thanks are given to all sponsors for their sponsorship, and to the committee members for service above and beyond the call of duty regarding organizational and production details that permitted relaxed deadlines for conference participants. Finally, I welcome you to Kuala Lumpur a destination for both local and international travelers. We hope that you will take advantage of the many sights to see in the city, as well as the many natural and man-made wonders nearby, during your stay.

Where Innovation in Governance Begins

Associate Professor Dr. Ahmad Bashawir Abdul Ghani
Dean, School of International Studies,
Universiti Utara Malaysia

Director's Message

To all esteemed delegates of the 6th biennial International Conference on International Studies (ICIS 2016).

On behalf of the College of Law, Government and International Studies (COLGIS), and in particular the School of International Studies (SOIS), Universiti Utara Malaysia, I convey my most sincere congratulations on the dynamic accomplishments of ICIS thus far.

Notably, it is my sincerest hope that this conference will provide a platform for all of us to exchange our knowledge, expertise, experiences and ideas under the various themes and topics that are related to International Studies.

I wish to express sincere respect, gratitude and thanks to all the co-organizers and sponsors for ICIS 2016. They have indeed provided continuous support and generous contributions and fabulous cooperation. It is not an exaggeration to confess that without such networking, this conference would not have managed to see the light of the day!

In a nutshell, I am most fortunate to have a dynamic secretariat that have readily given their blood and sweat in ensuring that this conference is a success. I sincerely hope that all the delegates would have a wonderful time at this conference and enjoy their stay in Kuala Lumpur!

Associate Professor Dr. Rusdi Omar
Director
Conference Organizing Committee

ROYAL ADDRESS

Royal Address

EMERGING CONTOURS OF WORLD ORDER:
THE CHALLENGES AHEAD

Her Royal Highness Dato' Seri DiRaja Tan Sri Tunku Puteri Intan Safinaz Binti
Tuanku Abdul Halim Mu'adzam Shah

Ladies and Gentlemen, a very good morning to all.

It is a great honor for me to deliver this address in front of very learned local and international participants in this conference. I do hope that this conference will become an avenue for intellectual exchanges and a conduit for future collaboration and networking. More importantly, I hope that this conference will put the UUM brand on the map of international academic circles.

The theme of this biennial conference, "Emerging Contours of World Order: The Challenges Ahead", reflects the current dynamism of global issues, which I believe, has produced more dialectic uncertainties and contributed to the world's instability.

The contemporary structure of the global system affects every systemic level of international community, from nation-states to individuals like us. All of us are affected under the current international arrangements and global issues require nation-states and individuals to respond positively to ensure the survival of nations and community.

There are many challenges to world order and stability. But, let me highlight its five major challenges.

Islamophobia, Terrorism and Political Violence

The first major challenge is the widening gap of religious understanding. Lately, Islam has been the focus since it has been associated with terror and violence. The religion of Islam and muslims, for that matter, have been misunderstood.

Islam has been painted as a religion of hate and intolerance. This misunderstanding of Islam is far from the truth and must be remedied to avoid major conflicts in the future. Furthermore, many Muslim countries have been positioned in the lower tier due to their economic and developmental lag, owing to instability, poverty and weak governance. Some of these countries have plunged to become weak and poverty-stricken states, which makes them easy prey and breeding grounds for terrorist organizations such as the Islamic State (IS).

Recent attacks in European cities and other parts of the world by is, for example, are a culmination of years of radicalisation, feeling neglected, oppressed and misunderstood. If such trends prolong, it would further damage the relationship between Muslims and the rest of the world.

Malaysia is trying hard not to become entangled in such a situation. We believe that Moderation or Wasatiyyah is the way to go. The Global Moderation Movement or the GMM, mooted by the current government, can play an important role in promoting global moderation in all spheres of life especially religious and political tolerance.

Islam is moderation. All of us, be they politicians, world leaders, civil movement leaders and even community leaders, must see that there is always room for the differing of views and approaches.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Good Governance

The second major challenge is the maintenance of good governance and leadership integrity. It is really unfortunate to see in so many places how corruption damages the

social and institutional fabric of a country. According to the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2015, for instance, not one single country, anywhere in the world, is corruption-free, and 69% of countries worldwide have a serious corruption problem.

In the strong words of José Ugaz, the Chair of Transparency International: "the 2015 Corruption Perceptions Index clearly shows that corruption remains a blight around the world. But 2015 was also a year when people again took to the streets to protest against corruption. People across the globe sent a strong signal to those in power: it is time to tackle grand corruption". Viewed in this light, the more open and transparent the process in which governments manage public resources, the less opportunity it will provide for malfeasance and abuse.

As Chancellor Of Unversiti Utara Malaysia, I am very pleased to see how committed UUM has been in tackling this issue of good governance and leadership integrity. I would like to congratulate UUM for the newly established Asia Pacific Institute for Corruption Studies (APICS), which is the first of its kind in our country and also in this region. It is hoped that with the advent of this institute, UUM will play a significant role in devising effective and concrete ways to combat corruption.

The Deterioration of Refugees Crisis

The next challenge affecting world order is the refugee crisis, human security and dignity due to wars and conflicts around the world.

In 2015, for instance, the escalating conflict in Iraq, Syria, and recently in Yemen, and, according to UNHCR, 65.3 million people, or one person in 113, were displaced from their homes by conflict and persecution. Meaning that, on average, 24 people were forced to flee each minute in 2015. Children constitute about 41 percent of the world's refugees, and about half of all refugees are women, according to the United Nations 2009 statistics. This shows the intensity of the situation.

The problem of refugees not only happens in one region, but also in Southeast Asia. According to Fortify Rights, a global human rights NGO, more than 170,000 people left Myanmar since 2012. They have been forced out of their country where they have no freedom of movement and are confined to camps right on the edge of the ocean. More than 140,000 Rohingyas currently live in overcrowded and internally displaced camps, with little access to food or healthcare. Malaysia has been faced with an influx of Rohingyas, originating from Myanmar, many of whom are living and working illegally in this country without proper documentation, rights and protection.

The Global Phenomenon of Migration

The fourth great challenge is the increasing number of migration – both regulated and unregulated. The United Nations reported that, in 2015, the numbers have reached 244 million, a 41 per cent increase compared to 2000. This statistic reflects the exponential growth of international migrants, faster than that of the world's population. In 2015, two thirds of international migrants have settled in major countries such as the United States - which hosted 19 per cent of all migrants, followed by Germany, Russia, Saudi Arabia, the United Kingdom, and the United Arab Emirates. India contributes the most to this diaspora in the world, followed by Mexico, Russia, China, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Ukraine.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, António Guterres, notes that displacement caused by the slow-onset effects of climate change is largely internal. But through the acceleration of drought, desertification, the salinization of ground water and soil, and rising sea levels, climate change, can contribute to the displacement of people across international frontiers. Again, the relevant international instruments are silent on these groups of people. In addition, identifying the correlation between slow-onset processes and displacement is particularly difficult.

We must not forget that there are other human-made calamities, such as severe socio-economic deprivation, internal conflicts, socio-ethnic-religious schisms, which can also cause people to flee across borders. While some may be escaping persecution, most

leave because they lack of any meaningful option to remain - the lack of food, water, education, healthcare and livelihood.

What is confronting us is a thin line between genuine refugees and economic migrants, which has brought divergent tensions between states.

Ladies and Gentlemen

The fifth challenge to world order is regional identity and community.

Regional Identity and Community

Globalization compels nation-states to adapt and to adopt mounting challenges that transcend the idea of sovereignty and national interests. This fifth challenge compels nation-states to adapt to the global system to become more competitive. At the same time, they also have to adopt various strategies to remain afloat in the world economy.

One of the strategies is to form regional economic communities. At one time, regional economic integration was seen as a way forward in promoting economic growth of a nation. The idea of trade liberalisation, trade creation, mutual sharing of resources, free movement of human capital, and political cooperation between members was so enticing that every region was trying to establish their own community.

The success of the European Union and the North America Free Trade Area (NAFTA) were then followed by the establishment of the Asean Free Trade Area (AFTA), which then evolved into the ASEAN Economic Community in 2015. Undoubtedly, ASEAN's 10 economies are a major force in the world economy, with a gross domestic product of us$2.6 trillion, the AEC is the seventh largest economic entity in the world. With a population of more than 620 million, it is the third largest in Asia after China and India.

However, Brexit, or "British Exit", which refers to the June 23 2016 referendum by British voters to exit the European Union has given rise to a number of uncertainties

including financial and market instability. The current issues of the EU will create a huge question mark over the future of other regional integration and economic organisations such as ASEAN and the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA).

The proposed exit of the UK from EU has evoked some concerns. To make an assumption that the EU and the other regional integration experiments will collapse is premature. However, it is a wake-up call for Malaysia and the other ASEAN members as the very survival of the AEC and the ASEAN Community itself relies very much on the mutual cooperation and understanding among members. The challenges for policymakers are to ensure that trade liberalism, expected as the outcome of integration, does not turn into trade protectionism that will inhibit trade with non-member countries. The issues faced by individual nations should not be ignored, neglected and sacrificed even for the sake of mutual benefits. Brexit has shown that disagreement, especially on the issues of migration, may shake up even a strong economic union such as the EU.

Ladies and Gentlemen

The five main challenges that I have highlighted earlier seem to portray a worrying picture of the future. But, I am also optimistic that the world we live in can become a better place for future generations.

The world order that has been promised to us many times over has eluded us for years. Is there going to be a world order and, you as academics, should ponder what kind or in what form that the world order should be?

Therefore, as part of my concluding remarks, I propose the followings:

We must manage differences in a very civilized manner. Religious hatred should not be the order of the day and continuous civilizational dialogue should be encouraged "not to find differences but to find points of commonality".

It is our utmost duty to remind our leaders to uphold the highest level of integrity. But, we have to understand that integrity awareness starts at home. Our children should be taught at the very young age on the dire consequences of dishonesty and corruption.

Solving the root of the refugees and migration problems needs concerted efforts by the wealthy nations and the world body, particularly the united nations. The global community should condemn all kinds of xenophobia, systematic ethnic cleansing and racial discrimination. We should not allow the huge, global humanitarian crisis to continue unchecked.

Finally, we should prepare ourselves to be part of our regional community. It is hoped that all ASEAN members fully support the concept and aspirations of ASEAN. For Malaysia, the ASEAN community is very important, especially in dealing with the increasing trends of trade protectionism of major powers and other regional trading blocks.

Ladies and Gentlemen

I have portrayed a wide range of perspectives of the idea of world order and in line with the theme, this conference should highlight contemporary concerns and practice that can serve as catalyst for change, and seek to stave off conflict and disorder.

Lastly, I would like to thank the organising committee of this conference, the School of International Studies, for organising this conference.

Let us work together to make our world a better place.

Thank you very much.

KEYNOTE SPEECH

Keynote Speech

STRENGTHENING OF ETHICS AND INTEGRITY

Senator Tan Sri Prof. Dr. Ibrahim Abu Shah

Ladies and Gentlemen

Assalamu'alaikum and Good Afternoon.

Ladies and Gentleman

We in Malaysia are very fortunate to have a visionary leader like Datuk Seri Najib Tun Razak who is very aware on the need for government to transform and find new ways to deliver strong economic growth and enhance the services the provide.

The most striking evidence of this is that no sooner than he become the Prime Minister in 2009 that he launched the National Blue Ocean Strategy (NBOS) initiative with the aim of rapidly delivering high value (impact) to the people of Malaysia, while keeping the costs of providing government services low. Since its adoption in 2009, over 90 NBOS initiatives have been implemented by over 80 ministries and agencies, which closely collaborate to share resources, eliminate duplication and deliver high value to the general public.

The acknowledgement of this success was highlighted in the hosting of the International Conference on Blue Ocean Strategy at the Putrajaya International Convention Centre (PICC) in Putrajaya, Malaysia from 16 to 18 August 2016 with the theme, Transforming Nations through Creativity and Innovation.

Development and Economics

Malaysia has grown tremendously and has become a more developed country over the year since her independence since 49 years ago. It has soared like an eagle, involving into a high technology nation with a own silicon valley, and her many high technology building, some of which were built to depict the rich heritage of Malaysia, like the Petronas Twin Tower.

Unity

Malaysia has experience a study economic progression and rapid infrastructure development of which a Malaysians are truly proud Malaysia is a country with a harmonious and peaceful living environment where various ethnic races intermingle amicably with one another through mutual understanding and tolerance fostered to many decades of togetherness.

As a country, Malaysia has achieved successes in many fields since its independence from the British in 1957. Of late, such successes have been slowing down, and the people are looking at the Government for more initiatives or programmes to move the country into a high income economy like Singapore, Taiwan, Japan or Korea.

What makes the matter worse is a large influx of illegal foreign workers into Malaysia, bringing with them a number of social problems. Against the background of existing corruption landscape, the crime rate in Malaysia is on the rise, including the cyber and white-collar crimes.

As expressed by the Prime Minister recently, Malaysia is now trapped in the middle-income syndrome, unable to move into a high income and developed nation status. This "middle-income trap" scenario is worrying both leaders and planners alike, especially so, when our neighbours are catching up with us economically and also, in many other fields.

The question now is, how could we move into a high income and developed nation status? What are the obstacles and what are the challenges?. It is my sincere hope that

the participants of ICIS 2016 will be active in discussing and participating in various sessions in a mutually benefiting learning environment.

In a recent "International Conference for Science and Peace", His Royal Highness the Sultan of Perak, Sultan Dr. Nazrin Shah said that, "*progress would require deliberate choices and action instead of the current complacency and widespread sense of helplessness in the face of a rapidly changing environment*" (Star, 16/8/16. p.22).

I totally agree with His Royal Highness' view on this matter. If we want to create peace and progress for Malaysia, all parties from policy makers, government servants, workers in the private sector, social groups, parents and school-going children had a major role to play, and a responsibility in determining the future progress of this beloved Nation of ours.

For today, I want to talk to you about ethics and integrity. It is about "**Strengthening of Ethics and Integrity in Malaysian Plural Society**". I believe that, there is a close and positive relationship between ethics and integrity on the one hand with human progress on the other. My general observations show that societies in developed countries like Japan, Korea, Sweden or Finland had high integrity and practice good ethics in their daily life and there exist good governance in the public and private sectors.

To me, good governance can be achieved if the citizens of a country have strong integrity and practice good ethics in their interactions and relationships. Many years back, I travelled to Melbourne, Australia. One day, I was watching a newspaper boy selling his newspapers in front of the busy Swanton Street Railway Station in Central Melbourne. He just left a pile of newspapers with a box of coins nearby. After an hour or so, the newspapers were all gone, and what was left, was a box of coins plus some notes in it. Nobody took away the coins and the notes. **Could the same thing happen in Kuala Lumpur Sentral**?

As earlier expressed by Her Royal Highness Tunku Puteri Intan Shafinaz, more than six billion people in the world today are living in countries with serious corruption problems.

Malaysia has its fair share of corruption problems, currently being handled by Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC). I strongly believe that, corruption is a global problem and we need to study and understand its root-cause and address this issue as a group with all the resources that we have. It is not wrong to say that corruption could damage the social fabric of a Nation and cause great misery to its citizens.

It is interesting to note that corruption is negatively related to integrity and ethics. Meaning to say, in a society with high integrity and good ethics, the rate of corruption is reduced to the minimum. This situation will certainly encourage good governance to be practiced at all levels in the administration.

It is interesting to note that the fourth challenge of Vision 2020 is, ***"to establish a fully moral and ethical society whose citizens are strong in religious and spiritual values and imbued with the highest ethical standards."*** (PIN, p.vii). It is the goal that each and every one of us strive to achieve.

In support of the above objective, the Malaysian Government under the leadership of Tun Abdullah Ahmad Badawi has launched "**National Integrity Plan**" in 2004, about 12 years ago. This initiative is bearing fruits now and it needs to be further enhanced in the years to come.

As an educationist, I strongly feel that the process of Nation-building must start with moulding and educating its people, the people of Malaysia. This is what being done by the Government of Malaysia today. The journey to development and prosperity is not an easy one, but it has to be taken with the support of each and everyone of us, the loyal citizens of Malaysia.

By and large, Malaysia has its fair share of problems and obstacles in achieving its objective of becoming a developed and high income Nation. It is indeed that, in a forum of this nature that, the participants of ICIS 2016 should meet, participate actively and discuss pertinent issues facing the Nation, and propose appropriate solutions.

For the purpose of this paper and for our discussion this afternoon, let us take **"Ethics"** to mean *a set of moral values and principles that guide the code of conduct of individuals, organizations and professions*.

And on the other hand, let us assume that **"Integrity"** to mean *a quality of excellence, manifesting in a holistic and integral manner within individuals, within government departments, and within organizations and society at large.*

To continuously educate and to mould a Malaysian society of 30 million people is not an easy task. More so with the constant influx of illegal immigrants into Malaysia in search of better life. Such phenomenon shows that we have a porous border situation which calls for strong, proper and intense border surveillance to keep away the illegal immigrants and other intruders.

Having said that, let us now examine some of the ways that we could **enhance the integrity** of Malaysians, and **promote ethical practices** among the people of Malaysia as well as **good governance** among the public servants and workers in the private sector. I strongly believe that, with these practices, we will be able to reduce the corruption problems in Malaysian society to the minimum level.

All efforts to enhance integrity, promote ethical practices and good governance among Malaysians and in Malaysia have to be taken in a holistic manner and on continuous basis until success is achieved. it should involve and be supported by every loyal citizen of Malaysia.

I think, some of the major components or institutions in the Malaysian society be involved in this drive should be the family units, the local communities, the civil society (NGOs), the socio-cultural groups (education, health, sports, etc) and also, other groups like, the various religious, economic, political, administrative groups.

In conclusion, I must say that, such a drive and transformational initiative within the Malaysian society must be initiated by the leaders and strongly supported by the people. The people-leader relationship must be mutually reinforcing one (bagai aur dengan tebing) and must be guided by the noble values of integrity, good ethics and good governance. The people (rakyat) in turn, need to support the leaders and be loyal to them, and constantly provide feedback and suggestions as a form of check and balance.

Thank you.

PART 8: GLOBAL BUSINESS MANAGEMENT

KNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION THROUGH INTER-FIRM COLLABORATION AND FIRM'S INNOVATION PERFORMANCE

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Abstract

In order to strengthen their competitive positions, emerging market firms establish inter-organizational collaborations actively for acquiring new knowledge, and during those collaborations, the attainment of knowledge and learning from parents staying abroad is considered critical. Nevertheless, the learning potential from these collaborations perhaps isn't understood because of the conflicts, risks, and problems confronted during the process of collaboration. Even if the research on attainment of knowledge is expanding, so far it's antecedents and consequences seems ambiguous and needs to be understood. Moreover, the current literature undergoes a vigilant analysis for the procedures of knowledge attainment step by step. All this current literature mostly discusses the attainment of knowledge procedures from the micro foundation, which indicates that there exists the lack of literature about the integration of numerous stages of analysis. Due to the aforementioned interactions, this conceptual paper will utilize bottom-up approach. Defined as the management of knowledge procedures are influenced equally by higher-level determinants and individual characteristics. To that end, we draw conceptual framework by suggesting the influence of HRM practices and change readiness to knowledge acquisition with the moderating role of absorptive capacity. Then, later we associate both, "the assessment of this knowledge attainment" with "firm innovative performance".

Keywords: HRM practices, change readiness, absorptive capacity, knowledge acquisition, firm 'innovation performance

Introduction

In order to speed their learning, the firms in emerging market countries frequently obtain managerial skills and advanced technology to boost up their ways of learning for business and to gain competitive advantages. (Bruton, & Lu, 2005; Meyer & Peng, 2005; Luo & Tung, 2007; Yiu).

Nevertheless, the absorbing of knowledge from the collaboration may not happen because of the troubles, dangers, and disagreements which occur meanwhile the period of connectivity (Chen et. al, 2016). Moreover, the Collaboration by itself does not imply that a firm will have the capacity to benefit from it when the firm does not perceive the knowledge of its partners; conceivable outcomes exchanging and creating knowledge are restricted (Bastos, 2001). According to Appleyard (1996), Mowery et. Al., (1996), Powell et. Al., (1996), it has been stressed that attainment of a firm's knowledge does not necessarily hint the manipulation and incorporation of this knowledge. Morwey et. Al., (1996), Lane et. Al., (2001), Steensma et. Al., (2005) added that many studies have been done on the aspects of attainment of knowledge mechanisms, knowledge exploitation inside the firms at the time of alliance and incorporation. According to Postrel, (2002) Knowledge attainment is observed like an administration occupation which is directed to the transformation of learning from an organization towards fresh knowledge which possesses best consequences. Notwithstanding this insight, we have an inadequate understanding with respects to knowledge acquisition process within inter-firm collaboration for emerging market firms.

Steensma et. al., (2005), Lyles and Salk, (1996), Van Wijk et. al., (2008) argued that an attainment of knowledge is not a final result, rather it is a never ending process which mediates the linkage amongst a group of antecedents and performance consequences. Sorenson (2003) added that an integration of two paradigms of research "the resource base view of the firm" and the "organizational learning". This knowledge base viewpoint gave knowledge a prominent role in order to determine performance disparities. For the examination of antecedents of organization learning, learning procedures and learning consequences on both levels, Intra and inter-firm an extensive literature has been focused (Argote et. al., 2003; van Wijk et. al., 2008; Bedman Narteh, 2008; Martinkenaite, 2011, 2012; Loebbecke, et. al 2016; Battistella, et. al 2015; Andersson, et. al 2016). Nevertheless, despite the fact the previous researches on inter-organizational learning are increasing, somehow, our thoughtfulness of its antecedents and consequences still indistinguishable. Current theoretical frameworks and models of inter-organizational learning seem does not completely reveal this fact and hence there is need of more investigation in this field.

This paper is developed based on the understanding of the literature review on projected role of knowledge attainment for conceptual models/frameworks within the inter-firm collaboration. Thus, the main focus has been paid to the mediating role of knowledge attainment for the relationships of numerous antecedents and performance consequences of transfer. The paper is organized as follows. We first present problem statement, followed by research questions and research objectives. Then we review the existing literature on antecedents and consequence of knowledge acquisition. Finally, we will develop the theoretical framework from which this study is based on.

Problem Statement

Norman (2004) stated that knowledge acquisition alludes to abilities learned and knowledge attained by the local firm with a partner through collaboration. Lyles and Salk (1996) proposed that we require a more noteworthy comprehension of what encourages learning obtaining and aptitudes advancement. Regardless of their essential character in knowledge acquisition, nevertheless, few researches have empirically examined the learning consequences of alliances.

Andersson, et. al (2016) demonstrated that knowledge construct as a multilevel concept: which it is existing within the individual's minds and is fascinated and shifted by them, whereas cooperation and connections are revealed at the firm level. Therefore, a thorough understanding of the processes of knowledge needs an incorporation of lower level (individuals) of investigation with more combined levels. This study package entails the usage of a multilevel method (Andersson, Cuervo-Cazurra, & Nielsen, 2014) that involves the acknowledgement that the aims of lower levels of analysis like individuals and teams intersection only partially with those of higher levels of analysis (Andersson, Forsgren, & Holm, 2007; Mudambi & Navarra, 2004). Therefore, consideration of individual factors that could stimulate involvement in the knowledge acquisition process is crucial. Nevertheless, the literature offers the little empirical discussion of individual factors affecting knowledge acquisition.

Knowledge acquisition inside and across organizations is perceived as a corresponding policy for accomplishing organizational innovation competence (Van Wijk et. al., 2008). The significance of study on innovation hardly requests any explanation (Damanpour, Walker, & Avellaneda, 2009). Globalization marks innovation even more essential (Berry, 2014). Authors claimed that the quantity of

new knowledge assimilated and applied limits the amount of innovation (Hall and Andriani, 2003; Plessis, 2007; Carneiro 2000). Consequently, knowledge is vital to innovation (e.g. Nonaka and Takeuchi,1995; Jensen et. al.,2007). Past studies by Shan, Walker, and Kogut, (1994) and Rogers, (2004) delivered a signal that inter-organizational collaboration has an optimistic effect on the innovative performance of organizations. Academics in the earlier have seen at the two pretty independently and very scarce literature is present that attempt to linkage the two (Gloet & Terziovski, 2004; Lin, Che & Ting, 2012; Du Plessis, 2007; Hana, 2013). Harryson et. al. (2008) argued that we have not been concentrating on knowledge acquisition, but also on the alteration and incorporation of knowledge into viable innovation. Thus, undertaking more research on firms' innovation performance is vital.

The absorptive capability has been debated broadly in the knowledge acquisition literature (Van Wijk et. al., 2008, Ojo, Raman, & Chong, 2016), particularly in an emerging economy (Lane et. al., 2001; Lane and Lubtakin, 1998; Zhao and Anand, 2009). Absorptive capacity is suggestive of the individual capacity to attain, digest new knowledge, and apply it to the field (Wook Seo 2013). In the seminal research on absorptive capacity by Cohen and Levinthal (1990), all individuals were observed as learning from outside sources of knowledge, permitted by their firms. In essence, the absorptive capacity of a firm is dependent upon the skills of its colleagues in order to explore the outside knowledge prevailing in the settings and to integrate it with an organization's personal abilities and enforce its applicability inside the firm. Volberda, Foss, and Lyles (2010), after going through the literature came to the point that antecedents at individual level seem relatively controlled in literature. Also, according to Foss, Laursen & Pedersen (2011), they attempted to construct a critical structure block for this concept in the viewpoint of organization research (Lane, Koka, & Pathak, 2006). However, there is deficiency a vivid thoughtfulness about the starring role which persons play in successfully gripping outside knowledge. Hence undertaking a study that focuses on how individuals could contribute in knowledge transfer is vital to advance the literature stream.

Human Resource Management (HRM) is defined as a range of strategies, applies and arrangements that affect the actions, assertiveness and performance of workers of the firm, in order to increase their competitiveness and learning capacity, to the extent of creating a culture of learning (Rebelo, 2006; Aït Razouk, Bayad, &

Wannenmacher, 2009; Edvardsson, 2008). Thus, set in contemporary academic positioning, HRM should complete a set of characters that permits it to subsidize to better elasticity and a superior capability for alteration and organizational change. It is therefore specified the main accountability of smoothing processes of knowledge and organizational learning with a view to achieving strategic purposes (Lengnick-Hall and Lengnick-Hall, 2003). However, certain studies arose (e.g. Ali and Ahmad, 2006; Bontis and Serenko, 2007, 2009; Cabrita and Bontis, 2008; Theriou and Chatzoglou, 2009; Figueiredo , et. al. 2016) which t aim to discover and comprehend inquiries of organizational learning, intellectual capital, knowledge management, and human resource management. Current studies also powerfully underscore the necessity to examine the two themes together, with a sight to appreciative and evaluating the influence of HRM practices on Knowledge processes (Al-bahussin & El-Garaihy, 2013; Camelo-Ordaz, et. al, 2011; Chiang and Chuang, 2011; Fong et. al. 2011; Jimenez-Jimenez and Sanz-Valle, 2013; Oltra, 2005;Scholl, Konig, Meyer and Heisig, 2004; Svetlik and Stavrou-Costea, 2007;Yahya and Goh, 2002, Figueiredo et. al. 2016). Nonetheless, the connection between HRM practices and knowledge acquisition process in inter-firm collaboration is neglected and is still perplexing.

Individual change readiness characterizes principles and attitudes that form an optimistic impetus to encirclement changes in the knowledge management process (Holt, Armenakis, Feild, & Harris, 2007; Armenakis & Harris, 2002). Consequently, these individuals 'readiness to involve in the process is critical. Knowledge acquisition depends on workers 'readiness to look for new knowledge; hence, understanding the foundations that improve willingness for the process would be valuable for firms targeting to institutionalize the knowledge acquisition process in their processes (Pacharapha & Ractham, 2012). Change readiness is individual principles and actions play a dynamic role to bring change within the organization. Therefore, there is a need to develop the considerable understanding of all mental and emotional aspects which occur meantime the process of alteration (Walinga, 2008; Moffett et. al., 2002). Cultivation of willingness and capacity of individuals shape the readiness inside the firm to bring them up into an innovative and succeeding from this changing phenomenon and is upheld by pertinent settings within the firm to increase this change readiness process (Rusly et al., 2015). The readiness has been discussed earlier to get an understanding of its outcomes on

various stages of alteration for example, Purpose, the adoption of these new information structures for example electronic resource planning (ERP), web services, electronic commerce, electronic data interchange systems (Kwahk and Lee, 2008; Wu, 2004; Luo et. al., 2006; Abdinnour-Helm et. al., 2003; Chan and Ngai, 2007; Chwelos et. al., 2001). This concept is also discussed relative to the process of business change, mergers, transfer of technology & knowledge management obligation (Holt et. al., 2007a, b; Guha et. al., 1997; Lehman et. al., 2002). A framework is built by Siemieniuch and Sinclair (2004) to address the organizational readiness for knowledge lifecycle application. In some other studies, it has been found by Chen (2008), that organizational willingness is evaluated on the basis of outlooks at the side of change, is associated positively with the knowledge creation process, development & stowage. A model built by Holt et. al. (2007a, b) identified four key concepts of readiness for knowledge management, and they include individual factors, altered settings, altered content and altered process in the evaluation of knowledge management behaviors. Even though all these researches, the change willingness concept has been abandoned in prior knowledge acquisition study except a qualitative study from Rusly et al. (2012, 2015). Thus, it is important to address this relationship between individual change readiness and knowledge acquisition.

To sum up, this study aims to add theoretical, methodological, and practical contribution based on the following points:

1-	Andersson, et. al (2016) note a consistent deficiency of researches that incorporate the several stages of analysis. Through few certain exclusions (Lederman, 2010; Raab, Ambos, & Tallman, 2014), the most current research characteristically assumes vigilant analysis and afford a comprehensive investigation of knowledge procedures at an upper stage of granularity. Whereas the similar researches response the question of constructing knowledge procedures up from their micro foundations, this is similarly correct that aggregate stage of analysis is more than simple combinations of their essential individuals and subunits. Responding to the question that raised by Andersson et al., (2016): To which degree the efficiency of cooperation, in scenarios of running knowledge procedures, is influenced by both the higher-level factors and individual characteristics. That is why there is a need to understand the complete knowledge procedures with an alignment of individual level analysis and added aggregate levels.

2-   Martinkenaite, (2011) stated that problems are mainly related with latent and lagged influences of learning that make dimension of learning processes challenging. From the time when organizations stock knowledge in routines, constructions and cultural schemes, and collect such knowledge over time it becomes tough to assess the antecedents and consequences of knowledge acquisition in recollection at an assumed point of time. Scholars highlight that knowledge acquisition mediates the relationship between a variety of antecedents and performance outcomes of inter-organizational knowledge transfer (Zahra et. al., 2000; Lyles and Salk, 1996; Lane et. al., 2001; van Wijk et. al., 2008; Steensma et. al., 2005).Thus, undertaking a study on the antecedents and outcomes of knowledge acquisition is worthwhile.

3-   Michailova & Mustaffa (2012) recommend in their study a research on firm knowledge flows is in need of more theoretical examinations of the phenomenon. Study will subsidy from developing theories that have so far not often been used to scrutinize knowledge flows (e.g., the organizational behavior and HRM grounds can be discovered in more deepness in relative to knowledge movements) as well as more distant bodies of knowledge, such as, emotional variable.

4-   Moreoever, Andersson et al., (2016) proposes future study to HR practices with knowledge flow. Numerous prior studies stated the significance of the relationship of absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal 1990, Zahra, S. A., & George, G. 2002, Colin Gray 2006, Van Wijk et. al., 2008, Byung II Park 2011, J.L. Ferreras-Méndezetal 2016), HRM practices (Al-bahussin and El-garaihy, 2013; Camelo-Ordaz, et. al. 2011), change readiness (Hashim. et. al.2012) with knowledge acquisition. In addition, the relationship between knowledge acquisition and innovation performance (Du Plessis, 2007; Gloet & Terziovski, 2004; Lin, Che & Ting, 2012; Hana, 2013). Yet, absorptive capacity as a moderator on the relationship between HRM practices and change readiness with knowledge acquisition has not been explored. Finally, all these elements were not being integrated together which leave a gap in the study of knowledge acquisition process and innovation performance.

5-   Scant studies were done in developing countries settings where the designs of partnership for knowledge acquisition are characteristically dissimilar from those in developed business backgrounds (2001; Tsang et. al., 2004; Lyles and Salk, 1996; Lane et. al., Steensma et. al., 2005). Responding to this as a limitation of the

previous study, (Martinkenaite, 2011) appeals for future studies on inter-organizational knowledge acquisition to go afar the space of developed business settings. In developing economy background, weak absorptive capacities and great motivational moods to learn from overseas partners may be of limited descriptive value. As firms in developing economies are quickly growing, it may now be the case of local firms are more talented of fascinating knowledge but are less eager to seize knowledge from their foreign partners. A study to clarify this would be much welcomed in this area.

Research Questions

1. What is the effect of HRM practices on knowledge acquisition?
2. To what extent absorptive capacity moderate the relationship between HRM practices and knowledge acquisition?
3. Does knowledge acquisition mediate the relationship between HRM practices and firm's innovation performance?
4. What is the effect of change readiness on knowledge acquisition?
5. To what extent absorptive capacity moderate the relationship between change readiness and knowledge acquisition?
6. Does knowledge acquisition mediate the relationship between change readiness and firm's innovation performance?
7. To what extent knowledge acquisition affect firm's innovation performance?

Research's Objectives

1. To examine the effect of HRM practices on knowledge acquisition
2. To investigate the moderating role of absorptive capacity on HRM practices and knowledge acquisition
3. To determine mediating effect of knowledge acquisition on the relationship between HRM practices and firm's innovation performance
4. To examine the effect of change readiness on knowledge acquisition
5. To investigate the moderating role of absorptive capacity on change readiness and knowledge acquisition
6. To determine mediating effect of knowledge acquisition on the relationship between change readiness and firm's innovation performance
7. To examine the effect knowledge acquisition on firm's innovation performance

Literature Review

Knowledge Acquisition

Knowledge acquisition defined as 'the method by which knowledge is attained' (Huber, 1991). Anh et. al (2006) additional describe knowledge acquisition as the practice by which new knowledge is acquired, and 'new knowledge' only earnings new to the organization, not anew formed knowledge. Knowledge acquisition outcomes from involvement and interactions of individuals with tasks, equipment, properties, and people within a particular environment (Bourdieu, 1990; Brown & Duguid, 1991; Garud & Rappa, 1994; Tsoukas, 1996). Individuals obtain knowledge. On the other hand, the firms generate a framework for individuals to gain that knowledge. In inter-firm collaboration knowledge, the inter-firm collaboration and its association with the external parent are the situations in which knowledge is learned by the inter-firm collaboration's individual members. The attained knowledge will become in inter-firm collaboration's knowledge through the organizational knowledge formation process which is labelled by Nonaka, Takeuchi, and Umemoto (1996, p. 834) as 'a procedure that 'organizationally' intensifies the knowledge fashioned by individuals and preserved it as a part of the knowledge scheme of the firm'. Following Alavi and Leidner (2001) and Lyles and Salk (1996) studies, in this study, knowledge acquisition is deliberated as a continuing doings rather than an ultimate outcome.

Innovation Performance

Innovation is extensively observed as an influential chauffeur of competitive advantage and industry development (Ar & Baki, 2011; Dess & Picken, 2000). Iyer, LaPlaca, & Sharma, (2006) demonstrates that corporations pursue to continue and raise over innovation, particularly in emerging economies. Plessi (2007, p21) defined innovation "as the procedure where knowledge is learned, communal, and integrated aimed to generate novel knowledge, which exemplifies goods and services". Existing researches are primarily concentrated on recognizing the elements of service or product innovation (Zhou & Wu, 2010; Atuahene-Gima, 1995). Product innovation here discusses to the novel service or product presented into the market for the determination of sustaining customers' requirements and desires (Barras, 1986), while process innovation refers to new essentials (e.g. new management methods,

manufacture approaches, and new skills) it presented into establishments' production and administration processes (Gopalakrishnan, Bierly, & Kessler, 1999; Ettlie & Reza, 1992).

Knowledge Acquisition and Firm's Innovation Performance

From a performance view, according to Phan and Peridis (2000), knowledge acquisition refers to vagaries of actions when acting responsibilities or alterations that may progress the firm's performance of its jobs. Osland and Yaprak (1995) respect knowledge acquisition as the element that might effect in performance modification. Liao et.al., (2009) finished that knowledge acquisition has a optimistic relationship with innovation competency but claimed that knowledge acquisition is indirectly affected by innovation competency. Lin, Che, and Ting (2012), originated that a sophisticated amount of market knowledge and client knowledge arouse better product innovation performance. Nevertheless, the similar study demonstrated that market alignment itself is not adequate to assurance success. In addition, players" direction inhibited firms" product innovation visualization by growing copied knowledge and overview of me-too goods whereas reducing the odds of new-to-the-world goods (Lin, Che, and Ting, 2012). Hana (2013) consequences challenge the extensively held hypothesis about the significance of knowledge diffusion performs for innovation by finding no informal or formal association among knowledge diffusion exercise and innovation. In emerging economies, it is vital for inter-firm collaboration to attain progressive knowledge from developed foreign parents. And because of the difficulty of the local surroundings, it is essential for inter-firm collaboration to gain recently advanced local knowledge from the local market. So by merging these views, knowledge acquisition in this study can be defined as the practice by which local workers in inter-firm collaboration attains appreciated knowledge from overseas companions that could toughen a firm's innovation performance.

Change Readiness

Change readiness concept has been extensively deliberated in the organizational change literature and has been formerly hypothesized as faiths that affect responses in the direction of change (Armenakis et. al., 1993) for the duration of the novel phase of change management process (Armenakis et. al., 2007). Change readiness

has been seen as interference essential for reducing change resistance (Bernerth, 2004). Even though there are some studies on change willingness, there is tiny consistency in describing and theorizing the term. This is mainly due to its abstract nature, which has caused in several explanations (Walinga, 2008; Fowler, 1998; Weiner et. al., 2008). In addition, few empirical studies have concentrated on this paradigm to better understand its impact on fruitful organizational change. Conceptualization of change willingness has extended to comprise renovation of principles into actions, thus demonstrating the pointer of optimistic attitudes for change (Rafferty et. al., 2013). It inspires workers to be determined and dedicated to the change process (Weiner et. al., 2008). Thus, change willingness is a critical component that forms the results of change initiative in the firm (Rafferty et. al., 2013). knowledge acquisition possibly will convey changes to individuals' and firms' prevailing knowledge bases and performs. At a micro level, Carley (1986) places individuals' knowledge acquisition from a social perception and recommends that the attainment of knowledge is the consequence of their exchanges with the surroundings. As the individual cooperates and gains more knowledge, his/her thinking changes, and inspiring further knowledge gaining. It is significant to note that an individual's knowledge attainment depends on his/her willingness to involve in the procedure (Gray and Meister, 2004). Gaining, integration and use of new knowledge encourage changes to the individual's cognitive construction (Pacharapha and Ractham, 2012). This alteration to the individual's thinking is important for the incorporation of new knowledge, which donates to the growth of his/her fundamental knowledge base. For these reasons, individuals' willingness to accept new concepts that change their recent emotional model is significant. These alterations in individuals' activities could positively affect a firm's performance. Therefore, the overhead point of view shows that arrangement in the knowledge attainment procedure encourages modifications in a firm's performs and actions at the micro as well as the macro levels.

HRM Practices

HRM is understood here as a range of strategies, performs and schemes that impact the actions, attitudes and performance of employees of the firm, in order to surge their affordability and learning volume, to the extent of generating a beliefs of learning (Razouk, Bayad and Wannenmacher, 2009; Gomes et. al. 2008; Rebelo,

2006; Edvardsson, 2008). So, set in modern academic placing, HRM ought to accomplish a set of roles that permits it to donate to superior elasticity and a better ability for adaptation and organizational change. It is consequently assumed the main accountability of easing procedures of knowledge and organizational learning with an understanding to satisfying planned purposes (Lengnick-Hall and Lengnick-Hall, 2003). HRM obtains a crucial role in potentiating and enabling both KM and knowledge processes (Svetlik and Stavrou-Costea, 2007; Intan-Soraya and Chew, 2010; Lengnick-Hall and Lengnick-Hall, 2003; Magalhães, 2005; Pablos, 2004), with the requirement to relocate its roles, positioning them towards strategic abilities of knowledge, i.e., handling knowledge employees, building worth from knowledge and evaluating the hazard of knowledge loss (Whiker and Andrews, 2004). Over its applies, it ought to therefore donate to growing the capacity of knowledge, inspiring patriots to transmission their knowledge to the firm and consolidating the relations among human capital administration and knowledge management in the firm (López, Péon and Ordás, 2006; Gloet, 2006; Prieto Pastor, Perez Santana, & Martín Sierra, 2010).

Monteiro and Pais (2014) provide academic and practical proof for scientific examination of HRM as a conditioning element of KM. For Minbaeva, Foss and Snell (2009) devices for selection, recruitment, retention, and placement are essential features of the creation and repairs of organizational knowledge routine. In the same way, HRM practices such as work design, training, career development, feedback on performance and others pay instrumentally to enlightening the knowledge movement, i.e., attainment, transference and its incorporation in the firm. According to Pérez et al,. (2009), it is conceivable to contemplate that certain procedures will have a particular role in capabilities, others will be more related in the arena of inspirations and a third group will be related in terms of chances. Scarbrough (2003) initiated that the progression of innovation could be simplified KM and HRM are connected within firms. Besides, Scholl et. al. (2004) clarifies that the greatest operative method to the empirical and theoretical problems of KM would be an interdisciplinary and a multi-disciplinary one. Based on their studies, the most demanding and perplexing practical problematic for the understanding and development of KM is to provide significance to human elements. In a similar manner, Oltra (2005) evaluates researchers for not compelling hard and regular stages toward complete theory constructing in relating KM and HRM. Possibly the

most critical argument about HRM is that persons and their personal relations become and are preserved as properties, something that could be measured both worthy and bad: the damaging side is that alternatives are often treated as expendable; we endorse the optimistic side, that alternatives are appreciated and compulsory for a firm to become brilliant (Svetlik, I., & Stavrou-Costea, E. 2007).
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Absorptive Capacity

According to Cohen and Levinthal (1990), the obligation to communicate in process outside knowledge within the firms is spread to individuals. Remaining closer towards the unique rationality of firm side construct as elaborated by Cohen and Levinthal (1990) and Lane and Lubatkin (1998), Individual level absorptive capacity is defined as the level of will power which individuals undertake to gain an outside knowledge, assimilate it and apply it to feasible ends. According to Foss et. al., (2011) and Volberda et. al., (2010) the organizational qualifications are identified as playing critical role in determining absorptive capacity at an organizational level, furthermore, they added that individual energies construct substantial structure blocks of organizational absorptive capacity which have to date acknowledged restricted academic consideration.

According to Ter Wal et. al. (2011), long time ago progress of under discussion construct of absorptive capacity, the new research has been craving to investigate how individuals and the administration's gain knowledge from outside paradigms. What we got from the efforts of Allen (1977), the part of personals learning from outside paradigms, are special individuals known as "technological gatekeepers" and were found important for an attainment of external knowledge during the innovation process. The current perspective of ours is individual roles which are aligned to constructs regarding technological gatekeepers, and not suggests a complete idea of how individuals reshape and win an outside knowledge to verify its absorption by the broader firm. It leaves the room to investigate that what are the characteristics individuals take along with during the procedure of knowledge attainment for the firm, and how these miscellaneous roles and efforts outline their capacity to create innovations for the firm.

According to Lane & Lubtakin (1998), the primary hurdle on the way of knowledge acquisition is absorptive capacity through IJVs, mainly for a developing economy. According to Todorova & Durisin (2007), it's easy for an individual to

absorb an outside knowledge when he or she has documented the linkages of such type of knowledge with an analytical reasoning map previously stored in the recollection. Tripsas & Gavetti (2000), added that the reasoning map is the design of linkages which influence an individual's investigations and classifications of new data. The use of this reasoning map allows an individual to focus the knowledge hunt energy on a zone with the huge worth to allocate mission. Hence, according to Lettl et. al., (2008) the skills of an individual to distinguish the analysis of knowledge can be linked with competent investigation determination, and as a result, it can streamline his or her initiative to understand the specific important knowledge. An optimistic linkage has been built between the capacity of team members by a US-based investigation team Nemanich et. al (2010), to analyze an outside knowledge and the capacity to adapt the knowledge.

Conceptual Framework

According to the arguments above, the following conceptual framework is proposed as a potential research area to address the issues regarding the influence of HRM practices and change readiness to knowledge acquisition. This will be a good platform to investigate on the individual's willingness and readiness to act as an agent to knowledge transfer that could ultimately contribute to the performance of the firm innovation.

Figure 1.1: Conceptual Framework

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GLOBALIZATION OF TRADE FIRMS: LESSONS FROM ASEAN FIRMS

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Abstract

In the last 50 years, the debate on the development of international business remained unsettled, especially concerning the establishment of multinational firms from developing countries. Using OLI Model this paper examined the formation of multinational firms from ASEAN countries. We found positive similarities in the advancing of firm's specific-ownership advantages such as skills, management know-how, R&D and technological capabilities. Unlike the firms from developed countries, the firms from developing countries adopted local elements in their products and services.

THE IMPACT OF MNC'S WORKPLACE ENVIRONMENT AND WORKPLACE DIVERSITY ON EMPLOYEE'S MOTIVATION AND ORGANISATIONAL PERFORMANCE

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Abstract

Employees working in the subsidiary of multinational corporations (MNC) may experience different working environment and they might also have to work with people from diverse background in terms of their nationality, race or culture. Thus, this study is conducted with the objective is to identify the impact of MNC's workplace environment and workplace diversity on the employee's motivation and the organisational performance. The study is conducted at the subsidiary of a Japanese based firms located in Ipoh, Perak, Malaysia. A quantitative research design were employed and data were collected using self-administered survey questionnaires. A total of 161 employees from various department and demographic background were randomly selected as a sample for this study. Hypothesis testing was conducted using the Partial Least Square (PLS) Regression Analysis. Result of the data analysis shows that the different working environment and workforce diversity that exists in this MNC do have a positive significant relationship with the employee's motivation. In addition, employee's motivation also positively influence the organisational performance. It can be concluded that different working environment and worforce diversity which exist in MNC did not create difficulties to the employees but instead, both factors increase their motivation and eventually leads towards a better organisational performance.

Keywords: Workplace Environment, Workplace Diversity, Employee Motivation, Organisational Performance

Introduction

In today's global business environment, multinational corporations (MNC) face huge challenges in order to successfully survive in the current highly competitive international business market. As a consequence, MNCs should continuously improve their performance in order to remain competitive in their industry for a long period of time. Performance of the firm depends very much on the performance of

the employees working at that company. The organisational performance depends on the employee performance because human resource capital of organization plays an important role in the growth and the organisational performance (Khan et al., 2011). Thus, it is important to conduct a study on the factors that may influence organisational performance. Previous studies have identified many factors that may influence organisational performance and three of them are workplace environment, workplace diversity and employee motivation.

Workplace environment according to Haynes (2008) is a concept, which has been operationalized by analysing the extent to which employees perceive the immediate surroundings as fulfilling their intrinsic, extrinsic and social needs and their reason of staying with the organization. He further adds that environment is a key determinant of the quality of their work and their level of performance. Factors such as workstation design, furniture, ventilation, lighting, noise, safety and equipment at the workplace are some of the elements that make up the workspace environment. These elements are expected to give an impact on employees and their motivation. Subsequently, motivated employees will contribute towards organisational performance. The second variable is workplace diversity and it refers to the variety or multiplicity of demographic features that characterize a company's workforce, particularly in terms of race, sex, culture, national origin, handicap, age and religion (Dessler, 2011). Workplace diversity is expected to play a role in influencing employee's motivation and the organisational performance because MNC may gain benefit from diverse members, work group and culture that exists in the organization if they could exploit this diversity for their own advantage.

Highly motivated employees are expected to directly influence the organisational performance by contributing positively towards their work. Previous study proved that motivation of employees may increase if they get their expected reward and recognition that will initially contributes to high performance (Kalimullah et al., 2010). The employees will also put more effort for achieving organizations goal if they are motivated. Motivation actually can give success to organization because it enhances employees to do their work with full concentration and determination. Hence, there will be more output from the production line, less product defect, less cost and job may be completed within the stipulated timeframe. The significance of this study is that it is conducted in an MNC where the workplace environment and level of diversity in the workplace is different with local companies. How these

differences effect employee's motivation and consequently on organisational performance are worth a study. Hence, the objective if this study is to determine the impact of workplace environment and workplace diversity that exist in a multinational company on the employee's motivation and the impact of motivation on organisational performance.

Literature Review

Organisational Performance

Organisational performance is defined as a set of financial or nonfinancial indicators which offer information on the degree of achievement of objectives and goals (Lebans & Euske, 2006). Organizations have to measure the performance in order to determine whether they have successfully achieved their organization goals, by reviewing and using a structured approach of measurement. In addition, the purpose of measuring organisational performance is to set future goals, detect the existing problems and rectify the problems effectively.

Employee Motivation

According to Matthew et al., (2009), employees that are highly motivated contribute towards the company's performance through their work efficiency and effectiveness as productive employees. In addition, Mc et al., (2014) found that the employee motivation and job satisfaction were both positively related to organisational performance. They added that if employees are well motivated through, for example, fair promotions and justifiable salary differences, they will work more towards a better performance of the organization. In addition, Malik et al., (2011) who examine the relationship between employee motivation and organisational effectiveness in telecommunication and banking sector in Pakistan also observed a significant relationship between the employee motivation and organisational effectiveness (organisational performance).

Workplace Environment

For workplace environment, Srivastava (2008) indicates that there are two major categories in workplace environment in organization namely physical and psycho-social environment. According to Hajjar et al., (2010), physical workplace environment is defined as the external and internal office layout, temperature,

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comfort zone and the arrangement of office work setting at the workplace. Psycho-social refers to the values or organisational culture inside the company. It consists of working organization, attitudes, beliefs, practices and daily routine of the organisational workplace environment. Other studies such as by Lundqvist (2013) found that physical workplace environment is positively related to organisational performance. Organization should provide physical workplace environment that is conducive in order to enhance the productivity of employees, hence improve the performance of the employees in the organization. In addition, Srivastava (2008) also examines the relationship of work environment and organisational effectiveness and found out that there is a significant relationship between these two variables.

Workplace Diversity

Jayne and Dipboye (2004) found out that the level of diversity in organization creates teamwork relationships. They conclude that strong workplace diversity in organization actually developed teamwork that positively contributes towards organisational performance. Furthermore, Chatman and Spataro (2005) stated that diversity in the workplace is good as they found out that organization which practice collectivism gain more benefits than organization that practice individualism. Workplace diversity is expected to play a role in determining the firm's performance because MNC may gain benefit from diverse members, work group and culture that exists in the organization if they could exploit this diversity for their own advantage (Dessler, 2011).

Theoretical Framework and Hypothesis of the Study

Based on the objective and the study of the literature, the theoretical framework of the study is shown in figure 1. There are three hypothesis tested as listed below:

H1: There is a positive relationship between MNCs workplace environment and employees' motivation.

H2: There is a positive relationship between MNCs workplace diversity and employees' motivation.

H3: There is a positive relationship between MNCs employees' motivation and organisational performance.

Figure 1: Theoretical Framework

Research Methodology

This research employed a quantitative research design with data collected via self-administered survey questionnaire. The population of the study are all employees in ten different departments at one of the MNC in Ipoh, Perak. The total number of employees is 909 people. The number of sample needed for the aforementioned population is 269 (Sekaran & Bougie, 2009). A systematic random sampling approach was used in order to determine the 269 respondents. This systematic random sampling approach involves two steps. First, the list of name of all employees was obtained from the Human Resource Department. Then, every second name from the list was selected until 269 names were drawn as a sample for this study. The survey were distributed to the selected employees and collected after a week.

The survey questionnaire used in this study contains close ended questions and all main variables were tested using a 5 Point Likert-scale. The questionnaires have five sections. The first section (Section A) is on the profile of the respondents. The second section (Section B) consists of nine questions on organisational performance. The third section (Section C) has nine questions related to employee motivation. The fourth section (Section D) includes eight questions on workplace environment. Finally, the fifth section (Section E) contains nine questions on workplace diversity. The Five point Likert Scales are ranged from "extremely disagree" (1), "disagree" (2), "neutral" (3), "agree" (4), "extremely agree" (5). A pilot test was conducted among 30 employees and the data were analysed for its reliability. The Cronbach Alpha values for all 5 variables are above the cut-off value of 0.70 and thus the reliability of the survey questionnaire is evidence.

Findings

Demographic Profile of the Respondents

A total of 269 questionnaires have been distributed to the employees and only 161 questionnaires were returned. Therefore, the response rate is 60%. From the total number of 161 respondents, majority of them are female with a total of 89 respondents or 55.3%, while 72 respondents are male or 44.7%. Majority of them are in the age range of 21 to 25 and 26 to 30 years old with 46 respondents (28.6%) for each range. It is then followed by the 36 to 40 years old category with 26 respondents (16.1%); and the age range of 31 to 35 and more than 40 years old with 17respondents (10.6%). There are only 9 respondents (5.6%) that are less than 20 years old. Majority of the respondents have been working at YEM between 1 to 3 years with 51 respondents (31.7%). 49 respondents have been with YEM between 3 to 6 years (30.4%), followed by more than 9 years with 47 respondents (29.2%).

Reliability and Validity

The assessment of the measurement model is done by examining the content validity, convergent validity and discriminant validity. For content validity, the Cronbach Alpha for each variable is above the cut-off level of 0.70 as shown in Table 1. Therefore, content validity is assumed to be fulfilled in this study. According to Fornell and Larcker (1981), convergent validity is demonstrated when indicators load highly (loading > 0.50) on their associated factors. Convergent validity is observed as all items loading for each variable achieve the minimum 0.50 value. Besides looking at items loading, convergent validity is also consider as adequate when each constructs (variables) have an Average Variance Extracted (AVE) score of at least 0.5 (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). Table 1 show that all constructs have an AVE value of more than 0.5 and therefore, it can be concluded that the model has an adequate convergent validity.

Table 1: Cronbach Alpha and AVE Values

Variables	Cronbach Alpha	AVE
Diversity	0.92	0.65
Motivation	0.90	0.62
Performance	0.92	0.61
Workplace Environment	0.91	0.62

In order to determine the discriminant validity of the model, the square root of the average variance extracted (AVE) statistics were calculated and compared with the correlations among the latent variables by using the latent variable correlation matrix output of PLS (Chin et al., 2003). The latent variable correlation matrix and the square root of the AVE are indicated in Table 2. The correlations between the constructs are displayed in the lower left off-diagonal elements in the matrix. The average variance shared between the construct and its measurements should be greater than the variance shared between the construct and other constructs in the model (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). Table 2 shows that the diagonal elements in bold (square root of AVE) are greater than the off-diagonal elements at both corresponding rows and columns. Therefore, discriminant validity is evident as all constructs are statistically discriminated from the others.

Table 2: Latent Variable Correlations

	Diversity	Motivation	Performance	Workplace Env
Diversity	**0.806**			
Motivation	0.726076	**0.787**		
Performance	0.495236	0.610661	**0.781**	
Workplace Env	0.551682	0.618265	0.548798	**0.787**

Result of the PLS Model Analysis

Table 3 shows the outcome of PLS model analysis and it details out the path coefficients, their t-values and the level of significance for each variables. The result shows that all three relationships tested illustrate positive and significant results. Previous studies using PLS have typically considered path coefficient of above 0.20 as having a strong relationship, path coefficients of between 0.10 to 0.20 as moderate, and path coefficients below 0.10 as weak (Johnson, 1997). Path coefficient for all three relationships are strong as the value recorded is more than 0.20. Meanwhile, the degree to which the PLS model accomplishes its objectives of minimising errors or to maximise the variance explained, can be determined by examining the R^2 values (Lertwongsatien, 2000). R^2 is a measure of the proportion of the total of the dependent variables, which is explained by independent variables. Falk (2005) suggests that the R^2 value should be more than 0.1, as any value lower than that informs very little even though it is statistically significant. The

variance explained values (R^2) is 0.38, which indicates that this model explain 38% of the variance in performance among employees at this multinational companies.

Table 3: Outcome of Structural Model Analysis

	Path Coefficients	T-Value	P-Value	R^2 Value
Workplace Environment Motivation	0.31	4.045	0.0000	
Diversity Motivation	0.55	8.069	0.0000	
Motivation Performance	0.61	9.372	0.0000	0.38

Discussion and Contributions of the Study

This study focuses on three objectives which are to identify the impact of MNC's workplace environment on employee motivation, workplace diversity on employee motivation, and also the impact of employee motivation on organisational performance. For the first objective which is to determine the impact of MNC's workplace environment on employee motivation, the finding shows a significant positive relationship between these two variables. It shows that comfortable and mostly ergonomic workplace environment give good impact to the employee's motivation. The positive relationship comes from the feeling of safety and security, physical convenience and comfortable facilities at the workplace. Workers are also motivated from an ergonomic workplace environment that will initially enhance organisational performance. In terms of literature, this study confirms Lundqvist (2013) study which found out that physical workplace environment is positively related to organisational performance.

The second objective is to look at the impact of workplace diversity that exists in the MNC as it consists of employees from diverse ethnicity and diverse countries, on the employee's motivation. Result indicates that this diversity actually helps improve employee's motivation as the analysis reveals a positive significant relationship. The finding of this study is in line with other previous research such as by Yegon and Kahara (2014), who found out that diversity in workplace actually creates harmony around the organization. In addition, Rosado (2006) states that the workplace diversity did contribute towards employee's satisfaction and employee's performance improvement in organization. Workplace diversity may maximize the workers contribution towards organisational goal and objectives when all the different individuals in the organization work in harmony.

The final objective is to determine the impact on the employee's motivation on organisational performance. Similar studies such as by Malik et. al (2011) found positive correlation between employee motivation and organisational effectiveness (performance). This study has provide further proofs that positive employee motivation may boost the performance in organization. Furthermore, Istvan and Nikolett (2004) stress that employee should be satisfied and committed with their work in long period in order to contribute towards organisational performance. Motivated workers will be more productive and contributes towards more quality product.

This study contributes to company itself in many aspects. First, the findings provide clear understanding on employees perception towards their level of motivation, their working environment and the level of diversity that exist in the company. Second contribution is in terms of factors that influence employee's motivation and organisational performance. Performance of the organization relies very much on the motivation of the employee. Employee's motivation may be improved by having a conducive workplace environment and also workplace diversity. These three factors need to be given full attention by the management of MNCs as the performance is highly influenced by the behaviour of employees. Motivated employees coupled with excellent working environment will surely contributes towards firm's success. At the same time, employees from diverse background that able to work together will add further advantage to the company.

Limitation of the Study

There are some limitations of this study. First, this study was conducted at one single MNC and one industry only which is manufacturing. Generalization of findings towards other companies or industries may be done but with cautions. Future studies may replicate this research throughout various organizations, not only private but public organization and also across industry for a better generalization. Data for this study are gathered through survey questionnaire and the measures for firm's performance are based on the subjective perception of the respondents only. Further studies that look at the objective performance of a firm especially the financial data may enrich the findings. Future researcher may also consider conducting a series of interviews with the respondents to enrich the data collection process and to get extra information for a better results or outcomes for the study.

Conclusion

As a conclusion, this study has identified that organisational performance is very much related to employee motivation. Different workplace environment and also the workplace diversity that exist in a multinational company actually contribute towards employee's motivation. Different working environment and workforce diversity which exist in MNC did not create difficulties to the employees but instead, both factors increase their motivation and eventually leads towards a better organisational performance. Therefore, the management of MNCs should consider these factors and use them as strategies in improving the organisational performance.

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FACTORS INFLUENCING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MALAYSIAN EXPORTING SMEs AND EXPORTER INTERMEDIARIES

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Abstract

Building a relationship alone between SME exporters and intermediaries is not sufficient to achieve high export performance. Thus, creating a quality relationship is highly encouraged for SMEs which are commonly known to have limited resources. Factors that affect relationships such as trust, commitment and cooperation have been proposed in this study as they play an important role in the success or failure of establishing partnerships between exporter and intermediaries while facilitating the internationalisation process. Quality is a crucial component in developing relationship between SME exporter and exporter intermediaries which has been highlighted as a significant aspect in enhancing the achievement of SMEs in foreign markets. Further, in order to support the development of such relationships, cultural similarity is suggested to be fundamental in the process due to the belief that companies would perform better in foreign markets when they have cultural similarity. In addition, the similarities of culture between two parties help to a great extent to minimize the psychic distance between home and host countries in respect of business approaches, language, marketing infrastructure, as well as legal and political systems. This particular investigation uses the Resource Based View (RBV) and the Theory of Social Capital (TSC) to examine the synergistic effect of several constructs on export performance within the context of Malaysian exporting SMEs and exporter intermediaries.

Keywords: Relational social capital, Export performance, Exporter intermediaries and SMEs

Introduction

SMEs are frequently faced with several restrictions to expand business in a foreign market especially due to financial limitations, inadequate foreign market intelligence, and also lack of international contacts (Agndal, Chetty& Wilson, 2008). Consequently, SMEs are advised to use the services of experts such as exporter

intermediaries. According to Balabanis (2000) intermediaries help exporters or their buyers to determine who among their clients could be potential distribution infrastructure providers, help exporters close the knowledge gap, and also reduce risks and uncertainties when doing business in an unfamiliar foreign, market. When exporting firms hire intermediary services, they hope these services are cost effective. For example, when the SMEs decide to use intermediaries, the intermediaries should possess specific knowledge regarding their country which will save the exporting company costs, such as marketing research expenses, and negotiating costs of exporters.

According to Peng and Ilinitch (1998) exporters or manufacturers are likely to use intermediaries in the early stages of their market penetration to help save costs related to monitoring and searching for additional buyers and cementing deals (Peng& York, 2001). Therefore, the strong relationshipsbetween SME exporters and their intermediariesare very crucial for maintaining competitive advantage and allowing them to penetrate markets in other countries and manage the complex nature of exporting and eventually succeed in managing and developing their foreign operations (Kuhlmeier & Knight, 2010).The relationships may then be used to recognize and exploit specific business opportunities in foreign markets (Agndal et al., 2008). Using expertise of other firms as a relationship network will improve export performance (Pinho, 2013). Consistent with Musteen, Francis, and Data (2010); Pinho (2013) claimed that relational social capital has a significant connection with internationalisation performance.

Nevertheless, it is not easy to generate social capital that would give an impact to a firm's' performance. It requires a particular time frame to convince managers to accept relationships as valuable investments that are crucial in building trust and commitment (Pinho, 2016). Wu (2008) acknowledges that the role of the social network is getting attention that drives the social capital-performance link, but he claims that, most empirical studies remain largely inconsistent. To explain these inconsistencies, Kianto and Waajakoski (2010) stress that there is a need to consider other relational variables such as cooperation between two parties in decreasing cost of transaction and opportunistic behavior (Zhao & Hsu, 2007).

According to Merovinch (2012) generally, to create harmony between the two parties especially between international partners they would tend to opt for markets that have cultural similarities, based on the assumption that it would help maintain

long-term relationships, and enjoy long-term trust and be commercially profitable (Kanter & Corn, 1994). This is supported in the internationalisation literature that shows psychically close countries with cultural similarities encounter less misunderstanding and therefore relationships are more easily maintained. This is parallel to the notion by Lane and Beamish (1990) who claimed that an environment of similar cultures between foreign partners is important in fostering a long-term partnership. Earlier, the literature also claimed that doing business with culturally similar markets would achieve better performance (e.g. Johanson & Vahlne, 1977; Johanson & Wiedersheim-Paul, 1975). McDuffie (2011) emphasised that one of the main issues to be considered in developing trust is related to culture because it has significant influence on trust.

Despite the importance of similarities of culture and social capital between two parties in enhancing export performance, very few studies in the relevant literature have examined cultural similarity and its international exchange process in general and export performance in particular. There exists a gap in the identification of the relevant determinants that link cultural similarity to the export performance of SMEs. Therefore, this current research is a contribution to the existing knowledge by growing an integrative model of the effects of cultural similarity, and relational social capital that would impact export performance in the relationship between SME exporter and intermediaries' context.

Literature Review

Cultural Similarities and Psychic Distance

Cultural similarity is a reference to the close cultural background of the parties involved in a relationship that removes cultural obstacles to achieve close relationships in respect of corporate value, business behaviour and activities and manner of communication (Swift, 1999). With particular reference to SMEs, the notion of psychic distance has been invoked lately in explaining exporting strategy and performance consequences (Sousa & Lages, 2011). According to Johanson and Vahlne (1977) psychic distance is described as the various parameters that prevent the exchange of information to and from the market. Meanwhile, in the scientific context, psychic distance is related to the perspective of individuals in respect of the differences of home and host countries. Sousa and Lages (2011) indicate that

compared with larger firms, small companies (SMEs) are more impressed and influenced by psychic distance which can result in negative outcomes on financial export achievements. One of the factors most often mentioned that influences psychic distance is cultural differences (O'Grady & Lane, 1996). Therefore, there is general agreement in the literature that similar cultural backgrounds are crucial cross border relationships to perform and succeed in the international arena (Meirovinch, 2012). This is because similarities in language, level of education, business and cultural practices, and communication style will remove any cultural barriers while psychic closeness minimizes the degree of uncertainty in the new market and positively impacts financial export results (Evans & Mavondo, 2008).

Nevertheless, Saleh et al. (2014) mention that reviewing the related literature revealed that few work has been done to investigate cultural similarity and its effect on export performance regarding the impacts on partnering relationships in the international exchange process. This may be the cause of many international marketers being frequently challenged by new and unfamiliar cultures. The perceived dissimilarities the home country and the target country are termed 'psychic distance' or 'cultural distance' (Klein &Roth, 1990) that have a negative correlation on performance (e.g. Lane & Beamish, 1990; Sirmon & Lane, 2004).

However, there are other studies that have yielded totally contrasting findings, for example, Park and Ungson (1997) reported that the duration of IJVs was positively correlated to national-cultural distance and U.S.–Japanese partnerships tend to be sustained better than U.S.–U.S. ones. Studies of mergers and acquisitions as well have also led to the conclusion that larger cultural distance has a positive correlation with performance (Krishnan, Miller, & Judge, 1997). Notwithstanding, theories of cognitive dissonance (Aronson & Carlsmith, 1962) suggest that people will are more likely to accept information that is in line with their own attitudes and behaviour, meaning that people are partial in gathering data that support their beliefs (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). It also recognised by Sarkar, Echambadi, Cavusgil, and Aulakh (2001) that striving for similarity could lead to compromises when the parties involved discard their preferred problem-solving approaches and in so doing, ignores or eliminate a significant amount of their tacit knowledge. Emulating the cultural behaviors of another partner can backfire (Francis, 1991). Therefore, cultural similarity would be an imperative factor to create a better outcome in the international market. Looking at this from the perspective of

an international joint venture (IJV), recommendation therefore is to identify a party with close cultural similarities so as to prevent intergroup conflicts, withholding information and distrust (Meirovnch, 2012).

Cultural Similarity and Trust

Human trust formation is very important in developing effective and efficient social network applications and has been studied from various perspectives including the social contexts (Trifunovic, Legendre, Herlocker & Sen, 2010). Nevertheless, one little explored issue is how trust is established in a dynamic relationship across borders (Hayashi & Kryssanov, 2013). Studies by Byrne (1971) in social psychology reveal that there is a relationship between trust and similarity while experiments carried out by Golbeck (2009) revealed that similarity has a relationship with the user's determinant either to trust each other or not. In this study, cultural similarity is proposed as a basic factor to lead trust relationship between exporter and intermediaries. As claimed by Kanter and Corn (1994) foreign buyers and sellers tend to opt for markets that have cultural similarities for relationships in the long-term, which may result in the generation of trust for long-term business gain. Meanwhile, Amelung (1994) suggested that if there are cultural similarities between parties across cultures, it will reduce operation costs and motivate building trustworthy relationships. Additionally, prior literature mostly advocated that exporters stand a better chance of being trusted and accepted by their partners in markets that have cultural similarities.

However, Ha, Karande and Singhapakdi (2004) discovered that the exporter's cultural background has no impact on trust. Nevertheless, many scholars assert that national and organisational culture influence trust (Zaheer et al., 2011; McDuffie, 2011) that impact export performance. Following this notion it is likely that cultural similarities is instrumental in development of trust in SME firms and subsequently result in export performance. There exists a gap in the identification of the relevant determinants (e.g. trust) that link cultural similarity to the export performance of SMEs. Specifically, according to relational view of Resource based View (RBV), cultural similarity between each firm also could generate understanding (Kogut & Singh, 1988) with their common cultural background which has significant influence on mutual trust (Coote, Forrest, & Tam, 2003).

Additionally, earlier research in relationship marketing has revealed the significance of interpersonal factors like cultural background when seeking to develop long term relationships in their business (Dabholkar, Johnston, &Cathey, 1994). Social psychologists in studying organisational behavior report that free and honest exchange of information between two parties is closely related to the level of trust between them (Jackson & Crockenberg, 1998). It is also more likely that such free and honest information exchange will occur between parties with cultural similarities than with cultural dissimilarities (Ahmed, Patterson, & Styles, 1999). It has also been noticed that such a situation is more common among Asian buyer and seller relationships (Chung, Sternquist, & Chen, 2008). Therefore, following the reasoning of the perspective and supported by ample evidence in the literature, the hypothesis below is proposed:

H1: A positive relationship exists between exporter and intermediary cultural similarity and trust

Social Capital (Trust, Commitment and Cooperation)

The concept of social capital firstly appeared in sociology (e.g. Bourdieu, 1986) and subsequently in economics (e.g. Coleman, 1998), whereas the numerous definitions can create conflict. Social capital is an extensively used notion in the social sciences and can be perceived (Cope, Jack & Rose, 2007) conceptually in the way it has been variously termed as "network capital", "social networks", "guanxi networks" and as "social trust" (Bowey & Easton, 2007). Coleman's (1988) definition of social capital is the "something extra" in a network, the basis of which is the notion that different actors working together produce a whole which is greater than the sum of their individual contributions. This means that social capital is the extent to which synergistically it can be measured relative to networks (Wills-Johnson, 2008). As noted by Social Network Theory (SNT), connections and personal ties have a crucial role in valuable information exchange and in cementing ties that connect people in different social groups to determine the foreign market opportunities in doing business with foreign mediators (Ellis & Pecotich, 2001).

Nahapiet and Goshal (1998) maintain that social capital has three types of typology: structural, relational, and cognitive that has a link with and impact on firm's financial achievement, especially in respect of income and profit margin

(Behyan, 2011). This study focus on relational elements of social networks as one of the key facets of social capital in which trust is of particular importance in business in Asian countries (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Liu et al., 2010).

Morgan and Hunt (1994) define trust as belief in the exchange partner's dependability and honesty based on the understanding that the other party will not take advantage even if there are opportunities for exploitation. This concurs with Moorman, Deshpande, and Zaltman (1993) who describe trust as being willing to depend on an exchange partner in whom one has confidence. In a classical study by Spekman (1988) it is claimed that trust is "the cornerstone of a strategic partnership" and can be a crucial factor in developing an acceptable long-term relationship with a business partner (Dwyer et al., 1986). Ruyter, Moorman and Lemmink (2011) view trust between partners as a crucial factor in any business activity that encourages the parties concerned to pay more attention to the "positive" motivation of affiliation as an important asset to gain appropriate resources such as information, technology, knowledge, access to distribution network and so forth to compete effectively in foreign markets. This is because trust can generate competitive advantage (Yli-Renko Autio & Sapienza, 2001) and plays an integral role in a company.

Pinho (2013) acknowledged that (trust) is also considered as the most essential factor at the very beginning of the relationship by being honest and direct about the common expectations of both parties. Development of trust is very crucial to generate commitment of potential channel members at the onset of a new relationship to guarantee higher group performance, and increased job satisfaction. According to Gulati and Sigh (1998), when trust is absent, there will be neither collaboration nor any relational benefits. At the heart of the trust-development challenge is the acceptance of vulnerability (Ring &Ven de Ven, 1992) as building a high level of trust and relational embededness can be both expensive and challenging.

Lohtia, Bello and Poter (2009) claimed that trust provides a sense of confidence among the parties involved in the integrity, honesty, reliability, openness, and goodwill of the other party. The relevant literature offers proof of trust as a key feature in understanding buyer-seller associations either as an explanatory variable or a criterion variable (Coote et al., 2003; Mavondo& Rodrigo, 2001) and most researchers have reported trust as a positive and important indicator of buyer-seller commitment (Saleh & Ali, 2009). Previous literature also supported that trust

increases commitment, which then leads to cooperation (Inkpen & Currall, 2004). Despite several studies referring to the conceptual relationship between the constructs of trust and commitment (e.g. Saleh et al., 2014; Pinho, 2013, Saleh & Ndubisi, 2006) in contrast, Tellefsen and Thomas (2005) argue that the link between trust and commitment has not been fully examined or tested in the literature and in follow up studies is confined to only a small set of factors and findings which are inconsistent (Liu, Li, & Zhang, 2010). For instance, Geyskens et al. (1996) found mixed results between trust and commitment. Therefore, the researcher believes that more evidence is needed to quantify the relationship and offer more proof of the significant influence of the relationship between trust and commitment. On the other hand, Saleh & Ndubisi (2006) emphasised that the 'trust' variable has been widely used in buyer-seller investigations as an independent variable in explaining commitment relationship which has found strong support. As such, the following hypothesis is offered for testing:

H2: There is a positive relationship between exporter and intermediary trust and commitment

Commitment and Cooperation

Many studies have accepted commitment as a critical element of successful relationships (Andaleeb & Syeed Saad, 1996; Geyskens et al., 1996; Morgan & Hunt 1994). The importance of relationship commitment stems from the fact that it will probably lead to cooperative behaviour, minimise or eliminate the likelihood of tempting short-term alternatives, and improve the profit margins (Andaleeb, 1996; Anderson & Weitz 1992; Morgan & Hunt 1994). A party involved in a partnership will be cooperative, motivated by an aspiration to work on the relationship and make it succeed (Anderson & Narus (1990).

Haahti et al. (2005) reported that cooperation between firms is driven by a desire to compete effectively in foreign markets and reap the benefits of synergy that enable the intense exchange of market information and valuable knowledge (Amble & Styles, 2000). This is parallel with the contention of Anderson and Narus (1990) who maintain that achieving a great cooperative behavior among committed partners is very crucial as it leads to mutually beneficial outcomes.

In contrast, several studies fail to validate the benefits of cooperation. Even though in some studies it is shown that cooperation has a significant relationship on performance, other studies seemed to indicate a weak relationship between these two constructs. For instance, Vereecke and Muylle (2006) conducted a study related to suppliers and customers'cooperation and found a fragile relationship between these two variables. Further, according to Fynes, Voss and Burca (2005) only partial relationship exists for the impact of supply chain relationships regarding cooperation and performance. A study conducted by Villena, Revilla and Choi (2011) also produced U- shaped relationship between social capital elements (e.g. cooperation) and performance and noted that too much cooperation may have a negative effect on performance. In addition, earlier studies carried out by Turnbull, Oliver and Wilkinson (1992) revealed that cooperation and performance have no significant relationship due to difficulties faced by a United Kingdom Company and Japanese practices. Burnes and New (1997) were also against exaggerating the beneficial effects from these two variables and noted that it depended on the relationship context. On the basis of the above discussions, this study intends to provide further evidence to verify the relationship between exporter and intermediaries' context and attempt to provide more indications of the impact of cooperation and performance on export markets.

However, based on Relational Exchange Theory, it is likely that in the context of SME exporter and intermediary, when the commitment is high with regard to giving quick feedback, cooperation like participation in every promotion or campaign may occur more easily. Based on this notion the following hypothesis is proposed:

H3: *There is a positive relationship between exporter and intermediary commitment and cooperation*

H4: *There is a positive relationship between exporter and intermediary cooperation and performance*

Malaysia Export Performance

Malaysia is a country where the government is highly supportive of the process of internationalisation by SMEs aimed at improving exporting activities and performance (Ahmadian, 2012). Export performance is the indicator of a country's

economic growth and is also important for a firm's competitiveness (Zou, Taylor &Osland, 1998). SMEs play a significant role in Malaysia's export performance as they contribute 19% of total exports (Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2015; SME Corporation, 2015). Malaysia has regarded SMEs as a seedbed to its economy as this sector has an important role to play in the generation of the nation's economy. Besides that, SMEs are also important contributors to the Economic development in Malaysia as they account for 97% of the business establishments in the country (Department of Statistics Malaysia & SME Corporation, 2015). Specifically, Figure 1.1 shows the sector contributes 33% to the nation's GDP, and 57% employment opportunities (Department of Statistics Malaysia & SME Corporation, 2015). However, the contribution of SMEs (33%) towards the country's GDP is still lower than that of other middle income nations (39%) and high income nations (51%) (DOS, 2015; SME Corp, 2015). As noted by Datuk Seri Mustapha Muhammad, Minister of International Trade and Industry, SMEs in Malaysia have broadened the export base but the level of participation in the export activities remains low. (Datuk Seri Mustapha Mohamad, 2014).

Figure 1.1 The Contribution of SMEs to the Malaysian Economy

Source: (DOS, SME Corporation, 2015).

Similar to many other countries in the world, SMEs in Malaysia are considered as the backbone for the nation's economic generation. Despite that, among SME manufacturers in Malaysia, only 10.8% of them are exporting their products (MATRADE, 2014). The question that arises is: "Why are almost 80% of SMEs not exporting?" As discussed earlier, lack of confidence in managing intermediary relationships could be a reason for this (Solberg, 2006; Nevins & Money, 2008; Pinho, 2013). Thus, it is believed that effective management of   exporter-

intermediary relationships is very crucial to determine and add value to the export process and contribute to the success of SMEs in their export ventures (Peng & Ilinitch, 1998). This is because the relationship and commitment of the export intermediary towards increasing sales of the exporting SMEs' products can be significant in improving export performance (Racela & Thoumrungroje, 2007). Responding to these gaps in the literature, this research develops and tests a comprehensive model that investigates the relationship between cultural similarity, trust, commitment and cooperation that has significant impact on export performance.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Figure 2: Proposed Conceptual Framework

The propositions and model (Figure 2) above show the integration of the independent variables of cultural similarity as antecedents of exporters' trust that will drive commitment and cooperation and eventually leads to achieve export performance. The model (Figure 3-1) specifies that cultural similarity is a fundamental component that helps in developing relationship between exporter and intermediaries. In other words, this is due to the psychic closeness which helps partners to increase the level of understanding between them to grow the relationship. This developed relationship if managed well will lead to a high level of trust that results in commitment and cooperation between exporter and

intermediaries. The high commitment and cooperation will ultimately influence the exporter's export performance positively.

Variable Measurements

This is a quantitative study and uses a structured questionnaire. Measurement items were derived from the relevant literature. A pre-testing was done before the implementation of the questionnaire involving 10 academicians and many export managers, to have face validity. Following their feedback the final questionnaire was formalised with relevant changes incorporated. Thereafter, the researcher tested it for non-response bias (Arnstrong & Overton, 1977; Jarvis et al; 2013).

Sampling Frame

The sampling frame was taken from the SME corporation database which meets three criteria: (1) firm is either in small or medium size category involved in product manufacturing and engaged in export activities, (ii) firm must use the intermediaries services (e.g. agent, sales representative, and distributor), (iii) the overall sample should cover firm from various sectors.

Research Methodology

Research Procedure

This study implemented a systematic sampling technique which often uses random sampling procedure, in which everyone in the identified population has an equal probability of being selected (Creswell, 2003). Leedy and Ormrod (2005) also pointed out that in the selection of a random sample, the researcher could make the assumption that characteristically the sample approximates the total population. For Systematic sampling, every kth (e.g.5th, 10th, 15th) member of the population is systematically selected. Further, in this study, the unit of analysis is the SME firm having a specific relationship with intermediaries with respect to a specific manufacturing product and its exporting activities. This intends to capture an exporter's perception of intermediary's relationship. To supply valid and reliable information it is essential to choose suitable well-informed key informant (respondent) who is involved in the export decision making process (Kim & Frazier, 1997) by confirming their pertinent details (Skarmeas et al., 2002). To be specific,

the target positions of the respondents of this study will be the export manager, owner of the firm or any other person responsible who is actively involved in the exporting activities and connected directly with the exporting intermediary. These high ranking informants are most likely able to provide information needed by this study (Mitchell, 1994).

Research Instruments and Construction

The primary data for this study collected using mail method which is most popularly used in social sciences quantitative surveys (Mohammad, 2012). Some advantages of using mail survey include low cost. In addition, mail survey also enables the respondents to fill the survey in privacy as compared to the interview method. In addition, mail survey is suitable to explore sensitive issues such as profits, financial situation of the company and companies' problems which entail respondents more time and consideration before he/she can complete the survey.

Data Analysis

An appropriate statistical test will used to analyse the quantitative data to address the research questions and hypotheses in this study. Two stages of quantitative statistical software programmes are used (Davis, 2005):

1- Descriptive statistical analysis, univariate analysis and multivariate analysis using SPSS 23.0

2- Structural Equation Modelling (SEM-AMOS) is to check the goodness of fit of the measurements and to test all the hypotheses in this study. This software is an extended version of the general linear model (GLM) that enables the researcher to test a set of regression equations simultaneously.

Conclusion

Based on the above discussion, In view of the gaps in the literature as summarized above, this study intends to close these gaps by answering the following research questions, with the central research questions being:

(1) Does cultural similarity between exporter and export intermediaries enhance export performance?

(2) What are the paths the exporter and intermediary's cultural similarity go through that result in export performance?

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PART 8: KELANTAN FLOOD DISASTER

THE ROLES AND CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE NON-GOVERNMENTALS ORGANIZATIONS (NGOs) IN THE POST-2014 KELANTAN FLOOD DISASTER

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Abstract

The post-flood aftermath or locally known as "*bah kuning*" witnessed a massive NGOs' engagement in assisting the flood victims in most affected areas, namely in Kuala Krai, Gua Musang, Kota Bharu, Pasir Mas, Tanah Merah, Tumpat and Machang . Among those NGOs involved in restoring and rebuilding the affected zones were MERCY or Medical Relief Society Malaysia, IKRAM Malaysia, Islamic Relief, DarulHijrah, *Khazanah Yayasan* (linked to *Khazanah Nasional*), *Pertubuhan Bantuan Bencana* (BBNGO) and few other international NGOs. Kelantan received a high volume of relief and assistance in the forms of food, cloth, shelters, cash donation, volunteers, experts, local and international donors including multinational corporations (MNCs) and individual countries (government-to-government relations) which includes Thailand, Indonesia, Japan, China United Kingdom etc. Yet, criticism arose on matters related to the distributing process of flood relief and assistance: uneven distribution of aid to the victims. One of the many reason was a lack of coordination among those NGOs, which actively involved helping the flood victims to lessen the impacts of flood disaster. The NGOs worked independently without a proper order and guideline in distributing aid to the victims. There were incidents where victims had claimed that in some areas goods and aid were distributed abundantly whereas in other places these assistances had been delayed. Indeed, the late receiving of critical goods, such as food and clothing, was due to a handicapped delivery of information between the NGOs and government agencies. Another factor was a sudden increase of water level, which led to road closure. This situation made it impossible for the rescue teams and NGOs to reach those flooded locations. In this manner, the researchers would strongly recommend for all NGOs to

work hand-in-hand with both state and federal governments should this worst flood ever struck in the future. To date, despite all the problems and difficulties faced by those NGOs involved not only during and aftermath the mega flood, NGOs do play a very significant role in the reconstruction of Kelantan in its post flood stage. This paper examines the roles and contributions played by the Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in the Post-2014 Kelantan Flood Disaster. Furthermore, a plan or strategy to manage, uplift as well as enhance their efficiency and performances in case if such a huge magnitude of flood ever occurred in future will also be highlighted.

Keywords: Kelantan, Flood, Non-Governmental Organization

KELANTAN FLOOD vs HURRICANE KATRINA: HOME BUILDING FOR DISASTER VICTIMS DURING POST-FLOOD RECONSTRUCTION

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A massive flood in Kelantan at the end of 2014 has greatly caused a terrible catastrophe to the flood victims. Thousands of houses have been affected by the heavy flow of water including some 2000 houses along Lebir and Galas rivers. Helping the flood victims rebuilding their lives, the Federal Government has broadly agreed to allocate RM500 million for developing new homes and RM10,000 for repairing each household's home: it is an ultimate responsibility of the Federal Government to build new homes for disaster survivors. The State Government, in unison, has spent RM5 million – a sum donated to *Tabung Amanah Bencana Banjir Negeri Kelantan-* to build and repair house and infrastructure for flood victims. Repairing and rebuilding homes involve an array of institutions including thousands of volunteers and non-governmental Organization (NGOs) members. The Post-flood Recovery Unit's record shows that 2,200 houses across Kelantan need to be built. At least, eight areas are designated for developing permanent homes: Kota Bharu, Chenulang (in Kuala Krai), Dabong (in Kuala Krai), Simpang Tiga Pulai, Bertam Baru, Tanah Putih, Limau Kasturi and Lebir (in Gua Musang). The research conclusions concerning housing efforts (during post-flood reconstruction in Kelantan) speak about unprecedented cooperation between the Federal and State governments; "I am not the land owner"; a lengthy and confusing registration process for new permanent homes; unlikely change of new home project schedule; and home building by NGOs which produces different designs and different specification. Considering some serious constraints in housing effort, the paper has two underlying aims: to assess the development of housing effort in Kelantan's flood aftermath; and to evaluate a possibility of developing effective disaster housing approaches based on American National Disaster Housing Strategy (NDHS). As a blueprint of Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) responses to Hurricane Katrina implications on sheltering, NDHS reveals the way the American nation providing home for disaster victims.

Keywords: FEMA, Kelantan Flood, New Orleans, Home Building, Post-Flood Reconstruction

POST-HURRICANE KATRINA DISASTER MANAGEMENT REGIME: LESSON LEARNED FROM MALAYSIA'S POST-FLOOD RECONSTRUCTION INITIATIVES

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Abstract

The massive flooding that hit Malaysia's east coast states of Kelantan and Terengganu in 2014 was viewed as the worst in the history of the two states. This unprecedented event has forced the federal, state, municipal and local emergency community in the country to rethink and reexamine the existing strategies, policies, plans, and programs for post-disaster management and reconstruction. Recurring problems of restoring physical environment and constructing infrastructure, along with a myriad of challenges in providing expedited emergency humanitarian services and recovery in the affected areas necessitate the need for the Malaysian authorities to learn from the developed countries. Malaysia can learn, review and if possible, implement emergency management models, operational measures and rebuilding strategies adopted by the United States government in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005. In response to the widely perceived failure of the country's federal government to carry out humanitarian assistance during and after Hurricane Katrina, US government have embarked several initiatives to improve the country's legislative, policy and institutional framework for effective natural disaster and post-disaster management. One of these initiatives includes major functional and structural reform for its main federal agency responsible in disaster management - Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Hence, the aim of this paper is to examine a range of policies, strategies, plans and programs adopted by US government for post-disaster management and disaster risk reduction immediately after the Hurricane Katrina from which Malaysia can learn and adopt for its post-flood disaster management regime, particularly on the reconstruction efforts.

Keywords: Flood, FEMA, Hurricane Katrina, Malaysia, Post-Flood Reconstruction, Kelantan

FLOOD DISASTER SAFETY NET: A CASE STUDY OF KELANTAN AND PAHANG IN MALAYSIA

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Abstract

The adversity of flood is exciting conservation event that undesirably distresses all parts in the globe. The 2014 year-end flood is the nastiest for the previous 40 years in Malaysia, with more than 300,000 evacuees. The purpose of this paper is to estimate the efficiency of flood adversity controlling in Kelantan and Pahang, Malaysia. An incident reading is accepted purchasable in two states in the east coast of Peninsular Malaysia since these states remain frequently exaggerated by flood adversity lately. Studies on exaggerated indigenous civic have been completed to apprehension their awareness on the efficiency of the flood controlling strategy and the direction of varieties. Outcomes display that the flood controlling is diverse vile on environmental aspect, rustic as well as town. Flood controlling in 2014 is understood as fewer effectual, particularly in rustic range of Kelantan owing to an unanticipated inundation extent as related with the grounding of flood controlling that is only gifted to switch the standard inundation condition. Further issues recognized were volume of removal centers is inadequate, deficiency of possessions, no flood responsiveness agendas at the communal glassy, the delinquent of the enclosed sufferers owing to impairment of public structures such as infrastructures and channels, statement disengaged. Finally, this study will suggest a framework towards the establishment of a sustainable flood disaster management system to reduce losses caused by flood disasters.

Keywords: Flood Disaster, Flood Management, Infrastructure, Safety Net

Introduction

Downpours consumes happening the upsurge in current ages and males consume responsible aimed at it. Though overflows prepare to transpire obviously, but, certain that have occupied a weighty peal on survives plus stuff remain artificial catastrophes for example overflowing of blocks, city overflowing and wreckages movement in thickly inhabited zones. Giddens (1990) culpabilities upgrading aimed at the "industrial hazards" which devour engaged concluded since ordinary hazards, affecting the integration of expected and industrial borders. Man's try at enterprise

counteractive procedures in contradiction of deluge appears pledge industrious, particularly after they partook to animate on the deluge savannahs they take, in details, preferred to prepare encounter through environment. Deluges remained by normal aspects or by a grouping of normal and social aspects. Flood hazard be contingent on flood scales such as flood seriousness, rapidity and duration.

The manufactured atmosphere is an important actor in adapting a typical risk to a calamity. The mainstream of hominoid and straight monetary victims since accepted threats transpire consequently impairment to the manufactured atmosphere (Max Lock Centre, 2009; Benson and Twigg, 2007). The dynamic part that the manufactured atmosphere achieves in attending mortal endeavors carries unadorned interruption to the skill of humanity to meaning, frugally and informally when its foundations are spoiled or ruined by natural threats (Haigh and Amaratunga, 2010). Thus, the skill of the manufactured atmosphere to endure the influences of theatres a straight part in decisive the fatalities and financial charges of adversities (Ofori, 2002; Mileti, 1999). In a certain, the shielding features of the constructed situation are decisive to attain ruin threat drop (DRR) (Haigh and Amaratunga, 2010).

In Malaysia National Security Council (NSC) takes accountability for monitoring the general catastrophe supervision scheme including flood. The deluge controlling co-ordination is founded on State Strategy and Instrument in Adversity Controlling known as Directive MKN 20 (*Arahan MKN 20*) that was recognized in May 1997 and it was studied in 30 March 2012 to designate the part of numerous linked investors in more inclusive and united, since the opportunity of the adversity controlling progressively intricate and multipart. Adversity controlling in Malaysia takes three stages and each group in each glassy consumes its individual accountability. In flat I, the team confirms synchronized activities, thru appropriate advantage and social capitals, in relative to the mass media. Level II, essential offer to the District support for example monetary support, possessions and hominid funds. For the third stage, the group need to decide the countrywide calamity controlling procedure, economics, resources and social capitals (Sukeri & Shazwani, 2015).

This instrument appears very regular in handling the flood adversity, however archaeologically it consumes generally been measured as a regime part and is mainly constructed on top-down government-centred technology (Chan, 1995). This

situation spectacles that there are numerous persons either from regime activities or offers in directing the various types of helps to flood sufferers. However how distant the backings reach the correct board groups in an impartial involvement? And uncertainty not where stand the breaks that essential to be amended to upsurge effectiveness in the administration of overflow adversity? Hence, this learning will appraise the efficiency of the MKN 20 Directive in handling deluge adversity 2014, captivating into explanation the interpretations from the control interventions that traditional accountable to this catastrophe, NGOs and exaggerated groups, particularly in the conditions of Kelantan and Pahang. The valuation drive the features of attentiveness of the accountable control interventions, controlling utensil of casualty emigration and direction of generous supply to the inundation dupes.

Literature Review

Malaysia remains a nation identical disposed to to inundation hazards, generally by environment of its somatic (e.g. geography and drainage) and its hominoid topography (e.g. payment and terrestrial usage outlines). The amalgamation of normal and hominoid features has formed altered natures of inundations, viz. downpour, showy and tidal (Chan, 1998). Malaysians stay archeologically a riverine individuals, as initial payments nurtured on the banks of the foremost waterways in the Peninsula. United through ordinary influences for example weighty downpour rain, forceful convection stream tornados, pitiable drainage and added indigenous aspects, inundations take developed a mutual piece in the subsists of a momentous amount of Malaysians. Downpour and flashy deluges are the record Spartan environment interrelated accepted adversities in Malaysia, with a inundation disposed to zone of about 29,000 km^2 upsetting in excess of 4.82 million people (22% of the inhabitants) and perpetrating yearly impairment of USD 298.29 million (Asian Disaster Reduction Centre, 2005) Vindication plus Controlling of Inundation Calamities in Malaysia.

Malaysia remains exaggerated by inundation as of the weighty monsoonal and predictable drizzle, smooth geography on together coasts of Peninsular Malaysia, substantial siltation of rivers and hominoid actions (transformed terrestrial usage owing to deforestation, agronomic observes and development). These partake all subsidised to amassed deluge hazard. Chan recognises hasty development, deforestation and other ecological terrestrial usages that consume changed the

hydrology constraints of the country as shifting inundation features (Chan 1997; Chan et al. 2002).

Tingsanchali (2012) defined the borough inundation adversity controlling. Deluge influence is one of the utmost substantial adversities in the world. More than half of international inundation indemnities arise in Asia. Sources of overflows are payable to accepted features such as substantial rainfall, extraordinary downpours and high surges, etc., and hominoid aspects such as stalling of networks or intensification of drainage conduits, inappropriate terrestrial usage, etc. Deluges outcome in victims of lifespan and impairment assets. Population growth upshots in added development, further resistant extent and fewer permeation and larger inundation crowning and overspill. Snags developed supplementary serious unpaid to more simple and normal overflowing likely triggered by environment variation, socio-economic impairment, populace exaggerated municipal turmoil and inadequate assets. Flood damage stoppage and vindication contains operational downpour governor procedures such as structure of blocks or tributary watercourses and non-structural measures such as overflow estimating and threatening, inundation deathtrap and hazard controlling, public partaking and influential procedure, etc.

A vital policy to industry with a post-disaster development stands to consume an inclusive context or sequencer that encompasses adversity forecasting, supply managing and productivity (repossession and reintegration). Such a plug-in, stomached through the participants, resolve unvaryingly stand guaranteed to convinced period and rate restrictions (Islam et al. 2016). The salvage procedures of Upland Strongholds remained hindered by the nonattendance of a pre-established alternative rejoinder idea (Soh, 1998). Salvage grind by Malaysian, Japan and France spare returners might not be harmonized. Related difficulties were formerly distinguished when answering to earlier adversities for example the Bright Sparklers and Choon Hong adversities. However the distorted of upland strongholds cooperative on 11 December 1993 speed the development of the scenery up of a domestic adversity idea. On 18 May 1994, the Cabinet absolute to verbalize a utensil for dealing adversities in the country. The strategy announcement for adversity release processes is postulated in Directive 20 of the NSC and acquired outcome on May 11, 1997.

Methodology

This paper recycled together secondary and primary data to produce the learning independent. The secondary data from direction intelligences, books, articles, newsletters and internet foundations stayed hand-me-down to seizure the zero material about the inundation adversity in East Coast zone. The primary data composed from communal study. A discussion with captains from interventions intricate in inundation controlling was shown first in directive to appreciate the setting of downpour in the revision zone. Then review by using controlled survey remained accepted available in twofold statuses of Peninsular Malaysia specifically Kelantan and Pahang since these states are regularly exaggerated by inundation adversity 2014. Investigation on exaggerated indigenous population's trendy the region of Kuantan in Pahang and region of Gua Musang in Kelantan had been done to imprisonment their awareness on the success of the inundation controlling and the management of varieties. These two areas were knowingly designated to investigate the setting of downpour supervision in urban and isolated extent, while Kuantan represented the urban and Gua Musang characterized the isolated expanse. The concentration assembly argument with several interventions intricate in inundation controlling such as MKN, indigenous civic demonstrative, police, fire department, welfare department, education department, health department and other associated activities had been directed to discourse about the questions high by the inundation sufferers in directive to progress the Standard Operational Procedure (SOP) of MKN 2O Directive.

Results and Discussion

Demographic and Discussion

Study on inundation fatalities remained accepted available in two regions of Kuantan in Pahang and the area of Gua Musang in Kelantan. Inundation fatalities stayed considered into dualistic clusters, evacuee and non-evacuee. Refugee denotes to the fatalities that stimulated to emptying focus, whereas non-evacuee raises to the fatalities who do not transfer to emigration center. However, for fatalities who encouraged to a residence other than emigration centers providing were encompassed in the grouping of non-evacuee.Table 1 demonstrations the amount of fatalities giving to the declared groups and learning place. The number of evacuees is higher in Kuantan (72%) than in Gua Musang (60%) (Table 1).

Table 1: Flood Victims by Category and Location

	Evacuee	Non-Evacuee	Total
Kuantan District, Pahang			
Sg. Isap	23	0	23
Sg. Lembing	51	47	98
Kg. Tiram	80	12	92
Sub-total	*154 (72%)*	*59 (28%)*	*213*
Guamusang District, Kelantan			
Bertam	67	9	76
Lebir	29	54	83
Sub-total	*96 (60%)*	*63 (40%)*	*159*
TOTAL	**250 (67%)**	**122 (33%)**	**372**

In standings of demographics, in general normal stage of the defendants complicated in the review is 51years old, encompassing 59% of man and 41% of woman with an normal domestic extent of 4.1 (Table 2). Whole, 81.4% of defendants are Malay and 16.9% are Chinese that commonly stood the inundation fatalities from Sungai Lembing, Kuantan. In standings of financial position, closely 70% of defendants received periodic profits lower RM1,000. Record defendants route their own professional (40.3%), jobless (28.2%) and driven in reserved area (13.4%).

Table 2: Demographic details by location (in %)

	Overall	Kuantan			Gua Musang	
		Sg. Isap	Sg. Lembing	Kg. Tiram	Bertam	Lebir
Age (*mean*)	51.2	52.3	58.5	44.4	50.3	51.1
Male	59.0	30.4	51.6	67.4	53.4	71.1
Household size (*mean*)	4.1	4.5	3.3	3.9	5.3	4.3
Race						
Malay	81.4	100.0	33.6	97.8	97.4	100.0
Chinese	16.9	0	63.3	1.1	0	0
Marital status						
Married	76.9	91.3	69.3	79.3	75.0	80.7
Education level						
Primary	48.3	39.1	57.1	29.3	56.5	54.2
Secondary	38.4	56.5	28.5	51.1	34.2	34.9
Job type						
Civil servant	6.1	4.3	3.1	13.0	3.9	1.2
Private sector	13.4	8.7	2.0	36.9	11.8	3.6
Pensioner	8.6	8.7	18.3	10.8	0	2.4
Unemployed	28.2	69.5	34.6	17.4	28.9	20.4
Own business	40.3	8.7	33.6	20.6	52.6	67.4
Income category						
< RM500	38.7	26.1	50.0	17.3	64.4	28.9

RM501- RM1000	30.9	0	26.5	33.7	15.7	55.4
RM1,001-RM2,000	13.1	21.7	7.1	33.7	3.9	3.6
Total, N	**372**	**23**	**98**	**92**	**76**	**83**

Evaluating of Effectiveness of Flood Management

Pre-Flood Management

To appraise the efficiency of the National Policy and Mechanism on flood Management (MKN 20 Order), interview on exaggerated indigenous communal have been completed to incarceration their discernment on the success of the inundation controlling strategy and the direction of varieties. However to certify the equality of the reading, emphasis cluster argument have been directed that constitutes of various parties involved in the flood management in East Coast area such as MKN officers, welfare department, JPAM, JPS, local community demonstrative, police and fire officers and other related agencies. Table 3 indications the percentage of defendants answer 'yes' to the enquiries associated to pre flood supervision measures which are importance to them. Outcomes have revealed that the transfer frequency of inundation fatalities is squat in secluded zone for example Sungai Lembing in Kuantan district (52%) as well as Lebir in Gua Musang district (34.9%) as linked through town zone for example Sungai Isap (100%) and Kampung Tiram (88%) in Kuantan region.

Table 3: The percentage of respondents answer 'yes' to the questions related to pre-flood management procedures

Details	Overall	Kuantan			GuaMusang	
		Sg. Isap	Sg.Lembing	Kg.Tiram	Bertam	Lebir
First time deluge fatality in past period	50.6	17.3	43.3	28.1	94.5	53.1
Evacuee	67.5	100.0	52.0	88.0	88.1	34.9
Motives aimed at not emptying:						
Remained thru folks whose zones are deluge permitted	43.1	-	8.7	50.0	50.0	71.1
Keep on home-produced as flood condition is underneath rheostat	36.2	-	69.5	20.0	25.0	11.5
Moved to higher grounds	20.6	-	21.7	30.0	25.0	17.3
Instructed to evacuate	77.8	91.3	58.3	96.6	93.4	62.2
Know where the evacuation centre	90.8	100.0	87.5	97.8	100.0	75.9
Distance to evacuation centre (in KM; *mean*)	2.04	4.61	1.04	2.98	0.72	2.63

Used own vehicle to reach evacuation centre	64.8	65.2	67.4	72.7	62.6	51.7
Are you informed of the following:						
Safe vehicle parking area	67.6	66.6	79.2	75.7	75.0	36.3
Area patrol	68.1	75.0	72.5	81.8	65.9	45.6
Alternative routes & road closure	72.5	95.2	76.1	81.2	72.5	50.9
Pre-flood information (weather, river/dam water level)	72.8	85.7	84.4	84.1	55.5	59.2
Water/electricity supply disruption	54.1	80.9	65.8	64.9	38.1	32.6
Is there any flood awareness programmes held periodically in your area?	49.5	40.9	35.4	65.4	58.9	42.8
Do you participate in such programmes	46.8	40.9	42.6	57.6	54.9	31.8
Participants find such programmes helpful	78.9	100.0	74.4	80.0	79.5	75.8

Notes:
*All respondents in Sg. Isap are evacuees.
† No observations

During Flood Management

Table 4 summarize the results of the inundation fatalities' self-perceived on during and post-flood supervision events recorded in Standard functioning technique for overflow adversity supervision constructed on a scale of 1 = very dissatisfied to 5 = very satisfied. In total mark malicious standards for all events is more than 3 which were in the variety of uncertain and fulfilled. This rate is adequate in the case of adversity condition at emptying hub. However inundation fatalities in Lebir were frustrated. Besides, downpour fatalities in Sungai Isap, Kuantan also fairly displeased with the events of supply of non-food supplies and plain facilities at the emptying hub. According to concentration cluster argument, most of the house in Sungai Isap encompass of the top persons so that their prospects of coziness in emptying hubs is high. Thus, in command to confirm the inundation controlling coordination is added universal that canister protection completely situations of the deluge, it prerequisites for Standard Procedure Operation aimed at non-refugees in MKN 20 Directive.

Table 4: Details on management during flood (by location)

Details	Mean	Kuantan			GuaMusang	
		Sg.Isap	Sg.Lembing	Kg.Tiram	Bertam	Lebir
Evacuees (n=251)						
Registration at evacuation centre goes smoothly	3.55	3.52	3.51	3.85	3.37	3.13
Good space allocation	3.39	3.13	3.33	3.94	3.24	2.45
Sufficient supplies and fair distribution of non-food necessities	3.26	2.91	3.17	3.98	2.89	2.36
Sufficient basic amenities (toilet, bathrooms)	3.31	2.95	3.34	3.71	3.03	2.95
Sufficient medicine supply	3.41	3.65	3.20	4.06	2.78	3.00
Good treatment by medical personnel	3.40	3.52	3.34	4.05	2.74	2.86
Provision of counselling service	3.19	3.05	3.11	3.80	2.61	2.91
Sufficient supplies and fair distribution of food stock	3.50	3.43	3.52	4.08	2.87	3.13
Good management of food provision	3.53	3.56	3.47	4.08	3.01	3.08
Evacuation centre committee done an overall good job	3.60	3.56	3.52	4.17	3.23	2.82
Number of days stayed	6.5	6.0	3.0	6.3	8.7	7.9
Water disruption at evacuation centre (in %)	59.8	52.1	65.3	15.3	96.8	100.0
Electricity disruption at evacuation centre (in %)	67.0	47.6	84.3	11.5	98.3	100.0
Non-evacuees (n=121)						
Established nourishment then health provisions from experts	51.7%	-*	42.2	60.0	12.5	65.3
Part of guard by establishments	58.5%	-	57.7	80.0	25.0	60.4
Customary financial support from establishments	50.0%	-	27.9	75.0	50.00	72.7

Notes:
*All respondents in Sg. Isap are evacuees.
[†] No observations

Post-Flood Management-Coordination of Kind Distribution

To affluence the load of the deluge fatalities, numerous revelries, counting regimes,

persons, private sector and non-constitutional establishments advance their ropes

any method of monetary, nourishment, sartorial and further elementary supplies to the fatalities. On the other hand the management also dispersed *Wang Ehsan* of RM500 to the deluge fatalities, but this is not a form of recompense. Table 5 demonstrations the fraction of fatalities who replied 'yes' to declarations containing to the dispersion of aid by the government. Defendants were rather pleased with overall inundation adversity organization with the mean score value of 3.34 out of 5.

Table 5: Post-flood management details (by location; in %)

Details	All	Kuantan			GuaMusang	
		Sg.Isap	Sg. Lembing	Kg. Tiram	Bertam	Lebir
Judicious supply of financial relief	60.4	82.6	34.1	72.1	67.1	63.2
Received housing assistance	30.3	13.0	16.0	18.9	48.5	46.1
The type of housing assistance received:						
Restoration	44.1	-†	25.0	57.1	47.0	46.7
New construction	33.3	-	25.0	28.6	35.3	36.6
Built flood barrier	16.5	21.7	25.9	18.5	7.9	9.1
Submitted claim for monetary/housing assistance	40.2	30.4	48.7	34.7	43.9	34.9
Difficult to get to monetary aid distribution location	26.6	13.6	27.6	6.6	36.9	42.4
Satisfied with overall flood disaster management (*mean*)	3.34	3.39	3.18	3.96	3.15	3.01

Notes:
† No observations

Conclusion

Outcomes demonstrate that the deluge controlling is diverse base on environmental issue, rustic and town. As for pre inundation controlling, the main issues arise were the capacity of evacuation centre cannot cater the flood victims, lack of assets such as boat to relinquish the fatalities, statement broke down and no responsiveness program seized periodically at the communal stage have causes the relocation rate in remote area is less as compared with urban and many of flood victims were surrounded. While during the flood, most of the victims were satisfied with the services provided at the evacuation centre except the victims in Lebir, Gua Musang since there is only one evacuation centre available to cater more than four hundred families with the capacity for one hundred people only. On behalf of the situation on non-refugees, the deluge controlling events is only inadequate to nourishment, remedial and pecuniary supports. However utmost of them appealed that they did not establish those generous of supports since they stood bounded by water and no

admittance to strangers to become into the zone to bring reliefs for them. Those topics ascending displayed the deficiency of size construction within the free rather than uselessness of the activities in treatment deluge adversity. Thus to decrease the hazard of the inundation calamity, mindfulness plans at the public stage should be comprised in the MKN 20 Directive in order to progress the size of the municipal in treatment themselves through the adversity.

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PART 10: SECURITY

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AGAINST THE ISLAMIC STATE IN IRAQ AND SYRIA: A NEOLIBERAL INSTITUTIONALIST ANALYSIS

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Abstract

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria/the Levant (ISIS/ISIL) has threatened human and national security of Iraq and Syria, as well as the rest of the world.Its influence spreads in forms of terrorism in many parts in the world such as Yemen, Libya, Sinai, Mali, Somalia, North-Eastern Nigeria, Pakistan, and some parts of Southeast Asia and Europe. USA has called for a formation of a new international coalition to confront ISIS in Iraq to provide a support for the Iraqi government institutions to impose the sovereignty of law and to provide equal opportunities for the members in federal governmental institutions. Following the declaration from the US President, an international coalition was formed by the USA, British, Bahrain, Jordan and Iraq on 10th September 2014, in addition to the military and humanitarian supports provided by NATO and EU states. A number of international organizations namely the UN and NATO, as well as regional organizations namely the Arab League and EU, have moved to contain the development of ISIS, but the results were limited and inconclusive. Using neoliberal institutionalist perspective, the study argues that an effective international organization is required to solve the crisis caused by ISIS and the shortcoming in solving ISIS crisis is caused by the non-existence of a unitary international organization. The study firstly identifies the current operating role of those international and regional organizations in response to ISIS in responding and preventing ISIS and its expansion. Secondly, the reasons behind the shortcoming of the current international coalition are discussed. Consequently, the study suggests the formation of a stronger international organization that manages the strategy to fight ISIS.

Keywords: Islamic State in Iraq and Syria/Levant (ISIS/ISIL), Conflict, Security, Neo-Liberal Institutionalism, International Organization (the UN, NATO, the Arab League and the EU)

Introduction

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria/the Levant (ISIS) has become the clear and present threat for human and national security of Iraq and Syria as well as regional and international security of Iraq. It is an extremist militant Islamic group that strictly follows the Wahhabi and Salafi jihadist notions in addition to the perspectives and thoughts of Kharijites. This group aims to establish an Islamic *Khalifah* and carries

out their interpretation of Sharia law in violent manners. It has controlled substantial parts of Iraq and Syria and exerts extremist version of Islamic rule in those areas. In addition, its influence spreads to many parts of the world in many Islamic countries such as Yemen, Libya, Sinai, Mali, Somalia, and eastern north of Nigeria and Pakistan (Office of the spokesperson, 2015) as well as other parts of the world such as the Europe, United States (hereafter, US), and Southeast Asia.

From the very beginning, ISIS adopted violent and terrorist methods for achieving objectives, obtaining territorial control and erecting its influence. ISIS historically emerged from a notorious terrorist organization named "Al-Qaeda in Iraq" that was established by Abu Musab Al Zarqawi in 2004. After the US invaded Iraq in 2003, he participated in military operations against the US forces and successive Iraqi governments between 2003 and 2011. The current ISIS leader is Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi whose true name is Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim al Badri al Samarra'i (Blanchard, Humud, Katzman & Weed, 2015). He was the leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) on 16 May 2010, taking after the demise of his forerunner Abu Omar al-Baghdadi (Shahid, 2010).

ISIS has posed a continuous threat on Iraq's stability and security and extended to Syria, Turkey and Lebanon. Iraqi security forces have been powerless for the first two years to confront ISIS that is active in Mosul and the provinces of Anbar, Tikrit, Diyala, the south of Kirkuk, and the north of Baghdad. ISIS has controlled approximately one third of Iraq at the end of 2013 after the collapse of Iraqi forces. ISIS obviously gets back up in Iraq because of the declaimed financial and political segregation by Iraqi Sunni citizens (Al-sokena, 2014). As a result, all of a sudden, some changes occurred in political and security imbalance in Iraq in addition to outcropping new factors, agreements and balances affected the Iraqi authority (Becky, 2015).

The US has formed and led a coalition to fight ISIS since September 2014. Around 110 countries including 28 member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (hereafter, NATO), 23 NATO partners, and 59 autonomous nations have contributed in different approaches to the battle (Benitez & Maletta, 2014). There are additionally 36 countries that guaranteed helpful advisers for the overall public of Iraq and Syria. Furthermore, the US has taken a more personal support for the Kurds. Kurdish volunteer armed force in Iraqi Kurdistan and Syria has exhibited the capacity to confront ISIS. Other than security help – air support and the supply of

refined weapons – the Kurds merit mollifying and political sponsorship. Iraqi Kurdistan emerges as American's best alliance in this region (Phillips, 2015).

Currently, there are four international organizations playing roles in the fight against ISIS in Iraq – the United Nations (hereafter, UN), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Arab League, and the European Union (hereafter, EU). International organizations working to withdraw geographic and political space, work, money and other resources related to the Islamic State. They use several measures, including driving a multilateral coalition undertaking direct military action; giving direction, planning, and equipment for assistant ground qualities in Syria and Iraq; collecting and sharing knowledge, and using fiscal measures against the Islamic State. On 10 September 2014, President Obama reported a movement of exercises proposed to "debase, and at last demolish" the Islamic State association (White House Office of the Press Secretary, 2014). In mid-2015, spectators continued to debate the success of the international organizations also, coalition endeavors against the Islamic State. A few specialists declared that with the coalition strikes and ground endeavors by Iraqi security strengths, Kurds, and overwhelmingly Shiite Popular Mobilization, the united powers have decreased the range of the Islamic State's control to some degree, while others argued that the US goal should be "the containment" of the Islamic State, rather than outright defeat (Zakheim, 2015).

Subscribing to neoliberal institutionalist theory, this study argues that an international organization should play as the main driver to manage the strategies to fight ISIS and alleviate the crisis caused by the terrorist organization. Four international organizations (UN, NATO, EU and Arab League) have showed their shortcoming in terms of conflict of interests and coordination. For this reasons, this paper suggests the imperative for a stronger international organization to play the driving seat for this purposes. However, it is puzzling why the success of international organizations' efforts to contain and fight ISIS has been very limited. To discuss this issue, this paper firstly examines Neoliberal Institutionalism as the theoretical framework and methodology, followed by discussing the role of international organizations, the shortcoming of current international coalitions, and finally goes in depth in its conclusion that argue for the imperative of a stronger international organization to manage strategies to fight the IS in Iraq.

Theoretical Framework: Neoliberal Institutionalism

Neoliberal Institutionalism is a theoretical tradition in the discipline of International Relations that argues on the role of International, regional and multilateral organizations in conflict mitigation (Navari, 2008). Neoliberal institutionalism implies that international institutions and organizations including the UN, NATO, EU and the Arab League could support the cooperation between states in fighting ISIS. States are dealt with as rational actors functioning in an international political system in which hierarchy cannot be enforced (Keohane, Robert & Lisa, 1995).

Neoliberal institutionalists assumed that global organizations are able to decrease the fear and uncertainty of a state. This will lead and encourage the cooperation between states. This IR theory is hopeful and optimistic convention, yet it imparts a few key ideas to neorealism. It is not at all like its forerunner, classical liberalism, which is against realist assumption all the more thoroughly. Neoliberals acknowledge that states are the significant actors in making global relationships. World politics are performed by two types of actors – states and non-states actors. However, Neoliberals suggested that global establishments and administrations could play crucial roles and effects all alone self-sufficient effect upon state conduct. Neorealists refute that every single international institutions as simply instruments of powerful states. On the other hand, neoliberal acknowledge the role of non-states actors because they are considered as important entities in international relations. In addition, Neoliberals acknowledge the role of international organizations in world politics which are often independent in their own rights and their own decisions. Moreover, Bureaucrats are also having a great influence in setting agendas and determining which issues is most important (Keohane, Robert & Lisa, 1995).

The inquiry is: how reasonable is neoliberal institutionalism with respect to security issues to battle ISIS? Jervis (1982: 360) observed that the domain of security has uncommon qualities that in the meantime make administration creation more difficult and increment its need: Security regimes, with their call for mutual restraint and limitations on unilateral actions, rarely seem attractive to decision-makers' under the security dilemma. Fundamental to the neoliberal institutionalists is the idea of common interests that states could accomplish together to battle ISIS. But what if antagonists do not share common interests? Jervis (1999: 54) argued that states will establish an institution if and only if they seek the goals that the

institution will help them reach". It does not appear that, superficially, that institution could do much to increase security. (Williams, 2012).

Methodology

The study utilized qualitative method as a part of accomplishing its target. It depended on secondary sources including issues concerning the part of international organizations in Iraq in fighting ISIS. The analysts gathered information from auxiliary sources and references, for example, books, past explores and investigative studies. These assets are identified with the subject of the present concentrate, either specifically or by implication since the start of the rise of ISIS in Iraq and how it has overwhelmed vast parts of Iraq to the present time. Alongside investigative reports, they demonstrate the underlying foundations of the association of ISIS and why it has changed its name to end up what is known today Islamic state.

The study utilized a thematic analysis to iteratively re- organize the data. In the thematic content analysis approach, researcher distinguished repeating issues to refine and, in other cases, to develop new subjects in resonance with the research objectives (Taylor and Bogdan, 1984). In this study, some of the themes had already been generated from the literature review. Another system that will be utilized as a part of the information investigation for data interpretation preparation is pattern building. This system was connected more on the information removed from the surveys. This technique was applied more on the data extracted from the questionnaires. Through reviewing on literature, researcher has noted that studies on the role of international and regional organizations in fighting against ISIS need to be studied more thoroughly.

The Role of International and Regional Organizations in Fighting ISIS

There are four international organizations actively involved in the fight against ISIS – UN, NATO, Arab League and the EU. The following section discusses more in-depth on the role of these four institutions in the fight against ISIS.

The Role of the United Nations in Fighting ISIS

The UN is the first organization actively involved to manage the crisis in Iraq. The involvement is very relevant because ISIS has challenged the most fundamental

principles of the UN, that is the maintenance of universal peace and security, the advancement of self-assurance and essential human rights, and the insurance of central opportunities (Schaefer & Harkness, 2014). ISIS has arguably challenging international peace and security by organizing attacks towards the Iraqi legitimate government and facilitating terrorism in Iraq, Syria, as well as in numerous parts of the world. Furthermore, ISIS conduct of atrocities to the minorities and people who opposed their rule, thus ISIS has arguably challenged the UN basic human right and protection of fundamental freedoms.

The UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon told an extraordinary session of the UN Security Council on 24 September 2014 that "the world is witnessing a dramatic evolution in the nature of the terrorist threat." In addition, he added "Eliminating terrorist requires international solidarity and a multifaceted approach—among the many tools we must use, we must also tackle the underlying conditions that provide violent extremist groups the opportunity to take root." He spoke when the UN and its part states raised their own specific concerns and promised to take comprehensive moves to obstruct global terrorist threat that has been not only more longwinded and transnational, but increasingly portable, flexible, and vicious. A late UN report speaks to how the ISIS is formed by the contemporary conflict end (Fink, 2014).

Anthony H. Cordesman (2002) published a study in Fighting Terrorism. He contended that the United Nations has since quite a while prior reacted to the risks fused into the littler importance of trepidation based persecution, and it is simply normal that the UN made new move after the events of September 11, 2001. The Security Council grasped three crucial resolutions, 1368, 1373 and 1377 after the ambushes on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. These resolutions, demanded the benefit of self-conservation, have watched dread based abuse to be a danger to widespread peace and security, and concentrated on the duty of supporters and moreover the guilty parties of mental activist acts. They obliged part states to confine the limit of mental activists and apprehension monger relationship to work all around by cementing assets of mental aggressor backup individuals and affiliations and precluding them place from claiming asylum, notwithstanding different things. They moreover set forward a Ministerial Declaration on International Terrorism.

Two areas that the UN has as of now tended to are of specific significance. To begin with, enduring, and very much organized endeavors will be required in

counter-fear based oppression, law authorization and related exercises like traditions. Second, there are far less national boundaries to an UN way to deal with enhancing the security of universal transportation, development of perilous material, insurance of high-hazard offices, and basic foundation security. The UN can seek after the production of normal security principles for air (Anthony, Cordesman, & Arleigh, 2002).

In 2009, a seminal working document (UNODC, 2009) was published in Arabic to describe a study on anti-terrorism legislation in the Arab Gulf states. This study discusses the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, and the role of regional and subregional organizations in the Arab Gulf countries in terms of fighting against terrorism. The results of the work indicate that what is stated in the plan of action adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on human rights requires the coalition against terrorism a deep critical study for the security of the society and human rights guarantees. This study should equate among the rights of the accused people, victims and witnesses categorized by the international instruments and norms of international law and international humanitarian law settled in the light of the judicial precedents.

Katulis, Lang, and Singh (2014) have been examined on the most proficient method to thrashing ISIS on counterterrorism and it ought to extend the endeavors at the United Nations amid the 2014 U.N. General Assembly. The U.N. Security Council voted to add ISIS individuals to the Al Qaeda sanctions administration and conjured Chapter VII of the U.N. Contract, underscoring the danger that ISIS postures to global peace and security. This can serve as a valuable premise for organizing universal activity to disturb ISIS's financing and other backing. Given the divisions among driving worldwide forces, activity through the United Nations to approve the utilization of power against ISIS, especially in Syria, would demonstrate troublesome. Regardless, engagement through the United Nations can construct political capital and authenticity for brought together global activity against ISIS, including military strikes if they demonstrate vital. The U.N. Security Council meeting that President Obama by and by led in 2014 offered an interesting chance to activate universal activity on the outside psychological oppressor contender issue. Another U.N. Security Council determination (in the future, UNSCR), could hone nations' instruments to counter radicalization and to meet their commitments to stifle fear based oppression and avoid psychological oppressor enlistment. President Obama

can push that another determination ought to expand participation between different counterterrorism and law-requirement bodies, helping cutting edge states track and organize with elements, for example, the INTERPOL.

Naureen Chowdhury Fink (2014) in her policy brief entitled "Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism" analyzed how the United Nations and its part states guaranteed to make all out move to vanquish a general fearbased misuse risk that is more diffuse and transnational, furthermore intelligently versatile, adaptable, and genuine. A late UN report shows how the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), as a chip get-together of al-Qaeda, is confined by the contemporary clash environment and uses its essential assets and present day exchanges advancements to draw in overall sponsorship and chooses from distant ranges abroad. Fink (2014) fought that this danger is exorbitantly troublesome for any country or zone to address. In like manner, Fink (2014) battled that the United Nations is in an all around different position now than it was in September 2001. Amidst this time, it has advanced and now has more demands, assets, and staff to address the risk of general anxiety based misuse. Besides, the accentuation of purpose of restriction building hones bolstered by the United Nations and its part states vouches for the certification by Security Council individuals that, with a specific extreme goal to meet all get-together asked for obligations, different states need particular help and offer help. Fink's methodology brief (2014) has besides investigated the effect of Resolution 2178 on overall counterterrorism endeavors with a specific spotlight on countering offensive radicalism and considered how the UN could bolster execution tries. There have been hassles that including another estimation of work to the legitimately thick bureaucratic building could ruin coordination and upgrade the probability of duplicationHowever, the above key gages and activity contemplations offer proposition for updating the sufficiency of existing UN assets and rehearses and adjusting them to address the confirmation's objectives. As frustrating clash stream, for occurrence, FTFs challenge the United Nations' part and capacity to react attractively and keep up the estimations of the UN Charter, the world body ought to embrace a methodology that is conscious of existing endeavors additionally key in including esteem (Fink, 2014).

In conclusion, UN has legitimate mission to fight ISIS because its emergence and action has been challenging the most fundamental principles of the UN as it has violated international peace and security, basic human rights and the protection of

fundamental freedoms. In further development, UN Resolution 2178 on international counterterrorism efforts to counter violent extremism has become the foundation for the UN leading role for fighting ISIS. However, the complex conflict dynamics such as foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) challenged the United Nations' part and capacity to react successfully and maintain the estimations of the UN Charter.

The Role of NATO in Fighting ISIS

NATO is the second organization actively involved to manage the crisis in Iraq. The intergovernmental military collusion depends on the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty and constitutes an aggregate protection framework whereby its part states consent to shared resistance because of an assault by any outer party ("The North Atlantic Treaty," 1949). Currently, NATO membership comprises 28 states, consisting of 25 European countries, two North American countries (the US and Canada), and Turkey in Eurasia ("NATO Member Countries," 2016).

The NATO Summit in September 2014 has decided to stimulate the Trans-Atlantic Community to go up against ISIS. Some nine nations swore to join the endeavors led by US to fight ISIS, but the specific duties has not been determined (Tarpley, 2011). Further, the US and its Western accomplices has not to proactively deal with the threats postured by European and American nationals now battling for ISIS.

Stevan Aleksoski & Petar Karagjuleski (2015) argued that NATO's involvement in the fight against ISIS is aimed to participate in military political participation in order to ensure the security of its member states. They recommended that all NATO individuals to coordinate with each other to an abnormal state keeping in mind the end goal to give enduring and tranquil request worldwide through associations and operations administration emergency in those districts and nations where it is required. Participation in the battle against psychological oppression amongst NATO and the UN these worldwide Organizations pervade all levels of that demonstration or institutional field, theoretical and political. Battling psychological oppression and managing emergency circumstances are simply part of the participation and meeting of NATO and the UN, and it stretches out to different issues, for example, common military collaboration, the battle against human trafficking, and pulverization of mines (Aleksoski & Karagjuleski, 2015).

Tarpley suggested that the US should work with its Trans-Atlantic partners and traditional allies with NATO in two distinctive strategies as follow. Firstly, NATO need to enhance solid and competent accomplices in the area to take the battle straightforwardly to ISIS (Tarpley, 2011). NATO and different U.S. partners ought to together build up a methodology to help the locale counter ISIS with specialized backing and military help. This ought to incorporate particular responsibilities to give backing to the Iraqi government, Kurdish powers, and third-way restriction contrasting options to the Assad administration and ISIS in Syria. Furthermore, NATO ought to upgrade law authorization and knowledge combination endeavors to recognize and counter ISIS and other fear based oppressor contenders holding Western travel permits (Tarpley, 2011). This ought to expand on existing U.S. - European endeavors in a joint effort with the International Criminal Police Organization, or INTERPOL. More than 12,000 outside warriors are evaluated to have rushed to Iraq and Syria. As indicated by knowledge offices and outside specialists, one-fourth of these warriors originate from Western nations. With an expected 3,000 people, including maybe 500 each from Britain and France, the perils of radicals getting back home to proceed with the battle with demonstrations of fear based oppression can't be overlooked. Western nations ought to cooperate with partners in the Middle East and nearby groups on counter-radicalization endeavors (Brian, Hardin, & Vikram, 2014).

In short, NATO has decided to take concrete moves to confront the Islamic States since the September 2014 NATO Summit. It played its role in fighting ISIS because of its mission to protect the security of its member countries. Moreover, NATO is required to proactively manage the dangers posed by the citizens of NATO member countries now fighting alongside ISIS.

The Role of the Arab League in Fighting ISIS

The Arab League is the third organization actively involved to manage the crisis in Iraq. This association comprises of autonomous Middle Easterner States on the space of northern and north-eastern bit of Africa and southwest Asia. It was confined in Cairo on 22 March 1945 with six people. Starting now and into the foreseeable future, 16 more states joined the affiliation, yet in light uprising in Syria and their administration's merciless method for managing political rivals, the group suspended

this part state and now numbers twenty-one individuals ("Presentation of the Arab League," 2012).

In September 2014, the head of the Arab League, Nabil Elaraby, has made a collective call to militarily confront the Islamic State group ("Arab League chief," 2014). He told the session that the ascent of the gathering in Iraq tested not simply the power of the state but rather " its very existence and the existence of other states" and required a conclusive determination to go up against psychological warfare militarily, politically, monetarily and socially. He then recommended that military move could make place under the umbrella of an Arab League joint safeguard settlement (Patterson, Alan, and Craig, 2015). Be that as it may, the Arab League held back before consenting to lead airstrikes against the radicals and offered couple of specifics on what the procedure will involve. The circumstance has turned out to be all the more squeezing in the troublesome conditions to accelerate assembling an Arab technique to battle ISIS ("Arab League's 22 States Agree," 2014).

In contrast, it can be noticed that the attitudes of the Arab countries are quite reluctant and unclear towards the threat of ISIS. Dr. Wafiq al-Samarrai, an formerly Iraqi chief of Iraqi general military intelligence who currently served as an analyst in military affairs, indicated that the reason why the US sent a number of envoys to visit Arab countries was to win their support ("Interview with Dr. Wafiq al-Samarrai," 2014). In a later development, France held the Paris Conference in 2014 which included both the territorial states and the permanent member states of the UN Security Council to discuss the issue of ISIS and came with a pledge to support Iraq by all possible means to fight jihadists, including providing military support ("Paris meeting backs Iraqi govt," 2014).

Baghdad had before presented a draft determination supporting its own endeavors to stand up to aggressors who have seized vast regions for a cross-outskirt caliphate and to censure ISIS' activities as atrocities and wrongdoings against mankind. The last content did not specifically support either the Iraqi or U.S. crusade against ISIS, yet discretionary sources said the wording obviously offered Arab collaboration to U.S. also, Iraqi endeavors and could be perused as an implicit consent to back Washington's battle against the gathering.

Undoubtedly, the support from the Arab League in the fight against ISIS is extremely important because it is the legitimate intergovernmental organization in the

region. In fact, the emergence and atrocities of ISIS has challenged the peace, stability, and security in the region, so the battle against ISIS has battled and driven by the Arab League, albeit certainly with universal and provincial associations (UN, NATO, Arab alliance and EU) and US backing. Politically, it must present an Arab face to win the ideological fight against Isis. After the sad US control of Iraq, Arab pioneers are very much aware that the more the US expands its presence in the Middle East, the more noteworthy the counter American feeling in the area, and the more troublesome it gets to be to pick up backing for activity from a hesitant White House and Congress (Rashid, 2015).

The Role of the European Union in Fighting ISIS

The EU is the fourth organization that is actively involved to manage the crisis in Iraq. It is a politico-economic union of 28 European countries which operates through a hybrid system of supranational and intergovernmental decision-making ("Information about the EU," n.d.). Some EU members have already decided to join the US-led worldwide coalition to counter a furnished hostile of ISIS. It appears to be important to consider how the EU could add to the battle against ISIS. This remark concentrates such reflection on European interests, methodology and means (Arteaga, 2014).

The Islamic State has developed a military capability in Syria that is geographically quite a remote place from the EUThus it traditionally does not pose a direct threat to the sovereignty of EU member states. However, EU anticipatively watched the advancement of ISIS to have the capacity to energize psychological oppressor exercises in Europe. Indeed, even without the danger of approaching assaults, European and Western nations are still worried about their nationals partaking in the Middle Eastern jihad and returning to their nations of origin (Arteaga, 2014).

Pertaining to terrorism, the European Council adopted the EU counter-terrorism strategy (2005) that emphasizes the commitment of EU member states to jointly fighting terrorism both in Europe and internationally as well as providing for the best possible protection for its citizens. The strategy acknowledges the EU as a zone of expanding openness in which inside and outside parts of security are intimately linked. The European Council are aware that the EU feature of free movement of people, ideas, technology and resources is prone to terrorist abuse to pursue their

objective. Thus, EU stresses the four mainstays of EU's Counter-Terrorism Strategy – forestall, ensure, seek after and react – constitute an extensive and proportionate reaction to the worldwide fear based oppressor danger. The Strategy requires work at Europe, national and worldwide levels to lessen the risk from psychological oppression and our powerlessness to assault.

Summing up, although EU is not located immediately to the Middle East, it has urgent interests to contain terrorism both conducted in Iraq or in the Europe by ISIS and its supporters. EU's counter-terrorism strategy has emphasizes the commitment of EU member states to jointly fighting terrorism both in Europe and internationally. As Felix Arteaga (2014) contends, the EU is not anticipated that would have an unmistakable part in the continuous battle against ISIS in Iraq and SyriaHowever, it ought to be set up to lead the pack in the following round of the battle against fear mongering. Since when another danger happens in the EU's outskirts, the EU ought to choose to lead from behind as opposed to step up.

Shortcoming of the Current Role of International Organizations

This paper argues that there are some deficiencies in the current role of international organizations for fighting ISIS. ISIS has been active in Iraq since 2004, but the success of the international coalitions in fighting it and managing its impact is very limited.

The UN has limitation in its fight against ISIS because, unlike NATO, UN has no air and ground forces to destroy ISIS. Having said that, UN's role is imperative because it has legitimate position to coordinate international powers to fight ISIS that have challenged international peace and security, basic human rights and the protection of fundamental freedom. Furthermore, ISIS terrorism attacks span not only in Iraq and Syria, but also in many parts of the world, so UN has more legitimacy to promote necessary and politically viable cooperation (Global Viewpoint Network, 2015).

The UN has the potential to promote the cooperation between international organizations and actors (NATO, Arab League, EU, the Iraqi army, Russia and Iran) to fight ISIS. However, until recently, the actions from the UN are considered very limited over the past few years because of the fundamental disagreement within the Security Council about just what the future of these countries – Iraq and Syria – ought to be. While all five Security Council members was agreeable on being

opposed to ISIS (with the exception of China that is somewhat indifferent to such affairs), they cannot agree on what measures to take to achieve this aim.

There is conflict of interests among the five permanent Security Council members on the conflict in Iraq and Syria (Security Council, 2015). Russia, according to its history, underpins Assad, the Alawite despot, the Syrian government strengths/structure and their Shiite partners in the district, particularly Iran. They need to dispense with ISIS and reestablish the Syrian government, whose force was tested when the Syrian Civil War started in 2011 (PORGMUN, 2016). On the other hand, the US has repeatedly called for Assad to step down and believes (wishfully) that there is a third party in the region with enough military force to defeat ISIS with Western support and a democratic, humanitarian ideal that is in line with Western's interest. The UK and France support the US position, but with a qualification - the UK insists that Assad can remain as an interim leader, but cannot remain in the long term.

Many observers hope NATO can play a bigger role in fighting ISIS. NATO's role in the fighting against ISIS is not optimum for lack of consensus reason. NATO works on a consensus model of governance; thus, unless each members votes in favour of an action, they cannot proceed with it as a NATO mission. Much like the UN, however, individual members are free to act in their own best interests, so although NATO or UN have reached no consensus on fighting ISIS, individual members can proceed with their measures *(US, Turkey have 'a conflict of interest': Analyst,* 2016).

As for now, ISIS has used terrorist measures to attack NATO members several times, but NATO has not come to consensus to go for war against ISIS in a full scale. In the response against the threat of ISIS, no country has asked to invoke Article 5 of NATO Treaty so they can go on full scale war against ISIS. Article 5 of NATO (1949) delineates that an armed attack against NATO's member shall be considered an attack against NATOThus, NATO will assist the member being attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other member states, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.

Turkey which shares borders with Iraq and Syria has experienced some attacked on its soil, but its attitude towards fighting ISIS can be considered ambiguous for not asking invoking the Article 5 of NATO Treaty (Labott and Borne,

2016). The US has called for NATO to play a bigger role in the fight against ISIS, but two of its largest members – France and Germany – which have experienced several attacks in their soil are still relunctant to respond to that call since they are concerned that more profound NATO contribution in Syria could be taken by Moscow as an incitement that the organization together is trying to augment its impact (Emmot, Stewart & Siebold, 2016). In addition, it is debatable that many members of NATO are still feeling traumatic to deploy ground troop against ISIS. After the huge debacle of the 2001 Afghanistan war and 2003 Iraq war, NATO arguably would be unwilling to launch another unpopular and long drawn ground offensive in the same volatile region.

Pentagon experts are said to trust ISIS will be forever smothered just by managed activity by ground troops whose assignment would be to physically wrest control of those territories presently possessed by the ISIS "caliphate". Involvement in Afghanistan (after 2001), Iraq (after 2003) and Libya (after 2011) positively recommends that air control alone, regardless of the possibility that unchallenged, can't accomplish a reasonable and enduring triumph. Be that as it may, the profoundly scarring eight-year control of Iraq has made the US and Britain hesitant to continued extensive scale ground troop arrangement in the Middle East. Regardless of the possibility that it were thought attractive, limit would need, given NATO's still fragmented withdrawal from Afghanistan and the new requests postured by the "quick response power" conceived for Eastern Europe because of Russia's military mediation in Ukraine (Tisdal, 2014).

The regional power – The Arab League – have no capability to send in ground forces, which is what it would take to completely destroy the group. Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which are the strongest of the League states, are already overstretched dealing with the Houthis in Yemen and none of these countries has armed forces created to be deployed abroad. It is arguable that the focus of Arabic states are merely internal security and their current objective is to keep the government from bring overthrown in a revolution (Almasmari, 2015). It is debatable that the cause of eradicating ISIS might not serve their purpose. The Arab League has interest to keep ISIS in power as it may serve as obstacle for Iran and Syria and to prevent the mullahs in Iran from providing more assistance to Bashar al Assad. Thus, ISIS have served the interests of Arab countries to weaken the Shi'ite power in Iran and Syria (Fulton, Holliday, & Wyer, 2013).

The reluctant of Arab leaders are evidential. Ahmed Rashid (2015) indicates the Arab's reluctance with these evidence: Firstly, there was absence of response from the Arab and more extensive Muslim world after the 2014 and 2015 psychological militant assaults in Paris and Beirut. Also, The US-drove coalition to battle Isis in Iraq and Syria is reeling from renunciations by Arab expresses that have progressively discovered reasons not to participate in military activities against the Islamist aggressor bunch, despite the fact that some of their own capitals have been targets. Universal weight is mounting on the Arab states. Thirdly, The UAE and Saudi Arabia long back quit bombarding Isis focuses in Iraq and Syria, asserting that they were excessively occupied with Yemen — where the contention is confined as opposed to a local risk. At last, the welloff Arab states likewise can't concede to who to back and arm among the bunch Syrian gatherings nor have they gave enough subsidizing to UN and other guide associations operations in the outcast emergency that ejected in Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon and has now spread to Europe. What's more, while the Europeans faced off regarding what number of displaced people to take in, the Gulf States have yet to consent to restore any Syrian or Iraqi evacuees (Rashid, 2015).

As discussed previously, EU has developed a counter-terrorism strategy (2005) that emphasizes the dedication of EU part states to together battling fear mongering both in Europe and universally. The EU's ISIS arrangement, that used to make activities for ceasing compassionate emergencies in the locale, has transformed into a battle against psychological oppression. Nonetheless, the EU has restricted legitimate and authoritative limit since it is the part expresses that have the genuine power to battle fear based oppression. After the failure of occupation in Iraq have made EU reluctant to be involved in the combat against ISIS. However, EU has played its role in supporting the fight against ISIS indirectly by providing contributions, donors, advise and programmers so as to create political answers for the Syrian and Iraqi emergencies, and also the debasement of ISIS limits, while assuming a key part in lightening the sensational compassionate results of the emergencies. Generous facilitated endeavors have been made to vanquishing ISIS with a substantial scope of inside and outside measures (European External Action Service 2016).

The shortcoming of EU's measures in their fight against ISIS is on its focus only on humanitarian measures and contribution for institutional building in Iraq and

Syria. In their domestic part, EU strives to strengthen European law enforcement and intelligence capabilities. It is arguable that EU's strategy has no direct effects on fighting ISIS. ISIS has easilty retaliated by influencing its supporters in Europe to launch attacks against European targets. Harleen Gambhir – the Counterterrorism Fellow at the Institute for the Study of War – observes that ISIS attacks in European soils was carefully planned as it particularly aim to destabilize Europe through polarization, which it calls "destroying the grayzone." ISIS trusts assaults in its name will incite state and social reaction against Europe's Muslim people group, empowering radicalization and jihadist enlistment. ISIS's place of refuge inside Iraq, Syria, and now Libya will keep on providing the logistical foundation important to prepare, asset, and direct assault cells in Europe. Accordingly, Gambhir (2016) recommends that the counter ISIS coalition must deny ISIS of its regional control as a caliphate, which is its essential wellspring of quality, with a specific end goal to crush the ISIS danger to Europe.

Conclusion

This paper concludes the discussion by arguing the imperative for a stronger coalition of international organizations and actors to manage strategies to fight ISIS and achieve a total solution for the crisis in Iraq and Syria.

As for now, military powers from some countries are directly involved in fighting ISIS - the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, France - alongside a few Arab countries and the Kurds. In addition, the international organization (UN, NATO, Arab League and EU) –although some observers criticized their limited involvement – also have played their roles in various level by providing supports for the fight. However, given the shortcoming of the current coalitions and roles of international organization, there is necessity to rethink the strategies.

Fighting ISIS requires more things beyond just military means; thus, it is an imperative to form a stronger coalition of international organizations to manage strategies to fight ISIS. The aims of the coalition's strategy should be to: (1) limit and reduce ISIS threats to national, regional and global security; (2) relieve humanitarian crisis affecting the people in Iraq and Syria; (3) strengthen government capabilities to provide national as well as human security and peace; and (4) achieve acceptable political solutions to cater conflicting factions in these countries to join democratic system; and (5) promote democratic values to the nations to respect life, peace,

liberty, justice, equality, diversity, truth, human rights, freedom of religion, and rule of laws.

Subscribing to neoliberal institutionalist theory, the paper argues that international organization should play leading roles in encouraging cooperation between states in the cause of fighting against ISIS. International regime should lead to coordinate the cooperation among states to achieve their common interest to contain and reduce ISIS threats in the Middle East and its spread of terrors at the rest of the world. The study argues that UN is the most legitimate international organization to lead the fight against ISIS because it has founded since 1945 to maintain peace and security, promote the respect for human rights, freedom and security, and to accomplish international co-operation in tackling worldwide issues of a monetary, social, social or humanitarian character (United Nations, 1945). In addition to that, other related international organizations (NATO, Arab League, the European Union) and states related to the conflict should be involved to work together to support the cause of fighting ISIS and promoting peace and security in Iraq and Syria.

The study admits that achieving a unitary international organization is very difficult now due to the divergence of interests among states. For this case, international regime should go back to the first purpose of the United Nations and negotiate the interests among conflicting parties and international actors.

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WOMEN AS IRREGULAR MIGRANTS: INDONESIA'S CHALLENGES FOR HUMAN SECURITY

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Abstract

Women is a quintessential part in globalization, and at the same time, are also the most exposed element to face various challenges that threaten their welfare and security within the society. Issues such as cultural, social, and economic have made women vulnerable, particularly those who live in poverty, where women are currently making up seventy percent of world's poor population. This situation is also one of the causes on why a significant number of women are involved as irregular migrants, whether as refugees, economic migrants, and even trafficking. This paper is choosing Indonesia as a country for the case study on researching the problems and challenges of women as irregular migrants. It will use the concept of human security and pose a question on how human security for women as irregular migrants in Indonesia are provided by the government. In terms of economic and personal security, women are still often being put in a very vulnerable condition, where sometimes they are being trafficked to be sexual objects, or have to travel abroad illegally, in order to fulfill their economic needs. There will be two important points to highlight in this paper. First, it will argue about the policy of Indonesian government in handling the challenges of human security for women, especially those with middle and low income, and its impacts that encourage the increasing number of irregular migrants. Second, this paper will talk about the importance of the role of government as well as society at large in creating the security for women in Indonesia, and therefore, protecting women as an important part of the society.

Keywords: Irregular Migrants, Human Security, Indonesia, Women

Introduction

The topic of human security for women is one of essential subjects in the contemporary global politics. Out of the poor population in today's world, seventy percent of them are women, and mostly located in developing countries including Indonesia. This situation has put women in a vulnerable condition, where women suffer from a number of threats in their social, economic, cultural and other aspects of their lives. In other words, the world is currently dealing with substantial challenges for women in terms of human security (Clark, 2003).

Since the issue of human security for women has become a global phenomenon, the urgency to highlight this issue in the international level has increased tremendously.. In the year 2000, the United Nations adopted the

resolution 1325 which focuses on women's equal participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security. The resolution is also intended to urge all actors to increase the participation of women and incorporate gender perspective in all areas of peacebuilding. Up to now, including resolution 1325, the UN has adopted seven resolutions on Women, Peace, and Security, with a quite wide range of problems to address. They are including protection against forced displacement; security of women during and post conflict; as well as the identification of problems regarding sexual violence against women (UN, n.d.).

In terms of human security, the concern for women is also including their involvement in irregular migration which put them in a vulnerable position. As women are more likely to be in a desperate economic and social situation, they are also highly prone to become victims. This has also been the negative side effect of globalization, which contributes to a high inequality of women's life, particularly in developing countries, and is even considered as ignoring and marginalizing women's indigenous movements in the Global South (Butale, 2015). This encourages women to migrate in order to find better opportunities at jobs as well as livelihood, which could end in two scenarios. First is, it will widen the labor market for women who cannot find jobs in their countries. However, the second scenario is the dangerous risks of migration, especially those conducted irregularly and illegally, which are carried in various aspects such as exploitation in domestic jobs and vulnerability to violence (UN Women, n.d.).

The threats for women's security as victims of migrations is particularly alarming in the developing countries, one of which is in Indonesia. As the world's fourth most populous country, with almost 240 million people spread across an archipelago of 17,600 islands and a porous coastline of 81,000 km long along with the highest Muslim population in the world, Indonesia experiences a rather unique situation regarding migration issue. It is one of the ultimate source, destination as well as transit country for out-bound and in-bound migrants. Domestically, it also experiences movements of population due to demands for labor, communal tensions and natural disasters within the country (IOM Indonesia, n.d.).

In 2013, the International Development Research Centre of Canada discovered in their research that international labor migration has become a major concern for Indonesia in recent decades. Over 2 percent of the 240 million people

making up the country's total population are deployed to various Middle-Eastern and Asian countries (IDRC, 2013). This is resulted in a significant Indonesian domestic workers which had to confront the risk of exploitation and abuse at every stage of the migration cycle, including recruitment, training, transit, employment, and return (HRW, 2004).

This paper will elaborate on how Indonesia handles the challenges of human security for women and its implications impacts that encourage the increasing number of irregular migrants. This paper will also discuss the significance of the role of Indonesia, and assess the domestic policy and foreign policy regarding human security and protection of women. The result of the research is expected to contribute to the future consideration of Indonesian government in policymaking and at the same time providing comparison to other countries with similar concerns and state of affairs in dealing with contemporary issues of globalization, such as irregular migration.

Literature Review

Globalization and People Movement

In the past three decades, globalization has been defined through various phenomenon, one of which is, arguably, international migration. It is reported that in the recent years, 3.2 percent of the world's population, which are about more than 200 million people in estimation (210 million in 2010, 223 million in 2013), are living outside their country of origin (International Labour Organization, 2010; Thornhill, 2013). This has become a global phenomenon that affects most, if not all, nations in the world, and is a priority for national, regional, and international policy agendas.

Since the 1980s, international migration has been a contemporary trend following the rise of globalization. The movement of labor that happens across country borders is significantly accelerated due to certain aspects of globalization. For instance, the evolution on technology and communication has made it drastically easier for information to spread, thus affecting people's decision of life options. Knowledge regarding better living standards, salary, as well as social conditions in other countries has become more and more available, and encourage even higher rate of people's movement. Globalization has created a reduction of time and distance, both real and symbolic, and provided promising incentives for people which encourage them to move across borders (Beneria, et. al., 2012).

Movement due to the existence of globalization is also encouraged by liberal theorists. For liberals, national borders should be open for free markets, labor mobility and individual liberty. Due to its belief in cooperation among countries, in liberal perspective, ideally international institutions and international laws are supposed to set rules and regulations to respect individual freedom and democracy, and contribute to shaping more cooperative and open-minded state behavior towards globalization and migration (Song & Cook [ed.], 2015). However, this does not necessarily mean efforts made by all actors involved in international migration go without any hindrances.

With the hype of globalization, migration also carries dangerous risks if misconducts take place and make people more vulnerable to exploitation and violence, where they can be exposed as irregular migrants (UN Women, n.d.). Free movements suggested by liberals, like trade liberalization, have instead made workers' conditions worse in many parts of the world, rather than helping them to eradicate poverty, underdevelopment and corruption (Song & Cook [ed.], 2015).

There is no definitive explanation on what is considered as irregular migration. International Organization for Migration (IOM) defines it as *'movement that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving countries'*. From the perspective of receiving countries it is entry, stay or work in a country without the necessary authorization or documents required under immigration regulations*.* From the perspective of the sending country, for instance, the irregularity is seen in cases in which a person crosses an international boundary without a valid passport or travel document or does not fulfill the administrative requirements for leaving the country. There is, however, a tendency to give limitation to the use of the term "illegal migration" strictly to cases of smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons (IOM, n.d.). International Labour Organization (ILO) is also agree that the term "illegal migrants" perceive a negative impression if referred to the migrant workers themselves. Instead, the terms "irregular migration" and "migrant workers in irregular status" are the preferred terms increasingly accepted by the ILO and other international organizations to describe movement of people who are authorized to enter, stay and work pursuant to the law of the destination country and international agreements to which it is a party (ILO, 2010).

Irregular Migration and Human Security

In terms of human security, irregular migration pose a considerable threats, and women, more often than not, become victims of violence from human rights and human security, as more than 50 percent of all migrants consist of women, outnumbering their male counterparts, especially in the developed regions of the world (ILO, 2010). Migrants are often to be found working in jobs that are dirty, dangerous and degrading. While for some people migration is a positive and empowering experience, far too many migrants have to endure human rights violations, discrimination, and exploitation. Human rights violations against migrants, including denial of access to fundamental economic and social rights such as the rights to education or the right to health, are often closely linked to discriminatory laws and practice, and to deep-seated attitudes of prejudice and xenophobia against migrants, which are all considered human insecurity (OHCHR, n.d.).

As far as definition goes, human security has a very wide range of aspects on what have to be in protection, and it is including the violence of human rights against migrants. Human security is popularly defined as freedom from fear and freedom from want as the two main aspects to identify Human Security. When UNDP first introduced the concept, freedom from fear translated into safety from such prolonged threats as hunger, disease and repression, while freedom from want is defined as protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life, whether in homes, in their places of employment or communities. These two aspects can exist at all levels of national income and development. UNDP also listed the seven main categories of human security which including *economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security,* and *political security*. (UNDP HDR, 1994).

Migrants, in general, are vulnerable due to the dangerous risks that they are exposed to. However, irregular migrants are even more prone to violation against the seven categories that are stated in human security. In 2004, a resolution by International Labour Conference (ILC) related to migrant workers in a global economy identified several categories of highly at risk migrant workers: women migrant workers, particularly women in domestic service and the informal economy; temporary migrant workers, including seasonal workers; and migrant workers in irregular status, including trafficked workers. The resolution called for encouragement "to eliminate all forms of gender discrimination in the labor market

and to promote gender equality between women and men and to dismantle barriers which prevent women from obtaining economic autonomy through their labor market participation on an equal footing with men" (ILO, 2004).

Relations between human security and irregular migration is also discussed by Song & Cook (2015). As a result of their unauthorized labor migration, irregular migrants tend to work as unskilled labors which are experiencing insecurities in various aspects of seven categories in human security. For instance, their off days are not guaranteed, their access to food are highly inadequate, accommodation is poor and the job is unsafe. Their economic, food and health securities are in danger. Because of their unwarranted legal status, their personal and community securities are threatened, for instance, large number of irregular migrants often results in violence and regional conflicts. While in terms of health and environmental securities, unregistered migrants with no access to health services also pose potential threats for public hygiene or infectious diseases in hosting countries (Song & Cook [ed.], 2015).

In terms of people movement, Indonesia is one of the countries that become the primary source of migrants, and even considered as a labor-surplus nation, due to its fairly high rate of unemployment. By 2006, it is estimated that 11 percent of Indonesian workers (11.6 million) were unemployed, and that 20 percent, or about 45 million workers, were underemployment (Hugo, 2007). The paper will discuss later on how women migrant workers in particular are threatened in terms of human security. This will be followed with discussions on the significance of Indonesian government in dealing with issues concerning human security of women migrants considering Indonesia's position as a country with high number of female workers abroad.

Data Analysis

Human Security of Women Migrant Workers

In the past few years, the number of women migrating on their own is gradually increasing, and they are accounted for almost half of all current international migrants. Their participation in labor force has reached parity with their male counterparts, and for many of them, migration provides significant benefits such as new opportunities, economic independence, and status. On the other hand, plenty still experience marginalization in salary, with jobs that are barely protected. While

women are far more educated nowadays, they are still not yet given the equal opportunity in labor market, and many are still channeled disproportionately into work considered traditionally acceptable for women, and rarely achieve any high-level positions in management and leadership. However, women are still encouraged to migrate due to high economic incentive, and in some cases, combined with strong personal aspirations and in some cases family violence (Trương & Gasper (Eds.], 2011; ILO, 2010; UN Women, 2010; UN Women, n.d.).

As established earlier, mobility or movement of people is significantly promoted by globalization. It contributes to the increasing flow of migrant workers from countries with less economic opportunities to countries in need of labor. Women migrant workers, particularly, contribute to the development and economic improvement of both sending and receiving countries. In 2008, remittances were estimated by the World Bank at US$305 billion. These monetary investments used for food, housing, education and medical services along with newly acquired skills of returnees, can potentially contribute significantly to poverty reduction and the Millennium Development Goals. On the other hand, despite fostering the acceleration of economy internationally, globalization neglects the need of environment that look after economic, social and personal security of the migrant workers. Harsher situation is even experienced by woman migrant workers since they are constituting 50 percent or more of the migrant workforce, especially in Asia and Latin America (UN Women, 2010).

ILO has established a list of cause of discrimination often experienced by women migrant workers which are as follows: 1) Sex, as women workers face to face with men workers; 2) Discrimination in race, color and ethnicity, where in labor market situations equal treatment and opportunities are rarely applied, mainly in the case of women migrant workers belonging to a certain ethnic or racial group when faced with the racial or ethnic origin of the majority of the population; 3) Occupation, where they perform jobs where they are not formally considered workers; 4) Discrimination in wages, where they are not paid equally to their other fellow workers; 5) Nationality, as foreign workers vis-à-vis nationals; and 6) And their status of migration status, whether documented or undocumented (ILO, 2009).

These risks are even higher to irregular women migrants, which are, most of the time, dealing with a serious protection problems. Women migrants consistently lack access to social services and legal protection and are subjected to abuses such

as harsh working and living conditions, low wages, illegal withholding of wages and premature termination of employment. The worst abuses force women into sexual slavery. Not to mention, those who are poor and desperate are particularly subjected to be taken advantage of and manipulated. Aside from being in danger to be victims of illegal migration such as trafficking in person and smuggling, women migrant workers also often suffer from plenty of risks such as sexual violence or even being manipulated to get involved to illegal and criminal activities (ILO, 2010; UN Women, 2010).

Several cases experienced by women migrant workers clearly show a threat to human security for women when they opted, although desperately or even forced, to participate in migrant labor forces. One case, for instance, is experienced by Erwiana, Indonesian migrant worker who was sent to Hong Kong to work as domestic helper and went home in 2014 with bodily harm caused by continuous physical assaults done by her employer, 44-year-old Law Wan Tung, during her seven month time of work. Erwiana was lucky enough to have her story published widely in the media, and it gave her courage and opportunity to fight for the injustice she suffered which resulted in Law Wan Tung having to deal with legal consequences. In 2014, Erwiana made into the list of TIME's magazine 100 Most Influential People due to her fight for justice and courage for standing up against her former employer (BBC, 2014a; BBC, 2014b; Mam, 2014).

Although there seems to be a silver lining by the end of the day for Erwiana, it is still important to understand that torture and assaults that she had to endure are highly unnecessary to happen, if only she had the protection or prior knowledge before the employment. Another story came from Satinah, a former migrant also working a domestic job in Saudi Arabia, who was sentenced to death for murdering her employer. She claimed that she acted on self-defense due to the constant physical abuse she had while working. Satinah's life was spared after Indonesian government along with donations from all over sources in Indonesia paid as much as 7 million Saudi Riyals, for what is called as 'blood money', to pardon Satinah and release her from the death penalty (Elwazer & Quiano, 2014; Kompas, 2015).

Again, not too different with Erwiana, despite being spared and now currently back home with her family, Satinah suffered from abuse and violence on a daily basis during her employment. Although she is not entirely innocent as she committed murder, it was clear that she was desperate and felt triggered to protect herself

which resulted in her murdering her employer, who was hitting her continuously with a wooden ruler before the murder finally committed. Same thing cannot be said about the two other Indonesian workers in Saudi Arabia, Karni and Siti Zainab. In 2014, both were executed in Saudi Arabia within the same week, after sentenced to death for murdering both of their employers. These executions were done without any prior official notice to the government of Indonesia, which led to fierce criticism and protests from the country (Quiano & Whiteman, 2015).

Satinah, Karni and Siti Zainab are only a few of dozens of death penalty cases faced by Indonesian women migrants, in Saudi Arabia only. By 2014, there were 39 cases of death penalty against Indonesian migrants who are not yet solved (Antara News, 2014). These migrant workers were not necessarily unprovoked when they committed the crime. Most of time, they were in such a defenseless circumstance, with their security threatened, that they did not have any choice but self-defense, which sometimes resulted in the worst-case scenarios. This happens more often than expected because these migrant workers are clueless about what their rights are, and combine with their desperate situation for better jobs and livelihood forcing them into a position where they experience human insecurity.

It is important to acknowledge that the above-mentioned cases are not irregular migrant workers because they went through an official process of migration. Yet they were still exposed to physical and sexual violence, and struggling to get protection and justice, and even basic needs that are required according to aspects in human security, such as food security, health security, and so on. Before this paper elaborate deeper on the root causes of these lack of protection, it is also essential to discuss about irregular migrants and their human security, which most of time are even more unfortunate compare to the legal worker migrants.

One case happened to Sihatul Alfiyah, an Indonesian migrant worker in Taiwan. In 2014, Sihatul was allegedly assaulted by her employer while again, working as a domestic helper, which resulted in her being in a comma and admitted into a Taiwan's hospital. However, when the representative from Indonesian embassy tried to investigate her case, they experience difficulties because her passport and documentation were under a different name. Which means, Sihatul was not holding a legal required documentation when entering Taiwan. This situation made Sihatul's case more complicated to process, and her employer ended up walking away without any legal consequences, after paying for Sihatul to be sent

home to Indonesia. After 8 months in Taiwan's hospital, and 8 other months in a hospital in Indonesia, Sihatul passed away in early 2015. There was a long process of struggle to find justice for Sihatul which involving so many parties, such as Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Migrant Care Indonesia's Council of People Representative, BNP2TKI, and so many others. Yet, due to lack of evidence as well as Sihatul's legal situation which was rather in a grey area, her employer walk out of the case freely with no consequences (BBC, 2014; Tempo News, 2015).

The afore-mentioned cases are only a few that made their ways out into public eyes and ears, and there are more which probably undetected and have yet to be solved. These cases are evidence that most of the time during their employment, human security of these migrant workers are highly at risk. Their food security was threatened for not being fed well and they also struggled for their economic security because their salaries were detained by the employers, their personal and political security were also exposed because of the sexual and physical violence and difficulties to access justice and legal protection. In terms of health security, they did not get proper health service. What made the situations worsened was that there was no adequate medical treatment for them (the abused women workers) as demonstrated in the cases of Erwiana who was brutally assaulted, and Satinah who passed away after more than a year being in a comma

Indonesia as a labor-surplus country contribute to approximately 6 million workers abroad, with 70 percent of them are women (IFRC, 2015). On the other hand, there are no exact data on how many of Indonesian are involved as irregular migrants. By 2015, it was reported that there were around 20.000 irregular migrants who entered Malaysia without any legal documents (Tempo, 2016). Indonesian women were also prone to trafficking in person, which is one form of irregular migrants. In early 2016, Indonesian police have successfully uncovered one of the biggest network of trafficking in Indonesia, which allegedly have trafficked 600 Indonesian migrant workers (Adriansyah, 2016).

Considering the high number of women migrants from Indonesia which experience various cases and problems related to their human security, it is absolutely important to discuss how the government of Indonesia handle the issue. In the next section of this paper, there will be a deeper elaboration on policies taken by Indonesian government, and how it affects the dynamic of human security of migrants, as well as challenges faced by the Indonesian government and the society

in general.

Indonesia's Policy and Challenges for Human Security of Migrants

There are two main points that need to be highlighted regarding how Indonesia handle the issue of migrants. First, in terms of irregular migrants from other countries such as refugees or trafficking victims from Iran, Afghanistan, Myanmar, and others, Indonesia is playing quite an important role as a transit country. By 2015, Indonesia has been housing 13,000 migrants that soon need to be relocated to other countries with more stable economic and social conditions such as European countries, Australia or the United States. However, with the recent influx of migrants to the Europe from the Middle East, Indonesia is urged to find an alternative solution for the 13,000 migrants it is currently housing (Salim, 2015).

So far, Indonesia is considered as actively engaged in finding the best solution for the issue of the irregular migrants currently being housed in the country. Indonesia even went as far as regarded to be a regional success story by the IOM Indonesia, praising that the country has developed an effective system to manage the issue of irregular migrants with proactive response, without having to wait for too long to build up capacity to respond. Indonesia is keenly participating and even initiating meetings along with relevant countries to encourage cooperation, as currently there are 1,000 Rohingya refugees that are in an urgent need of asylum aid from the international community (IOM Indonesia, 2015a; IOM Indonesia, 2015b; Salim, 2015).

On the other hand, there is a second point to Indonesia's role in facing challenges regarding the issue of irregular migrants. As explained in the previous section, a significant number of Indonesian migrant workers, particularly women, are experiencing threats regarding their human security. It is fairly obvious that Indonesia still struggles in dealing with the issue of migrant workers who are sent abroad, despite being considered as successful in responding to the issue of irregular migrants such as refugees, and even managed to uncover one of the biggest human trafficking networks in the country, with victims as high as 600 Indonesian migrant workers. One article in Jakarta Post even went as far as calling the irregular migration issue faced by Indonesia as an irony (IOM Indonesia, 2015b; Adriansyah, 2016).

It is considered ironic because as a signing and ratifying party of the 2000 UN

Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and UN Convention on the Protection of Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, Indonesia needs to adapt all the international norm to its national legislation. However, even until now the process of localization of such global norms into Indonesia's legislation has been very minimal (Acharya, 2009). The reason why the migrant workers, even the ones who go through a legal migration process, are still vulnerable to threats of human security is because their treatment even before their placement are not prepared well. In fact, 80 percent of the problems for Indonesian migrant workers begin at home (Adriansyah, 2016).

Most of the migrant workers, before leaving to other countries, are required to follow some trainings, in terms of language, and other things they need to learn such as their rights and obligations once they are employed. However, these potential workers sometimes are left with a third party such as agents to take care of these requirements, and they do not necessarily do a proper job with these migrant workers. Some agency even charge these migrant workers above the average cost to give them trainings, and by the time the women are employed, they are all in debt to the agency for the payment of said trainings. The workers are also made to sign contracts without having a full understanding of the content, since they are lengthy and written in English, a language that they are not familiar with. As a result, the migrant workers are sent with very minimum knowledge and understanding of their rights and obligations, and many experienced a violation of human rights and human security such as physical and sexual assaults, limited supply of food, limited freedom of movement, and unreasonable working hour (Armandhanu, et.al., 2014).

This does not mean that the government of Indonesia have done nothing regarding this alarming matter. In 2004, Indonesian government establish an institution to deal with migrant workers called the National Board of Placement and Protection for Indonesian Migrant Workers (*Badan Nasional Penempatan dan Perlindungan Tenaga Kerja Indonesia* or *BNP2TKI*) that answers to the Minister of Manpower and Transmigration of Indonesia, and is responsible for the protection of migrant workers from the beginning of preparation, employment, all the way to returning (BNP2TKI, 2011).

Another important job of BNP2TKI is also to aid migrant workers who struggling with legal and social problems, dealing with their complaints and provide service that assure the protection of migrant workers. The institution answers and

attempts to solve the complaints that are submitted to them in various media, such as phone call, direct visit, post mail, electronic mail, text message, and others. Based on the data provided by Crisis Centre in BNP2TKI, from June 2011 to December 2014, it has received 18,420 complaints and has resolved 12,257 out of the total complaints received (BNP2TKI, 2015). In percentage, in the span of 3 years, BNP2TKI has resolved around 66.54 percent complaints submitted by migrant workers, as shown in the chart below.

Figure 1. Complaints Received by BNP2TKI Year 2011-2014

Source: Crisis Center BNP2TKI Selesaikan 66,54 Persen Layanan Pengaduan. (2015, January 5). Retrieved July 31, 2016, from http://www.bnp2tki.go.id/read/9758/Crisis-Center-BNP2TKI-Selesaikan-6654-Persen-Layanan-Pengaduan-

Based on the data provided, it is clearly showing that BNP2TKI has been fairly successful in providing service to handle complaints from migrant workers, considering it has resolved almost 70 percent of the total complaints reported during 2011 to 2014. However, it is also important to note that there are 33.46 percent of unresolved ones, or similar to 6,163 complaints submitted, that have yet to be handled for various reasons. Although, BNP2TKI claims that these complaints are all still being processed, whether internal or external of the institution. The process are including data validation, distribution process, process in the working unit of BNP2TKI, and process outside BNP2TKI (BNP2TKI, 2015).

The establishment of BNP2TKI since 2004, and the service they provide shows the serious concern regarding the problem of migrant workers whether at home or abroad. However, it is also fair to admit that BNP2TKI as an institution still

have their limitations in order to solve the very root cause of migrant workers' problems. Some are even starting at home, such as the lack of professionalism of agency in preparing the migrant workers to adapt in their place of employment. Plenty of migrant workers are even manipulated by their own agencies, where they are required to pay a high amount of training fees, which later on will be taken from their salaries once the workers are employed. Therefore, so many cases of migrant workers abroad have been employed for months, or even years, yet never received their salaries as it is used to pay off their debt (Armandhanu, et.al., 2014).

The government of Indonesia also needs to take care of the human security of the migrant workers when they are employed abroad. The assaults and violence endured by Erwiana, Satinah, and Sihatul are only a few of so many cases occurred during employment, regardless if they are migrant workers who have gone through all the legal process to be employed, or if they are irregular migrants, with incomplete or even false documentation. Due to an extreme lack of care and preparation while they are at home, many of migrant workers are highly exposed to violation of human rights and human security during their employment. On the other hand, there are also other threats which unnecessarily related to migrant issues, yet still significant to human security of the migrant workers.

One of the case happens to Merry Utami, Indonesian migrant worker who once was employed in Taiwan. She opted to be a migrant worker to escape her abusive husband, and later involved with a man who took her to Nepal. When the pair returned separately to Indonesia, she claimed that the man told him to bring a bag, without realizing that it contained heroin (Sim, 2016). When entering Indonesian border through Soekarno-Hatta airport, Merry was captured by the authority after proven carrying 1.1 kilograms of heroin in her luggage. She is currently imprisoned in Nusa Kambangan, and facing a death penalty, following the law regarding drug dealing in Indonesia (Lestari, 2016).

Similar case also happened to Mary Jane Veloso, a mother of two from a poor family in the Philippines. She used to work a domestic job in Dubai but left the country after an attempted rape. Veloso was on her way to find another job, by entering Indonesia via Malaysia, when she was caught carrying a suitcase with 2.65 kilograms of heroin. Veloso claimed that she was tricked by a trafficking gang to smuggle the drugs. Veloso has been in Indonesian prison for six years now, and just like Merry Utami she was also sentenced to death, following the drug dealing law in

Indonesia (Holmes, 2016).

Both of this migrant workers are currently in reprieve, right in the very last minute before the time for their execution. However, it is still not yet clear whether or not they are permanently released from the death sentence, or if the reprieves are only temporary. These two cases show how, in terms of human security, migrant workers such as Veloso or Utami are extremely vulnerable to be taken advantage of and exposed to manipulation. Although the case of Veloso and Utami are still under review, and it has not yet been proven whether they are only victims of manipulation or actually part of the drug dealer ring, it is only fair to notice that there a real threat for women's security as women migrant workers, such as the ones that have been mentioned earlier. Migrants become perfect targets for drug trafficking rings because they are often poor and in a desperate situation with have limited education, but they hold passports (Sim, 2016).

It is rather paradoxical if seeing the policy taken by Indonesian government on two sides of the issues. On one side, Indonesia is one of the countries who sends out the most number of migrant workers, especially female, and a significant number of these migrant workers experienced troubles and problems with law in the countries where they are employed. Seeing this, Indonesia tried the hardest to advocate all the migrant workers and to release them out of the legal problems. Indonesia even decided on a unilateral decision which is to ban its citizens to work in certain countries where the workers are highly exposed to violence and abuse. These countries are Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania, Egypt, Oman, Pakistan, the Palestinian territories, Qatar, South Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates, Yemen and Jordan (Whiteman, 2015).

This policy is decided by the government in the best intention to protect all migrant workers from being assaulted and tortured during their employment. However, it has been criticized heavily by groups of migrant workers because it is considered putting the migrant workers into an even more dangerous position because it will encourage irregular migrants where the workers enter the banned countries through illegal means, and thus, creating situations where their human security is more threatened. Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs claimed that more than 630,000 Indonesians work in the Middle East, which is a highly significant number. There could be even a total of 1.8 million if irregular migrant workers who

enter borders illegally are taken into account (Whiteman, 2015).

On the other hand, returning migrant workers, who are still as vulnerable, are being antagonized by Indonesian government itself. For instance, what happened in the cases of Utami and Veloso, who broke the narcotic law of the country by carrying illegal drugs into the border, regardless the allegation of them being manipulated. They are currently facing death row while waiting in prison and worrying about their uncertain fates. Meanwhile, these women are just as guilty as much as they are victims, just like the cases of Indonesian migrant workers who committed murders for self-defense in Saudi Arabia and other countries. A significant number of protests are directed to the government for sentencing these migrant workers to death without having a deeper investigation to find out the main network of drug ring that manipulated these workers.

For a country who is also dealing with various problems of migrant workers, and whose citizens are also facing the same sentence such as death penalty, public eyes are judging the Indonesian government as being blind when it comes to enforce the domestic law of the country. Indonesia tend to see the case of manipulated migrant workers in the drug case in a black and white frame, instead of attempting to provide advocacy and considering the possibility that they are only victims. For the case of Merry Utami, for instance, the Indonesian National Commission on Violence against Women said that there is an urgent need to review the case such as Utami's. She should be granted a reprieve as her case highlighted how easily poor women in Indonesia fell prey to drug syndicates. Most women involved in drug syndicates come from poor family, and therefore there is a need to postpone the death penalty to these poor women due to manipulation, and they are much deserving of a case review before being sentenced (Farrow & Rahadi, 2016).

The next section of this paper will examine these policies based on the cases already mentioned above, and whether or not it is a strategy that is right on target to truly solve the problems of human security of migrant workers, abroad as well as at home. It will also discuss the reasons and criticisms about the importance of the role of government as well as society at large in changing the security for women, particularly female migrant workers and irregular migrants, in Indonesia.

Discussion

The main root cause of threats regarding human security of female migrant workers is economy. Most female migrant workers from Indonesia opted to work abroad because they were living in poverty and could not find any job opportunities in the country. By February 2016, unemployment rate of Indonesia has reached 5.5 percent, or equals to 7.02 million that are currently unemployed (Indonesia Investment, 2016). Seeing this situation, the urgency for workforce population of the country to find job opportunities is significantly high, and being migrant workers has a promising economic incentives so that the workforce, particularly women, are highly encouraged to go abroad and work in blue collar jobs such as domestic helpers, factories, or farms. For those who could not fulfil all the requirements to go through the official process of migration, being irregular migrants becomes an alternative.

Economic wise, having a high number of population working as migrants in other countries will help with the economic development of Indonesia due to the remittance from and to the countries where they are employed. However, it does not mean Indonesian government ignore the high risk of violation of human rights and human security, especially women. Some feminist scholars even argue that there is an urgency to develop a feminist political economy approach when it comes to female migration and associated vulnerability of migrant women in the global service economy, in order to a more effective response to changing realities of migration involving women, some feminist scholars began to urge for a feminist political economy approach in the analysis on female migration and associated vulnerability of migrant women in the global service economy (Trương & Gasper, 2011).

This is necessary in analyzing the vulnerable position of women's labor which at times facilitated by intersecting inequalities under global capitalism. As established earlier, ILO has stated that female migrant workers often experience discrimination in various aspects and receive different treatment compared to their male counterparts (Trương & Gasper [Eds.], 2011). When it comes to economic security for women, Indonesia need not only to provide more job opportunities in general, but also to provide the opportunities in work field that promote women empowerment and eradicate discrimination, so women will not need to go abroad to find work and better opportunities.

Indonesia also could do some improvement from the legal aspect of migration. In 2013, IDRC even stated that domestic work remains undefined in the

Labor Law of Indonesia as well as of some receiving countries, exposing women to exploitation and abuse in different phases of labor migration schemes (IDRC, 2013). Indonesian domestic law such as narcotic law has also sentenced a number of migrant workers, without even acknowledging the possibility of them being manipulated. On the other hand, the law against human trafficking is also deemed inadequate, seeing the number of victims of trafficking from Indonesia is significantly high, despite the effort done by the government. Therefore, Indonesia needs to do a comprehensive review of its law, and go as far as eradicating all the corruptive behavior within its authority. At the same time, Indonesia also needs to provide legal advocacy for migrant workers who experience manipulation.

It is fair to say that due to the flow of globalization, migration is an unavoidable phenomenon, particularly with the condition of unemployment Indonesia is currently having. In terms of personal and community security for the women migrant workers, several steps could be taken by Indonesian government, for instance, there should be a more comprehensive regulation regarding the training and sending of the migrant workers. Indonesia also needs to have a better cooperation with the destination countries to guarantee the protection of the workers. However, what have been happening so far is mostly a unilateral decision taken by Indonesia, such as establishing ban against countries as mentioned earlier in the previous section of this paper.

Many scholars and activists for women migrant workers seeing this as a reckless decision as it will encourage higher number of irregular migration victims in the form of human trafficking (Whiteman, 2015). Even before the ban, the data from UNODC stated that, in 2009, Indonesia already ranked the first in the number of victims in terms of trafficking in persons detected based on country of origin (UNODC, 2015). Banning countries without any further elaborated action to protect the women migrant workers that are already there, or the ones who are having potentials to work, will only encourage the trafficking network in Indonesia to find devious way(s) to send and manipulate the workers or potential workers, and therefore, jeopardize their personal and community security.

A strict regulation is also essential to supervise the third-party agencies that will give trainings and find the place of employment for the workers. What have happened so far, the agencies often are the ones who are taking advantage of the migrant workers, due to their lack of knowledge and education. This not only

happens to agency in Indonesia, but also in destination countries such as Malaysia, Hong Kong, and others. Findings from Human Rights Watch even stated that labor agencies in Indonesia and Malaysia control most aspects of the migration process with virtually no oversight from either government (HRW, 2004). Agency in sending and recipient countries needs strict regulation so they will not exploit the migrant. This paper strongly recommends direct hiring for these women migrant workers. Otherwise, agencies need to have a strict supervision and regulation, and even legal consequences if the regulation is violated. Interviews and surveys need to be conducted and assisted by the government before releasing the workers to the agencies or the potential employers.

Last concern in the social aspect of migration, there is an urgent need for the Indonesian government to raise awareness of its citizens regarding the protection and human security of migrant workers. The government needs to work together with every aspect of the society, not only through BNP2TKI or The Ministry of Manforce, but other related aspects in the government have to cooperate with NGO such as *Komnas Perempuan*, and other organization with concern in migration and women's protection. What needs to be acknowledged by the government of Indonesia and the society at large is a real urgency to address the human security of female migrant workers, particularly irregular migrants, and some concrete actions need to be taken to assure the security of women as an important part of the society.

Conclusion

This paper is focusing in two important points. First, it examines the policy of Indonesian government in handling the challenges of human security for women, especially female migrant workers, whether legal or irregular migrants. Second, this paper discussed about the importance of the role of government as well as society at large in creating the security for women in Indonesia, in order to avoid altogether the potential of irregular migrants, as well as protecting them as legal migrant workers. There are three important aspects needs to be taken by Indonesian government in order to protect the human security of women as migrants. *First,* for the economic aspect, Indonesia needs to create more job opportunities that not only decreasing the number of irregular migrants but also promote women's empowerment. *Second,* from legal aspect, in terms of domestic law, Indonesia needs to review its law in labor and women's protection, give a more threatening punishment to manipulative

agencies and also provide advocacy for migrants that are victims of manipulation and violence. In terms of international law, Indonesia needs to cooperate more comprehensively with partner countries in order to guarantee the safety and protection of these women. *Third,* from the social aspect, Indonesia needs to raise awareness and work with every element in the society, whether domestic or international, to assure the human security of women as migrant workers. It is important to notice that this paper mainly focus on irregular migrants in terms of economic migration. As the definition of irregular migration is not definitive, further research is required to obtain a more detailed research regarding human security of women as irregular migrants in terms of refugees, trafficking, smuggling and other form of irregular migration.

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ISIL THREAT AND DERADICALISATION IN MALAYSIA

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Abstract

The emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has shocked the international community after the release of gruesome beheading videos of western journalists via the internet. The violence methods used by ISIL militants were considered as crimes and argued to be contradicted with the Islamic teachings. ISIL manages to attract many supporters and sympathisers including Malaysians to join them in Iraq and Syria. As a Muslim-majority country, the influence of ISIL in Malaysia is considered as a threat to national security and stability. The concern now is the spread of ISIL extreme ideology especially through social media to Malaysian youth which is hostile to Muslims and non-Muslims in Malaysia. If it fails to be contained pre-emptively, it can also harm the multi-religious Malaysian society through terrorism activities. This presentation focuses on ISIL threat in Malaysia and how does it attracted Malaysians particularly youths to join the militant group voluntarily. It also looks at the deradicalisation efforts by the government to counter the ISIL threats. This presentation will also highlight a ground-breaking or first ever empirical research conducted by Universiti Utara Malaysia's researchers about the influence of ISIL at the local institutions of higher learning. This will enlighten many regarding the impact of ISIL threat to society in Malaysia.

ISIL Threat in Malaysia

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) threats emerge as a global world phenomenon, transcending all over the world and have become huge concern and discussions. It is undeniable that the threats are moving so fast, which turn out to be the serious concern of every nation in the globe. Malaysia, though geographically far from Syria and Iraq, is also facing serious threats of ISIL. As a country with a Muslim majority population, Malaysia has to deal with difficult situations and challenges to curb the threats emanating by the ISIL.

One of the greatest concerns of Malaysia is the spreading of the ISIL extremist ideology to its Muslim community. The spreading of the misleading ideology is very dangerous as it had proven to cause many turmoil and chaos in the past because it propagated radicalism and violence as political means. For example, the spread of Al-Qaeda ideology had successfully helped the establishment of extremist group in Southeast Asia called Jemaah Islamiah (JI) which was committed

several terrorist attacks in Indonesia particularly such as the infamous high-profile Bali bombing in 2002. In fact, JI was founded by Abu Bakar Bashir and Abdullah Sungkar on January 1, 1993 when they were hiding in Malaysia from the prosecution of the Suharto government (van Bruinessen, 2002).

The existence of ISIL is very worrisome that it might serve as an inspiration for Islamic radicals' movements to form an alliance with ISIL. According to Malaysia's Home Minister, Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, "unlike local terror groups, such as Al-Maunah (in Sauk incident in 2000) and Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (both aiming to overthrow the government through violence) in the past, militant groups are now more linked to each other internationally" (Farik, 2014, p. 1). Presently, several radical groups who were previously linked to Al-Qaeda has re-emerged and declared its allegiance to ISIL. Among the group is the Mindanao-based radical Islamic terrorist group, Abu Sayyaf who is active in Southern Philippines and East Malaysia. For instance recently in Sabah, Abu Sayyaf gunmen kidnapped two Malaysians, a fish breeder Chan Sai Chuin on June 16, 2014 in Kunak and a marine police constable corporal Zakiah Aleip on July, 12 2014 from a police post in Mabul Island (Vanar, 2014). Also in July 2014, Abu Sayyaf had vowed its allegiance to ISIL and Abu Bakar (Baghdadi), the leader of ISIL through an oath of loyalty (Nadaraj, 2014). The resurgence of Abu Sayyaf will not only threaten Philippines citizens but also endanger Malaysia communities, particularly in eastern Sabah. In its movements, Abu Sayyaf had enormously involved in kidnapping, bombing, and other attack against civilians in Philippines. Recently, Abu Sayyaf were trusted to have recruited and trained new fighters in their military based and sending them to fight with ISIL in Iraq and Syria (Asian Pacific Post, 2014).

Malaysian has also been awakened by the emergence of four new terror organizations known as BKAW, BAJ, DIMzia and ADI (known only by their acronyms) (Straits Times, 2014a). These groups were trusted to be operating actively in Selangor and Perak, on a mission to establish a 'super' caliphate system called *Daulah Islamiah Nusantara*, which comprised several states in Southeast Asia, including Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Southern Philippines and Southern Thailand (The Malaymail Online, 2014a). These groups currently embark on aggressive recruitment of new members and are struggling in pushing their agenda ahead. Although the four groups operate independently, they are actually subscribing to the same salafi '*Jihadi*' ideology, similar to the ideology embraced by

ISIL. The salafi '*Jihadi*' justifies bloodshed for its divine purposes (Holbrook, 2014). This extreme ideology has influenced many Islamic radical movements. Most of the radical Islamic movements are operating separately, but they are obviously sharing the same missions such as to form an Islamic States, to implement the *Sharia* law and to reject democratic system. What is most terrifying is if all the groups cooperating through these common agenda and form movements to achieve their ultimate missions through violence means.

In Malaysia, struggle in pursuing the implementation of *Hudud* Law (Islamic Criminal Law) had been going on for many years. This struggle pursued by the opposition Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) still failed to be materialized even though it received supports from many Muslims in Malaysia including recently among members of the ruling party of United Malays National Organization (UMNO) under its President, Prime Minister Najib Razak, but not previously under Najib's predecessors. The failure of PAS to implement *Hudud* law to certain extent has given resentment for some Muslims, particularly for those against the secular government in Malaysia. This matter indirectly has opened the way for the more extreme ideology, like ISIL ideology, to infiltrate and influence the mind of the resentment Muslims in Malaysia. PAS however rejects ISIL. PAS Youth Wing chief Suhaizan Kalat said that "the party is worried that more (young Muslims) Malaysians are being drawn to the movement's romanticised jihadist struggle and are taking up arms with the ISIL in the Middle East…(ISIL) aims to create division and discord among Muslims" (The Malaymail Online, 2014b, p. 1).

ISIL ideology and movements will be adhered and become a model of reference for some Muslims in order to achieve their Islamic mission. For example, early this year, as much as 19 people in Malaysia were suspected to conduct a movement link with ISIL. According to the Police's counter-terrorism division senior official, Ayub Khan, the movement is seeking to topple Putrajaya and replace the government with a fully Islamic government based on the *Sharia* law. Among them who had being detained, several had admitted that their main objective was to attack the government and they were planning to attack a disco, pubs in Kuala Lumpur and Carlberg (brew) factory in Petaling Jaya (The Malaymail Online, 2014c).

Concerns on Youth Involvement in ISIL

There are several cases which demonstrated that ISIL influence had been gaining ground in Malaysia and these were involved the local youths. This includes a case where one Malaysian citizen, Ahmad Tarmimi Maliki, aged 26, was said to be the first Malaysia's ISIL suicide bomber. As reported by media, a military vehicle was driven by Ahmad Tarmimi carrying explosives managed to murder 25 Iraqi soldiers including himself after attacking Iraq Special Forces headquarters in Anbar (Regencia, 2014). The second suicide bomber from Malaysia was identified as Ahmad Affendi Abdull Manaff, a 27-year-old from Tumpat, Kelantan. It is believed that a bomb-laden truck driven by Ahmad Affendi strucke a military installation in Homs, Syria. There were 50 soldiers of Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad murdered in that icsident. According to the police, he had gone to Syria on April 23, 2014 and carried out the attack on either November 8 or November 9, 2014 (Straits Times, 2014b).

Recently three Malaysian women aged 20s had travelled to the Middle East as "comfort women" for the ISIL fighters. It is believed that they have offered themselves in sexual comfort roles (*jihad Al-Nikah*) to ISIL fighters to allegedly boost their morale (Lee, 2014). However, Malaysian government later argued that there is no clear proof to suggest that they were "comfort women". Apart from these cases, an estimate of 40 Malaysian citizens had flown to Syria to fight with ISIL against Bassar Al- Assad regime (The Star Online, 2014a).

So far, ISIL employed several methods to lure youths in Malaysia to join *jihad* in the Middle East. Among them are: 1) the strategy of recruiting, inviting students to join their struggle, 2) funding the trip and activities, and 3) using propaganda.

The Strategy of Recruiting

ISIL requires a lot of volunteers. The strategy of ISIL so far is 1) to use social media for recruiting and 2) the main target group would be student. Recently, there is shocking news that ISIL recruiters were also a 14-year old school boy to fight alongside militants in Syria. According to Ayob Khan Mydin Pitchay, the Principal Assistant Director Senior Assistant Commissioner, "We found that among those targeted by the recruiter was a Form Two student. The recruiter was communicating with this boy through *Facebook*, coaxing him to join IS in the war-torn country (Syria)" (Today Online, 2014, p. 1). The best method for the recruiters to recruit

volunteers is through social media like *Facebook*. Ayob said that teenagers were targeted as they were easily misled and manipulated and the recruiter would use and misinterpret Quranic verses to legitimise the objective of fighting against the authorities in Syria. Other example is that Syamimi Faiqah, aged 20, a former Kolej Universiti Islam Antarabangsa Selangor student had left for Syria on Oct 4, 2014 to join ISIL after attracted to it via Facebook (Today Online, 2014).

In order to combat ISIL, the police made the decision on October 15, 2014 to shut down pro-ISIL websites used to recruit Malaysians. There were about 12 locally registered websites used by militant recruiters targeting Malaysians were shut down in 2012. These websites had glorified several terrorist groups, including Al-Qaeda, and were known to be responsible for convincing a number of Malaysians to join militant activity. The police now works with the Malaysian Communications and Multimedia Commission to monitor sites which are not only used to recruit but which also promote terrorism and extremist beliefs. Other recruitment tools used were Yahoo Messenger and WhatsApp (The Malaysian Insider, 2014b). However, it is not an easy task to combat ISIL online because the ISIL members from Malaysia actively update their activities in the Middle East for the local audiences. For instance, Muhamad Wanndy Muhamad Jedi, aged 25, used *Facebook* to upload a video onto Abu Hamzah Al Fateh's Facebook account on February 22, 2015 depicting a beheaded man in Syria. The actions depicted in the video resulted to a mix of strong support and indifference in the comment thread. The earlier picture of the dead man captured the conversation surrounding it and saw Muhamad Wanndy explaining that "he was present when the beheading occurred, and that militants had fired 50 rockets from the same site earlier. He further thanked all those whom he claimed had helped him change, and 'dedicated' his journey to Harakat Ilmu Wal Dakwah @ HIDD and friends detained under the Special Offences (Security Measures) Act (SOSMA). Muhamad Wanndy is in Syria with his wife Nor Mahmudah. He is believed to have gone to Syria with her in January 2015. It is understood that Muhamad Wanndy is a member of the new wing of Malaysian and Indonesian militants identified as Majmu'ah al Arkhabiliy" (Tam, 2015, p. 1-2).

The police also managed to arrest a militant recruiter, a former civil servant, and a housewife for suspected to have links with the ISIL terror group. The man was detained on March 19 while he was returning to Malaysia from abroad. The housewife, as she was about to travel to a neighboring country for Syria, was

detained at the Kuala Lumpur International Airport (KLIA). Meanwhile, Dr Mahmud Ahmad (former university lecturer known as Abu Handzalah) and Mohd Najib Husen (sundry shop owner), both aged 36 years old, were suspected to recruit youth for ISIL as well (Farik, 2015). According to Khalid Abu Bakar, Inspector-General of Police, the police has launched a full-scale investigation through the police's Counter Terrorism Unit to investigate whether a man arrested on December 17, 2015, a National Service trainer who attemptedto join the ISIL terror group, influenced the National Service (NS) trainees when he was a trainer in Pahang. Police are also looking into whether there are other militant elements in NS camps (Jayamanogaran & Prakash, 2015).

Among students, ISIL is really targeting the students in institutions of higher learning in Malaysia (Today Online, 2015). For instance, Police captured two higher learning institution students, including a woman aged 27-year-old who married an ISIL militant via Skype, who were about to leave for Syria to join ISIL on December 24, 2014. The female suspect was a student at a private institution in the Klang Valley. The second suspect, who was arrested in KLIA on December 28, 2014, was a male student aged 22-year-old of a public university in Perlis. Both were sympathetic to ISIL struggle after watching ISIL's propaganda video on *YouTube* (Hariz, 2015). Therefore, local public and private universities are frequently monitoring students' activities in order to avoid students from being recruited by ISIL. Rais Yatim, President of the International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM), said that "the management and staff of the university's security division should check on students' background and curb the increasingly aggressive actions of militant groups in enticing the young through *Facebook*" (Malaysiakini, 2014, p.1).

In the latest twist, the Malaysian Police managed to detain at least 10 people associated with ISIL multiple raids across Malaysia on 20 August 2015. Among those arrested six security forces personnel, a kindergarten teacher, and a former interior designer (Kaplan, 2015). However, it is still a huge task by the authority to stop any new recruit to join ISIL. This is after a video appeared online in April 2015 of young Malay-speaking Malaysian and possibly Indonesian boys attending religious classes and participating in weapons training in believed to be ISIS-held territory in Iraq or Syria (Kaplan, 2015).

Funding

Some Malaysians have gone to the extent of taking personal loans up to MYR20,000 (Malaysian Ringgit) from banks and moneylenders in order to join ISIL in the Middle East (The New Paper, 2014). It has emerged that according to the Special Branch's Counter- Terrorism Division (SB-CTD), the former National Service trainer, aged 30-year-old, who was arrested, had taken out a MYR20,000 loan. Source from the police said that "investigation papers on at least five Malaysian fighters, who were stopped from going over, showed that they had not only disposed of most of their properties, but had also applied for loans, some up to more than MYR100,000. Malaysians heading for Syria and Iraq to fight with the ISIL have been taking out bank loans to fund their journey and life there" (Farrah & Hariz, 2014, p. 1-2). Police also has detained two ISIL sympathisers, aged 23 and 28, work at a government agency in Kuala Lumpur for channelling funds to new recruits who are planning to travel to Syria to fight alongside ISIL. They were detained on November 27, 2015 under the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act (SOSMA) (Prakash & Daniele, 2014). Noor Rashid Ibrahim, Deputy Inspector-General of Police, said that police reportedly investigated a shop in Bandar Baru Bangi for selling militant-themed merchandise whether profits from the business were utilised to fund ISIL activities. For police, this matter is serious because the shop could at the same time spread propaganda on behalf of the ISIL (The Star Online, 2015).

According to New Delhi Times, Malaysia is now at greater risk of having its youth involving in ISIL as the growth of Muslim-dominated politics has allowed more room for 'radical Islam' to spread. This weekly paper argued that although Malaysia is a multi-religious country, it manages in keeping peace by 'appeasing' the local Muslim conservatives. Now there are growing calls for the implementation of *hudud* — a strict Islamic penal code — and increased debate on Islam's role in Malaysia, has been turning the Southeast Asian nation more vulnerable to ISIL group. Malaysia is giving room for the growing radical Islamic influence through mosques and other organisations which in turn is having an adverse impact on the youth of the nation in Malaysia. Malaysia is particularly vulnerable to extremism due to the existence of radical-leaning political parties and the aggressive ISIL recruitment drive of locals here by organisations such as Jamaah Islamiah and Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (The Malaymail Online, 2015). However, the main problem is also that, according to Ahmad El-Muhammady, a panel member of the Royal Malaysia Police

Rehabilitation Program for terrorist detainees, Malaysians youths in particular who join or support the ISIL believe that it is an honor to be part of the ISIL group (Free Malaysia Today, 2015). Meanwhile, Akhbar Satar, HELP University's Institute of Crime & Criminology Director, opined that "religious departments needed to play a bigger role in the long term to enlighten the people, especially youths, of the true meaning of Islam and what ISIL, which propagates jihad, is all about. Religious departments, like the Department of Islamic Development Malaysia (JAKIM) for example, should go to schools and institutes of higher learning to explain further what ISIL and Jihad were" (Free Malaysia Today, 2015, p. 1-2). The anxiety is that if there is no monitoring and engaging the youth done by the government, this can stimulate the growth of the home-grown terrorists who will highly threaten Malaysian security especially those who come back from the Middle East. All incidents occurred have depicted that ISIL threats are becoming real in Malaysia. Serious action should be taken in order to combat ISIL threats.

Efforts in Combating ISIL Threats in Malaysia

The assessments of the degree and character of the threat posed by the ISIL in Malaysia might suggest several strategies for combating it. The biggest battle is to counter ISIL ideology. Fighting against the battle of ideology is nevertheless a complicated and difficult mission. In this matter, Malaysia needs to come out with various strategies and initiatives to block all the possible routes that will provide path for the entrance of the ideology. Until recently, several initiatives had been conducted by the governments to combat the ideology. This includes the monitoring of social media; by picking out content used to recruit and exploit young Malaysians to join the ISIL movement and detained those behind it (Nadaraj, 2014). ISIL had been using online media, particularly social media as its tools for exporting its influence to the global audience. Through this strategy, the government had at least shut the main source of ISIL medium of expansion. In this case, censorship against a terror group like ISIL is justifiable for security reasons, but this should not be a slippery slope to justify any other restriction by the government on the social media and free expression.

ISIL ideology was in other aspects had successfully inspired many radical Islamic movements in Southeast Asia. Recently, many movements sharing the same ideology had been operating aggressively and are expected to threaten national

security such as the threat of Abu Sayyaf in eastern Sabah. In this case, Malaysia is currently taking pro-active precaution measures to curtail the movements from expanding to the eastern Sabah. According to Hishammuddin Hussein, Malaysia's Minister of Defence, the government had spent MYR6 billion ringgit to increase "the defence and security in Sabah, especially the Eastern Sabah Security Command, the airport runaway in Lahad Datu (to accommodate landings by the military aircraft C-130), improving the airforce base in Labuan (for the Hawk fighter jet and acquiring high-capability control radar), and establishing two Forward Operational Bases in the form of sea bases (intended to fight off threats, especially at sea exit points – but also functioning as command centres, intercepting and blocking routes, surveillance, inspection points and enforcement for control)" (Esscom Times, 2014, p. 1).

In order to prevent Malaysian citizens from getting into Iraq and Syria, Malaysian government works closely with the Interpol and intelligence agencies to monitor the movements of Malaysians travelling to Syria and Iraq via transit countries (Fazleena, 2014). It believes that these people are getting into Iraq and Syria through various borders' crossings. According to Ahmad Zahid Hamid, Home Minister, "We are monitoring these people because they don't travel straight from Malaysia" (Fazleena, 2014, p. 1). As mentioned before that there are at least 40 Malaysians believed to have flown to Iraq and Syria (The Star Online, 2014a). Malaysian government had come out with this strategy to prevent these numbers from escalating.

Apart from that, Malaysian government had also come out with regional initiative which called for regional cooperation in Southeast Asia to prevent the threats from getting the foothold in this region. Regional cooperation and intelligence sharing are important to halt the movements from getting advanced. Hishammuddin Hussein claimed that "We cannot work in isolation. We need to work with our friends and our neighbours" (The Star Online, 2014b, pp. 1-2). Hishamuddin strongly requests for greater cooperation particularly on the regional intelligence sharing as it is an important strategy to detect and combat an increasingly mobile and global threat. The exchange of the intelligence between neighbouring countries is pivotal in combating the growing threat of the ISIL influence in the Malaysia. Particularly, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand and Singapore had history of dealing with the terrorists and extremist movements in the past. Aside with neighbouring countries, information gather from other countries like the United States (US) which

is already dealing with the ISIL in the Middle East might prove to be very useful in assisting Malaysia gathering more information to recognize the action needed to combat against them.

As a result, Malaysia's strategy to combat ISIL is currently working and very effective. On January 13, 2015 the local English Daily *the Star* published a report saying that ISIL recruiters have warned its members through the ISIL website not to use Malaysia as a transit point to go to Syria. This is because the police launched a crackdown on the militant group. A recruiter named Abu Hud said that many Indonesian ISIL members had been arrested because they used Malaysia as a transit point. According to Bukit Aman Special Branch Counter Terrorism Division since February 2014, 51 Malaysians suspected of being militants were arrested including 12 Indonesians, there were five children among them (The Malaysian Insider, 2015a). However, there are lot needs to be done to really eradicate the ISIL from recruiting Malaysians as fighters to serve their extreme ambitions.

Meanwhile, Malaysian authorities have also arrested Ardit Ferizi, a 20 years old Kosovo citizen and Malaysia-based hacker on September 15, 2015 in Kuala Lumpur who they and the US Justice Department accuse of hacking and stealing of US military members' personal information and passing them to ISIL. According to US government, "Ferizi was accused to hack into the computer system of a company in the US and stole personally identifiable information of more than 1,000 US service members and federal employees. He later allegedly gave that information to several ISIL figures, including a prominent propagandist for the group namely Junaid Hussein, a British hacker who was active on social media recruiting Westerners to join ISIL" (Perez, Shoichet & Bruer, 2015, p. 1). The arrest of Ferizi was an effort by the collaboration between authorities from the US and Malaysia. US government is now in the process of applying for extradition to bring Ferizi to the US for trial (Perez, Shoichet & Bruer, 2015).

In order to counter people like Ferizi, Home Minister Ahmad Zahid Hamidi at a meeting with US Secretary of State John Kerry in Washington on October 10, 2015, confirmed that a Regional Digital Counter-Messaging Communications Centre would be set up in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. The center would take the battle against ISIL on the cyberspace in which US is willing to help Malaysia particularly in three aspects namely training, operations and equipment. Kerry and Zahid also jointly signed a Homeland Security Presidential Directive No. 6 (HSPD-6) document for the

commitment of Malaysia and the US to share information of likely 86,000 terrorists and suspected terrorists in the US particularly and various countries (Straits Times, 2015).

The current development was when Prime Minister Najib Tun Razak tabling a 19 pages White Paper report in Parliament on November 26, 2014 entitled "Towards Handling Threats of Islamic State". He proposes a new law to be enacted next year as a strategy to combat ISIL's threats. He said that: "The involvement of Malaysians in militant activities using the name of Islam has tarnished the country's image and affected the sanctity of Islam. These militants, who are equipped with military expertise, logistics and capability to make explosive materials, will be able to make individual attacks, from IS (ISIL) cell groups in Malaysia and establish a network with militants in the region, if action is not taken" (The Sun, 2014, pp. 1-2). The White Paper also intends to strengthen present laws like the Prevention of Crime (Amendments and Extensions) Act 2013, the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012, and the Penal Code to specifically tackle militant activities. Therefore, the Special Measures Against Terrorism in Foreign Countries Act and the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) were tabled in the Parliament. POTA, for instance, would "allow authorities to detain suspects indefinitely without trial. It will create a five-to-eight member Prevention of Terrorism Board to make decisions on detention or restriction orders as well as a Registrar containing fingerprints and photographs of persons detained. On the other hand, the Special Measures Against Terrorism in Foreign Countries would enable authorities to seize travel documents of citizens or foreigners believed to be engaging in or abetting terrorist acts. Several amendments to existing laws would also tighten restrictions in this regard. For example, a proposed amendment to the penal code would make it an offense to receive training from terrorist groups and other perpetrators" (The Malaysian Insider, 2015b, p. 1). POTA was passed by the Parliament on April 7, 2015 and all bills are going to be enforced by the end of 2016. However, there is also a concern when the restrictions could be too harsh and undermine human rights (The Diplomat, 2015). Phil Robertson, the Human Right Watch's Asia division deputy director, said that POTA will re-open the "Pandora's Box for politically motivated, abusive state actions" that "had been a feature when Putrajaya used the former Internal Security Act (ISA)" (The Malaysian Insider, 2015b, p. 1). The National Fatwa Council (Islamic Council)

has also listed "ISIL as a terrorist group and the deaths of Muslims due to ISIL activities cannot be categorized as martyrdom" (The Sun, 2014, pp. 1-2).

Conclusion

The violence against civilians and innocent people by ISIL that was widely published in the internet since August 2014 indicated that this extremist group is a global threat to the international community. ISIL's goal was to restore the Caliphate system suggested that the action was about pursuing political power and contradicted to Islamic teachings. It clearly showed that the act of ISIL can be referred as crimes. The growing number of foreign fighters joining ISIL from around the world showed that this extremist group's capability to pursue its goals strategically and deliberately. As for now, the major concern for Malaysia is that it should counter the spread of ISIL ideology among Malaysians especially youths knowing that social media is the effective tool for ISIL's recruitment and to gain its influence (Mohd Azizuddin, 2016).

Therefore, all government agencies and civil societies, either Muslims or non-Muslims groups, must work together and educate themselves and the society in eradicating the threat of terrorism and at the same time avoiding any potential negative backlash, blaming each other in any atrocity, on social unity. Current Prime Minister Najib Razak introduced the concept of '1Malaysia' emphasizing ethnic harmony, national unity, inclusivity and efficient government in 2009 and then projected a concept of '*Wasatiyyah*', which translates into 'moderation', in 2010. If these two concepts are embraced fully by all Malaysians, and they are not just political slogans for politicians without any clear substance for social cohesion, definitely terrorism and extremism can be removed from the society. So far the threats of ISIL in Malaysia are manageable and relatively under control. However, the actions of previous extremist movements in Malaysia and others Southeast Asia countries had proven that the threat of ISIL movement is real and it should not be taken lightly because it can harm the regional and national security. Therefore, cooperation among countries is the key to combat this issue as it also should involve all stakeholders including civil society to increase their awareness of the potential threat of this extremist movement.

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PERUBAHAN DASAR PERTAHANAN MALAYSIA: ERA MAHATHIR MOHAMAD 1981-2003

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Abstrak

Dasar Pertahanan Negara merupakan satu manifestasi matlamat yang bertanggungjawab untuk melindungi keselamatan dan kepentingan strategik sesebuah negara. Dalam konteks Malaysia, tiga asas utama yang menjadi teras utama Dasar Pertahanan iaitu kepentingan strategik negara, prinsip pertahanan dan konsep pertahanan adalah bertujuan untuk mengekalkan keamanan dan kestabilan negara. Semenjak 1957, Malaysia telah membangunkan aspek pertahanan negara bagi memastikan keselamatan dan kedaulatan terjamin. Secara umumnya, Dasar pertahanan yang dibangunkan pada era Tunku Abdul Rahman 1957 sehingga 1970 adalah pro barat (*dependency*). Ketika ancaman konfrontasi dari Indonesia misalnya Malaysia mendapat sokongan dari semua anggota AMDA dan sekaligus mendapat bantuan ketenteraan dari AMDA. Manakala ketika era pemerintahan Tun Razak pada tahun 1970 sehingga 1976 dan Tun Hussin Onn pada tahun 1976 sehingga 1980 dasar pertahanan berubah kepada berkecuali. Dalam interaksinya dengan dunia antrabangsa Malaysia mengadakan hubungan bilateral dan multilateral serta bersahabat dengan semua negara tanpa mengambilkira fahaman politik negara tersebut. Sewaktu pentadbiran era Mahathir dasar pertahanannya lebih kepada *self reliance* berbanding pentadbiran sebelumnya yang pro west yang bergantung kepada barat serta neutraliti. Dasar Pertahanan Malaysia era Tun Mahathir (1981-2003) merupakan era perubahan yang drastik kepada sebuah negara yang lebih berdikari (*self reliance*). Perubahan dasar pertahanan Mahathir dapat dilihat dalam *Precument* persenjataan beliau yang telah memberi kesan kepada Malaysia sebagai negara membangun yang begitu lantang dan berani bersuara. Di gelanggang antarabangsa suaranya begitu bergema bagi menyuarakan aspirasi Negara Dunia Ketiga dan komitmen yang ditunjukkan melebihi pemimpin yang lain. Dasar yang dilaksanakan oleh Mahathir agak menyimpang daripada dasar yang diketengahkan oleh ketiga-tiga pemimpin negara yang terdahulu, terutama dasar yang tidak bermodelkan barat sebaliknya menjadikan timur sebagai role model. Implikasinya, sudah tentu memberi impak kepada keselamatan dan pertahanan negara. *Self reliance* di bawah pentadbiran Tun Mahathir menjadikan aspek pertahanan Malaysia bertambah moden sehingga Tun Mahathir menjadi rujukan dan perhatian diseluruh dunia terutamanya Negara Dunia Ketiga.

Pengenalan

Semasa era Perang Dingin, dunia menyaksikan pengelompokan dunia sebagai 'dwipolar'. Dua buah kuasa besar dunia iaitu Amerika Syarikat (AS) dan Kesatuan Soviet (USSR) masing-masing berusaha memperluaskan kuasa dan pengaruh menyebabkan rantau ini berada dalam ketidakstabilan. K.S Nathan menyatakan bahawa dua buah kuasa besar dunia iaitu AS dan USSR berusaha memperluaskan kuasa masing-masing termasuk menyebarkan ideologi komunis antarabangsa (*international communism*) dan *free world*.[1] Senario ini juga sudah tentunya akan mempengaruhi negara-negara di setiap rantau dan global sepertimana peperangan dan konflik seperti Perang Vietnam 1 (1945-1954) dan Perang Vietnam II (1965-1975). Walaupun berakhirnya Perang Dingin, sengketa-sengketa lama masih berterusan seperti di Timur Tengah, Asia Barat dan Asia Pasifik. Ancaman dan konflik masih tercetus antaranya ancaman dan ketidakstabilan yang telah melibatkan banyak negara termasuk Malaysia yang menghadapi pelbagai ancaman dalaman dan luaran yang memerlukan perubahan sebuah dasar pertahanan yang kukuh dan padu. Ancaman dalaman rantau dipengaruhi oleh perselisihan berbentuk dua hala dan yang berbentuk pelbagai hala.

Perselisihan berbentuk dua hala banyak tertumpu kepada masalah antara negara yang menghadapi masalah wilayah dan sempadan serta isu gerakan pemisah. Contohnya, krisis antara Malaysia-Filipina yang berpunca daripada tuntutan wilayah Sabah oleh Filipina yang menuntut hak yang menyebabkan wujudnya ketegangan antara negara. Malah masalah ini bertambah serius apabila kerajaan Filipina menuduh Malaysia membantu kegiatan gerakan pemisah Moro Islam di Selatan Filipina. Malaysia turut menghadapi masalah dan ketegangan politik dengan Thailand yang berpunca daripada tuduhan Thailand ke atas Malaysia yang mengaitkan penglibatan Malaysia dalam gerakan pemisah Pattani Islam di Selatan Thailand yang didakwa melibatkan kerajaan negeri Kelantan (Malaysia). Malaysia turut menghadapi masalah dengan Singapura apabila isu perkauman telah menjadi isu yang membawa tindakan Singapura untuk keluar daripada Persekutuan Malaysia[2]. Manakala idea Presiden Sukarno untuk menubuhkan Gagasan Nusantara (Melayu Raya) telah mengakibatkan Malaysia dan Singapura tertekan

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dengan ancaman keselamatan daripada Indonesia. Konfrantasi Indonesia-Malaysia pada tahun 1965 adalah klimaks kepada ketegangan kedua-dua negara apabila negara Indonesia telah mengambil tindakan ketenteraan ke atas Malaysia. Malaysia dapat mengharungi kesukaran dengan pembangunan pertahanan menghadapi ancaman dan konflik dengan melaksanakan pembanguan pertahanan dan keselamatan.

Pembangunan Pendekatan Pertahanan Malaysia

Ancaman dalaman dan luaran negara telah mempengaruhi Malaysia untuk memperkukuh dan memperkasakan aspek pembangunan pertahanan dan Dasar Pertahanan Negara (DPN). Sejak merdeka, pendekatan pertahanan negara ini mengalami perubahan demi perubahan agar pertahanan dan keselamatan Malaysia terjamin. Bagi menjamin keselamatan Malaysia, pada tahun 1948 sehingga tahun 1960, Malaysia bernaung dengan Britain dalam aspek pertahanan. Pendekatan pertahanan adalah berlandaskan dasar luar negara dan bergantung kepada dasar yang diamalkan oleh penjajah khususnya British[3]. Justeru, perjanjian keselamatan *Anglo Malayan Defense Arrangement* (AMDA) ditubuhkan pada 12 Oktober 1957 dengan kerjasama Britain agar keselamatan Malaysia dilindungi dan ianya menjadi teras sokongan Dasar Pertahanan British kepada Tanah Melayu.

Cadangan untuk membentuk DPN bermula pada tahun 1962 yang dikenali *Dynamo Plan* (Plan Dynamo) bertujuan untuk memperluaskan peranan ATM untuk membantu pihak polis menjaga keselamatan. Namun, pembangunan DPN ini gagal kerana British menolak kerana memerlukan kos yang tinggi. Kemasukan Sabah dan Sarawak ke dalam Persekutuan Tanah Melayu pada tahun 1963 juga telah meningkatkan komitmen Malaysia dalam aspek pertahanan dan keselamatan beritan pertambahan wilayah. Konfrontasi Malaysia -Indonesia 1965 dan tindakan Singapura keluar dari Persekutuan Malaysia menyebabkan aspek keselamatan dan pembangunan pertahanan mula mendapat perhatian. Pada tahun 1964, isu keselamatan seperti tamatnya darurat 1960 dan PKM bermaharajalela telah mendapat perhatian sidang parlimen. Perbincangan ini dipanjangkan dan turut dibincangkan di Mesyuarat Kerjasama Asia Pasifik Seoul pada tahun 1966 dan menetapkan DPN berteraskan memelihara kemakmuran, keamanan, memelihara

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[3] Chandran Jeshrun (1980) dalam Malaysia Defence Policy : A Study of Parliaments Attitudes : 1963-1974. Kuala Lumpur : Universiti Malaya. Hlm 11

kedaulatan dan berkecuali. Walaupun begitu, DPN gagal menghasilkan Kertas Putih Pertahanan *(Defence White Paper)* walaupun terdapat cadangan menghasilkan (KPP).   Walaupun demikian, kerajaan telah mengambil keputusan untuk menubuhkan Majlis Keselamatan Negara (MKN) bertujuan untuk menyelaraskan hal ehwal ancaman kepada keselamatan negara.

Pada tahun 1981, KPP yang komprehensif telah dibentuk , namun ianya gagal lagi untuk menghasilkan KPP pada 1986. Walaubagaimanapun, MKN telah memberi kelulusan kertas cadangan tersebut sebagai rujukan DPN.   Usaha menghasilkan KPP telah diteruskan dengan menjalankan kajian dan penelitian semula paada tahun 1991 dan dibentangkan kepada kabinet pada tahun 1993 namun ianya gagal menghasilkan KPP.

Menurut Kementerian Pertahanan Malaysia, DPN mencerminkan hasrat negara untuk mempertahankan kepentingan-kepentingan strategiknya dan memelihara keselamatan negara. Dasar pertahanan menggariskan tiga asas utama, iaitu kepentingan-kepentingan strategiknya negara, prinsip-prinsip pertahanan dan konsep pertahanan.   Ia menekankan keperluan mengekalkan sekitaran kawasan kepentingan strategic negara yang stabil dan aman. Objektif utama pendekatan pertahanan negara Malaysia adalah untuk mempertahankan kepentingan negara yang menjadi teras kepada kedaulatan, keutuhan wilayah dan kesejahteraan ekonomi. Untuk mencapai tujuan tersebut, keperluan satu strategi komprehensif telah dibentuk sebagai prinsip-prinsip asas pertahanan berdasarkan tiga prinsip utama Dasar Pertahanan Negara:

Jadual 1: Tiga Prinsip Utama Dasar Pertahanan Negara

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┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Dasar Pertahanan Negara[1]                                            │
│                                                                       │
│                                                                       │
│  Kepentingan strategik      Prinsip Pertahanan      Konsep Pertahanan │
│                                                                       │
│                                                                       │
│      ┌──────────────┐   ┌──────────────┐   ┌──────────────┐           │
│      │  PRINSIP     │   │  PRINSIP     │   │  PRINSIP     │           │
│      │  PERTAHANAN  │   │  KERJASAMA   │   │  BANTUAN     │           │
│      │  BERDIKARI   │   │  SERANTAU    │   │  LUAR        │           │
│      │  (self       │   │  (Regional   │   │  (Foreign    │           │
│      │  reliance)   │   │  Cooperation)│   │  Aid)        │           │
│      └──────────────┘   └──────────────┘   └──────────────┘           │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

Perubahan Dasar Pertahanan Malaysia

Pembangunan ketenteraan negara semenjak tahun 1957 telah dapat dilihat dengan pelbagai perubahan. Berikut, merupakan jangkamasa 1957-1970, 1970-1976, 1976-1981 dan 1981-2003. Di sini, ia menunjukkan perubahan pembangunan Dasar Pertahanan Negara adalah berbeza mengikut kepimpinan tertinggi negara. Walaupun rata-rata pemikir strategi melihat faktor yang mempengaruhi dasar dan pembangunan pertahanan dipengaruhi oleh persepsi ancaman (*treat perception*). Namun, perbezaan gaya pendekatan setiap kepimpinan negara turut dianggap mempengaruhi dasar pertahanan. Perubahan dalam Dasar Pertahanan Malaysia dapat dilihat melalui pemerintahan setiap Perdana Menteri Malaysia bermula dengan ketika era Tunku Abdul Rahman sehingga era Tun Mahathir dapat diringkaskan seperti berikut:

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[1] Diubahsuai daripada Pertahanan Malaysia: Kearah Pertahanan Yang Berdikari. Kuala Lumpur: Kementerian Pertahanan.Hlm 22

Jadual 2: Perubahan Dasar Pertahanan sehingga era Tun Mahathir

Dependency (1957) Era Tunku Abdul Rahman (Pro barat, anti komunis)

Neutrality –ZOPFAN- (1970) Era Tun Razak/Tun Hussein Onn (Pembangunan, integrasi sosial-hub diplomatik)

Self Reliance (1981) Era Tun Mahathir- Very Open, Sosial- ekonomi aktiviti, Keamanan, Keadilan, Prestij)

Era Tunku Abdul Rahman (1957-1970)

Umumnya, Dasar Pertahanan yang dicorakkan oleh Perdana Menteri telah mempengaruhi bentuk Dasar Pertahanan yang diamalkan. Tanah Melayu ketika transisi kemerdekaan masih lagi bergantung kepada kerajaan British. Keperibadian Tunku yang begitu menyenangi Barat telah mendorong beliau menjalinkan hubungan yang erat dengan negara-negara Barat. Sejak 1957 sehingga berakhirnya zaman Tunku, Tunku menonjolkan sikap pro-barat dan antikomunis. Kebergantungan ini adalah kerana Tanah Melayu baru merdeka, masih muda dan pada masa itu negara menghadapi ancaman komunis. Oleh sebab itu, dasar Tunku ketika itu ialah *pro-west* dan anti komunis. British telah memainkan peranan yang besar dalam soal pertahanan negara. Kebergantungan (*dependency*) ini jelas terbukti apabila Tanah Melayu telah menandatangani perjanjian pertahanan dengan Britain pada bulan Oktober 1957.[2] Perjanjian ini membolehkan tentera British, Australia dan New Zealand ditempatkan di Tanah Melayu untuk menentang pemberontakan Parti Komunis Malaya (PKM).[3]

Kerajaan Perikatan di bawah Tunku Abdul Rahman mementingkan hubungan dengan barat (*pro-west*) khususnya British dan hanya mengadakan hubungan diplomatik dengan negara yang bukan komunis seperti Britain, Indonesia, Australia, Thailand, India dan Filipina serta menyertai KOMANWEL (Pertubuhan Negara-Negara Bekas Jajahan British). Ketika era Tunku Dasar Pertahanan zaman Tunku

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[2] K. Ratnam. 1998. Sejarah Kertas 940/2 Malaysia, Asia tenggara, Asia Selatan dan Asia Timur. Pustaka sarjana Sdn . Bhd: The Commercial Press. Hlm: 206.
[3] Ibid. Hlm: 206.

berbentuk *dependency* (bergantungan) merupakan kebiasaan bagi Negara baru lahir sepertimana dinyatakan oleh Muhammad Ayob iaitu :

> Ini kerana dalam era 1950-an dan 1960-an rata-rata Negara Asia Tenggara merupakan negara-negara yang baru 'dilahirkan' setelah mendapat kemerdekaan daripada kuasa-kuasa penjajah. Oleh kerana usia Negara Asia Tenggara yang masih muda, negara-negara ini turut menghadapi ketidakstabilan politik dalaman, menghadapi konflik entik, masalah perpaduan dan sistem keselamatan dan pertahanan yang lemah[4].

Mengadakan perjanjian pertahanan dengan Britain, penerimaan bantuan pertahanan dari Barat dan dasar antikomunis merupakan sikap manifestasi sikap pro-Barat.[5] AMDA (*Anglo Malayan Defence Agreement*) merupakan perjanjian pertahanan dan bantuan ketenteraan dari Barat. Melalui perjanjian ini, Britain mempunyai komitmen untuk melindungi Tanah Melayu dari sebarang ancaman negara luar dan akan melatih dan membangunkan pasukan tentera Tanah Melayu.

Era Tun Abdul Razak (1970-1976) dan Tun Hussein Onn (1976-1981)

Apabila tampuk pemerintahan bertukar tangan kepada Tun Abdul Razak, Perdana Menteri Kedua (1970-1976) pendekatan pertahanan berubah bentuk dari *dependency* kepada pola *neutrality* (berkecuali). Ini adalah kerana komunis masih menjadi ancaman, menyebabkan Malaysia mengambil langkah berhati-hati dan tidak memihak kepada mana-mana negara dalam menjalinkan hubungan dengan negara luar. Malaysia ketika itu masih lagi bergantung harap kepada kuasa barat seperti British sebagai satu usaha menangani ancaman komunis.[6] Tun Abdul Razak telah mengambil pendekatan neutraliti dalam meneraju negara ini dan telah menjelajah ke seluruh dunia untuk memperluaskan persahabatan antara negara tanpa mengira ideologi atau fahaman negara lain.[7] Lawatan pertama Tun Abdul Razak selepas menjadi Perdana Menteri Kedua dalam memperkenalkan dasar Malaysia ketika itu yang bersifat berkecuali ialah ke Beijing, China. Lawatan-lawatan beliau seterusnya ialah ke negara-negara di benua Amerika Latin, Asia Pasifik dan Timor Tengah. Semasa era Tun Abdul Razak, Malaysia juga menganggotai Pertubuhan

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[4] Mohammed Ayoob*, The Third World security predicament: State making, regional conflict and the international system*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1995. hlm 5
[5] Faridah Jaafar.2007. Perdana Menteri dan Dasar Luar Malaysia 1957-2005.Penerbit Universiti Malaya. Kuala Lumpur.Hlm: 34.
[6] Chee S. 1974. Hlm 88.
[7] Selat. 2008. Hlm 109.

Persidangan Negara-negara Islam (OIC) dan Persatuan Negara-Negara Berkecuali (NAM).

Tun Abdul Razak turut menyatakan bahawa polisi neutraliti ini adalah selari dengan kehendak antarabangsa yang menjadi ikutan di seluruh dunia seperti mana ucapan beliau dalam perutusan Hari Malaysia iaitu:

> *We have to a shif in foreign policy as a tool to keep peace with the trend of events in the world…[8]*

Selepas Tun Abdul Razak meninggal dunia, bermulalah pemerintahan Perdana Menteri Ketiga iaitu Tun Hussein Onn (1976-1981). Ketika dunia sedang berhadapan dengan keadaan dunia yang agak tegang akibat perbezaaan ideologi, Malaysia telah mengambil langkah proaktif dengan pengukuhan dasar negaranya di samping mengekalkan langkah berkecuali dengan negara yang sedang berkonflik[9]. Pendekatan Tun Hussein Onn tidak banyak berubah dengan pendekatan Tun Abdul Razak dalam arus politik Malaysia ketika itu sepertimana ucapan Tun Hussein Onn dalam Perhimpunan Agong UMNO pada 1997 yang menyatakan bahawa:

> Di dalam pelaksanaan dasar berkecuali dan dasar bebas luar negeri, kita sentiasa menghulurkan tangan persahabatan kepada semua negara yang berhasrat hendak bersahabat dengan kita, tidak kira sistem kerajaan atau ideologi politik mereka, kecuali mereka bersedia mengakui kemerdekaan dan kedaulatan kita dan tidak melibatkan diri mereka di dalam hal ehwal negeri kita[10].

Ketika ini juga Malaysia meningkatkan perbelanjaannya bagi pasukan bersenjata dengan 56 peratus (%) pada tahun 1980 dan pembelian 80 pesawat Skyhawk tambahan dan peningkatan jarak jauh angkatan tentera untuk pembesaran saiz tentera dengan mengadakan hubungan dan kerjasama pertahanan dengan empat negara lain dalam Perjanjian Pertahanan Lima Pakatan (*Five Power Defence arrangments*) (FPDA) antara Malaysia, Singapura, Britain, Australia dan New Zealand. Ini dinyatakan dalam buku Gordon P. Means:

> *In reaction to these new power realities in South- East Asia, Malaysia increased its expenditure for its armed force by 56 per cent in 1980 paliamentary session, and also arranged for the purchase of 80 additional Skyhawk planes and the long –range increase of its armed forces to include a reserve forces that would by 1990 be three times the size of the*

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[8] Makalah Penerangan.1975. Jabatan Penerangan Malaysia. Hlm 86.
[9] Gordon P Means.1991. Malaysian Politics the Second Generation.Oxford University Press:Singapore. Hlm 77.
[10] Onn.1975.

standing army. At the same time, Malaysia re-emphasized its mutual security arrangements the were provides by the Five Power Defence Pact between Malaysia, Singapore, Britain, Australia and New Zealand[11].

Dalam kenyataan Tun Hussein dalam ucapannya di Sidang Kemuncak ASEAN;

I would ensure that the Malaysia peoples and government would contribute more to strengthening and ultinately the success of ASEAN..[12].

ASEAN telah bersetuju menjadikan rantau ini sebagai rantau yang bebas daripada persaingan kuasa besar. Ekoran ini, muncul konsep Zon Aman, Bebas, dan Berkecuali (*Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality*) (ZOPFAN) di semua negara anggota ASEAN. Selain itu, semua negara ASEAN juga bersetuju mengelakkan rantau ini daripada menjadi tempat persaingan tenaga nuklear dan menerima konsep *South East Asia Nuclear Weapons free Zone* (SEANWFZ).[13] Di samping memberikan tumpuan kepada ASEAN, Tun Hussein Onn juga berusaha untuk meningkatkan hubungan Malaysia dengan China yang telah dirintis oleh Tun Abdul Razak dahulu. Rasionalnya ialah untuk memberikan pemahaman jelas tentang situasi politik yang tegang di rantau Asia Tenggara, mengurangkan potensi ancaman China sebagai sebuah negara komunis di samping meminta agar China menghentikan penyaluran bantuan kepada Parti Komunis Malaya di Malaysia[14].

Era Tun Mahathir Mohamad (1981-2003)

Dasar Pertahanan berubah kepada bentuk *Self Reliance*. Pentadbiran Tun Dr. Mahathir telah menyaksikan bahawa beliau begitu tegas dalam semua perkara. Semasa awal pentadbiran, beliau menegaskan pendirian Malaysia terhadap kepentingan menjaga alam sekitar dimana keperluan untuk menjaga Antartika sebagai tapak warisan bersama dunia perlu disepakati oleh semua pihak.[15] Beliau menegaskan pendekatan proaktif dalam memperjuangkan isu Apartheid di Afrika Selatan di samping memperjuangkan keamanan bumi Palestin. Sebelum ini, dasar Malaysia menjadikan Barat sebagai role-model. Dalam era Mahathir, beliau

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[11] Gordon P Means.1991. Malaysian Politics the Second Generation.Oxford University Press:Singapore. Hlm 78.

[12] Chee C.H.

[13] Mardiana Nordin dan Hasnah Husiin.2011.Pengajian Malaysia.Edisi Keempat.Oxford Fajar.Hlm: 364

[14] Utusan Melayu.1978.Hlm:38.

[15] Pathmanathan. M. 1984. *Malaysia and World Affairs. The Mahathir Impact on Foreign Policy*. Kuala Lumpur:Easview Production.Hlm 52.

membuat perubahan yang drastik dengan menjadikan Timur sebagai role-model. Ini merupakan satu pembaharuan yang sangat nyata dalam pemerintahan Malaysia dan menarik perhatian dunia khususnya, Barat.

Malaysia amat terkenal di persada antarabangsa semasa berada di bawah pentadbiran Tun Dr. Mahathir dan menjadi *role model* bagi Negara Dunia Ketiga dari pelbagai sudut termasuklah perubahan dalam memodenkan Angkatan Tentera Malaysia (ATM) dan pertahanan. Cabaran-cabaran semasa memerlukan perubahan dalam dasar pertahanan demi pengukuhan pertahanan sepertimana dinyatakan oleh David Jablonsky dalam *US Military Doctrine and the Revolution in Military Affairs* menyatakan mengenai perkembangan pembangunan dalam pertempuran akan sentiasa berubah dari semasa ke semasa kerana keperluan untuk mengejar kejayaan dan kuasa akan membuatkan sesebuah negara untuk terus membangunkan teknologi khususnya dalam aspek keselamatan dan ketenteraan demi kemajuan dalam aspek pertahanan.

> *The nature of warfare is changing. Although the revolution in warfare is still underway its outlines have become clear. The effects of technology- in precision guided weapons in stealthy delivery systems in advanced sensor and targeting system, in battle management platform is transforming and in fact already has demonstrably transformed the way in which armed forces conduct their operations…[16]*

Dalam era pentadbiran Mahathir menjangkau dua puluh dua tahun iaitu dari tahun 1981 sehingga 2003, dasar pertahanannya lebih kepada *self reliance* berbanding pentadbiran sebelumnya yang pro barat, bergantung kepada barat serta bersikap berkecuali. Sewaktu pentadbiran Mahathir, *less amphasis* Malaysia bukan lagi kepada *Five Power Defence Arrangment* (FPDA). Ini bermaksud bahawa Malaysia tidak keluar dari FPDA tetapi fokus Mahathir tidak kepada FPDA tetapi fokus pada ketika itu adalah ASEAN. Perjanjian-perjanjian keselamatan dengan Amerika Syarikat, sebelum ini ada *join execise* dengan Amerika Syarikat, United Kingdom, kini terdapat *join exercise* dengan Rusia, Korea dan China. Kerjasama ini khususnya pertukaran pertahanan, delegasi tentera, personel, maklumat dan latihan ketenteraan hubungan dua hala antara Angkatan Tentera Malaysia dengan tentera China bermula hasil lawatan Menteri Pertahanan Malaysia pada 1992 dan diikuti lawatan Ketua Angkatan Bersenjata China ke Malaysia pada 1994.

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[16] David Jablonsky. 1994. *US Military doctrine and The Revolution in Military Affairs*. Parameters. US Army War College. Autum. Hlm: 18-36.

Precument persenjataan Mahathir ini telah memberi kesan kepada Malaysia sebagai negara membangun yang begitu lantang dan berani bersuara. Di gelanggang antarabangsa suaranya begitu bergema bagi menyuarakan aspirasi Negara Dunia Ketiga dan komitment yang ditunjukkan melebihi pemimpin yang lain. Dasar yang dilaksanakan oleh Mahathir agak menyimpang daripada dasar yang diketengahkan oleh ketiga-tiga pemimpin negara yang terdahulu, terutama dasar yang tidak berkiblat ke barat dan beliau telah berbaik dgn sekutu Soviet.

KESIMPULAN/PENUTUP

Pembaharuan bentuk DPN ini daripada *dependency* kepada *neutrality* seterusnya berubah kepada *self reliance* jelas membuktikan Malaysia begitu komited untuk mempertahankan kepentingan strategiknya serta memelihara kedaulatan, kemerdekaan dan keutuhan Malaysia. Sejak kemerdekaan Malaysia pada tahun 1957 sehinggalah era pemerintahan Tun Mahathir (1981-2003) merupakan tempoh perubahan dasar pertahanan yang agak drastik kepada sebuah negara kecil yang 'gah' untuk sama-sama bersaing dalam arena antarabangsa. Ini penting untuk kelangsungan dan survival Malaysia sesuai dengan objektif Dasar Pertahanan Negara iaitu untuk melindungi dan mempertahankan kepentingan negara yang menjadi teras kepada kedaulatan, keutuhan wilayah dan kesejahteraan ekonomi negara.

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SOCIOCULTURAL EFFECTS THROUGH INTERNATIONAL WORKER

MIGRATION

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Abstract

International migration (IM) is one of the main elements of economic development in countries through sending workers. However, the sociocultural effects of international worker migration have not received much attention in the literature. The objective of the study is to reveal the sociocultural influences such as reducing poverty through the sending abundance of labor. In order to find out the results, the study conducted a questionnaire survey to gather primary data from 306 Bangladeshi workers in Malaysia who had employed in blue-collar jobs. The data analyzed based on the path measurement model and ordinal regressions. The findings reveal that international migration significantly improves the social status and certain behaviors of non-resident Bangladeshis. Several recommendations made to reduce the negative effects of international migration, particularly for those from Bangladesh.

Keywords: Social effect, Economic Development, International migration (IM), International Labor Migration (ILM)

PART 11: GLOBAL POLITICS

IRAN'S STRATEGY IN IRAQ AND SYRIA

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Abstract

This article examines the roles of Iran in post-2003 Iraq and in the ongoing Syrian conflict. It also investigates and analyses Iran's strategy in both countries. The aim is to assess Iran's foreign policy and its use of proxy warfare in Iraq and Syria in order to identify Iran's strategic goals in the two countries and in the Middle East in general. The article seeks a better understanding of the underlying causes and motives behind Iran's use of proxy warfare as a key element of its foreign policy. It also attempts to analyse actions and reactions by Iran's regional rivals such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar. The article argues that Syrian regime's religious affiliation and its strategic location connecting Iran to Hezbollah are the most significance driving force behind Iran's involvement in Syrian conflict. It also asserts that the significance of Iraq to Iran lies in the fact that Iraq is a vital conduit connecting Iran with Syria and Hezbollah. Also, this article argues that, Iraq is a political tool used by Iran to advance its regional power ambition in order to keep the balance of power in the Middle East. In this way, Iraq occupies a better position than Syria in the Iran's geopolitical calculation in the Middle East.

WHY DOES THAI MILITARY INTERVENE INTO POLITICS?

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Abstract

This article provides an insight into the reasons that the Royal Thai Army intervenes in the political system of Thailand. Over the years, senior Thai army officers have been blamed for using the Royal Thai Army as their vehicle to intervene in the political system of Thailand by staging various coup d'etat to unseat the elected government. However, more recent evidences have indicated that the intervention draw flak from many quarters and did not go down well with the majority of people of Thailand as well as from foreign government including The United States of America and The European Union. On May 22, 2014, the Royal Thai Army, led by General Prayuth Chan-ocha, Commander in Chief, launched a coup d'état against the caretaker government of Thailand, following six months of political crisis. The military established a junta called National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) to govern the nation. This article aim at to examine the causes of Thai military coup regarding intervention on politic in the post-Thaksin era. This study is purely a qualitative research. The methodological orientation of this study is based on two methods of data collection. The methods of data collection employed including interviews and documentary consultation. This study found that the root cause of military intervention was to uproot Thaksin regime that influence in Thai politics for the past 13 year.

Keywords: Coup D'état, Thai Army, Thaksin Era, Thai Politics, Democracy in Thailand

Introduction

Thailand has a unique history within the developing world. The growth of Thai nationalism and exposure to new ideas after WWI led by King Rama VI brought an end to the absolute monarchy with the first military coup in 1932. This event also began the military's role of bringing modernization to the Thai people. This history

also includes the renaming of the state to Thailand from the more inclusive Siam, the restoration of a central role for the monarchy under the current king (O'Connor, 2011).

There were 21 coups in Thailand's political history that comprise of 9 successful coups and 12 attempted coups (Bunbongkarn, 1987). Furthermore, he pointed out that there was other in coup 1991, after the coup, military was faced with a problem of how to deal with the growing democratic forces (Bunbongkarn, 1992). O'Connor's thesis "Why Thailand's Military stepped into political system of Thailand" his study pointed out that it ideas of a "Thai-style democracy" persist may be informative of what direction the future of Thai politics may take (O'Connor, 2011).

Koonings and Krujit suggested that the conditions surrounding both of the coups were similar. In both events, the military acted as a "political army" as defined by Koonings and Krujit that the events led up to the coups of 1991 and 2006 contain a combination of three principles of birthright (the military has a history in the foundation of the nation), civilian incompetence, and military competence (Koonings & Krujit, 2002).

Chambers underlined in his book that "Overshadowed by the Armed Forces: The Status of Democratic Civilian Control in Thailand" the era of 2001-2006 saw more formal civilian challenges to the military. In terms of Elite Recruitment, in the 2000-2006 Senate, for the first time, all members (200) were elected (Chambers, 2011).

Why does Thai Military intervene into politics?

The article focuses the causes of coup d'etat that the Royal Thai Army leader claimed to intervene into politics before Thaksin Era, starting from 1932 which there was transformation from absolute monarchy to constitutional democracy until 1991 coup. In 1991 military ousted civilian government of PM Chattichai and following by political violence so-called "Black May" in 1992 led to a numerous of Thai people died in that period. The political situation in Thailand has been settled for almost 15 years starting from 1992 until 2006; many scholars predicted that a trajectory of politics in Thailand so far away from military coup. In contrast, military coup occurred again in September 2006 while PM Thaksin attended UN Assembly in United States of America causing again civilian government had been toppled and replacing by

military rule. This article will discusses the causes of coup that the Royal Thai Army leader claimed to intervene into politic in the post-Thaksin era which was 2014 coup.

The causes of coup d'etat that the Royal Thai Army leader claimed to intervene into politic before Thaksin Era.

The causes of Thailand's first military coup in 1932

Huntington stated that Thailand's first military coup of 1932 ended the absolute monarchy and replacing by installation of constitutional monarchy, but this was not a revolution. Installing military leaders at the top of political institutions neither created a legal model of government nor altered the structure of Thai governance. He evaluated Thailand's coups through the 1950s was that this was an example of bureaucracy regimes where the political competition among the military leaders established in politics and the interests of the middle class (Huntington, 1957). In contrast, the 1932 Coup in Thailand, however, was not related to the Meiji Dynasty restoration of Japan in which military force brought in the interests of the business class for the social and political consequences were very different for the military and the society (Anderson, 1978). In fact, the thought of transformation from absolute monarchy to constitutional monarchy starting from 1884 when group of elites, comprised of King Rama V's Royal family and some bureaucrats who studied in Europe, coordinated signed their name and presented to King Rama V. This proposal did not agree from the King Rama V, instead the King just transformed its administration of each ministries to more modernization (Interview with scholar by author, 2015).

Thomas attained that the military organized a standard format for the coup, in which politicians are placed under detention, a new government is published, bureaucrats continue to work and martial law is declared. With repetition of the pattern, the coup became a list in Thailand's Politics (Thomas, 1988). The Military leaders who competed for political control had similar backgrounds and wanted to maintain the elite; patrimonial structure is evident in the turnover of civilian governments for the decade. The Prime Ministers from 1938 to 1976 were from the same generation that staged the first coup in 1932 (Ockey, 2010).

Yoshifumi Tamada pointed out that in Thailand since 1932 after the first military coup, when there was a completed coup or attempted coup, it would be practical to evaluate regarding the causes of the coups. It seems that, where the western politics to overthrow the absolute monarchy was important, with an exception of the first coup in Thai history, there have been four core causes (Tamada, 1995).

Firstly, severe political violence seem to encourage a numerous of people to support the military to solve the problem. In case of military coup happening, the military declared the cause of military seizing power such as economic problem, insecurity of politic, international circumstance changing and the national security threat.

Secondly, the worse relationship between government and military allowed the high risk of possibility of military coup such as 1991 coup. Reality, the military rarely claimed unreasonable causes on the government in case of their own interest reputation.

Thirdly, military's internal conflict between each factions was the cause of military coup as well. Especially, internal conflict of rival in the army was candidate for top brass position.

Fourthly, military government staged the coup against itself due to weaknesses appearance and to strengthening the governmental power this model happened when military government enjoy full support from soldiers such as 1951 and 1985 coup. Ultimately, military coups were provoked not a sole cause but grouping of these four causes (Tamada, 1995).

The causes of 1991 coup and other coups before Thaksin era

The characterization of the 1991 coup in Thailand as an anachronistic attempt by the military to re-establish its prominence in Thailand's politics only describes part of the scene. The coup resulted from a simultaneous occurrence of civilian failures and military strengths. The balance of the political forces that supported the semi-democracy of the 1980s fell apart when Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhawan's elected civilian government took office in 1989. A perception of civilian incompetence and political stalemate put his government in a weak political position. At the same time, the military remained strong within the state and retained its

political mindset. The source of power for the new, elected government and its exercising of its authority challenged the military's values and role within the government (O'Connor, 2011).

In 1988, Chatichai's entrance into government appeared to be a successful consolidation of democratic forms (Boonbongkarn, 1996). Chatichai was not accepted in the same manner as Prem by the urban middle class, which raised questions about the integrity of the new politicians with their business interests. Accusations of corruption and vote buying came nearly immediately after Chatichai took office (Laothamatas, 1996).

The unity of the military reached a high point when Class Five ascended to the top posts in the Royal Thai Army in 1989. The unity of leadership was a departure from the factionalism of the 1980s (Hewison, 1993). Class Five had been challenged by the Thai Young Turks, who represented a younger generation of officers, led by Class Seven, seeking a more professional, less politicized military force. The coup attempts of 1981 and 1985 were consistent with the impression that military intervention was an acceptable means of defending the nation's interests by seizing the authority to define the threats (Suwannathat, 2003). The result of the coup attempts was the removal of involved officers from Class Seven. To solidify his relationship with the military leadership in 1989, Chatichai promoted members of Class Five, the largest, most cohesive class in the higher reaches of the military (Handley, 2006).

By 1991, the conditions were set that established the elected government and the military as opposing political forces. Chatichai's government represented capitalist business interests, and the corrupt practices for those interests weakened the government's political position and contributed to a loss of legitimacy from the middle class that supported democratic ideals. A threat by the government to the immediate interests of the military could now precipitate military intervention. Conflict occurred over Chatichai's nominations for defense leaders, who were unacceptable to General Suchinda military leader (O'Connor, 2011).

By the end of 1990, the military leader's favor shifted away from the elected government. The military leader's reviewed of the military and indicated more support for the military and traditional Thai forms with less support for the

government and Western methods (Handley, 2006). Chatichai, his cabinet again, and his appointments directly assaulted the military's political sensitivities and, this time, the elites as well. Chatichai revived the career of Major General Manoon Roopkachorn, a rival of Class Five in disgrace for his involvement in the 1981 and 1985 coup attempts (Handley, 2006).

In the contested issue of appointments and cabinet positions, Chatichai moved to install someone senior to the army leaders. General Suchinda took action before the appointment could take place by arresting Chatichai before their flight to visit the king departed. The resulting coup received an almost popular welcome as the middle class and elites had removed their support for the elected government. The tradition-minded coup leaders continued the historic pattern. As with previous coups in their bloodless form, the National Peacekeeping Council (NPKC) nullified the constitution, named an interim government, and continued the operations of the state (Tasker, 1991).

Corruption was the reason cited as driving the coup by the National Peacekeeping Council and the reason accepted by the middle class who welcomed the intervention. However, corruption in politics existed before and after the Chatichai administration. The middle class acknowledged that Prem's government also had corruption, but Prem had the integrity to hold corruption within limits (Laothamatas, 1996). The middle class did not have the same perception of integrity for Chatichai, so corruption became a focal point (Boonbongkarn, 1996).

O'Connor suggested that several factors came together in Thailand's politics to precipitate a coup at this point in time. The combination of these factors was necessary, and the absence of one could have avoided the coup. Outcomes other than a coup were possible under suggested alternative conditions for the political competence of the elected government, the role of the bureaucracy and military within the new government, and the unity and political strength of the military at the time of the coup (O'Connor, 2011).

The causes of 2006 coup d'etat in Thaksin era

O'Connor underlined that Thailand's coup of 2006 had a different character from the previous coup, but many of the same conditions existed. Civilian incompetence led to political stalemate. The stalemate opened the opportunity for

the military to take action. The elected government's challenge to the military's interests again took the form of influencing the promotion process (O'Connor, 2011). McCargo suggested that politics in Thailand through the 1990s reflected a shift in political authority away from traditional bureaucratic and military elites toward democratic forms including more of a role from civil society and business. The attempt by the military to retain power after the 1991 coup led to a middle-class uprising during May 1992 in a clear rejection of the military leadership (McCargo, 2005).

Freedman supported that the rules of politics changed with the 1997 Constitution, which serve as a significant boost for democratic consolidation. A confluence of internal and external interests in developing democracy brought about the passage of the new constitution and the divergence of those interests eventually led to the failure of genuine consolidation (Freedman, 2006).

In 2001, the billionaire businessman turned politician, Thaksin Shinawatra, entered the office of Prime Minister with capitalist class interests and changed the political dynamic of Thailand. Thaksin entered office with overwhelming support of the population to make government more responsive and the support of the monarchy. The corrupt practices of earlier periods in Thailand's politics had not changed, and vote-buying and patronage networks were significant in gaining the electoral support from the rural regions (Phongpaichit & Baker, 2004).

O'Connor underline that the 1990s and early 2000s in Thailand witnessed an increase in democratic forms and legitimacy derived from them. Thaksin's abuse of power and his control of the strong implements of the state eventually eroded support from the middle class and challenged the values of the traditional elites. The network monarchy that had controlled the state before Thaksin looked to a traditional source of support (the military) to regain its position (O'Connor, 2011).

Despite the discredit of 1992, the military remained a competent institution within Thailand. Through the 1990s, the military retained prominence in defense policy making and limited the elected government's influence on the military promotions process (Croissant & Kuehn, 2009). The military further increased its role in Foreign Affairs with neighbors Laos and Cambodia, and in low level projects of development, within the check of the elected officials (Ockey, 2001). Throughout the 1990s and the 1997 constitutional changes, Thailand's state structure, and the

military as a part of it, remained a strong force within Thai society (Phongpaichit & Baker, 2004).

Part of the military's competence came from its remaining within its domain. The military removed itself from direct political roles. The military's strategy for survival was to avoid direct political involvement and concentrate on the protection of the military's legitimate role and corporate interests (Samutwanit, 1997). Not only was the military less interested in a direct political role, the business class and monarchy created a political environment that would permit greater civilian control over the military. The military retreated from a direct role in politics through the 1990s and remained a viable institution into the 2000s (Matthews, 2005).

The military took a less direct political role between 1992 and 2006, but overt factional politics emerged again among the military leadership in the Thaksin era. In a sense, Thailand's military never really depoliticized. A strong connection remained through the 1990s between the military and the civilian leadership, primarily through Prem's patronage network (McCargo & Pathmanand, 2005).

When Thaksin entered office as Prime Minister, he had learned the lessons of Prime Ministers Sarit Thanarat and Chatichai Choonhawan, recognizing the need to have the support of the military. Since 2001, the military promotion process became much more explicitly political when Thaksin sought support for his former classmates from Class 10 (McCargo & Pathmanand, 2005). By 2003, Thaksin had his brother-in-law appointed as Army Commander; this was the first time a three star was promoted to full general after only a year. This challenged Prem's dominant role as military caretaker (Phongpaichit & Baker, 2004).

The incompetence of the Thaksin administration was the erosion of the democratic process and its legitimacy. Thaksin exploited the power of the executive for populist policies and for personal gain. The strength of the office also permitted Thaksin to manipulate the political system to ensure his party would remain in power, but the corruption of the elections and independent bodies undermined the democratic process. The government also used its strength in campaigns that violated human rights and civil liberties. Thaksin's exploitation of the power of his office reflected his sense of authority over the government and ultimately undermined the legitimacy of the democratic process (O'Connor, 2011). By 2005, Thaksin administration that focusing on his strong policies was reduced importance

in terms of country reformation after second term in the parliament. The major obstacles to the bureaucracy were the old-fashioned public sector and the conservative culture of government officials (interview with civil servant by author, 2015).

Thaksin gained public support by offering economic and social programs that were presented as supporting Thai values and offered an acceptable alternative to what appeared to be the ineffective government that handled the financial crisis of 1997 and the subsequent prescriptions of the International Monetary Fund that had frustrated so many in Thailand. "Thaksinomics" on its face promoted local businesses, local governance, and Thai ingenuity (Phongpaichit & Baker, 2004). Thaksin determined what was important to the populace and used the constitutionally reformed powers of the executive to deliver efficiently on campaign promises. Thaksin's direct approach worked: Indeed, some of Thaksin's popularity may even have lain in his very abasement of democratic procedures, catering to the impatience of his constituents. The character by which Thaksin accomplished his goals while in office was initially popular, but the directness of his leadership also revealed a sense of personal authority over the state and undermined participatory democracy (Case, 2007).

Thaksin's administration took advantage of the strong powers granted to the executive office by the 1997 Constitution, in business and security issues, which brought criticism from the opposition parties and the network monarchy, leading them to portray him as dishonest and disloyal to the nation. A few key events demonstrate Thaksin's use of his executive powers for personal gain. Thaksin's wealth came as a result of earlier governments granting concessions to his businesses, particularly Shin Corp in the telecommunications industry (McCargo & Pathmanand, 2005). In addition to supporting some of the common people's needs and promoting local businesses, Thaksin heavily promoted his own business interests, granting monopoly concessions for his companies. This compelled investors to add as much as a one-third premium to the value of the shares associated with him (Pongpaichit & Baker, 2004).

Thaksin also used his power to weaken civil liberties and commit human rights abuses. He embarked on several campaigns which have negative consequences for civil rights/civil liberties and which ultimately call into question the very nature of

Thailand's political reforms (Freedman, 2006). The 2003 War on Drugs saw an estimated 2,637 extrajudicial killings by government-affiliated gunmen shooting alleged drug dealers (Pongpaichit & Baker, 2004).

Thaksin's corruption of the political system and abuse of executive power reflected his sense of authority. Major features of the 2001 election that brought him to power were the traditionally used electioneering methods of vote buying, manipulation, patronage networks, and intimidation. As a result of the 1997 constitutional reforms, however, the Thai Rak Thai was the first party to achieve an actual majority in Thailand's parliament. Thaksin then sought to build a grand majority in the government to marginalize the role of factional leaders (McCargo & Pathmanant, 2005). The step of state domination of Thaksin starting from top businessman won the election and obtained majority in parliament. Then, he became Prime Minister and corrupted of the political system in supporting his family businesses (interview with businessman by author, 2015).

By the 2005 election, the benefits of office were enough that direct vote buying was no longer as necessary because the politicians accepted the promises of government expenditures (Croissant & Daniel Jr., 2005). Thaksin understood the election results as a popular mandate for his policies and, taking that a step further, as his right to determine the will of the people, rather than his duty to carry out the people's will. He combined the Western concept of social contract with politics from modern Buddhist thinking, claiming that he was the good, disinterested leader who could determine what is best for the country. Within this concept, opposition was viewed as illegitimate (Pongpaichit & Baker, 2004).

The corruption of the democratic system and the abuse of power made many enemies for Thaksin, who did not view the political system as capable of fixing the problems. The boycott of to the April 2006 election by opposition groups prevented the elections of ministers to a new government. A political stalemate occurred when government was unable to form. The Thaksin administration had corrupted the democratic system enough that the support for the system eroded underneath it. The inability to form a government permitted the rising royalist support in the military to gain a stronger political position, which would be key during the interim government immediately prior to the September 2006 Coup (O'Connor, 2011).

The 2005 election was another landslide victory for Thaksin. Thai Rak Thai won an overwhelming number of seats with considerable use of illicit means (Croissant & Daniel Jr., 2005). Soon after the election, a new political movement, the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) demonstrated in mass protests in Bangkok in opposition to Thaksin and TRT. Led by a business and economic rival to Thaksin, Sondhi Limthongkul, the PAD took up the royalist cause; an effective means to gain public support because it appears to be above politics (Ferrara, 2010). In January 2006, Sondhi's cause gained further support after Thaksin sold his shares in Shin Corp and satellite technology for an enormous profit without paying taxes on it. This event, while within the letter of the law, gave the opposition an example of how Thaksin was not loyal to the nation even ostensibly putting national security at risk. In an effort to shore up his electoral support against the PAD demonstrations, Thaksin called for elections in April 2006 (Case, 2007).

Thaksin soon after decided to remain as caretaker Prime Minister and head of his party until the re-elections (Murphy, 2006). However, Thaksin had no constitutional authority to take this action. Further, other constitutional problems arose for the election scheduled in October. There was no Election Commission ready to oversee the election. In its absence, the Senate oversees the election, but there was no Senate formed either. The judiciary was left without a constitutional means to ensure an election. The boycott of the election and the loss of support for Thaksin from party members resulting from the demonstrations created a political deadlock (O'Connor, 2011).

The political stalemate resulted from the lack of commitment to the democratic process by both the Thaksin government and the opposition. This problem with the political structure was noted as early as 2002 (McCargo, 2002). Thaksin's authoritarian leanings (Case, 2007). Neither side genuinely sought to promote and abide by the democratic process. What was at stake was the competition for power between a Thaksin-led, capitalist-based, popularly supported network of patronage through government concessions and a traditional elite and opposition parties that espoused the defense of the monarchy against extreme corruption. This stalemate set the stage for a threat to the military's interests enough so to precipitate a coup (O'connor, 2011). Thaksin business was expanded during his administration led to

corruption of his family's taxes payment, later his government was toppled by military coup (interview with businessman by author, 2015).

O'Connor suggested regarding the threats of military interests that politics in Thailand in 2006 included a backdrop of rising royalist support in the military and groups opposed to the Thaksin government, a corrupted political system mired in deadlock, and latent concerns about royal succession. As in 1991, the reshuffle of military leaders again took a prominent role. Thaksin's proposed appointments were a direct threat to the interests of the royalist supporters and reflected the tactics Thaksin was willing to use to remain in power. In this context, the royal supporting military stepped in, using the known repertoire of the coup, to save the nation from an authoritarian-leaning leader (O'Connor, 2011).

As some of the middle class and the monarchy withdrew its support for Thaksin during 2006, the military also made its initial moves to check his power. During the demonstrations by the PAD, Thaksin sought military support for declaring a state of emergency. As Army Commander and Prem supporter, General Sonthi recognized that the outcry from the public against the military could be used by Thaksin to remove him from the Army Commander post, so Sonthi kept Thaksin at bay. In July 2006, Prem delivered a speech to the graduating cadets about the loyalty of the military belonging with the king and not the government; one week later, a midyear military reshuffle reappointed mid-ranking officers, who could be considered Thaksin supporters, to units without fighting troops (O'Connor, 2011). As the October election approached, Sonthi's intelligence agency learned of an upcoming PAD demonstration that was likely to turn violent (Khanthong, 2006). Such an event would have given Thaksin his opportunity to declare emergency powers, and his proposed military reshuffle in August would have supported Thaksin's authority.

The 2006 proposed reshuffle of military leaders benefited Thaksin more than previous years' reshuffles. Thaksin attempted to promote his ally, Major General Prin Suwannthat, from 1st Division Commander to be Commander of 1stArmy Area in Bangkok and to place Major General Prin's ally, Major General Daopong Ratanasuwan, as Commander of First Division. As long-term Thailand correspondent Shawn Crispin noted: With assistant army commander Pornchai Kranlert in place, the reshuffle, if accomplished, would have given Thaksin an

unbroken chain of command over crack troops responsible for Bangkok's security. This reshuffle would have locked Thakin's control over the military at the center of power. If a state of emergency were declared with willing military support, Thaksin would have had complete control over Thailand (Crispin, 2006).

Army Commander Sonthi had been put in place at Prem's insistence in 2005 and had the support of the First Infantry Division Commander in Bangkok, Lt-General Aunupong and Lt-General Saphrang Kalayanamit of the Third Army. To avert the PAD demonstration and what would be Thaksin's subsequent declarations and promotions, the army staged its coup. Thaksin was in New York at a UN conference, and his local military supporters were unable to move; leaders being reluctant to assume political power, the check on the factional balance of military power within Bangkok during the political stalemate proved to be too much of a threat to the interests of the royalists. The bloodless coup again followed its historical format.

In terms of corruption of civilian government O'Connor supported that corruption as a factor in 2006 was similar to what it had been in 1991. Corruption was pervasive and had eroded the quality of the democratic process. When the factions came together against Thaksin in 2006, they also sought means outside of the Constitution to remove Thaksin from power, appealing to the monarchy and the military. The Shin Corporation sale was seen as an example of Thaksin's disloyalty to the nation rather than simply unacceptable corruption. Many of Thaksin's corrupt business practices had occurred well before the Shin Corp. sale. The general public accepted many of the human rights abuses from the government as part of its efficiency. The royalist supporters claimed defense against the authoritarianism of Thaksin, not against his corruption. The military and elite supporters were concerned about the loss of their influence over the government. Thaksin's practices gradually made enough enemies and provided justification for demanding his removal, but the practices themselves were not the issue. Instead, the issue was his consolidation of power and ability to enact his will over the government (O'Connor, 2011).

Thaksin's administration shifted toward a popularly elected authoritarianism and permitted an opposition group to claim this government as disloyal to the monarchy and the nation. The civilian incompetence was the abuse of executive power for personal gain, the failures of internal security in the Southern regions, and the inability of the government to accept opposition within the political framework.

Rising royalist support sought to counter Thaksin's strong influence over the government but went outside of the democratic process. Political stalemate resulted from the extra constitutional means by the opposition in the boycott that resulted in no government being able to form. Royalist support within the military leadership, a result of network monarchy influence before the Thaksin administration, reemerged when the promotions were blatantly re-politicized by Thaksin. The royalist supporters in the military had values that aligned with traditional elites, who were challenged by Thaksin's rising power and ability to enact his will over the government. The proposed military reshuffle of 2006, just prior to the October reelection, would have given Thaksin unchecked control over security in Bangkok. With the democratic process unable to counter Thaksin's influence, the royalist military leaders' interests were threatened. The military leaders felt compelled to step in to save the nation (O'Connor, 2011). Finally, military intervention was necessary it was reasoned, to save Thailand from an authoritarian Prime Minister who corrupted and threatened both democracy and Monarchy (Interview with military by author, 2015).

The causes of 2014 coup d'etat in the post Thaksin era

On 22 May 2014, the Royal Thai Armed Forces, led by General Prayuth Chan-ocha, launched the 12^th military coup, since the first 1932 coup, against the civilian elected government of Thaksin's Phua Thai party, as of political crisis about six months. The military established an administration called the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) to rule Thailand. The NCPO established the executive and legislative powers in its leader and from civilian outsider, after dissolved the government and the senate, and controlled the judicial branch to activate under their directives. Additionally, NCPO revoked a constitution of the year of 2007, stated martial law up country, including a banned more than five person for political gatherings purpose, detained and seized anti-coup movement and political activists, imposed social media censorship and took control of the media (Taylor & Kaphle, 2014).

Hodal pointed out that military coup was staged and rule the country after the continue political crisis for a period of six months, counted that this coup was 12^th military coup in the history of Thailand after 82 years of changing to democratic regime. Since November 2013 the political crisis was resulted 28 killed and 700 wounded when the anti-government movement rallied to ousted Prime Minister of

Pheu Thai party from the office. The protestors occupied the street and intersection in Bangkok including took over some government agency building and rumor of the kidnapping a politicians of Thaksin's party because this party was the puppet of him and reelected again after he was toppled in 2006 and exiled to overseas (Hodal, 2014).

The 2014 latest coup in Thai political history was bloodless coup or some mass media called judicial coup that toppled Yingluck whose clan of Thaksin from the office, following the court ruling her and nine of her ministers from the abuse of power of rice scheme. The chief of military led the coup claimed that he seized power from the acting government but he did not use wording of coup, he will return power to people as quickly as possible. The military claimed that the power seizing will help the country reformation of political process including economic problem and social crisis. Moreover, people in Thailand both Thai and foreigner should not panic and could use continuously their life as normal, military will take care of all people and foreign embassies in Thailand as well (Hodal, 2014). Harlan Chico stated in his journalist entitled "five reasons a coup was staged in Thailand again" that after the 2014 military coup which Prime Minister Yingluck the clan of ousted Prime Minister Thaksin was toppled, this situation led to the junta administration that had not been functioning normally. This situation can clarify with five related phenomenal (Harlan, 2014).

1) A comparatively powerful minority and weak majority were locked in prolong of violence, the struggle had been gain more and more insecure for people in the nation. In the general election since 2001 until 2011 the majority gained the victory and allowed their political party to form the governmental office. It should be enough power in democratic country to rule the nation but the minority which controls the country's most powerful factions such as court, military network and elite businesses have used the court verdict and military coup to topple the civilian elected government. The minority says in the past during the civilian government there has been severe corruption and abuse of power by Shinawatra clan. In the period of the past eight years there were the occasionally crisis and many time of street protest of both sides and the cycle of military coup and general election, until occurring of 2014 military coup (Harlan, 2014).

2) The coups do not unite the country, since 1932, Thailand has endured 12 successful military coups, and they tend to exacerbate and divisions. The military coup in 2006 the military staged the bloodless coup ousted Thaksin's civilian government in order to bring back the normal situation and resolve the political conflict in the nation. After 2006 coup the Red Shirts has known as provoke forces for the military to exercise the fighting. The objectives of 2014 military coup has repeated the previous 2006 coup due to the continue conflict. General Prayuth has sometimes said that military has the key task is to upheld the monarchy institute (Harlan, 2014).

3) In Thailand, the king is at the heart of all situations happening, the king of Thailand is the longest reign monarch in the world and develop the country from the low to upper-middle income country starting when he was young. Harlan maintained that it is the question regarding the succession for the king that it seems to drive instability in the nation. The stakes of power will be competed in the high for the political competition. He suggests that whoever held the power in the office at the time of being has an opportunity to gain the chance hold the important power at a major transition time (Harlan, 2014).

4) Former Prime Minister Thaksin is the key person of the competition in political power in Thailand and he is the key figure dispute in the nation. He controls rural voters with populist schemes, a powerful force for develop Thailand's standard of living. He came in 2001 and was ousted in 2006, and again ousted his clone's party with 2014 coup. Addition, he has performed as supporter of the anti-minority network from overseas including his voters reliable send his clan into governmental office (Harlan, 2014).

5) There is not clear situation that what will happen in the future because Thaksin is in exiled and many key anti-coup politicians including other political forces are in limitation because of military ruling. The military currently says that it will not be sure about the duration in charge of the country and when they will hand over the political power to elected government. Harlan urges that some scholars afraid that the military junta will try to keep the political power in long period until the change of monarch reigning (Harlan, 2014).

Conclusion

The cause of coup that military claimed in 1932 to intervene into politics was transformation from absolute monarchy to constitutional democracy which they put efforts to change with proposal to King Rama V many times. The Duration from 1993 until 1991, military staged successful coup 10 times in 1933, 1947, 1951, 1957, 1958, 1971, 1976, and 1977 with the causes of military interest, communist threat, and conflict between military and government. Although the military at the time represented a society seeking reforms. It was necessarily for the military to seek democracy. The opportunity was available to inject the principles of democracy, but the military ultimately stepped in to defend its elite role. The military's relationship with the bureaucracy, brought military into politics during a perceived crisis, and permitted the military to believe itself a force for democracy. The military organized a standard format for the coup, in which politicians are placed under detention, a new government is published, bureaucrats continue to work, and martial law is declared. The military leaders'competition for power through coups replaced the palace politics of the past and was legitimated by the monarchy and the support of the civil service. In practice, coups were motivated not by a single cause but by some combination of many causes.

In 1991 military ousted civilian government of PM Chattichai and following by political violence so called "Black May" in 1992 led to a numerous of Thai people died in that period. By 1988, Chatichai's entrance into government appeared to be a successful consolidation of democratic forms at the same time military held a strong position in Thai society due to the success against the CPT. The policy to defeat the CPT which state that to destroy the CPT it was necessary to establish a truly democratic regime. By 1991, the conditions were set that established the elected government and the military as opposing political forces. Finally, the argument of soldier and an elected civilian administration that had risen reach a degree which Prime Minister measured a removal from office of military leader was an actual reason about the 1991 military intervention.

The 2006 coup had a different character from the previous coup, but many of the same conditions existed. The political situation in Thailand has been settled for almost 15 years starting from 1992 until 2006, many scholars predicted that trajectory of politics in Thailand so far away from military coup. Military coup was

staged again in September 2006. Civilian incompetence led to political stalemate. In terms of vulnerable of Thaksin administration that Thaksin entered office in 2001 under a populist appeal but with an agenda to promote his own business interests. Thaksin sold his shares in Shin Corp and satellite technology for an enormous profit without paying taxes on it. The corruption of the democratic system and the abuse of power made many enemies for Thaksin. Thaksin's administration shifted toward a popularly elected authoritarianism and permitted an opposition group to claim this government as disloyal to the monarchy and the nation. Thakin tried to overwhelm parliament, constitutional independent organization, and control over the military at the center of power but was not successful.

The 2014 coup was staged because of the political turmoil, since November 2013 the political crisis was resulted 28 killed and 700 wounded when the anti-government movement rallied to ousted Prime Minister of Pheu Thai party from the office. The 2014 coup in Thai political history was bloodless coup or some mass media called judicial coup that toppled Yingluck whose clan of Thaksin from the office, following the court ruling her and nine of her ministers from the abuse of power of rice scheme. Thaksin's clan controls rural voters with populist schemes, vote-buying, and a force for improved living standards. Thaksin used this people to support his party's activities during violence. Again, corruption of politician and loyalty to monarch were the reasons military claimed for seizing power. In terms of people movement forces, mostly rural voters in the north and northern part of the country are stronger than in the past of Thai political history.

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UNDERSTANDING HIEP HOI CHAM HOI GIAO VIETNAM

(THE ASSOCIATION OF MUSLIM CHAM IN VIETNAM)

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Abstract

The proposed paper aims to understand the Association of Muslim Cham in Vietnam and their activities. It was the government recognized organization of the Cham ethnic minority group in 1960s. This association was needed to assist Cham people who had migrated into Saigon, seeking employments and escaping from the war. They also needed to have an organization to identify them as Cham ethnic minority to prevent them from being conscribed. Upon establishment of the Association, it carried out various activities to assert their ethnic identity as Cham based on the religion of Islam. Since the Association was recognized by the former Saigon government, current Vietnamese scholars see it as a product of the US puppet regime. There are only limited number of research carried out and those studies are quite sketcy and some facts are mixed up. The proposed paper is based on the interview accounts of former officials of the association and some archive records to re-evaluate meaning of the Association. It argues that the Association of Muslim Cham in Vietnam can be understood as earliest attempt to unify the Cham ethnic minority scattered in the southern part of Vietnam through religion of Islam and to build Pan-Cham ethnic identity. The paper also discusses the Cham Muslim community's relationship to to International Muslim communities especially the Malay communities in Malaysia. Relating to this issue, the paper examines the process of introduction of the new sect of Islam called "Muda" (young group) from Malaysia.

Keywords: Cham, Muslim, Ethnicity

COHABITATION IN THE OCCUPIED PALESTINE'S POLITICAL SYSTEM

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Abstract

This paper attempts to investigate the impact of the mixed electoral system on the creation of the state of cohabitation that occurred in the Palestinian political system after the second legislative elections in 2006, viewed through a theoretical framework based on the idea of divided societies. This study employed quantitative and qualitative research methods together. This study found several important results regarding this relationship. Firstly, cohabitation is more likely to occur when there is a low rate of party fractionalization (more polarization) produced in the mixed electoral system. Second, the strategic voting in this election was sensitive to the divided attitudes about the Israeli occupation. Third, the mixed electoral system did not greatly reduce the small parties punishment caused by the pluralistic system, which increased opportunities for creating a state of cohabitation.

Keywords: Cohabitation, Mixed Electoral System, Consensus Democracy, Occupied Palestine

Introduction

After 1948, the beginnings of Palestinian political regime, or what Hilal (2006) calls the Palestinian Political field refers to the establishment of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1964. Over time, several factors such as Arab polarization and a series of Arab-Israeli conflicts influenced the development of Palestinian politics (Al Buderi, et al.,1995). After several a protracted series of battles, the PLO was expelled from Lebanon and exiled to Tunisia in 1982. As Palestinians started to accept reconciliation, international conditions became more suitable for making such reconciliation possible. The process started at the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991 and succeed with secret negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians. Called the Oslo negotiations, the negotiations ended with Oslo Accord I in 1993 and Oslo Accord II in 1995 by which the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) was

established as a self-autonomous authority and created a modern Palestinian political regime, although the PNA was located in thenon-sovereign territories.

The Oslo Accords was intended to achieve peace and create self-determination for the Palestinian people. The terms of this accord and the later agreements contained arrangements for what was to be a five-year transition period. The Oslo Accords called upon the Palestinian National Authority to conduct democratic elections at the presidential and legislative levels. The first elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council were on 20 January 1996. The government elected by the PLC was renamed the Palestinian National Authority.

Despite expectations that these accords might lead to a successful peace process between the Palestinians and Israelis, elections problems and issues with the democratic process in the Palestinian political system have continued until the present. The first legislative and presidential elections were conducted in 1996 under Plurality formula. Although elections were supposed to be held every four years, they were not held again until after the death of Yasser Arafat, the founder and former head of the Palestinian National Authority. That presidential election was held in 2005, which Mahmoud Abbas won (Presidential Elections 2005). Then, the second legislative elections were held in 2006. In advance of that election, a new electoral system was used called mixed electoral system. This new electoral system expanded the PLC from 88 to 132 seats.

The new Palestinian political regime had been first established as a presidential regime, with Palestinian basic law giving the elected president the power to establish his government, and gave him great independence from the legislative council. However, as a result of great pressure from the US administration after the failure of Camp David negotiations in 2000, the Palestinian Basic Law was amended in 2003, and the position of prime minister was introduced (Lopes, 2008, p. 2). Under international pressure, Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) assumed the position of prime minister on 19 March 2003, a position in which he served until September 2003.

With this amendment, the Palestinian political system was altered from a presidential system to a semi-presidential system, in which the president was elected directly and then appointed the Prime Minister from within or outside the Parliament, provided that he obtains the trust of the Legislative Council. Although this amendment to the Palestinian Basic Law withdrew many of the powers granted to the President, he retains many powers, in particular, those related to the work of the

Cabinet and its functions (Dweik, 2013, p. 76). The president also has the power to appoint and dismiss the Prime Minister (Article 45 of the Amended Basic Law), and the prime minister is accountable to both the President and the Legislative Council (Article 50 of the Amended Basic Law). Because of this, the Palestinian semi-presidential system is classified as a Presidential-Parliamentary system.

The transition of the Palestinian political system into a semi-presidential system was initially considered a remarkable milestone for the stability of the nascent Palestinian democracy, especially after the second legislative elections, which were held in 2006. In this election, Hamas won a majority of council seats in the legislative council (74 seats), compared to 45 seats only for Fatah (the Central Election Commission, 2006, p. 120) — the ruling party — (the party of President Abu Mazen)[1]. The results of this election created a problematic case for the Palestinian political system among semi-presidential systems, which was the state of cohabitation in which the President was from one party, which was Fatah, and the prime minister belonged to another party, which was Hamas. This situation led to a gridlock of the Palestinian political system, and conflict concerning the powers granted between the two parts of the executive branch: the president on one side, and the prime minister on the other side. This conflict soon led to an internal conflict, which led, to the division between the West Bank led by Fatah, and Gaza Strip led by Hamas in mid-2007. Soon, the Palestinian democracy was in shambles, a condition that exists to the present.

The electoral system used in this election was divided into two tiers: the first tier was a plurality system (First Past The Post System) that included 66 seats, used in 16 electoral constituencies varying in their sizes, with a system called Block Voting. The second one was a system of proportional representation (PR), which also included 66 seats and considered the nation as one constituency, in which seats were distributed proportionally to those lists that received more than 2% of the total lists votes using the Sainte-Laguë method. Indeed, cohabitation phenomenon has its constitutional and political origins also, but the electoral system also can produce this phenomenon by controlling of a number of elected parties. In this context, the polarization in voting by supporters of small parties favored the

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[1]Abu Mazen has won the presidential elections held in 2005 that were boycotted by the majority of Palestinian parties and political factions, including Hamas. Abu Mazen gained 62.52% of the vote against 19.48% for his closest competitor Mustafa Barghouthi. Refer to Presidential Elections (2005).

Hamas opposition party, and, according to Duverger's law, increased the chance of cohabitation in the Palestinian political system in the face of rising numbers of independents and a high degree of disproportionality in the mixed electoral system.

Problem Statement

In general, semi-presidential political systems, especially nascent ones, often suffer from instability, crisis and regression in many cases (Elgie, 2007; Shugart and Carey, 1992). Among such cases is the Palestinian political system. The system experienced instability after the second legislative elections in 2006. In spite of the fact that the state cohabitation rarely occurs generally (Elgie, 2010, p. 68), it did occur after the second legislative elections in which a "Mixed Electoral System" was used for the first time in Palestinian political system. This leads to major questions about the role of the mixed electoral system in creating the state of cohabitation. In this study, we argue that the attributes of the mixed electoral system used in the second Palestinian legislative elections (mechanical and psychological impacts and disproportionality) helped in creating the state of cohabitation.

According to Duverger's law, the both big parties, Fatah and Hamas must receive more votes in the electoral constituencies than in electoral lists, but in the 2006 elections, the opposite happened. The voting percentage for both Fatah and Hamas decreased, and both parties lost more votes in the constituency tier than in the list tier. Nevertheless, the loss of Hamas (3.45%) was much less than that of Fatah (5.43%). However, a variation exists in this decrease (passive polarization). This leads to the need to address several key questions:

1. Is there any relationship between the passive polarization of votes in favor for the two major parties, unlike Duverger's law, and between the occurrences of cohabitation in the Palestinian political system?

2. What is the relationship between the independent candidates and Hamas' victory in the legislative elections, consequently, creating the state of cohabitation?

3. What is the relationship between the contamination effects of the mixed electoral system and increasing the opportunities for creating cohabitation in the second legislative elections, through facilitating Hamas gaining a majority in the second legislative council?

Theoretical Framework and Previous Literature

In imposed democracies, the state of cohabitation is considered to be rare. The reason is the novelty of the semi-presidential systems compared to purely parliamentary and presidential systems, which widely spread in the nineties after the collapse of the Soviet Union, while the occupation era has been almost finished before this period. For this reason, the topic of cohabitation in the Palestinian political system is unique, as it reflects a case that has not been addressed in previous studies.

The concept of cohabitation appears in semi-presidential systems when the president belongs to one party, and the prime minister belongs to the opposite party, and the president's party is not represented in the ministry (Elgie & McMenamin, 2011, p. 4). This situation leads to stagnation and/or instability in most cases. These problems appear in the semi-presidential systems, in which the constitution divides executive authority between the president and the prime minister, who are elected for specific periods and who each possess different powers (Elgie, 2010).

These semi-presidential systems are divided into two types. The first type is the President-Parliamentary system in which the prime minister is accountable to both the president and parliament. The second type is a Premier-Presidential system, in which the prime minister is only accountable to the parliament. Linz (1990, p. 53) pointed to the potential conflict in semi-presidential systems between the two legitimate authorities, which might lead to instability and the collapse of the political system. Most studies (Linz, 1990; Stepan & Skach, 1993) found a negative relationship between cohabitation and the sustainability of democracies, but Elgie (2010; 2011), in addition to Shugart and Carey (1992), believe that this cohabitation becomes much more dangerous in specific cases, especially when the president's powers increase and when the type of the semi-presidential system is the Presidential-Parliamentary.

However, analysis of the extant literature provides no coherent theory about the emergence of cohabitation; all the theoretical literature about this phenomenon focuses on its implications for the cohesion of democracies, without identifying the specific factors that help create the occurrence of this phenomenon. Even Elgie and McMenamin (2011) when they emphasized what Samuels and Shugart (2010) had suggested that cohabitation was more likely to occur in semi-presidential systems of the Premier-Presidential type, did not explain the reasons behind this possibility.

This study focuses on understanding the features of the electoral system that help produce cohabitation, but not on the reasons for the collapse of the cohabitation system. Previous literature has not addressed this relationship, except for Elgie and McMenamin's study (2011). However, the connection between party fragmentation and the occurrence of cohabitation was unclear in their study. That is because Elgie and McMenamin's study (2011, p. 6) settles for the assumption that cohabitation is less likely to happen when there are either many or few parties. In fact, this assumption is very general and unclear, and furthermore was not examined with respect to any theory of party fragmentation in a parliament.

We asked Elgie (Elgie, personal communication, 16 Sep. 2015) about the paradox in his previous article about cohabitation emergence in the cases in which the number of parliamentary parties was many or few, explaining that no theoretical framework existed for this assumption in his study. In this context, we argued that the logical assumption was that fewer parties would increase the opportunities for the opposition party to receive 50% of the seats, which would, in turn, increase the prospect of cohabitation. Conversely, if the number of parliamentary parties decreased, the opportunities for cohabitation would be reduced because the opportunity of the opposition party to garner a larger percentage of the votes would be reduced accordingly. Elgie responded that this argument was correct in cases in which presidential and parliamentary elections were not asynchronous in the light of bipartisan systems.

In fact, these objective conditions as explained by Elgie are compatible with those of the Palestinian case. The state of cohabitation in the Palestinian political system resulted from a decrease in the number of effective parliamentary parties. In second Palestinian legislative election year 2006, the number of effective parties decreased to 2.32. This value is close to the party fractionalization in the majority/ Plurality electoral systems, but not mixed systems. The study addresses this dialectic and detects a potential relationship between strategic voting and the emergence of cohabitation, which followed the second legislative elections in Palestine.

The decline in the fragmentation of parties in the second Palestinian legislative elections indicates the great influence of mechanical and psychological factors included in Duverger's law, which may explain the creation of cohabitation in

the Palestinian political system, as argued in this current study. Duverger's law (Duverger, 1986, p. 70) states the following:

1. The number of small parties is few in pluralist elections (the psychological factor on parties); and

2. Voting is less fractionalization (more polarized) in majority elections in favor for big parties (psychological factor on voters).

According to this law, the effects of psychological and mechanical factors do not apply to majority or proportional representation systems, only to plurality and mixed electoral systems, in which voters do not want to waste their votes even to express their preferences. That is because voters feel sure that their opportunity to successful express their preferences are limited in a Plurality tier . For their part, small parties will also not direct resources like money and efforts to electoral constituencies because winning opportunities are limited in Plurality tier. Therefore, they focus on lists tier within the proportional representation system, in which they have greater opportunities to win more seats.

The mechanical effect of electoral systems is determined by how votes are converted into seats. In their study about the psychological and mechanical influence in a number of electoral systems, Blais, Lachat, and Doray-Demers (2011) argued that all electoral systems are biased towards big parties, including the methods and means of calculating multiple votes like those of Sainte-Laguë or D'Hondt, although the first method is more biased for big parties. Through identifying the effective number of parties (ENP), a comparison can be made between how these systems affect the number of seats a shares in the parliament. The issue here is determined by the number of votes each party gains, and then how they are converted into seats. In this case, disproportionality is considered an important indicator for the bias of these systems towards big parties. In majority/pluralism systems, the degree of disproportionality increases.

New Framework

This study uses the impact of Duverger's law on the second Palestinian legislative elections, in order to explain how Hamas, the opposing party, won the majority of legislative seats, which allows an occurrence of cohabitation. Hamas won that election, and cohabitation resulted because the president was from Fatah. Nonetheless, a consensus model could produce successful governance. Lijphart

(1999) argued that a consensus model could produce a successful democracy in less divided countries. He said, "The consensus model is obviously also appropriate for less divided but still heterogeneous countries, and it is a reasonable and workable alternative to the Westminster model even in fairly homogeneous countries" (Lijphart 1999, p. 33).

His theory is based on five critical points. The first is power sharing through wide coalitions. The second is a proportional electoral system. The third is the ability and willingness of various political segments to implement consensus democracy. The fourth is veto power for minorities. The fifth and last is decentralization and federalization. Lijphart (1999) believed that the advantages of implanting the consensus model in divided countries were stability, justice, and inclusive political participation by integrating minorities and non-governed groups and parties into the power mechanism of the political system.

Indeed, Lijphart (1999) believed that his model could be a suitable model for nascent democracy states, even occupied for ones. He felt that the consensus model could be implanted in Palestine as an occupied country (Lijphart, personal communication, March, 2015). His advice was to compare democracy in the Palestinian case with his database of consensus variable of thirty-six countries included in his book *Patterns of Democracy*.

Palestine democracy is foreign-imposed democracy, which has divided Palestinian society into two opposing groups. The first is pro-authority, which agrees with the occupier; whereas, the second group opposes any relationship with occupier. This division is stronger because it is combined with culture and an ideological split in Palestinian society. In Palestine, two splits exist. The first one is religious, led by Hamas, which is against Oslo agreement. The second is secular-led by Fatah, which is leading the peace process with the occupier (Bargouthi, 2012).

Our model argues that, in light of sharp split in Palestinian society, according to Duverger's law, voters of small parties who are against the Oslo agreement view Israel as occupiers gave their votes to Hamas instead of Fatah at the constituency level. This model argues that the mixed electoral system present in a semi-presidential political system due to the social split in an occupied country is more likely to increase the rate of polarization towards the larger opposing parties in a bi-partisan system, which increases the likelihood of cohabitation.

The others contribution from this article on the theoretical level is to link the split in the community with party fractionalization (polarization). This issue is mainly linked to the consensus theory. As a matter of fact, it is a theory which differentiates between democracies in homogeneous and heterogeneous communities. The focal point here is that foreign imposed democracies face a great value of division within the community between the two mainly parts due to a position with or against the occupation. Necessarily, this division significantly affects the polarization of votes in favor for the two main parties in the legislative elections, and then increases the likely hood of occurrence for the state of cohabitation in the mixed electoral systems, because it reduces party fractionalization.

Hypotheses of the Study

This study assumes that in the cases of non-synchronization of the presidential and parliamentary elections in bipartisan systems, a larger vote share of main opposition party compared to the ruling party would lead the opposition party to win a majority of parliamentary seats. This leads in most cases to produce the state of cohabitation in the semi-presidential political systems, in case the President belongs to a political party.

In fact, polarization in favor for the big parties is a form of strategic voting; in this case, the voters divided their electoral ticket between more than one party. In general, the mixed electoral system encourages this kind of strategic voting for several reasons : First: state of confusion that affects voter as a result of the presence of two electoral tiers; proportional and a plurality/majority. Second, the failure of some smaller parties that compete in the proportional tier to nominate their candidates in plurality/majority tier due to the impact of the Dovreign psychological law. Third: the novelty of using the mixed electoral system by both voters and parties, and lack of experience in dealing with this type, which leads to confusing in voting and candidacy. Because of these factors, it can be concluded that the mixed electoral system is more likely to produce a strategic voting, and necessarily, this electoral system reduces party fractionalization. In this article, I refer to polarization in voting as a synonym for low value of party fractionalization, and necessarily, the main contribution that I'm trying to point out is that cohabitation is more likely to occur in the case with a low value of party fractionalization (the existence of fewer parliamentary parties), or polarization in favor of big parties. As the mixed electoral

systems are more likely to produce strategic voting as I explained earlier, that cohabitation is more likely to occur in mixed electoral systems. Thus, the first hypothesis of this study is:

H1: In the cases of mixed electoral system, cohabitation is more likely to occur when the strategic voting increases.

Focusing on a variable that may explain the increasing possibility of creating cohabitation in semi-presidential systems is important. The degree of polarization exhibited in voting for the big parties is greatly influenced by the attitudes of voters about the reality of political and ideological divisions in the Palestinian society that has resulted from the relationship with the occupation. This polarization has increased the chances of the two major parties receiving a high percentage of votes in the mixed electoral system, and, as a result, has increased the opportunities to create a state of cohabitation and for the two major parties to receive the largest number of seats, according to Duverger's law. The paradoxical attitude of the Palestinian political parties was reflected not only in the political divisions in Palestinian society but also in the process of voting in the legislative elections of 2006. Thus, the second hypothesis of this study is:

H2: In the cases of non-synchronization of the presidential and parliamentary elections, cohabitation is more likely to occur when the polarization between the two parties voting varies in favor for the opposition party, depending on the attitudes of smaller parties towards the relationship with the occupation.

The paradoxical attitude may also, explain the reason behind the mismatch of strategic voting with Duverger's law in the Palestinian case, which has led to an increasing number of independent candidates in the constituencies. In fact, Moser and Shiner (2004) noticed this problem in Armenia, Russia and Ukraine, which lead to an increasing number of independent candidates. This point, perhaps explains the large loss of Fatah in districts, which was larger than the losses of Hamas. This was due to the high number of dissident independent from Fatah as indicated by previous studies (Lahlouh, 2007). Accordingly, the third hypothesis of the study is:

H3: In cases of non-synchronization of presidential and parliamentary elections, cohabitation is more likely because of the impact of rising numbers of independent candidates on the ruling party compared to the opposition party depending on the degree of institutional partisanship.

Mechanical factors could be expected to be responsible for Hamas and Fatah having a large share of seats in the second Legislative Council, and necessarily increasing Hamas' chance of winning in the majority of these seats. One way to conduct this analysis is to utilize the variable of proportionality. Disproportionality expresses the ratio between the number of votes that have been obtained and the number of seats gained. The degree of disproportionality varies inversely with the size of constituencies; the more the electoral constituencies expand, the less the disproportionality (Lijphart, 1999). In fact, the degree of disproportionate reflects the bias of the electoral system towards big parties, which punishes small parties. With the same share of the votes, big parties gain more seats than in the lists system seats than do small parties (Blais and Carty, 1991). Thus, the following hypothesis is posited.

H4: In cases of non-synchronization of the presidential and parliamentary elections, cohabitation is more likely to occur when the degree of disproportion increases.

Methodology and Data Analysis

In order to test the first hypothesis, we used two ways in order to test implementing of strategic voting in second legislative election, if we find that type of voting, we can assume that mixed electoral system produce more polarization in voting, then cohabitation will occur due to that effectiveness. The first way is to compare ENP in both district and list tiers in order to follow the impact of Duverger low.

The results of the second Palestinian legislative election, shown in Table 1, Indicate that a mixed electoral system has led to low value of party fractionalization, where the number of competing parties in list tier was 11 party parties, while this number was reduced in the constituencies to six parties. On another hand, the number of winning parties in list tier was six including Fatah and Hamas, while this number is reduced to only two parties in constituencies, and necessarily less effective number of parties according their seats (ENPs) was reduced from 2.65 in

constituencies to 1.88 in list tier. These results indicate firstly that effective number of parties in both list and district tiers are low[2].   Besides, they indicate secondly that strategic voting occurred according to fewer numbers of winning and competing parties in constituencies than list tier. That fact explains how psychological impact of the Dovreign law affected on both voters and parties, even the four smaller parties that competed in constituencies did not nominate only 34 candidates from the total 66 constituencies' seats of which 23 candidates from the list of Abu Ali Mustafa alone. This explains that the majority of the smaller parties in the constituencies were competed weekly and just only on the front seats of the constituencies seats.

The second way to monitor the relationship of the electoral system with strategic voting is to compare the percentage of votes share obtained by the party in the constituency and between the percentages of votes shares obtained in the list. If the ratio is equal to one, it means that there is no strategic voting or Dovreign law impact. If the ratio is larger than the one, it means that there is a strategic vote, and if it is less than one, it means no strategic voting, as the party's candidates lost votes in in constituencies more than those obtained by the party in the list tier. In that calculating of votes, we used an average of votes for the party in the constituency because of nature of the electoral bloc voting system.

Applying comparison in the share of the vote for parties between the constituencies and the list, we find that the voters in the constituencies were more likely to vote strategic for Hamas, compared to the Fatah. We find that is clear in three constituencies; Qalqilya, Bethlehem, and Rafah, where the rate was 1.1, 1.1, 1.02 respectively. In contrast, Fatah did not have any strategic voting only in one small constituency; Jericho (1.2). From another side, Hamas has maintained almost votes without any loss in two constituencies; Ramallah and Al Bireh, and Deir Al-Balah, while it lost some votes in three constituencies; Gaza, north of Gaza, and Khan Younis. In contrast, Fatah lost voices in the majority of constituencies, where the average of votes obtained by Fatah in the constituencies from votes were obtained in list tier is 82% rate. In contrast, the very same rate for Hamas reached to 95%. This shows that voters were closer to reaching strategic voting for Hamas than Fatah, however, that the average also clarify that both parties lost votes in the

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[2] Note that ENPs for mixed electoral system in second Palestinian legislative election is 2.31.

constituency, but the percentage of votes were lost by Fatah were more than Hamas.

Table 1. Major indicators for the results of Palestinian political parties in second legislative election

+	Value	Percentage%
Votes number in Districts (Hamas)	1932168	41
Votes number in list (Hamas)	440409	44.45
Votes number in Districts (Fatah)	1684441	36
Votes number in list (Fatah)	410554	41.43
Saets number in Districts (Hamas)	45	68
Saets number in list (Hamas)	29	44.45
Saets number in Districts (Fatah)	17	25.7
Saets number in list (Fatah)	28	42.4
Votes Average for Pro-Oslo parties	38916	N
Votes Average for Oslo opposition parties	100994	N
Number of seats gained by small parties in district	0	0
Number of seats gained by small parties in list	9	13.6
Independent votes in district	953465	20
Votes average for senior independents	115806	N
Votes average for junior independents	21566	N
Votes average for dissident independent from Fatah	20784	N
Number of seats for independents in district	4	6
Number of Hamas nominated candidates in district	56	13.5
Number of Fatah nominated candidates in district	66	15.9
Number of independent nominated candidates in district	258	62
Effective number of parties upon votes (ENPvs)	3.26	8
Effective number of parties upon seats (ENPS)	2.31	-
Disproportionality rate (Lsq) for mixed system	10.6	-
Disproportionality rate (Lsq) for list tier	0.8	-
Disproportionality rate (Lsq) for district	22.5	-

N: Un-known value

Source: Aggregate data from Central election committee (2006, 89-119; 14-141)

In order to test the second hypotheses, the small political parties in each constituency were classified in terms of their attitudes toward Oslo (peace agreement), based on the electoral program for each list or party and its political statements and declarations of its officials. Once so categorized, the votes of the pro-Oslo parties were added to each other, and the votes of parties that opposed

Oslo were also added to each other. Then, descriptive statistics and regression using the ordinary least squares (OLS)[3] method were used to determine if any changes were brought about by the differences in voting patterns of small parties based on their attitudes toward Oslo. Through this process, a determination can be made as to whether the vote shares of small parties according to their attitude towards Oslo did or did not have any influence on strategic voting in favor for Hamas, the opposition party, and the direction of this relationship if any. The results will indicate the amount of either the increase or the decrease in the percentage of votes for Fatah and Hamas separately that were due to changes in the percentage voting for small parties between constituency votes and electoral list (strategic voting).

An analysis of the categorization of party materials leads to the conclusion that the list of Abu Ali Mustafa, the Albadil List, the Independent Palestine list, and the list of Martyr Abu Abbas should considered to be in opposition to Oslo, while the Third Way List, the list of Freedom and Independence, the list of Freedom and Social Justice, the list of Palestinian Justice and the Al-Waa'd list should be considered to be pro-Oslo.

Table 2 below presents the descriptive statistical analysis for data collected from 16 electoral constituencies, which represents all the population of the study. This table shows the following:

1. Fatah lost more votes in constituencies than did Hamas, as the average of the votes of Hamas was 2.1% of the total votes in the constituency, while the rate was 6.5% for Fatah.

2. For Fatah, the sharp decline in the percentage of constituency votes represented negative polarization with a higher vote average for Oslo opposition parties (11.1%) compared to (9.3%) for pro-Oslo parties. Hamas had a lower percentage of polarization compared to Fatah, which had a higher average of the Oslo opponents' votes.

3. The proportions votes average of Fatah independent dissident candidates (5.95%) was slightly lower than the proportion of negative polarization for the Fatah movement in the constituencies (6.5%). This demonstrates that, if Fatah had not lost these votes in the constituency elections, Fatah would

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[3] The least squares method was used in the analysis of regression relationships, according to the estimated number of votes according to averages of study variables.

have lost 0.54 % of the votes on average. This percentage is less than the votes lost average for Hamas, which was 2.1%.

Table 2 Descriptive analyses for aggregate data (n=16)

	Lowest point	Highest point	Mean	Standard regression
Polarization for Hamas	-6.5	2.9	-2.0869	2.44761
Polarization for Fatah	-14.3	7.5	-6.5187	5.16168
Oslo opposition parties	3.9	19.8	11.0875	4.76485
Pro-Oslo parties	2.0	45.5	9.3438	11.28421
Constituency size	1.0	9.0	4.125	2.39096
Junior independent candidates	0.98	4.7	2.2613	1.02269
Senior independent candidates	3.5	23.3	11.8125	6.34632
Fatah dissident independents	0.0	17.9	5.9563	4.45855

Note: All data were calculated using the mean, and then classified by using percentages, except the electoral constituency size, which was calculated using the number of seats.

Using the data in Table 2 above, the data was classified according to the variables' values means. These data were divided into either less than or more than the mean of the values of independent variables, which were: Oslo-opposition parties, pro-Oslo parties, the size of the electoral constituency, in addition to variables associated with independent candidates. Each variable will be divided into two groups: the first group comprises the values that are lower than the general variable mean at the constituency level; whereas, the second group comprises the variable values that are higher than the general variable value at the constituency level. Then, these values are examined according to the constituency with the values of polarization of both Fatah and Hamas. The next step is finding the correlations and regression between these variables. If as the result produces significant differences between the lowest and highest values of the variable, this denotes that a contrast exists between the positive or negative polarization values.

Oslo Opposition Parties

Data recorded an increase above this average (11.1%) in eight constituencies, which were: Jerusalem, Jenin, Tubas, Nablus, Salfit, Ramallah, Jericho and

Bethlehem. This rate dropped in the remaining eight constituencies: Tulkarem, Qalqiliya, Hebron, North Gaza, Gaza City, Khan Yunis, Deir al-Balah and Rafah.

The descriptive statistical analysis of the data shows that constituencies with a higher level of votes for Oslo opposition parties were associated with a higher level of negative polarization for Hamas than were those constituencies with a lower level of votes for Oslo opposition parties. Hamas lost more votes in constituencies in which votes of Oslo opposition parties were higher, with a loss average of 2.82% in these constituencies compared to 1.89% in constituencies with a lower level of Oslo opposition votes. In parallel, Fatah lost a higher mean percentage of votes in constituencies characterized by higher level of votes for Oslo opposition parties 7.46 % versus 5.58 %. However, Hamas' loss of votes in constituencies with a higher weight for Oslo opposition parties was 0.93%, which was less than the rate of votes lost by Fatah which was 1.885%. This inferred that Fatah was more negatively affected than Hamas, as a result of the increase in the Oslo opposition vote.

The results of regression corresponded with previous descriptive analyses, in that a medium correlation between the two variables; Polarization for Hamas and Votes of Oslo opposition parties, (-0.505) was found. Table (3) shows the most important results in this relationship as follows:

1. Votes of opposition parties to Oslo had a negative effect on the polarization of Hamas in terms of the number of votes with one unit; polarization to Hamas is decreased by 0.285 units.

2. The more votes of opposition parties to Oslo, the more polarization decreased for Fatah as a one unit increase in the opposition parties decreased polarization to Fatah by 0.655.

3. Fatah was less polarized by the opposition parties to Oslo than was Hamas.

Pro-Oslo Parties

The data show that pro-Oslo constituencies had a higher number of votes in Tulkarem, Qalqiliya, Salfit, Jericho, and north of Gaza, while these votes decreased in Jerusalem, Jenin, Tubas, Nablus, Ramallah and Al Bireh, Bethlehem, Hebron, Gaza City, Deir al-Balah, Khan Younis and Rafah. This shows that the general trend of this variable is a decline in the majority of constituencies.

The descriptive statistical analysis of data shows that the results of the five constituencies, with relatively high votes for pro-Oslo parties (higher than the 9.30%

average) were associated with an average Hamas loss of votes that was 2.56% higher than those constituencies associated with a lower level of votes in favor of the Oslo Accords (1.87%). This indicated that supporters of small parties did not give votes to Hamas. In contrast, the results demonstrated that when pro-Oslo votes increased, the loss of Fatah votes in these constituencies ranged from 8.01% to 3.1%.

The results of regression corresponded with the previous descriptive analyses, as shown in Table 3 below. A strong negative relationship existed between the Polarization and pro-Oslo (-0.781) variables, and these results show that the votes of the Oslo supporters may negatively affect both Fatah and Hamas almost equally. The polarization of both Fatah and Hamas decreased and this indicates that the proponents of Oslo withheld their voices from both Fatah and Hamas. In a sense, the voting of pro-Oslo supporters was neutral for both the two major parties.

Independent Candidates

The main contribution of this study is the relationship of the independent with strategic voting in mixed electoral systems that have a bloc voting as the other tier of these systems. The majority of studies have looked at independents candidates as they are one of the main reasons occurred split of electoral ticket and the weakness of strategic voting. This study suggests that the need for the split of independent candidates to junior and senior candidates, in order to track their impact on strategic voting in favor for the two major parties, and necessarily to produce a state of cohabitation. The idea here is a high number of independent candidates in the light of other political variables, such as dissidence inside parties, is encouraged by electoral bloc voting system. We argue that the effectiveness of junior independent differs from seniors on polarization in voting, depends on dissidents' percentage of senior and junior independents candidates in ruling and opposition party juniors and seniors' independents.

To examine hypothesis three, the share of independent candidates (senior and junior)[4] in each constituency was measured as an independent factor. Then,

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[4] Independent candidates were divided into senior and junior candidates in terms of the number Constituency seats. For example, in a constituency with four seats, such as the Jenin Constituency, the four independents with the highest number of votes were classified as senior independents, and the rest of the independents were classified as junior independents. The rate of their votes was calculated using the averages method.

descriptive statistics and regression using ordinary least squares (OLS) was used to search for the relationship between the candidates and two major parties Fatah and Hamas.

Junior Independents

Data recorded seven constituencies in which junior independents votes exceeded the overall rate (2.26%) which were: Jerusalem, Jenin, Tulkarm, Tubas, Ramallah and Al Bireh, Bethlehem, and Hebron. This rate was reduced in the remaining nine constituencies, which were: Nablus, Qalqiliya, Salfit, Jericho, northern Gaza Strip, Gaza City, Deir al-Balah, Khan Younis and Rafah. The data showed that all Gaza province constituencies had a marked decrease in junior independent votes compared to the West Bank.

The descriptive statistical data analysis shows that the negative polarization of Hamas increased from 1.61% on average in the constituencies in which a smaller number of junior independents were present to 2.69% in constituencies in which a high number of junior independents were present. In the case for Fatah, negative polarization rose from 4.05% in the constituencies of with fewer votes for junior independents to 9.68% in the constituencies with higher votes for junior independents. In other words, both of the two major parties, Fatah and Hamas, lost more votes in constituencies with more junior independents compared to those constituencies with less junior independents.. However, Fatah was more affected by the increasing votes for young independent than was Hamas. Fatah lost an average of 5.63% of the votes, while the rate was much lower than Hamas, which lost an average of 1.08% of the votes.

The results of the regression in Table 3 below show the negative relationship between the junior independents variable and the polarization of both Fatah and Hamas. A strong negative relationship exists between these two variables with -0.701, and -0.776 for Hamas and Fatah respectively. The results also indicate that Fatah was more affected than Hamas because of the existence of junior independents because Hamas had β (-1.826), which was less than β for Fatah (-2.989).

Senior Independents

Seven constituencies had votes for senior independents exceeded the mean of this variable (11.8%). These were in Tulkarm, Tubas, Nablus, Salfit, Ramallah and Al Bireh, Bethlehem and Gaza City, while this rate decreased in the remaining nine constituencies of Jerusalem, Jenin, Hebron, Qalqilya, Jericho, north of Gaza, Deir al-Balah, Khan Younis and Rafah. These data also illustrate that the majority of constituencies in Gaza provinces, except for Gaza City, voted for senior independents votes in comparison to West Bank constituencies.

The descriptive statistical analysis of data shows that that the negative polarization of Hamas decreased slightly from 2.23% on average to 1.89% in the constituencies in which a smaller number of senior independents were present and in constituencies in which a higher number of senior independents were present the size of the decline was on average 0.34%. In contrast, the negative polarization of Fatah rose from 4.86% of the votes to 8.64% in constituencies with higher votes for senior independents' constituencies, so the size of the decline was 3.78%. According to this data, then, the impact of senior independents was stronger on Fatah than on Hamas, Fatah lost more votes in the constituencies in which senior Independents votes increased. The regression relationship between the two variables as shown in Table 3 below demonstrates the existence of a negative medium relationship between Fatah and senior independents (-0.585), while the relationship was very weak for Hamas (-0.234), and the β in the case of Fatah was -0.274 while it was just -0.07 for Hamas.

Dissident Independent from Fatah

Previous results have indicated that Fatah candidates have been adversely affected by the presence of senior independents in electoral constituencies. The reason is largely due to an increase in the proportion of independent candidates fragmented from the Fatah movement[5] in relationship to the total number of independents. Therefore, a list of independent dissident candidates from fragmented Fatah was

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[5] In determining dissident independent candidates from Fatah, the researcher depended mainly on the list of those expelled from Fatah by Fatah court decisions to expel them for competing in electoral constituencies in the second legislative elections without having the permission of the party. To see the names on this list, refer to (Palestine Network for Dialogue, 2006).

drawn and classified. Then, the relationship between them and the polarization of the two big parties was analyzed.

Data recorded six constituencies in which votes of independents who had split from Fatah exceeded the overall rate of 5.95%. These were in Jerusalem, Tulkarem, Tubas, Salfit, Bethlehem and Deir al-Balah, while this rate decreased in the remaining ten constituencies in Jenin, Nablus, Qalqilya, Ramallah and Al Bireh, Jericho, Hebron, North Gaza, Gaza City, Khan Younis and Rafah. These data showed that the majority of Gaza province constituencies, except for Deir al-Balah, voted for independents who had split from Fatah constituencies as compared to the West Bank constituencies.

The descriptive statistical analysis of the data show that the negative polarization for Fatah increased from 4.69% to 9.56% with a 4.87% average loss of votes by Fatah in constituencies. This is a high percentage and represents the negative effects of independent candidates who split from Fatah in that Fatah lost a high number of votes in constituencies. Hamas was clearly not as much affected by independents who had split from the party, as the polarization rate that ranged from 2.106% in constituencies in which dissidents were less, compared to 2.05% in constituencies that had more dissidents. The regression in Table 3 below shows a strong negative relationship between Fatah and dissident independents (-0.705), while the strength of the relationship between dissident independents and Hamas was much less (-0.399). Thus, although both parties were impacted negatively by dissident independents, Fatah was more affected by its dissident independents than was Hamas.

29 dissidents independents candidates from senior independents, gained 153,237 votes in the context of low average of their numbers comparing to district size‹(%43.9) , compared to 47 dissidents independents candidates from junior independents, gained fewer votes 106 637 votes in the face of rising their average votes compared to district size (71.2%). These differences lead to an increased likelihood for any of the senior dissident's candidates to gain a majority of votes, while this possibility was reduced for junior dissidents candidates, due to the high weight of votes for senior dissidents candidates (16.1%) compared to 11.2% for junior dissidents candidates. These data demonstrate that Fatah was influenced by senior dissidents independents adult independent more than Hamas, as we can say

that Fatah competed itself on the front seats in the constituencies and this caused its loss.

Table 3 The results of linear regression between dependent and independent variable

| Independent variable | Dependent variable | | | | | | | |
| | Polarization for Hamas | | | | Polarization for Fatah | | | |
	R	R2	B	Sig	R	R2	B	Sig
Votes of Oslo opposition parties	0.505	0.255	0.285-	0.046	0.784	0.615	0.655-	0.000
Votes of Pro-Oslo parties	0.781	0.610	1.192-	0.000	0.513	0.263	1.156-	0.042
Votes of Junior candidates	0.701	0.491	1.826-	0.003	0.776	0.603	2.989-	0.000
Votes of Senior candidates	0.234	0.055	0.074-	0.382	0.585	0.342	0.274-	0.017
Votes of Fatah dissident candidates	0.399	0.159	0.561-	0.126	0.705	0.496	1.463-	0.200

Note: OLS method, with 16 samples

Disproportionality

Hamas won 41% of the total constituency votes, which entitled the party to get 45 seats allocated to constituency (68%) voting, while Fatah received 36% of votes in the constituencies, which entitled the party to receive 17 seats (25.7%). Although the difference between the votes that Fatah and Hamas obtained was only 5% in favor for Hamas, the difference between the percentage of seats was 42.3% in favor of Hamas. The comparison between the two ratios illustrates the size for disproportionality that resulted from constituencies system in the mixed system, which was skewed towards Hamas.

The Advantage Curve for the second Palestinian legislative elections shows how disproportionality affected the party system and the government formed as a result of this election. If advantage ratio is higher than 1, this ratio indicates that the ratio of the party share of seats exceeds the proportion of votes

obtained. Conversely, if the ratio is less than one, this shows the extent to which the proportion of obtained seats decreased from the party's share of votes.

The Table 4 below compares the percentage of the advantage ratio for the two big parties at the constituency level as well as with respect to the mixed system as a whole in order to compare between the two percentages and to find out which party suffered or benefited from the two systems. The data contained in this comparison process shows that Hamas earned about 67% of the seats more than its fair share of seats as demonstrated by the votes in constituencies system, while in the mixed system, Hamas gained about 35% more seats than its fair share of the votes would indicate at the macro level. As for Fatah, exactly the opposite was true. The party lost about 28% of the seats compared to its share of the votes would have indicated. Moreover, the rate of disadvantage also accompanied Fatah in the mixed electoral system results, losing about 7% of the seats as its share of the votes would have indicated.

Table 4 Advantage percentage between electoral constituencies and mixed systems

List name	Votes % in constituency	Constituency seats number	Constituency seats %	Advantage percent in constituency (S%.V%)	Votes % in mixed system	Seats % in mixed system	Advantage % in mixed system (S%/V%)*
Change and Reform List (Hamas)	40.8	45.0	68.2	1.670494	41.4	56.1	1.352688
Fatah List	35.6	17.0	25.8	0.723886	36.6	34.1	0.93157
Abu Ali Mustafa List	2.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.1	2.3	0.74

Note: *The advantage percentage in the mixed system was calculated by summing the votes in constituencies and votes in the list, and then finding the percentage. Source: Central Election Commission – Palestine (2006, 120; 140-141). The researcher calculated the advantage ration.

The above results indicate that, whenever the share of big party votes increased, the proportion of advantage increased, and that when the party's share of the votes decreased, the proportion of advantage decreased until it reached the level of disadvantage, as happened with Fatah. Fatah suffered greatly from the biases inherent in both the constituency and mixed systems due to a lower share of the

votes compared with Hamas. The impact of the contamination effects of the mixed system did not seriously affect the advantage proportion, because it did not reduce the number of the seats that Hamas gained in the constituencies only 32% while this mixed system could not reduce the total percentage of Fatah lost in the constituencies only 21% This means that, even if the mixed system could reduce the high disproportionality in constituencies, it was unable to convert the results from a disadvantage to an advantage or even create a balance. In other words, Fatah which lost many seats due to plurality system (FPTP) could not compensate for its loss of seats under the proportional system used in lists (PR), which negatively influenced the overall final number of seats. Hamas received an advantage, giving it more seats within the constituencies system and was not seriously affected by the lost seats in the lists system, this helped Hamas win the majority of seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council.

An analysis of the Break-Even Point also shows the mechanical impact of the electoral system[6]. The second Palestinian legislative elections show the influence of Contamination Effect of the mixed system by increasing the degree of disproportionality in these results, which led to Hamas's victory and Fatah's loss. The relationship line for Proportionality Profiles represents the regression relationship between Y and X, where Y represents the proportion of seats for each party, divided by the proportion of votes obtained by each party. X represents the percentage of votes obtained by party from the total votes.

The value of the Break-Even Point was calculated on the mixed system as a whole and equaled 20.88%, which was the percentage at which Y should intersect with X. In the Proportional Profile, the horizontal line intersected at less than 40%. That indicates that the mixed electoral system used in Palestinian legislative election punished small parties less.

Then, a regression line between the Advantage Ratio and vote's percentage in the mixed system as a whole was created. As it is clear from Figure 1 below, the Y curve, which is the Proportional Profile, intersected with the vote rate X at 28% in the mixed system, which is less than 40%, which represents the intersection point in the ideal model of the proportional profile. However, this figures is still large, suggesting that the effect of the mixed system as a whole punished small parties more. This

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[6] The Break-Even Point is calculated using Taagepera and Shugarts' formula $B = 100\%(1/2)^{Nv-1}$, *Nv* equal number of effective parties (as cited in Herron & Nishikawa, 2001).

result is close to the hypothesis that the mechanical effect of mixed electoral system favoured the two big parties, Hamas and Fatah, but particularly favored Hamas.

Figure 1. Proportional profile carve in Palestinian second mixed electoral system

The previous analysis shows a positive relationship between the high degree of disproportionality and the victory of Hamas in the constituencies with an overwhelming majority, and, made the Hamas party, the main opposition party, in the second Legislative council. The results show that the majority system, including the high degree of disproportionality, led Hamas to get seats more than the proportion of votes obtained would have suggested as compared to Fatah. The mixed system as a whole led to the punishment of smaller parties, which led to the division of parliamentary seats between the two major parties. This, in turn led to the increased opportunity of Hamas ultimately to win the elections. This explains precisely the decline in the effective number of parliamentary parties in these elections, which did not exceed 2.31, as the decline in this rate resulted in a greater opportunity for the two major parties to win the elections decisively.

Discussion

The results of this study are several. First, are the findings related to the existence of strategic voting (polarization) for the two big parties. Previous studies have shown that Duverger's law to some extent affects both voters and political parties in the legislative elections in which, the two major parties lost votes in the constituency elections compared to those in the list section. However, the results also indicated important differences between the polarization rates of Fatah and Hamas. The negative polarization at the level of candidates of the party as a whole was less for Hamas compared to Fatah. The occurrence of the negative polarization in the second Palestinian legislative elections, which is contrary to the Duverger's law, can, in part be explained in light of the following:

1. The high proportion of independent candidates;
2. The weakness of partisan institutionalization in the Palestinian political system;
3. The lack of knowledge among political parties about how to deal with the block vote system in the mixed electoral system;
4. The state of confusion that struck the Palestinian voter;
5. The lack of clear information about pre-election polls and the increasing error rate;
6. The big size of the constituencies; and
7. The increased number of non-ideological party supporters.

Second, are the results associated with the existence of a relationship between polarization and the attitudes toward Oslo**.** Previous results show a negative relationship between the size of the opposition votes to Oslo and between both polarization and polarization of Hamas and Fatah. The results indicated that Fatah was more negatively influenced by the votes of Oslo opponents than was Hamas. This is an important result: that strategic voting was more sensitive towards the attitudes from Oslo. This can be explained as follows:

1. The great negative effect of the factors that reduced the polarization and strategic voting in favor for Hamas (and to some extent to Fatah) was much larger than the size of the positive effect of the supporters of Oslo opposition parties in its relationship with the polarization. In other words, the situation of the Oslo opposition party supporters is similar to voters who did not give their votes to Hamas in

constituency elections for many reasons. These included the effect of independents, a lack of knowledge and experience in a mixed electoral system, the difficulty in dealing with the block voting system. This interpretation is confirmed by the fact that the same negative relationship existed between pro-Oslo parties and Fatah movement; and

2.   The nominating of candidates by the list of Abu Ali Mustafa, which is considered to be a small party, in most constituencies. This directed many voters of Oslo opposition parties to this list instead of being directed to Hamas according to strategic voting. The two parties represent the most important opposition parties, and the list of Abu Ali Mustafa produced polarization in the three major constituencies of Nablus, Bethlehem and Gaza City.

Third, the relationship between polarization and independent candidates was a factor as well. A comparison of the affected polarization of the two major parties Fatah and Hamas as a result of vote for senior and junior independents, shows that Hamas lost an average of 1.08% of the vote due to the rise of junior independents votes versus 0.34% due to the rise of senior independents votes. Fatah lost on average 5.63% due to the rise of junior independents votes versus 3.78% due to the rise of senior independents votes. First, these data indicate that both senior and junior independents deprived Fatah and Hamas of a percentage of their votes, but this percentage for Fatah was higher than that for Hamas. That's why there are high rate of dissident independent from Fatah in senior independents. Second, this data shows that the votes of junior independents had a bigger influence on the loss of votes for the two major parties in the constituencies than did senior independent votes. The third implication is that Fatah was more affected than Hamas with the rise the votes of each of the senior and junior independents.

The above analysis proved hypothesis three; the negative relationship between the increasing numbers of independent candidates (in total and depending on their variations) by polarization in favor for the two major parties, which reduced the polarization for both Fatah and Hamas, However, Fatah was the most affected because of the candidates who split from the movement, and so the opportunities for the opposition party, Hamas, increased in winning a majority of seats in the constituencies, which created a state of cohabitation.

Fourth, the results of the study indicate a large amount of disproportionality that occurred as a result of the constituencies system in the mixed electoral system.

The degree of disproportionality in constituencies system has reached 22.5, versus 10.6 in the mixed system as a whole. This high-degree of disproportionality led Hamas, which gained only 5% more votes more than Fatah, to get 42.3% more constituency seats more than Fatah. According to previous literature (Herron & Nishikawa, 2001; Cox, 1997) the determination of advantage ratios in elections, helps to know the degree of disproportionality, and how it affects small parties in favor of large parties. The results of this current study indicated that in the constituencies system, Hamas gained about 67% of seats as a bonus compared to its actual share of votes, while in the mixed electoral system, Hamas earned 35% of the seats as a bonus compared to its share of votes at the macro level. Fatah, which did not have an advantage in either system, lost in constituencies 28% of seats compared with the votes it obtained; Hamas lost 7% of seats as a decrease of its share of votes. This result shows that the mixed system reduced the degree of punishing small parties by electoral system, but not substantially, which corresponds to hypothesis 3.

Conclusion and Recommendation

The study recommends that researchers search for polarization trends and their relationships with divisions in society. Most theoretical literature in the Duverger field has focused on proving or denying the application of Duverger's law or splitting electoral tickets, and reasons behind this application. However, in this study we propose that researchers should focus on the mechanisms through which votes of small parties go to the two major parties, through focusing on the concept of sharp political and ideological divisions in society, which are usually represented by the major parties. Based on this division, researchers can interpret variations in positive/negative polarization among major parties. In this regard, this framework should be applied in non-homogeneous countries, i.e., those divided by political and ideological attitudes, like most of the Third World countries. This framework can also be applied in imposed democracies such as Kurdistan, Iraq, Afghanistan, in which sharp ideological and political divisions exist in a society with respect to their attitudes towards the occupation. Necessarily, testing this framework in such countries, will contribute to identifying polarization trends for major parties, and thus can be useful for both big and small parties in managing electoral campaigns.

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THE IMPORTANCE OF BUILDING STRATEGIC ALLIANCE BETWEEN INDONESIA AND MALAYSIA FOR COUNTERING ISIS IDEOLOGY AND MOVEMENT

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Abstract

The development of ISIS ideology and movement in Indonesia and Malaysia is alarming. It can be seen from its efforts of spreading its ideology and movement in the two countries, particularly to the young generations, students, civil servants, and others. Developing strategy and strong networking as well as maintaining hidden recruitment processes through social media, prisons, mosques, and campuses, ISIS' ideology and movement have been spread widely in the two countries. Not surprisingly that from its base in al Shadadi, Syria, members of ISIS from Indonesia and Malaysia has established an institution namely *Khatibah Nusantara*, which translates and publishes ISIS propaganda in Malay language. One of the most serious ISIS propaganda is to propagate apocalyptic ideology based on "theology of dead", which promotes misleading interpretation of *jihad* (holy war) and the final battle to attack what they describe as "enemies of Islam" both in Indonesia and Malaysia. To counter this development, both Indonesia and Malaysia as moderate Muslim countries need to build a strong strategic alliance not only between the two governments and state actors, but also mobilizing support from the non-state actors such as religious organizations, civil society movements, and the media. This paper will demonstrate the importance of building strategic alliance between Indonesia and Malaysia in refuting ISIS ideology and movement.

PART 12: MARITIME AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

SECURING MARITIME SUPPLY CHAIN: THREATS AND CHALLENGES OF PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY IN SOUTHEAST ASIAN WATERS

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Abstract

According to United Nation Conference on Trade and Development (UNTAD, 2015), maritime transport is a key economic sector that underpins international trade, with some 80 percent of trade volumes are carried out by sea. It provides the low-cost, efficient and reliable long distance transportation of commodities and merchandise. However, the scourge of modern maritime piracy and armed robbery is expensive for the international maritime community. The loss of ships and cargoes, seafarer abuse, injury, and death, the need for premium compensation, the payment of ransom, high fuel cost, delayed cargo delivery etc. are an inevitable cost of the global supply chain operations. Therefore, this paper will highlights some of recent issues and challenges of piracy and armed robbery in Southeast Asian waters.. Discussion of this paper will provide a hindsight view of security of supply chains in this region.

Keywords: Piracy and Armed Robbery, Supply Chain Security, Southeast Asian waters

Introduction

> "…the modern day implication of piracy are now in global scope. In today's globalized age the problem of piracy is one that affects not just individual countries or shipping companies but potentially the entire global economy. We live in the era of complex and integrated global supply chains where people in countries around the world depend on safe and reliable shipping lanes for their goods, their energy, their medicine and basic consumer goods. By threatening one of the world's busiest shipping lanes, piracy off horns of Africa threatens not just specific ships, but has broader strategic implications."
>
> (Shapiro, 2011)

Assistant Secretary of the US State Department Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Mr. Andrew J. Shapiro's remarks to International Institute for Strategic Studies underlies the threat of piracy and armed robbery to the security of supply chains as well as global world trade. Loss of ships and cargoes, seafarer abuse, injury and death, the need for premium compensation, the payment of ransom, delayed cargo

delivery and among others, due to piratical attacks are an inevitable scourge to the maritime supply chains. Thus, securing maritime supply chains against disruption presents enormous challenges for the global community. For that reasons, this paper will highlight the threats and challenges of piracy and armed robbery to the security of maritime supply chains in Southeast Asian waters.

Overview of Piracy and Armed Robbery in Southeast Asian Waters

According to Piracy Reporting Centre (IMB-PRC, 2015), a total 246 incidents have been reported worldwide; 203 vessels were boarded, 27 attempted attacks, 15 hijackings and one upon fired. In 2015, the number of crew taken as hostage was 271 and the kidnapped ones was 19 crews. In the first quarter of 2016, Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC, 2016) reported that a total of 37 incidents of piracy and armed robbery attacks worldwide. Leach (2011) estimated the total cost of piracy about US 15 – 25 billion per year. In Asia, the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against ships in Asia (ReCAAP, 2015) reported that total of 175 attacks in 2015, as compared 155 in 2014. In the half year report of January-June 2016, a total number of incidents have decreased from 160 attacks in 2015 to 27 attacks in 2016 (ReCAAP, 2016). Despite the decreasing number of piracy activities, the Southeast Asian pirates turned vicious from petty theft to targeting valuable cargoes such as oil and threatening the life of crews by kidnapping for ransom.

Table 1 Incidents of Piracy and Armed Robbery Attacks, 2014-2016

Location	2014	2015	2016 (Jan – June)
Andaman Sea	0	1	0
Indian Ocean	1	0	0
Indonesia	48	22	15
Malaysia	5	4	2
Philippines	5	8	4
South China Sea	42	11	2
Straits of Malacca and Singapore	48	104	1
Thailand	0	1	0
Vietnam	6	27	3
Total	155	178	27

Sources: Compilation of ReCAAP Annual (2015) and Half-Year 2016 Report (2016) The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships (ReCAAP) Information Sharing Centre. www.recaap.org

Table 1 shows the piracy and armed robbery attacks in Southeast Asia from 2014 to mid-year 2016. According to Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea (ReCAAP, 2016), Straits of Malacca and Singapore indicate the highest number of piracy and armed robbery attacks. The ISC reported 104 incidents in 2015, in which that the number has doubled compared to 48 incidents in 2014. For decades, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore has been known as a hotspot for the piracy activities in the region. The 550 miles long-straits with the depth 25 meters deep at the shallowest part, is one of the busiest sea lanes of communications. More than 70 000 of various sizes and types of merchant ships passes through the straits annually, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore offer luxurious revenues to the pirates.

Surrounded by states, namely Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia with a width of 3.5 million square kilometres, the South China Sea (SCS) is a second largest pirate prone area in the region. The pirates in the South China Sea are rather sophisticated well-organized crimes and foreknowledge of the cargo type and disposal. In recent years, there are significant incidents of piracy attacks involving hijacking for the theft of oil cargoes and crews are being taken held while unloading the cargoes to the second ship, the names of the ship are sometimes re-painted and disable communication equipment, such as the case of Malaysian tanker MV Orkim Harmony (Graham, 2014). According to ReCAAP (2014a, 2014b, 2015) out of 42 incidents reported in 2014, 11 incidents under CAT 1, the category of hijacking and oil siphoning. Meanwhile, in 2015, a total number of piracy incidents reported 11 incidents and six incidents with the similar category.

In addition, the security analysts were also concerned about the tri-border area, the Celebes-Sulu seas. The body of water of the Sulu Sea is about 100 000 square miles, connected with the Celebes Sea, about 110000 squares miles. The seas are at the confluence of three states - the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia, which are vital as alternative routes for the very large crude carriers (VLCC, type ships over 230 000 deadweight tonnages) (Storey, 2008). According to Roman (2016), the amount of trade in the tri-border area with a cargo value of around $40 billion, the Philippines depends on domestic inbound of coal cargo export from Indonesia, with a total value worth $800 million. However, several incidences of ship-jacking and kidnap and ransom have significantly increased in this area in recent years. The rough terrains and scattered islands, not only have offered the bases for

militant activities, but also allowed the organized crimes groups to operate freely and engage in piracy, kidnappings and the smuggling of weapons and drugs. The Abu Sayyaf group has reportedly engaged in piracy and kidnappings for revenue in the waters off the Sulu archipelago. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), which is now is cooperating with the Philippines government against others militant groups still reportedly smuggles weapons through the tri-border area and having ties with local criminal gangs involve in kidnappings (Storey, 2008).

Map 1

Major Sea-lane in Southeast Asia

Sources: Muzalevsky, R. (2016). Southeast Asia's Treacherous Waters. Stratfor https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/southeast-asias-treacherous-waters accessed on 29 September 2016.

Security Threats and Challenges to Maritime Supply Chains

Supply chain involves multi-layered networks of business movements and activities from manufacturing to end-users. According to Christopher (2005), supply chains are defined as "the network of organisations that are involved in upstream and downstream relationships in the different process and activities that produce value in the form of products and services in the hands of the ultimate customers". One of the networks of the movement of the goods is transportation network. The transportation networks involve various system, including a logistic system which consists of the flow of materials from one place to another place, requires the movable resources such as lorries, trains, airplanes, and ships. These movable flows of the resource are

vulnerable to the cargo raiders. Department of Homeland Security (2007) alerted that securing the supply chain immediately raises the issues involving the security of infrastructure, facilities, carriers, people, cargo, and information. Piracy is one of the scourge to the security that disrupts the global supply chain.

The modern sea piracy exerts costs on the shipping industry, to some extent indirectly affects the insurance industry and government. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD, 2015) indicates 80 percent of global world trade are carried by sea as commercial fleets nearly 90 000 vessels with a capacity of some 1.75 billion deadweight tonnes. Southeast Asia indicates one-third of the world's seaborne trade, and 80 percent of oil transported to Northeast Asia passes through this region.

Securing the sea-lane is vital for the logistics and supply chains, as global trade is reliant on the waterways. The UNCTAD (2014) reported that the piracy costs range from USD$ 1 billion – 16 billion a year, including the industry cost for the payment of ransom and rerouting, ship protection measures, counter-piracy organisation, prosecution and imprisonment and government and civil society costs. Piracy also affected insurance premiums and coverage. In the past years, additional premiums were paid on cargo transiting piracy regions has increased by USD$25 to $100 per container (Bendekovic & Vuletic, 2013). In 2010, the Hull insurance has doubled and the cost of rerouting the ships to avoid the high-risk piracy area estimated US$ 2.3 to $ billion per year (UNCTAD, 2014).

Over than one-third of all shipping pass through the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea, with an estimated 15.2 million barrels of crude oil transported through these strategic choke points. In recent years, tankers carrying domestic crude oil and palm oil often being a target for piracy and hijacking for oil siphoning. According to the Ocean Beyond Policy (2015), the total estimated cargo lost due to hijacking USD$ 8 million which has been reported to the local authorities last year. The amount of loss of the cargoes, particularly the oil and fuel in 2014 and 2015 estimated 200, 815 tonnes metrics of oil (ReCAAP, 2014b, 2016). The incidents pose security alert and disruption to the global oil supply chain. Table 2 shows estimated of loss of cargo due to hijacking and oil siphoning in 2014 and 2015.

Table 2 Estimated Loss of Cargo due to Hijacking and oil siphoning, 2014 and 2015

Name	Date	Types Of Vessel	Flag	Location Of Attack	Total Oil/Fuel Siphoned
Sri Phangnga	17 April 14	Oil tanker	Thailand	South China Sea	400 metric tonnes of MGO
Naniwa Maru No. 1	22 April 14	Oil tanker	St Kitts & Nevis	Straits of Malacca	2500 metric tonnes of MDO
New Glory	24 May 14	Tanker	Singapore	South China Sea	-Nil-
Orapin 4	28 May 14	Product tanker	Thailand	South China Sea	3200 metric tonne ADF
Budi Mesra Dua	7 Jun 14	Product tanker	Malaysia	South China Sea	940 metric tonne diesel
Ai Maru	14 Jun 14	Product tanker	Honduras	South China Sea	620 metric tonne MGO
Moresby 9	4 July 14	Product tanker	Honduras	South China Sea	2118 metric tonnes MGO
Oriental Glory	15 July 14	Product tanker	Malaysia	South China Sea	1600 metric tonnes of MFO
V.L. 14	28 Aug	Product tanker	Thailand	South China Sea	1296 metric tonnes of lube oil
Orapin 2	17 Sep 14	Product tanker	Thailand	South China Sea	1048 metric tonnes of MGO
Sunrise 689	2 Oct 14	Product tanker	Vietnam	South China Sea off Anambas Island (Indonesia)	5000 metric tonne of MGO
Suratchanya	15 Oct 14	Tanker	Thailand	Straits of Singapore off Bintan Island (Indonesia)	2100 metric tonne of gasoline
Sun Birdie II	29 Jan 2015	Tanker	Malaysia	Tanjung Ayam, Malaysia	700 metric tonnes of MFO
Lapin	12 Feb 2015	Product Tanker	Thailand	Straits of Malacca	2000 tonnes of bunker oil
Phubai Pattra 1	20 Feb 2015	Product tanker	Thailand	South China Sea	Not stated
Singa Berlian	11 March 2015	Tanker	Malaysia	Straits of Malacca	Not stated
David Tide II	22 March 2015	Supply Vessel	Vanuatu	South China Sea	200 000 litres of diesel
Dangfang	4 Apr 2015	Product tanker	Malaysia	South China Sea	4000 tonnes petrol & 1000 tonnes of diesel
Ocean Energy	2 May 2015	Product Tanker	Malaysia	Straits of Malacca	2023 tonnes of gas oil
Oriental Glory	15 May 2015	Product tanker	Malaysia	South China Sea	2500 tonnes ship fuel/oil
Orkim Victory	4 June 2015	Oil Product tanker	Malaysia	Pulau Aur, Malaysia	770 tonnes MDO
Orkim Harmony	11 June 2015	Product tanker	Malaysia	South China Sea	6000 tonnes petrol
Joaquim	8 Aug 2015	Bunker tanker	Singapore	Straits of Malacca	3500 tonnes of fuel oil
Total					240 815 tonnes

Sources: Compilation of Recaap (2014). Special Report on Incidents of Siphoning of Fuel/Oil at Sea in Asia (Part II), Singapore: Recaap Information Sharing Centre. Recaap (2015). Annual Report Jan-Dec 2015. Singapore: Recaap Information Sharing Centre.

Another security concern involves the seafarers. Due to hijacking and hostage-taking, the seafarers miserably months in captivity, often suffer physical deprivation and post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Ocean Beyond Policy Group (2015) indicates in 2015, 38% of pirates and robbers in Southeast Asia were armed with guns, knives or steel rods. A total of 722 seafarers, 21% of incidents were on board, 166 of seafarers were directly threatened by the perpetrators. 12 incidents, for instance, crews held hostage by pirates and armed robbers on board for cargo theft. The crews were held hostage for a period of ranging from less than a day to more than a week, relatively these incidents were non-violent, with perpetrators generally avoid confrontation with the crews. However, the level of violence associated with the kidnap and ransom has increased, which resulted in killing the crews if fail to pay the ransom, particularly in the Celebes and Sulu seas.

In September 2015, two Canadians, Norwegian, and Filipino were held hostage when they abducted from a Davao resort in the Philippines. The abductors were sent six Islamic States (IS)-like videos demanding ransom issued over seven months. However, two Canadians were beheaded they failed to pay the ransom (Rider, 2016). Kidnap and ransom activities allegedly conduct by the rebel groups, such as Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), purposely to finance their rebel against the Philipines government in the southern Philippines. Based on various reports from newspapers, USD$ 12 million of ransom was paid to the abductors. This cost did not include the cost for ransom delivery, negotiator and attorney fees, vessel damage and other payment associated with ransom payment.

Table 3 Incidents involved Kidnap and Ransom in 2016

Date	Vessels	Location	Hostage	Ransom Paid
26/3/2016	Brahma 12 Tug Boat Indonesia	Tawi-Tawi Province, Philippines	10 Indonesia	USD 1.45 million
1/4/2016	Massive 6 Tug Boat 6 Malaysia	Off Semporna Sabah, Malaysia	9 Malaysian Four crews were released	No information
15/4/16	Henry Tug Boat Indonesia Christi Barge	Off Sintangkai Island, Philippines	1 crew injured 4 crews kidnapped	No information
22/6.2016	Charles 00 Tugboat Indonesia Robby 152	Philippines-Indonesia border	7 crews abducted	No information

	Barge			
9/7/2016	Fishing Trawlers Malaysia	Off Lahad Datu, Sabah	3 crews abducted – four remained on board.	No information
18/7/16	Serudong 3 Tug Boat Malaysia Serudong 4 Barge	Tanjung Labian, Lahad Datu, Malaysia	5 abducted	

Sources: Recaap (2016). Half-Year Report Jan-Dec 2015. Singapore: Recaap Information Sharing Centre.

Hijacking and kidnapping activities in the areas disrupt regional trade. The Sulu and Celebes seas indicate USD $ 40 billion of trade value. Indonesian coal exports from East Kalimantan accounts 70% of a total of the Philippines coal imports, approximately US$ 800 million. An estimation worth of 55 million tonnes of goods traverses through these waters a year. On April 21, 2016, Indonesian authorities temporarily blocked the ships to traverse to the Philippines and issued a warning that the waters were becoming the "New Somalia". On 20 June 2016, Indonesian Foreign Minister, Retno Marsudi announced a ban on licences to ship coal to the Philippines from Indonesian ports until the Philippines Government guarantee its security (Rider, 2016). The threat of piracy and hijacking of kidnap and ransom has undermined the safety of the fishing activities and shipping in these remote seas. As the shipping company has already run on thin margins, the threat of hijacking and kidnap and ransom and the blockade suffered the industry.

The waterway often used by tankers as alternative routes to the narrower and shallower the Straits of Malacca. Recent piracy activities in these remote sea lanes interrupts the flow of cargo. If a ship is hijacked and held for any period of time, the shipping company and the charterer may have to deal with the loss of revenue and higher charter expenses, particularly the high-value cargoes such as crude oil, pharmaceuticals, luxury cars etc. Some of London insurers introduce a policy design to cover the financial impact business loss of earning incurred by the shipping company, the charterer and cargo owner (Helmick, 2015). To some extent, this cost inevitably transfers to end-user and potentially increase the price of goods in the market.

Conclusion

The remarks by Mr Andrew Shapiro, Assistant Secretary of the US State Department Bureau of Political-Military Affairs underlies the risk of piracy and robbery to the security of maritime supply chains and global trade. This region is known as piracy hotspot, her waters namely the Straits of Malacca and the South China Sea are known as dangerous for the ships to traverse through, yet these seas are strategic sea-lane of communications (SLOCs) connecting the major economies in the northeast to the rest of the world in the west. Despite the decline of piratical attacks in recent years, the level of threat has increased. The reports from the ReCAAP and IMB has shown that the high value cargo such as the crude oil for the syphoning of oil. The authorities believed that it involved highly organised crime group, transferring the cargoes in few hours to another ships and the hijacked ship was repaint and forged their document. Meanwhile in the Celebes and Sulu seas the kidnaping activities were rampant. The perpetrator asked for ransom for the release of the crews. Total amount of ransom cost about million dollars. If the family member or shipping company failed to meet their demands, the crews were being killed.

Therefore, the scourge of piracy and armed robbery are expensive to maritime community and global trade. It may disrupt the flow of trade and incur indirect costs, including the cost of delaying, the increase of insurance premiums to cover the loss of cargo and crews, the cost for negotiator, cost of ransom, security equipment, cost in government operations, fuel etc. to some extent these cost inevitably transfer to the end-user and potentially increase the price in the market. Thus, piracy and armed robbery undermines the security of maritime supply chains and global trade.

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MARITIME SILK ROAD: PAST PICTURE AND FUTURE CHALLENGES FOR ASEAN CENTRALITY

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Abstract

Eleven centuries ago, around 900 to 1400 AD, maritime trade brought commercial changes and increased maritime links among civilization around maritime Silk Road. This maritime trade route stretched from China to South Asia and Middle East through Southeast Asia. It brought wealth and prosperity was secured by convoy merchant fleets to dissuade pirates or another threat.

In today 21st century and in the globalized economy, China as emerging maritime power in international level has published its 21st Century Maritime Silk Road. A congruent trade route with ancient maritime trade route which transport oil, energy, and other material for Chinese industry and also a trade route to distributed Chinese product around the globe. This trade route essential for China to be secured by its naval forces as far as China's island chain strategy of string of pearls. The strategy for dissuasion to the other extra-regional naval great power, such as US pivots in the Asia Pacific and India naval modernization.

By describing narrative of maritime history and neighbouring countries were linked of trade route at 900 to 1400 in Southeast Asia with comparative maritime history methodology, this paper will mapping history to current development. This paper argues that based on historical narrative, current emerging contour of maritime landscape of regional affairs will challenges many nation in Southeast Asia, due to their geostrategic location with vital sea lines of communications (SLOCs) which important among emerging maritime great power.

Keywords: Emerging Maritime Power, Maritime History, Maritime Silk Road, Maritime Trade Route, Southeast Asia

Economic Dependence on Maritime Commerce and Chinese Peaceful Rise

For two millennia, maritime trade had brought commercial changes and increased maritime links among civilization in Western Pacific and Indian Ocean. This maritime trade route named Maritime Silk Road had brought wealth and prosperity stretched from East Asia to South Asia and Middle East through Southeast Asian waters. This ancient trade route transported silk, spices, tea, and enabled the circulation of ideas, technologies, people and culture for several centuries (Duquennoy & Zielonka, 2015).

In today globalized economy, these regions are strategic sea lanes that shape international political architecture with increased role in global economic as engine for global economic growth. This economic growth based maritime commerce has

not only brought prosperity but has also raised concerns about the safety of freedom of navigations through the sea lanes of communications (SLOCs) in these regions. Emerging development in these regions where the SLOCs of East Asia to South Asia through Southeast Asia are threatened by unresolved territorial claims among majors countries concerning maritime jurisdictional in East China Sea and South China Sea. These over claims has brought instability in regional security affairs due to a lack of trust among countries and the lack of transparency in the naval build up to project their power over claimed region along with other issues of non-traditional maritime security threat such as piracy, people smuggling, illegal fishing, maritime insurgence, and many others.

Even so, world attention on this region could not turn focus from the rise of China as maritime great power. Besides Chinese naval expansion and claim over several part of South China Sea, China has published its new Maritime Silk Road in 21st century; it announced internationally by Chinese President to Indonesian parliament in October 2013 during diplomatic visit to Indonesia (Singh, 2014). This maritime Silk Road is essential for China's national interest to be secured by its naval forces with its offshore active defence strategy and string of pearls strategy (Tiezzi, 2014). A defensive military strategy for Chinese maritime security consists of dual-use commercial maritime infrastructure with logistical support capability, conducted by People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) (Singh, 2015). The Chinese military strategy was meant to dissuade extra regional maritime great power, such as US pivots in the Asia Pacific and in the same times as a part of naval diplomacy to US allies, such as India, South Korea, and Japan (Chellaney, 2015). This situation raises the potential of strategic competition and security problem which poses as a threat to the security of SLOCs along the outskirts of the Indian Ocean and western Pacific Rim as artery of global maritime commerce (Scott, 2012).

The new 21st century maritime Silk Road is congruent with ancient maritime Silk Road. It extended from Southern China province heading to Indian Ocean and western Africa through Strait of Malacca and Sunda Strait. This re-emergence of ancient maritime Silk Road by China was due to drowned wealth and strength for several empires in several centuries ago from silk trade, ceramic, and spices trades (Chellaney, 2015; Nataraj, 2015). But today, this route transports oil, energy, and others material for Chinese industry and also serves as a route to reach global market. In soft power term this 21st century maritime Silk Road was initially an

ASEAN-centred project (Singh, 2014); aimed to spread Beijing regional influence by strengthening a maritime partnership with ASEAN and South Asia countries and also gulf countries by maritime infrastructure corridor in the broader Indian Ocean and Pacific region (Desker, 2015; McBride, 2015; Singh, 2014).

The nature of challenges and impact a head from the new Chinese Maritime Silk Road in 21st century to neighbouring countries remains unclear. Understanding these issues is important for ASEAN Countries to prevent regional mistrust and security instability. An analysis based on a review of the maritime history will describe possible consequence and challenges ahead from the new Chinese Maritime Silk Road in 21st century, especially to build mutual trust and maritime security cooperation system for a secure and free flow of economic prosperity brought by sea commerce.

This issue is relevant to Southeast Asia countries' interest and ASEAN regionalism due to historical record, that Maritime commerce has flowed steadily westward to India and Africa and eastward to china across Indian Ocean through the South China Sea and the Java Sea with Strait of Malacca and Sunda strait as critical choke point and Southeast Asian waters as economically efficient route for more than 2,000 years (Miksic, 2013). Southeast Asia is located at the centre of a joining location among great economy power in East Asia and the outskirts of the Indian Ocean. This geostrategic position laid Southeast Asia Countries in position that they cannot escape from the Chinese 21st century Maritime Silk Road and it will be dilemmatic to face challenges ahead. From this spectrum with perspective of ASEAN Centrality, we can see that there is an impetus in broadening the regional cooperation scheme in maritime domain based on mutual trust and economic prosperity. ASEAN and its partner countries should build mutual trust and strengthen cooperation to continue collaboration as engine for global economic growth, by eliminating or reducing potentials menace to SLOCs security.

This paper will explore the maritime historical roots and changing dynamics of geo-economics and geopolitical contour along Maritime Silk Road from the early beginnings of age of commerce around first century to 17th century and the modern era. By describing narrative of maritime history that involved with economics, trade, politics, imperial growth and rivalry (Hattendorf, 2003:15-20), this paper will map out past history to current development. It's means; this paper will describe the narrative

of national history and neighbouring countries linked by maritime Silk Road (Masashi, 2009:3).

For this purpose, this paper conduct an in-depth literature review and media tracing to complete the possible puzzle to depict development of maritime commerce and also maritime great empire or nation-states contacts through ancient and the new Chinese Maritime Silk Road (Masashi, 2009:3). This approach is necessary to understand the nature of emerging contour of maritime power in this region, beyond the influenced of the powerful Anglo-American maritime tradition.

An Ancient Maritime Silk Road: Economic Prosperity and Imperial Rivalry

Sea commerce has flowed in Southeast Asian waters for more than two millennia which extended north to China and westward to India and eastern African coast with Strait of Malacca as its hearts (Miksic, 2013). This maritime trade route connected prehistoric Southeast Asia entities with China by commerce since the third or fourth centuries BC. The Moluccas spices from Maluku Island had reach Xi'an, capital of the Han Dynasty in the first century BC through maritime Silk Road (Miksic, 2013). This Silk Road bridged the first contact between two early civilizations, China and India, estimated as early as 217 BC by traders and gradually followed by monks and royal missions through Southern Silk Route; a route begins in Sichuan and Yunnan provinces through Burma to the Bay of Bengal through the Brahmaputra and the Ganga (Patra, 2014:46). In the other side, the contact between these two early great civilizations has also passed by the sea through Sumatra, Java, Malay Peninsula, Gulf of Thailand, and Vietnam (Patra, 2014:46).

From the seafaring traffic, around 50 AD, the Kingdom of Funan established in southern Cambodia to western Thailand along Gulf of Thailand. Funan grew from the profit and monopolized maritime commerce by conquering rival coastal entities or trading centres. In first century AD, Funan had established trading relations with the Chinese under Han Dynasty. This relation maintained until 3rd century in the same period of the decline of the Han dynasty in China (Goucher, LeGuin, & Walton, 1998:2-4). The Kingdom of Funan weakened due to Khmer kingdom invasion and direct trading route from Indonesia archipelago particularly from Srivijaya Empire to mainland China on 5th to 6th century. In the other side, the development of hinterland area with its agriculture became a foundation for the birth of Angkor Polity which replaced Funan's monopoly in Southern Cambodia (Wade, 2009:244). By the 12th

century the Angkor Polity faced Champa in eastern Vietnam as a new rival. Their rivalry escalated to several conflicts over the hinterland area which produced the desirable product for sea commerce and several seaports which transported the desirable product to Chinese market and southern region. The conflict between two kingdoms escalated with the invasion of Angkor army to Champa (Wade, 2009:245). Even though there was a rivalry and conflict, but the sea commerce to China still steadily flowed from this region.

After the collapse of Han Dynasty in late 3th century and Tang Dynasty in 10th century and replaced by Song dynasty, China under the Song dynasty realized the advantage of sea commerce with Southeast Asian kingdoms (Wade, 2009). In 10th to 13th century, China under the Song began to strengthen their sea commerce with Southeast Asian kingdom to gain economical advantage from the growth of their domestic industry and spread their influence to the southern region (Wade, 2009:222-224). The early connection between China and Southeast Asian Kingdoms was limited, predominantly constructed by merchants, traders, and Buddhist missionaries (Manggala, 2013:9; Peng Er & Teo, 2012:4). Some historical record found that the sea commerce between China and Southeast Asia was limited before 9th century due to Chinese under Tang Dynasty intensified sea commerce with Korean and Japan than to southern region of Southeast Asia and Indonesian Archipelago (Yamauchi, 2013:112-129).

Diverse from their predecessor, Tang Dynasty, the Song state actively encouraged foreign maritime trade by sending missions with imperial credentials to southern region along maritime Silk Road, especially to Southeast Asia in 10th century (Wade, 2009:225). Their effort paid off in the 11th century when several trading mission from Southeast Asia, India, Arabs, and Indonesian Archipelago, particularly Srivijaya, to the Song State was paid in copper coin (Heng, 2006:179-203; Wade, 2009:225). Song merchants intensified maritime trade with Southeast Asia in the next several decades, and it was indicated special relationship between Srivijaya, Champa and Quan-zhou, after the Song State moved their seaport for international sea commerce from Guang-zhou in Guangdong to Quan-zhou in Southeast Fujian in 11th century (Wade, 2009:229).

After Funan as maritime power defeated by the Khmer kingdom of Chen-la, a continental power, around 539 AD there were a shifting in geo-economics and geo-political contour in Maritime Silk Road. Srivijaya emerged as a new maritime power

from river-based coastal trading communities in 7th century (Gomez, 1967:71-72). Srivijaya dominated the heart of maritime commerce in Southeast Asian waters from about 670 to 1025 by developing good relations with China in the north, India in the west, and the agricultural hinterland as a supplier for sea commerce commodity (Goucher, LeGuin, & Walton, 1998:7). By regulating diplomatic relations with other regional power, Srivijaya enjoyed a virtual monopoly of the commercial activities in the Southeast Asian SLOCs (Sodhy, 1983:22).

Along with the emergence of Srivijaya imperium, from the 8th to 11th century also marked a period of Muslim trader expansion particularly from Arabia and Persia to India and Southeast Asia along the outskirts of the Indian Ocean SLOCs (Wade, 2009:231; Wink,1991&2004). In the 10th century, sea commerce had flowed steadily from Middle East to Southeast Asia and China through critical SLOCs and choke point in ancient Maritime Silk Route (Wade, 2009:232). This profitable sea commerce protected by armed escort in several convoys that consists of several merchant ships provided by caliphate in Middle East (Liu & Schaffer, 2007:196-201). This relation and cooperation assure a security of Maritime Silk Road from pirates that's could disturb the maritime commerce.

In the same period of the emergence of Srivijaya Empire, the Vietnamese polities of Dai Viêt in northern Champa had control maritime sea commerce route with its SLOCs and choke points in Southeast Asia. (Shiro, 1998:1-34; Tana, 2006:83-102; Whitmore, 2006:103-122). The Dai Viêt polity, in today northern Vietnam, had flourished and prosper as the result of their capability to control SLOCs and involved in sea commerce. The prosperity of the Dai Viêt polity came also from their capability to control the Bach Đang River as a shipping line from hinterland area to the seaport and then transported along Maritime Silk Road to reach Chinese and Southeast Asian market (Wade, 2009:241). This prosperity based on sea commerce strengthened by good politics and economic relation with other kingdom. In Southern Vietnam, Champa connected by sea to Srivijaya, Ma-yi (Mait in the modern Philippines Islands) and Butuan around the tenth to the twelfth centuries (Wade, 2009:242). Whitmore (2006:110) argued that in the 12th century Champa had controlled seaport in Thi Nai and Vân Đôn. Both seaports played as trade link or hubs between Javanese people and other Indonesian archipelago traders with the Chinese market (Wade, 2009:243).

In pre-colonial Southeast Asia, there were many maritime great powers which controlled a specific area of sea. However, the sea commerce between 10th and 12th century in Southeast Asia marked by Srivijaya Empire as the first great maritime empire in Southeast Asia who controlled straits and critical chokepoints within its immediate vicinity, had connected to other empire such as Champa (Southern Vietnam), Koryo (Korea), and China under the wu-Yue State (Wade, 2009:11-12). Dellios and Ferguson (2015) argued Srivijaya Empire may be congruent with 21st century ASEAN regionalism, when Srivijaya has even been described as combination of a small city-state with expanse of empire based on maritime trade. After the fall of Srivijaya, Majapahit in Java developed into a maritime empire and engaged in active sea commerce with Ayutthaya in Siam, Ming Dynasty in China, Joseon Dynasty in Korean peninsula, and Japan under Ashikaga shogunate (Cho, 2006:22-23).

After the declined of Srivijaya due to Chola attacked in 1007 and 1023/1024 and continued being declined until 13th century, Majapahit had controlled wide sea commerce route that connect the Malay Peninsula to Sumatera Island, Borneo Island and even the Moluccas islands in eastern Indonesian archipelago with the Java island as international centre port in late 13th century. A century later, in 14th century Majapahit had become great maritime power in Southeast Asia with centralized government and controlled sea commerce around Malay Peninsula and Indonesian waters (Goucher, LeGuin, & Walton, 1998: 10).

The Majapahit as central ruler created its concentric circle to describe their geopolitical realities. This concentric circle consists of friendly kingdom, hostile kingdom, medium power kingdom, and great power kingdom in facing regional interaction along Maritime Silk Road. Several friendly neighbouring kingdoms were Ayutthaya in Thailand, Cambodia, Champa along Vietnam coastline, and Syangka in Sri Lanka (Slametmuljana, 2006). Majapahit had maintained good international relation with many others kingdom was to get profit from high intensity of sea commerce traffic with China and other Southeast Asia kingdom (Manggala, 2013:1-13). In the early of 14th century, the vast majority of Asian waters with the island above it were under the Majapahit Empire influence and sea commerce monopoly. Majapahit controlled the sea commerce and sea ports in Sumatera Island, Borneo, eastern Indonesia archipelago, New Guinea, the Philippines Island, and govern several parts of today's Thailand, Malaysia and Brunei. Even though this vast

territory did not governed directly from Majapahit's capital city, they were under Majapahit influence of sea commerce (Manggala, 2013:6; Sardesai:2010). After the age of expansion, Majapahit begun to decline in the late 14th century, and then the Chinese trading fleets started to dominate Southeast Asian SLOCs and trade network (Manggala, 2013:10; Wade, 2010:3-4).

Jan Christie (1998:344) has noted that in the 14th century, highly sea commerce had changed many aspect of economic practice, from agriculture, international trade, and the monetary and tribute system. The changing had brought wealth and prosperity to the coastal region, especially in highly trading ports near Strait of Malacca, north of Aceh, Java Island, and the Gulf of Thailand region (Wade, 2009:248).

When Srivijaya was declined as hegemonic power in Southeast Asia and replaced by Majapahit, in mainland China, the Song Dynasty (907-1279 AD) had restored their trading network to the Arabian Peninsula, Middle east, and Africa after centuries of disruption (Roell, 2016:2). Chinese foreign relations, after the declined of Song Dynasty, under Emperor Zhu Di (1360 – 1424) from Ming Dynasty was marked by the sea exploration which was conducted all under the leadership of Admiral Zheng He, who embarked upon his first voyage in the year 1405 and return in 1407. It marked the Chinese emergence as a great maritime power until the arrival of western nation to Asian sea commerce in 16th century (Roell, 2016:2); this fleet took the trade routes that has well charted at least since the Han dynasty as a symbol of Chinese maritime power. Admiral Zheng's voyages to the Indian Ocean and eastern Africa Coast with the largest naval fleet in the world were not aimed to conquer peoples or even territory or to establish military bases. Their aim was to swap Chinese silk and porcelain for exotic souvenirs and animals from distance regions. These voyages left a legacy of a Chinese image as a centre of world's attention, strong yet benign and friendly to all, and based on this voyage, Chinese seems will do it again with 21st century maritime Silk Road (Bo, 2014).

The geopolitical architecture of Chinese connection with ancient Southeast Asian Kingdom was characterized by complex political structures from different philosophy and dynamic of rise and declined of empire. Even though, there are disputes concerning the Chinese engagement with ancient kingdom around Southeast Asia, but this long established relation had grown similar norms and similar culture of a Southeast Asian nations with the Chinese. This similarity reflected

in ASEAN Community framework and Southeast Asian Countries foreign policy (Kang, 2007; Manggala, 2013:1-13; Suzuki, 2009). The ASEAN regionalism was built on foundation on autonomy but with several dependencies in larger political unit to achieved common interests especially in economic matters (Gesick,1983:1-8).

Even though the political dynamic in Southeast Asia and China changed, the reason for the overseas commerce in Southeast Asia and along maritime Silk Road was largely the demand for spices (pepper, cloves, nutmeg, and camphor) and other exotic marine and forest products in India and Southeast Asia (Reid, 1980:235-250). Although the spice trade was intensified in the fifteenth century, the arrival of the Europeans in Southeast Asia created new market opportunities and reoriented maritime network (Reid, 1980; Orillaneda, n.d:1-2). This led to the emergence of insular and mainland Southeast Asian-controlled trade centres such as Aceh, Banten, Makassar, Demak, Gresik, Surabaya, and Hoi An that catered mostly to international seaborne trade (Reid, 1999:39-55). The Europeans later established their own port cities, with the Portuguese in Melaka and the Spanish in Manila and, a century later, the Dutch in Batavia (Andaya, 1992; Doeppers,1972:769-92; Thomaz, 1993:69-75). At the beginning of the sixteenth century, Ayutthaya and Melaka became dominant trade centres in Southeast Asia in order to take control of Southeast Asia's maritime trade (Orillaneda, n.d:2-3). From this historical record, the maritime trade increased contact and communication among ancient societies, culture, and the spread of religion (Wade, 2009:221-265). Along with religious introduction, the Maritime Silk Road had brought revolution in military technology from other part of the world to wage a war as effort to aid strengthen of local landlord that lead to the empire of war among civilization (Reid, 1988:219-33; Wade, 2009:222). It captured the rise and decline of empire along ancient Maritime Silk Road depending on sea commerce as their vital interest.

The New Maritime Silk Road: Economic Prosperity and International Cooperation

The history teaches us the importance of ancient Maritime Silk Route from China through Southeast Asian waters and Indian Ocean to India and Middle East as important as Silk Road through Central Asia. Focusing on Maritime Silk Road, current Chinese economic development, political revival, and its dependence on

secure of SLOCs to support its domestic economy showed the timeless role of geography in political-economy.

The role of geography such as the Eurasian Rimland sketched by Nicholas Spykman - a set of theory that combined Mackinder's Inner crescent (Sempa,2015) and Mahan's Command of the sea - gives sea power greater influence in Indian Ocean and Western Pacific relation. China as an ancient world civilization re-emerges on current international stage as a great power, a continental power with control of SLOCs stretching from northern Pacific to western Indian Ocean along Eurasian Rimland. China had realised these geopolitical contour and it will pursue strategic balance of power to secure its SLOCs as national interest and their rightful place in new world order.

China's Proposed Maritime Silk Road

Source: McBride, James. (2015, May 25). Building the New Silk Road. Retrieved from http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/building-new-silk-road/p36573

Almost all countries at the northern Eurasian Rimland depend on free flow of energy from Middle East and Africa region, through ancient maritime Silk Route. For Chinese government, the new Maritime Silk Route in 21st century is a key of soft approach to its rightful place in current world order to expand their influence based on historical roots. This sea route could boost trade, shipping, tourism, expand the maritime infrastructure, and create new jobs, promote people-to-people relations and improve understanding (Roell, 2016:14). Sea commerce continued to influence Chinese national policy, like others countries, due to a domestic market scarcity and demand for overseas energy resources. It will also strengthen justification of PLAN

involvement in combating piracy to assure security of SLOCs that transport Chinese energy import and to pursue economic gain through sea commerce with littoral state.

The combination of Chinese economic interest and strategic consideration from Maritime Silk Road is necessary to create prosperous nation with strong military to maintain domestic stability and maximize its power. In Japanese term history recorded the familiar effort when they modernize their nation under Meiji restoration, known as Fukoku Kyohei (McClain, 2002:207). For China, the new Maritime Silk Road will also provide means and ways to control SLOCs and dominate the littoral waters along Eurasian Rimland by showcasing its naval power projection. Such supremacy is essential for China to achieve global maritime power status and to neutralize extra-regional naval power and also support friendly countries for strategic or economic purposes (Mahalingam, 2015:1-3).

The Chinese 21st century Maritime Silk Road from the philosophy of seven thinkers from the 8th to the 3rd centuries BC gives different perspective. From this ancient notion, Chinese Maritime Silk Road in the 21st century is important to enhance Beijing's moral influence and politics revival internationally (Xuetong, 2011). The re-emergence of postcolonial China and, even India as two great early civilizations in Asia (Guānxì, 2009:1146), affirmed their morality in international affairs with depend on sea commerce for more than two millennia.

The challenges to Chinese Maritime Silk Road in short term is regional naval rivalry in Southeast and East Asia that induced South Asia for power and influence over critical SLOCs and strategic choke points. The rivalry over Beijing proposed for maritime silk road begun to occur when Beijing build seaport and military bases in several Southeast Asia and South Asia countries such as in Bangladesh, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. Moreover, Chinese naval expansion by developing naval power with ocean-going capability and regional power projection to the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean had increased several countries attention on naval rivalry to gain strategic sea commerce access with critical chokepoint (Ahlawat,2012). The prospect for maritime rivalry is being raised by high volume of maritime trade passed narrow choke-points and littoral sea along maritime Silk Road which being over claimed each other. This Maritime Silk Road consists of three routes. The first one begins from Arabian coast to Northeast Asia through Indian and Southeast Asian waters; the second one begins from Oceania through Southeast Asian waters to

Northeast Asia; and the third one from Africa through Indian ocean to Oceania and Northeast Asian sea area (Akimoto,2002:114).

The China's peaceful rise is unstoppable, but neighbouring countries continues to hedge against the potential of use of force unilaterally by Beijing in near future (Shiraishi, 2016). Several countries have been clearly demonstrating their approach to emerge contour of current Chinese rise and expansion. They dissuade and deter every challenge in order to balance the shifting of regional balance of power. This effort to address maritime infrastructure and SLOCs Security over disputes maritime region conducted by naval build up and bilateral relation with other maritime power. This effort is done also to defend national interest in maritime domain faced piracy, people smuggling, illegal fishing, maritime insurgence, and other non-traditional security problems.

Asian-Pacific Seaports

Source: Rimmer, P J. (2002). Commercial Shipping Patterns in the Asian-Pacific Region, 1990-2000: The Rise and Rise of China, in Andrew Forbes (ed). The strategic importance of seaborne trade and shipping: a common interest of Asia Pacific. *Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs*; no. 10

The maritime infrastructure, a seaport as gateway for international sea commerce is critical infrastructure to maintain economic growth from littoral countries along maritime Silk Road. In the north there are Pusan in South Korea and Yokohama in Japan that are dependent on undisturbed overseas commerce pass through South and East China Sea (Pant,2009). Both countries are vulnerable with

maritime territorial disputes and SLOCs security in South and East China Sea (Roehrig, 2012). South Korea respond Chinese military expansion by modernizing its navy into blue water navy (Roehrig,2011), even the primary threat is still posed by North Korea. For Japan, military action outside of Japanese territory jurisdiction is still US responsibility under the US-Japan defence treaty (Koda, 2011:34). Although, Japanese National Defence Program Guidelines for FY 2011 (NDPG 2011) outline China's primacy in Japan defence planning over disputed territory, maritime sovereignty over claimed and economic interests particularly in maritime domain (Japan MoD, 2010).

In Indian Ocean, India has been undergoing naval build-up into blue water navy to assure SLOC security, freedom of access, and forward presence in Indian Ocean (Ministry of Defense, 2007:87). India has also responded Beijing power projection with developed defence cooperation with Oman and Israel in Gulf region, and cooperation with several countries in the outskirts of the Indian Ocean such as Madagascar and Indonesia and also U.S. naval present in Indian Ocean. India's look east policy also strengthens to respond China's maritime Silk Road and assure India's freedom of action along SLOCs by tightened cooperation with ASEAN countries, Australia, and Japan based on confluence of the Indian and Pacific Ocean (Guānxì, 2009:1148-9).

Even though some major countries has taken clear policy, current Chinese maritime Silk Road with PLAN and Coast Guard overseas presence supported by port and other dual use facility, would be insufficient to support a large Chinese air or naval combat operations. Current Chinese facility along maritime Silk Road capable to deter non-traditional security challenges; non-combatant evacuation operations (NEOs); assure Chinese citizen and its property overseas (Yung, 2015). The deterrence capability of Chinese integration of PLAN Aviation and PLAAF (People's Liberation Army Air Forces) can allow Beijing to strengthen naval presence with airpower umbrella to protect maritime Silk Road from piracy, maritime terrorism, insurgence, conducting naval diplomacy, and compel extra regional naval presence, especially in immediate vicinity of South and East China Sea and the outskirt of the Indian Ocean with its critical choke points. This capability had been proved several years in conducting counter-piracy operation and task group deployments in Gulf of Aden (Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2015:40-42).

In long term, Maritime Silk Road could alter regional naval balance and regional instability due to the shift in maritime domain from unipolar structure to multipolar structure. These SLOCs, which is a major artery of the international trade, will create new challenges, such as the different perception concerning the use of the sea, sea passage over territorial waters, maritime security and defence, jurisdictional claim over disputed region, and the nature of multinational shipping industry (Akimoto, 2002:117-118).

Claims and Counterclaims in South China Sea

Source: Neuman, Scott. (2012, September 7). Little Islands Are Big Trouble In The South China Sea. Retrieved from http://www.npr.org/2012/09/07/160745930/little-islands-are-big-trouble-in-the-south-china-sea

For long period the SLOCs defence from Bab-el-Mandeb, Hormuz to Bay of Bengal and South China Sea is under littoral countries sovereignty, but it is vital national interest for China that need to be secured by its Maritime Silk Road proposal (Bo, 2014). Remembering that China has become the largest trader in today globalized economy and increased dependence on open SLOCs as vital road to connecting the world economy (Sakhuja, 2002), this fact will create real challenge for many countries when China would take military action to defend its vital national interest in the event of the SLOCs are threatened (Nathan & Ross, 1997: 42). The challenge occurred and escalated in 1996 when China conducted missile test firing

aimed to the Taiwan Strait as an effort to compel Taiwan and it were deterred merchant ships from transiting in Taiwan territory.

The options of hard power in long term from maritime Silk Road in Beijing's offshore active defence formulated by PLAN Admiral, Liu Huaqing, are necessary to assure freedom of action across the seas that extend to Chinese island chains (Cole, 2001:10). While keeping open to hard power, soft power will be seen as a good alternative from the new Maritime Silk Road based on naval diplomacy and naval constabulary duties to create regional mutual trust and maritime security cooperation. Maritime Silk Road in soft power term as bilateral relation with big investment from China, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, ASEAN-China Free Trade Area, and China-India-Myanmar-Bangladesh Economic Corridor will mitigate security pitfall in this region. Both, hard and soft power will protect Chinese maritime trade route and assure regional stability. It is also strengthened by several bilateral cooperation and economic development by building port and other maritime infrastructure from Southern China to Indian Ocean region named String of Pearls strategy by the Western analysts (Pehrson, 2006:3).

First and Second Island Chain of China's Offshore Active Defence

Figure 3. The First and Second Island Chains. *PRC military theorists conceive of two island "chains" as forming a geographic basis for China's maritime defensive perimeter.*

Source: U.S. Department of Defense. (2008). Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2008. *Annual Report to Congress.*

However, the economic cooperation based on historical sea commerce didn't assure mutual trust in South and East China Sea and also Indian Ocean. Many countries in Southeast Asia attempt to build mutual trust by re-stating principles on 2002 Declaration on the Code of Conduct (DOC) in South China Sea between ASEAN and China at the 17th ASEAN/China Summit in Myanmar on November 2014. It agreed on several implementations on Code of Conduct consultation, communication among search and rescue agencies, and exercise on search and rescue (Desker, 2015). Even, continued effort to resolve maritime dispute was conducted in multilateral forum until today, but a regional rivalry and mistrust among maritime power along maritime Silk Road will create uneasy regional cooperation. This mistrust also occurred due to Chinese effort to arming conflicting countries in ASEAN and South Asia and also Beijing support to several countries' nuclear programs (Guānxì, 2009:1145). From this basis further cooperation, dialogue, and correspondence are needed to intensify by ASEAN to maintain regional stability and free flow of sea commerce.

ASEAN's Centrality among Great Power: Cooperation Facing Emerging Contour of Globalized Economy

The ASEAN's centrality is applied in the context of a single power because of its economic integration based on three pillars and ASEAN's growing influence as a geopolitical force that balanced between Indian Ocean and Pacific Ocean for stable and secure international sea commerce through Southeast Asian waters. ASEAN's centrality in SLOCs security can also be seen through the strengthened and tightened economic cooperation proposed by several maritime powers, especially Chinese proposal of the new Maritime Silk Road in 21st century.

To support the new Maritime Silk Road in 21st century proposal, China has planned to provide financial support to upgrade the Malaysian port of Kuantan and the development of Cambodia's port infrastructure (Tiezzi, 2014). Cambodia saw that the new Maritime Silk Road in 21st century as a new era of cooperation and mutual understanding to create regional peace and prosperity (News Xinhuanet, 2015). The ASEAN's centrality in Chinese proposed maritime Silk Road even more clearly with Chinese cooperation to expand and build port infrastructure in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. For this purpose, the establishment of an Asian Infrastructural Investment Bank (AIIB) would provide a strong investment and

financial support in building ports, railway, highway, and other infrastructure to strengthen the connectivity of Maritime Silk Road (Mahalingam, 2015:3-4), which can be integrated with Singapore-Kunming Rail Link (SKRL).

Even so, the greatest challenge for China's Maritime Silk Road stems from ASEAN countries, like other countries, is the deep mistrust towards Beijing intentions. Whereby, the China claim over several ASEAN countries territorial waters stretching along critical SLOCs parallel with their proposals of the new Maritime Silk Road particularly from South to East China Sea is primary concern. Furthermore, many countries are concerned with the probability of the port and other maritime infrastructure in maritime Silk Road framework will be used in strategic military purposes in the time of conflict over disputed territory.

Little wonder, a consequence of the Chinese proposal of Maritime Silk Road in its endeavour to counter-balance China's power and influence is the centrifugal effect within ASEAN countries. The Philippines and Vietnam adopted firm positions towards China's claim in dispute area but continued economic cooperation. Malaysia and Brunei have generally ignored the increasing of China's power projection and white fleet of China coast guard in disputed region. Indonesia has stated that there are no overlapping claims with China and China recognized Indonesia's sovereignty. However, regular Chinese coast guard patrols in Indonesian waters north of the Natuna archipelago unleashed little incident on sea. Singapore is not a claimant state and its neutrality is important to maintain free flow of merchant shipping through the Strait of Malacca alongside with Malaysia and Indonesia. Other ASEAN Countries, Cambodia, who is pro to China's claimed region in South China Sea, together with Thailand, Laos and Myanmar encouraged ASEAN to shape framework to settle this claimed problem along maritime Silk Road and to strengthen economic cooperation (Desker, 2015).

ASEAN's unity is fragile and several ASEAN countries are trying to tighten their cooperation with the U.S. and its ally to face international contour especially China revival. The U.S. pivot to Asia including with ASEAN countries from U.S. support for democratic transition in Myanmar, military cooperation and assistance to Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Brunei has created serious incentive for Beijing. Even so, ASEAN countries need to cooperate with those extra-regional powers for the establishment of a framework which would facilitate the settlement of the problem and maintain economic cooperation (Desker, 2015; Roell, 2016:13). The

maritime Silk Road looks a proper and acceptable framework for this based on positive references to maritime historical record, and multilateral norm and understanding as well as mutually beneficial cooperation with others countries in the Pacific and Indian region (Shiraishi, 2016). Transparency and reliability are vital requirements for preventing misunderstanding that lead into crises (Roell, 2016:11). When trust is occurred between ASEAN and its neighbouring countries with shared interests in maintaining free flow of sea commerce through undisturbed SLOCs, it will bring prosperity and engine for global economic growth based on harmony of interest.

China's Maritime Silk Road: A Recommendation for New Equilibrium

Historical description in this paper sheds light on the understanding of current emerging contour of maritime domain dominated by China's peaceful rise and the new Chinese Maritime Silk Road in 21st century. Even though the new Maritime Silk Road in 21st century as Chinese 21st Century proposal to promote economic prosperity and maintain harmony of interest (Xuetong, 2011), ASEAN countries need to formulate a new equilibrium based on mutual understanding and cooperation, due to extra-regional maritime presence in the sea along maritime Silk Road. The regional geo-strategic and geo-economic architecture faced by ASEAN need to be balanced by strengthening strategic grouping from ASEAN+3 and East Asia Summit and other cooperation. It is suggestive of Southeast Asian history idea as a place of mediation and linkages among the great civilizations stretching along maritime Silk Road, with a new maritime network in terms of trade and culture.

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THE MARITIME SECURITY ARCHITECTURE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

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Abstract

Southeast Asia's waters are one of the most significant waterways in the world. Its strategic position and natural resources stocks are the basis of economic advantages and security challenges. The region has crucial sea-lanes of international trade and maritime potentials. But it also has plenty of security challenges such as overlapping borders issues, contraband activities, piracy and armed robbery at sea, and natural disaster. Above all these, the South China Sea issues and the struggle for primacy between The United States and China are probably the most latent threats to the security of the region. The over claim of China on the most parts of South China Sea area has sparked dissenting opinions among the members of ASEAN. Despite the ongoing ASEAN Regional Forum dialogue, the rivalry between The US and China has threatened the unity of ASEAN members. Therefore, this paper tries to qualitatively analyse the question of how these advantages and security challenges contribute to the maritime architecture in Southeast Asia? In addition, what are the roles of ASEAN in this maritime architecture? The working argument in this paper is that the maritime security architecture in Southeast Asia is significantly influenced by the presence of Asia Pacific's major power, the US and China; whereas, ASEAN's role is mostly as the security forum organizers.

Keywords: ASEAN, maritime security architecture, South China Sea, The US and China rivalry

Introduction

Maritime security is as significant as land security. The threats to maritime security pose the same danger as threats to land security. However, securing maritime area requires particular instruments such as vessels, ships, submarines and aeroplanes. Securing a state maritime territory is already challenging, securing regional maritime territory is far more challenging. Southeast Asia's maritime territory is one of the complex area inhabited by eleven nations and has direct sea borders with China and Australia. Its strategic position and natural resources stocks are the basis of economic advantages and security challenges. The region has crucial sea lanes of international trade and maritime potentials. But it also has plenty of security challenges such as overlapping borders issues, contraband activities, piracy and

armed robbery at sea, and natural disasters. Overlapping borders issues among Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, and between Malaysia and the Philippines have so far unsettled. The incidents involving Malaysian fishermen, Indonesian patrol boat, and Malaysian maritime police in 2010 and another similar incident in 2011 are two examples of maritime borders problem involving states in Southeast Asia, particularly Indonesia (Arsana, 2011). The contraband activities such as illicit drugs and people smuggling have created US$ 31.3 billion worth transaction. Started in 2012, the actual and attempted activities related to piracy and armed robbery at sea increased significantly from 21 accidents to 29 accidents in 2013. Most of these accidents occurred in the surroundings of Indonesia water. On the events of natural disasters, Asia Pacific experienced 5.139 or 42,9% of total natural disasters occurred between 1970-2014 (Blikberg et al., 2015). Undisputedly, these "internal" security issues contribute to the maritime security architecture in Southeast Asia. However, the external factor also contributes to this architecture.

The external factor that could contribute to the maritime security architecture in Southeast Asia is the presence of the United States and China in the region. After the rise of China in the last two decades, the United States turns to Asia and recalculate its policy against China (Evans, 2013). The "pivot to Asia" is the US's grand strategy towards Asia which includes some strategic policies. Those are enhancing the US alliance with its traditional partners, strengthening relations with emerging power, creating wider trade initiative, employing a multilateral approach to the regional institution, promoting universal values, and increasing military presence (Campbell & Andrews, 2013). Therefore, major US military shift from Europe to Asia, the establishment of Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and close engagement with ASEAN are part of the US rebalancing policy in Asia. From this point of view, the relation between the US and China can be described as rival relations. The rivalry between the US and China gives influence to states attitudes surrounding Asia and forcing ASEAN to craft prudent policy towards the two major powers (Acharya, 2015; Egberink & Putten, 2010; Sutter, 2014). In relations with maritime security, the South China Sea disputes and the military cooperation between ASEAN member states and the US and/or China are the primary potentials for disintegration if the Southeast Asia region. The South China Sea border disputes are not only involving the Philippines, Brunei Darussalam, Vietnam, Malaysia, and recently Indonesia, but it also draws in the US. The US's interests in the dispute are to maintain the free

navigation for commercial activities and to maintain the stability through its naval power. As the history of the US massive naval power building prior the World War I to rule the ocean, the naval power focused strategy in the US pivot to Asia policy is still relevant (Hodge, 2014).

Maritime Security Architecture

Maritime security architecture is a "high profile" term, which needs to be clarified first. The first attempt to clarify this term is by investigating the so called maritime security. As the complexity in security definition, the definition of maritime security is wider and has some aspects or perspectives. A fundamental concept of maritime security proposed by Geoffrey Till is that maritime security to be the good order at sea (Rahman, 2009). The importance of maintaining good order at sea is to "ensures the safety and security of shipping and permits countries to pursue their maritime interests and develop their maritime resources in accordance with agreed principles of international law" (Bateman, Ho, & Chan, 2009). However, the definition heavily focuses on traditional or naval warfare issues. It lacks to address other non-traditional issues in maritime security such as the climate change and other maritime environmental issues. Therefore, in developing the concept of maritime security, there are five maritime security aspects that should be considered (Rahman, 2009);

1. The security of the sea itself

   The security of the sea itself relates to the protection or conservation of maritime ecology. The protection of maritime life is important to prevent excessive and irresponsible ocean exploitation activities.

2. Ocean governance

   In this perspective, the ocean or the maritime ecology is to be put first in any regulation on the use of the sea. It manages the use and the users of the oceans.

3. Maritimes border protection

   The third perspective on maritime security is the protection of state's maritime border. It relates to the sovereignty of a state to exercise its jurisdiction inside its border. Determining borders among states are not as easy as it looks. In the case of Southeast Asia, even with the creation of ASEAN, there are still unsettled disputes over territorial claims. The negotiation to settle the disputes took a long

diplomatic dialogue and sometimes ended in the international court. The case of Sipadan and Ligitan Island which involves Indonesia and Malaysia as the claimants is the actual sample case.

1 Military activities at sea

In this context, the military activities are managed to be limited particularly on the usage of weapons and armaments. This enables the military to protect the sea environment and to reduce the possibility of naval wars. The Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone is an effort by ASEAN nations to defy the existence of nuclear weapons in the region. The most common feature of large scale military activities in ASEAN is military exercises which mostly focus on disasters management at sea.

2 Security regulation of the maritime transportation system.

This type of maritime security is concerning the safety of ships (commercial and non-commercial) crossing any sea-lanes in the world. The most common threats for the commercial ships are the act of piracy, armed robbery at sea, and hijacking. In Southeast Asia, low-level criminals and armed groups like Abu Sayyaf carry out these illegal activities. They usually go after anchored vessels and slow cruise boats.

The complex aspects of maritime security representing the difficulties in formulating are a precise definition of maritime security. Not to mention the concept of security itself also has complex aspects. Bueger (2015), suggests three frameworks to understand the maritime security. The first is the semiotics framework that tries to differentiate each concept related to maritime security. To capture the differentiation of each related concept in maritime security, Bueger (2015) presents the maritime security matrix as shown below.

Figure 1. Maritime Security Matrix

MARINE ENVIRONMENT		**ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT**	
	Marine Safety	Blue Economy	
	Accidents	Pollution	Smuggling
	Climate Change	**MARITIME SECURITY**	
Terrorist Acts		Piracy	IUU Fishing
Arms Proliferation	Inter-states disputes	Human trafficking	
	SEAPOWER	RESILIENCE	
NATIONAL SECURITY		**HUMAN SECURITY**	

Source: Bueger, C. (2015)

The matrix shows the interconnectedness of maritime environment, national security, human security, and economic development as tightly connected to maritime security. The various issues related to maritime security lead to the different interpretation of maritime security. It depends on which aspect or issue being used. If it uses national security as the point of view then maritime security will be defined as the safety of a state from hostile activities at the sea. The second is the securitization framework. Widely known, the securitization is a process in presenting non-traditional security issues by agents (Buzan, Waever, & de Wilde, 1998). The process of securitizing involves the rhetoric to convince the public to acknowledge certain issue as a security issue. The agents or actors who are mostly responsible for the securitization are the political elites and media.

The political elites are considered as the legitimate source person in presenting the securitization idea. According to securitization framework, the maritime security is constructed by agents who have interests on the issue. Hence, the definition of maritime security depends on the securitization construction of agents. The third is security practice theory framework which looks at the "action" or state policies in relations with maritime security. These activities include intelligence data collecting and sharing, sea patrol, law enforcement, and security forums (Bueger, 2015). These activities represent how actors or states give the meaning of maritime security. Even though there is no precise definition of maritime security, an operative meaning of maritime security, which concerns about the good order at the sea to

ensure the safety of both marine environment and the people, and the good management of economic exploration at the sea can be proposed.

Similar to the concept of maritime security, security architecture is a contesting concept to define. The term is widely used in security and strategic studies in International Relations and Defence schools. It commonly used to describe a common feature of security order in certain place and time. A strike forward definition of security architecture is presented by the Australian National University defence analysts, William Tow and Brendan Taylor. Accordingly, security architecture is "an overarching, coherent and comprehensive security structure for a geographically-defined area, which facilitates the resolution of that region's policy concerns and achieves its security objectives" (Tow & Taylor, 2010). Tow and Taylor's definition on security architecture exceeds common understanding of security architecture. Commonly, the security architecture is composing of alliance and other multilateral forums or institutions which affect the security order in a definite region. The structure of this relations depends on a significant number of states engage in the arrangement. The forums will have a high level of acknowledgement if it involves major power/player in the region. However, the security architecture is beyond the structure of multilateral forums, it encompasses "over-arching and macro-analytical sense" and it is not equal to the "arrangement", "networks" or "system" (Tow & Taylor, 2010). Tow and Taylor come to conclude that there is no such architecture in Asia (Tow & Taylor, 2010). If security architecture in Asia is not materially existed, then maritime security in architecture in Southeast Asia is far from existence too. However, the attempt to identify maritime security architecture in Southeast Asia is a positive effort to observe the development of maritime security in Southeast Asia.

The US and China Influence

By combining the maritime security understanding and security architecture, it can be inferred that maritime security architecture is an over-arching maritime security structure in a definite region. The structure of maritime security architecture in Southeast Asia is composed by ASEAN mechanism and some major external players especially the US and China. ASEAN mechanism in managing security issues is by setting up dialogue forums such as ASEAN Regional Forums (ARF), ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crimes (AMMTC), ASEAN Defense Minister Meeting (ADMM), ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Drugs (AMMD), and

ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF). The AMF was established in 2010 in Surabaya, Indonesia. Two years later, the forum is enlarged into Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF) in which attended by ten ASEAN nations plus Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation and the United States of America. AMF and EAMF are ASEAN's particular mechanism in tackling the maritime security issues. It is not only undertaken maritime issues in Southeast Asia but as far as East Asia. The central objective of this forum is to enhance maritime cooperation among EAMF participatory states.

Even though ASEAN may play the role of the architect in the region, it cannot diminish the role of the US and China as the most influential major powers in Southeast Asia. The "reliance" of ASEAN to the presence of the US and China is reflected in the participation of the US and China almost in every ASEAN expanded forums. The triangular relations among ASEAN, the US and China is a complex connection which requires cautious attention especially for ASEAN. For the US, the security architecture in Asia Pacific is characterized by the US strategic policy. The recent US pivot to Asia is a new engagement of the US in Asia. One of its strategies is engaging with a regional organization such as ASEAN. Prior to the US involvement in Southeast Asia, China has already had close relations with nations in this region. It is supported by Chinese prolonged traditional relations with nations in Southeast Asia. In the security context, China has significant influence to the development of maritime security architecture. Chinese peaceful rise idiom and its involvement in various multilateral forums such as ASEAN-China Free Trade Area, and ARF has influenced the security architecture in Southeast Asia.

Conclusion

The paper has discussed the conceptual frameworks of maritime security and security architecture. The combination of these concept leads the possible understanding of maritime security architecture particularly in Southeast Asia. Many elements affected the development of this architecture. The first is the existence of security challenges (traditional and non-traditional) which inspire the Southeast Asia's regional organization, ASEAN and its member states to adjust their policies. Aside from those challenges, the presence of the US and China in from of rivalry relations has greatly affected the development of the region's security architecture.

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THE CONTRIBUTION OF TRACK TWO TO TRACK ONE DIPLOMACY: AN ANALYZES OF INDONESIAN EFFORTS IN MANAGING CONFLICT IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA

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Abstract

Conflict in the South China Sea became a flashpoint in Southeast Asia since 1970s. Located in a strategic area which has important sea lanes and rich in living and non-living resources, the South China Sea is claimed wholly or partly by six states namely China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei. However, in that period, there was no formal forum through which the conflict could be handled. Based on basic tenets of "free and active foreign policy", Indonesia led Track Two (non-formal) diplomacy to manage the conflict through a series of meetings entitled "Workshop on Managing Potential Conflict in the South China Sea" since 1990. Track Two Diplomacy was applied in order to reduce tension by developing dialogue among the parties and to pave the way to conduct formal/ Track One Diplomacy. This study analyzes the process of Track Two Diplomacy initiated by Indonesia in managing conflict in the South China Sea during the period 1990-2001 and its impact to the Track One Diplomacy carried out by formal parties surrounding the South China Sea. It shows some results of Track Two Diplomacy such as cooperation activities in marine scientific research was adopted into formal cooperation among states. It is also noted that some statements released by Track Two Diplomacy transformed into formal declaration, for instance, ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea in 1992 and Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in 2002. Furthermore, Track Two Diplomacy was able to maintain peace in the region as indicated by the absence of major military conflict since 1990.

Keywords: Indonesia; South China Sea; Diplomacy; Conflict Management; Foreign Policy

Introduction

The South China Sea (SCS) is a body of water surrounded by China, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, Vietnam, Singapore, Thailand and Cambodia. There are three groups of islands in the SCS namely Pratas Islands, Paracel Islands, Spratly Islands and one submerged bank called Macclesfield Bank. These islands can be considered as tiny islands. For instance, Itu Aba Island, the largest island in the Spratly Islands, is only 36 hectare in size (Catley & Keliat, 1997). Notably, the majority of these islands are uninhabited. From a geographical angle, the SCS is a strategic location. It connects the Pacific and the Indian Ocean, and

hence, the water is an important sea lane for ships, both commercial and military as well as oil tankers. As a matter of fact the sea is rich in natural resources especially species of fishes and its biodiversity. The sea-bed area, especially in the Spratly Islands, is also suspected of containing extensive deposits of oil and natural gas.

Given the potential of the groups of islands in the SCS, sovereignty over the islands and jurisdiction of maritime demarcations are naturally claimed by many states, constituting the basic conflict of the SCS. China and Taiwan claim the Pratas Islands and Macclesfield Bank. In much the same way, China and Vietnam claim the Paracel Islands. Meanwhile, the Spratly Islands, the largest group of Islands in the SCS, are claimed by six states: China, Vietnam, Taiwan, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei. China, Taiwan, and Vietnam assert their sovereignty claims mostly over the SCS, including all part of the Spratly Islands. While, the Philippines and Malaysia claim only certain parts of the Spratly Islands, and Brunei is only concerned about overlapping claim affecting its legal Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Figure below depicts overlapping claim in the SCS.

Illustrative Map of Overlapping Claim in the SCS

Source: Rosenberg, D. (2010). Governing the South China Sea: from freedom of the seas to ocean enclosure movements. *Harvard Asia Quarterly. 12(3&4), Page: 5.*

Tensions in the SCS increased since the 1970s. At least three factors escalated the conflict. First, the oil crisis in 1973 triggered by the Arab-Israel War when the Arab states embargoed oil supply to Western ally which support to Israel. It resulted the price of oil rocket from US$ 3 to US$ 11.65 per barrel in January 1974 (Trumbore, 2002). The SCS, especially in the Spratly Islands and its surrounding waters, is known to have huge deposits of oil and gas reserves. It is not surprising therefore that tensions have risen in the SCS because the area is strategic and a possible alternative energy supply for Western states and other regions.

Second, in 1973, the third UNCLOS" conference was opened and agreed in 1982. According to the UNCLOS, littoral states enjoyed the sovereignty of 12 nm of territorial sea, and also rights of exploration in the EEZ of 200 nm. This indicates that if a state could enact sovereignty over the islands in the SCS, it will enjoy the opportunities of extending maritime jurisdiction.

Third, a power vacuum occurred in South East Asia when the United States (US) withdrew from South Vietnam at the end of 1973. This vacuum deepened in the post-Cold War era when both the Soviet Union and the US degraded their military assets in bases in Vietnam and the Philippines respectively. Unsurprisingly, these political and geo-strategic shifts enabled China to occupy the islands in the SCS and caused counter responses from Vietnam and the Philippines. Conflict in the SCS inclined into military conflagration between China and Vietnam in 1988. The SCS therefore has become a hot-spot in the world that threatened peace, security and stability in Southeast Asia,

This article analyzes Indonesian efforts to manage conflict by using informal dialogues or Track Two Diplomacy through the deployment of annual workshop namely the Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea (hereafter the Workshop) which financed by Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). This study focuses from the beginning of the Workshop in 1990 to 2001 when CIDA terminated its financial support as well as the impact of the Workshop to support formal negotiation and cooperation.

This article has seven sections. The first section is introduction outlining of the whole paper. The second section provides a glimpse of Indonesian Foreign Policy in seeking why Indonesia supports the Workshop. The third section explains the meaning of Track Two Diplomacy and its relation to the Track One Diplomacy. The next three sections explore the Workshop, its mechanism, process and outcomes,

especially in contributing to the Track One Diplomacy. The last section is conclusion highlighting the importance of the Workshop as Track Two Diplomacy to endorse formal dialogues and cooperation.

A Glimpse of Indonesian Foreign Policy

Principles of Indonesia foreign policy have developed together with the birth of its nation-state, especially when it applied the 1945 Constitution. Under the 1945 Constitution, the state"s ideology was nationalist and strongly anti-colonial as stipulated in the first paragraph of the preamble and it is also stated the basic national interests of Indonesia in the fourth paragraph. These paragraphs convey the ideas that Indonesia holds the obligation to help other nations under colonial rule and to support their pursuit of independence or national self-determination. The constitution also obliges the government to take an active role in achieving the world order as part of Indonesia"s international responsibility. In addition, the fourth paragraph of the preamble also mentions the state ideology of *Pancasila* (five basic principles) as follows: Belief in The One and Only God; Just and civilized Humanity; The Unity of Indonesia; Democracy guided by the inner wisdom of Deliberations amongst Representatives; And by creating social Justice for the entire people of Indonesia.

In the revolutionary period, the government of the newly born republic was shadowed by the competing ideologies of the Cold War: Communism against Western Capitalism. The super-power ideological competition was also reflected in the ideological orientation among Indonesian leaders. Cleavage among the leaders was inevitable. When Mohammad Hatta, a national democrat, took charge as prime minister, the leftist or communist groups demanded from him that Indonesia should lean towards the Soviet Union bloc. Prime Minister Hatta was not in favor of the demand, and instead sought to formulate a different framework principle of foreign policy for the new republic. Hatta laid down the basic elements of Indonesian foreign policy in his famous speech at the Central Indonesian National Committee on September 2, 1948. This speech defined the Indonesian principle of foreign policy called *Politik Luar Negeri Bebas Aktif* (Free and Active Foreign Policy) (Hatta, 1976).

Free and Active Foreign Policy as defined by Hatta comprised some significant premises. First, the state"s ideology *Pancasila* should guide the conduct of Indonesian Foreign Policy. Second, foreign policy should be aimed at

safeguarding the national interest as defined in the constitution. Third, the pursuit of national interest should be best served through an independent policy (Sukma, 1995).

In the context of the SCS conflict which is threatening peace and security in Southeast Asia and based on its own principles, Indonesia supports actively any efforts to promote peace and cooperation. If the efforts are unable to conduct with formal diplomacy, it should find other way by conducting Track Two Diplomacy.

The Tracks of Diplomacy

In order to maintain peace and avoid war, the conflicting parties attempt to settle the dispute through formal/official or Track One Diplomacy. Track One Diplomacy is an instrument of foreign policy which enables a state to communicate or negotiate with other states on certain issues. This action is conducted by official actors as representatives of their government (Nan, 2003). Due to a number of reasons, Track One Diplomacy is considered to be the primary method for dispute settlement. First, Track One Diplomacy has the capacity to mobilize political power resources to influence the negotiation process in order to obtain maximum benefit. Second, Track One Diplomacy enables access to material as well as financial resources to heighten leverage during the negotiation process. Third, Track One Diplomacy is able to employ abundant information about the parties' interests collecting from intelligence sources (Mapendere, 2005). Regarding conflicts in the Post-Cold War have become more complicated, Track One Diplomacy is inadequate to settle conflict. It should be supported by unofficial diplomacy which is also known as Citizen Diplomacy or Track Two Diplomacy. All the terms have the same meaning that the initiative is conducted by citizens who do not represent their government, emphasizes on direct or face-to-face communication between unofficial representatives of parties engaged in a conflict, and it is also usually mediated by an impartial third party practitioner (Fisher, 2007).

Primary instrument to conduct Track Two Diplomacy is a Problem Solving Workshop (PSW), an unofficial face-to-face meeting which involves the representative of the conflicting groups and is usually facilitated by a neutral third party. The PSW process provides an opportunity for the participants to examine their perspectives, hopes, needs, fears, and priorities in their quest to engage in joint thinking and finding the best solutions to the conflict (Demirdogen, 2011, Kelman,

2005). The PSW can contribute to the accomplishment of the negotiation process conducted under official diplomacy (Track One Diplomacy).

Meanwhile, Track Two Diplomacy is a broader term encompassing all efforts or initiatives taken by persons in their private capacity to conduct diplomacy. The term Track Two Diplomacy was introduced firstly by Joseph Montville, an American Foreign Service officer who defined it in 1981 as "unofficial interaction between members of adversarial groups who have goals in developing strategies, influencing public opinion, and organizing human and material resources in ways that might help to resolve the conflict" (Cited from Jones, 2008, p. 1). It should be noted that Track Two Diplomacy derived from the belief that war can be minimized if contacts between people are increased and intended to build friendship and understanding. Such contacts can be carried out by dialogues, PSWs, and cultural exchanges (Naidoo, 2000).

As a supporting tool for dispute settlement, Track Two Diplomacy has some basic assumptions. First, Track Two Diplomacy focuses on the process that improves the relationship between the adversaries through communication and understanding. Such processes break psychological barriers and pave the way for the conduct of official diplomacy. Second, the process enables the adversaries to explore ideas and reactions concerning alternative solutions in a non-obligatory framework. Third, Track Two Diplomacy is designed only as a supplement by providing inputs into each stage of the official negotiation process (Schiff, 2010).

The term Track Two Diplomacy is not without critics. It is not clear who should attend the process. The term „unofficial" could involve participants ranging from ordinary citizen to the official government in their private capacity. If it is attended by „amateur" people, Track Two Diplomacy will not obtain maximum results, and it may even hurt the negotiation process (Jones, 2008). In order to conduct effective unofficial diplomacy, Susan Nan (2003) suggests that the process should be attended by people who have the capacity and direction to conduct public policy making. Ideally, such people are government officials in their private capacity.

Effective Track Two Diplomacy can shape how elites, and the public, recognize the problems causing conflict as well as generate new ideas to address such problems. The function of Track Two Diplomacy is only to reduce tension, manage the conflict, provide confidence-building and form new identities that allow actors to frame and approach the problems in similar and preferably cooperative

ways (Kaye, 2005). Dalia Kaye proposes three steps on obtaining effective Track Two Diplomacy namely socialization, filtering and transmission process (Kaye, 2007). Socialization emphasizes on the process that the conflicting parties organize a forum which they can share views on various issues related to security, cooperation and lessons learned based on their experience to obtain common understanding. This process also enables the discussion of extra-regional norms before transforming them into local context. On the other hand, it is also crucial that local norms are discussed in a regional context before being transformed into the regional environment. Of course, there is need for frequent meetings and interactions among participants of the process in their quest to reduce misperceptions and inaccurate assumptions. The next step is the filtering process, a step where the outcomes in the first step are introduced into the public domain through media or public lectures. The main aim of this stage is to ensure that the ideas obtained in the first step are transformed into the public agenda. The final step is the transmission process where the public interests related to the dispute settlement are transmitted into public decisions (Kaye, 2007, Kraft, 2000). Thus, the Track Two Diplomacy in this context can be defined as "unofficial policy dialogue focused on problem solving, in which the participants have some form of accesses to official policymaking circles" (Kaye, 2007, p.8).

In order to avoid misinterpretation of Track Two Diplomacy, John McDonald and Louise Diamond (2012) categorizes the tracks of diplomacy into nine tracks for peacemaking of which eight tracks refer to unofficial diplomacy. Track One Diplomacy is governmental peacemaking in which diplomacy is conducted by official persons who are representatives of their government. Track Two is action taken by non-governmental professionals in their attempt to examine, prevent and manage conflict. Meanwhile, Track Three refers to diplomacy through channels of commerce. It is essentially an effort at peace-building which provides business people opportunities to conduct activities in the economic field. Track Four is related to diplomacy conducted through personal involvement. This track enables private citizens, NGOs, and interest groups to participate in peace-building. Track Five is diplomacy through learning. This track encompasses research, training, and educational activities in peacebuilding. Track Six is diplomacy through advocacy in various issues such as environment, human rights, disarmament, and socio-economic justice. Track Seven is diplomacy through faith/religious activity. This is

the realm of spiritual or religious leaders as well as religious communities in which there is a drive to build morality-based movements that promote peace. Track Eight refers to diplomacy by providing resources. This track highlights the role of funding communities and philanthropists in providing financial or other supporting resources for activities undertaken by other tracks. Track Nine is diplomacy through information. This track examines the fields of media and arts in shaping public opinion.

For the purpose of this study concerning the SCS conflict, Track Two Diplomacy is presented as an informal dialogue conducted by persons in their private capacity who seek to manage the conflict by developing constructive communication on various issues including assessing cooperation activities in less sensitive fields. These persons come from both the conflicting parties and non-conflicting parties involved in the SCS. It should be pointed out that Track Two Diplomacy does not seek conflict settlement but rather aims on reducing tensions by establishing confidence-building measures and creating conducive atmosphere to pave the way for formal negotiation.

It should be noted, the most important aspect of Track Two Diplomacy study is how the outcome leads to Track One Diplomacy. Scholars have developed various opinions about this issue. Some of them assume that new ideas, innovative findings and positive changing of participants" attitudes in Track Two Diplomacy will later on automatically transfer to the official policy-making level (Cuhadar, 2009). This idea, of course, is very simplistic and inadequate to assist in understanding the transferring process. Therefore, Fisher (1997) suggests that the proximity of Track Two Diplomacy"s participants to the decision-makers, the more likely that transfer to Track One Diplomacy will be direct. Conversely, the more distant they are from decision-makers, the more that transfer will be indirect.

The Workshop Mechanism

After military skirmish between China and Vietnam in the SCS, Dr. Hasjim Djalal, an Indonesian retired diplomat and the Head of the Center for Southeast Asian Studies in Jakarta, launched initiative to manage conflict in the SCS in 1989. He designed a concept paper in order to investigate the attitude of ASEAN"s members on managing conflict in the SCS. Then, he traveled to the all ASEAN"s capitals and met his colleagues, diplomats and law experts to discuss his concept (Satyawan, 2015). He

found that ASEAN members have different views on the SCS conflict. Singapore suggested that it was imperative to involve non-ASEAN members, like China and Taiwan, in order to avoid the impression that ASEAN members were grouping against the two countries. Meanwhile, Thailand preferred conflict management approaches that were conducted in a low profile and informal manner so as to minimize misinterpretation by other countries that have an interest in the SCS. Malaysia and the Philippines tended to favor an approach that solves the conflict via the bilateral approach (Catley & Keliat, 1997).

After summarizing the discussion among his colleagues, Djalal presented the results of his round-trip in ASEAN capitals as follows: First, ASEAN members should take action to manage any potential conflict of the SCS and convert them into cooperation. Second, considering the difficulties and the sensitiveness of territorial issues, it would be better if the activity was informal, at least at the initial stage. Third, ASEAN members should coordinate their vision and positions first in a meeting before they invite non-ASEAN members. Fourth, the meeting should be informal, attended by both government and non-governmental participants in their private capacities. In order to contribute directly to the policy making process of ASEAN members, the outcomes of the meeting should be policy-oriented (Satyawan, 2015). In addition, decisions and recommendations should be reached by consensus as a custom adopted in ASEAN meetings.

Finally, the proposals for managing conflict namely the „Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea" was adopted and implemented with the support from Indonesian Ministry of Foreign. Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) provided ten years financial assistance for operating the Workshop which was designed not to solve the conflict directly, but to seek a pathway to solve the conflict. After all, solving the conflict depends on the political will of all claimants. The Workshop had three objectives. First, to exchange the views through dialogue so it could increase mutual understanding among participants. Second, to develop confidence-building measures so the participants would be comfortable with one another. It was also important to provide a favorable atmosphere in the quest of seeking a solution to the claimants" territorial or jurisdictional dispute. Third, to manage potential conflicts by exploring areas in which every party could cooperate. The cooperation was based on the principles of the

step-by-step approach, stressing on cost-effectiveness and starting from the least controversial issues (Djalal & Gault, 1999).

From the beginning, the informal dialogue was recognized as a long-term continuing process and lacked immediate concrete outcomes. In this process, patience was essentially required to change the habit of confrontation into the habit of cooperation. Prior to 1990, coastal states of the SCS had no experience in establishing cooperation, but they only had confrontation experiences. Therefore, it was not a matter how slow the process or how small the outcomes of the Workshop was (Djalal & Gault, 1999).

The Workshop meetings attended mostly by official participants with private capacity were held annually in various cities in Indonesia. To implement cooperation, the Workshop Established the Technical Working Group (TWG) and Group of Experts (GE). The TWG was a group of technical experts in a particular marine/ocean discipline established by the Workshop and mandated to define the areas of its cooperative activities and build up proposals. The TWG also provided policy direction for implementing project proposals. Group of Experts was a group established and mandated by the TWG to address the technical implementation of the project proposals for activities that encouraged cooperation. The TWG and GE meetings were convened outside Indonesia. Since 1995, a rough hierarchy of meetings held under the Workshop process has emerged, whereby each GE meeting reported to the TWG, and in turn the TWG reported to the annual workshop. The Workshop mechanism has become a sort of plenary meeting for the whole process (Gault, 1998).

The coordinator of the Workshop was Ambassador Dr. Hasjim Djalal, chairman of Centre for Southeast Asia Studies in Jakarta. He coordinated the Workshop in tandem with Professor Ian Townsend-Gault from the Center Asian Legal Studies, the University of British Columbia – Canada. The Workshop was financed by the CIDA.

The Workshop Process

The First Workshop was convened in Bali on January 22 – 24, 1990. It was attended exclusively by participants from ASEAN members. They were invited to examine the SCS dispute from a Southeast Asia regional perspective. Furthermore, the First

Workshop was intended to build the same perception as well as to lay down a common platform before inviting non-ASEAN members.

At the beginning, Ali Alatas, the Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs, explained the reasons and the goals of the Workshop. He indicated that after the Cambodia conflict, the SCS might be the next acute source of conflict in the region. In view of that, he supported the idea of promoting cooperation among the coastal states of the SCS. He welcomed the aims of the Workshop and expressed the hope that it may be made formal in the future and evolved into a wider forum encompassing all the claimant states and even other major powers outside the region. He also expressed the hope that the Workshop would produce positive results that may be useful to governments as policy inputs (Alatas, 1990, transcript of the opening speech of the First Workshop). There were six issues discussed in the first Workshop to identify possible areas for establishing cooperation. These issues were: (1) Environment, Ecology and Scientific Research; (2) Shipping, Navigation and Communication; (3) Resources Management; (4) Political and Security Issues; (5) Territorial and Jurisdictional Issues; and (6) Institutional Mechanism for Cooperation.

Although the First Workshop did not produce any statements, it made some observations and recommendations reached by consensus as follows. First, two issues, that is, „Territorial and Jurisdictional Issue" and „Political and Security Issue", were complex and sensitive and took time to settle. However, cooperative arrangements through both bilateral and multilateral means of the coastal states were conducted without waiting for the settlement of the two issues. The areas which were identified as possible avenues for cooperation were: protection of the marine environment, marine scientific research, navigational safety, and marine resources management. Second, informal contacts and discussions were significant until formal dialogue was possible. Third, the participants agreed that maritime disputes in the SCS should be settled by peaceful means and all parties were not suggested to apply military force as the final resort. Fourth, it was also approved that the participants of the workshop dialogue should be broadened to include all claimants of the SCS and extra-regional parties which had interests in the region (Report of the First Workshop, 1990).

The Second Workshop was held in Bandung in 1991. In this meeting, the participants were broadened and included six ASEAN members, China, Taiwan,

Laos and Vietnam. In essence, all states surrounding the SCS attended the meeting. At the end of the Workshop, participants issued a joint statement or Bandung Statement which contained the following items: (1) the promotion of cooperation without prejudice to territorial and jurisdictional claims; (2) the relevant areas of cooperation such as on the safe of navigation and communication, the coordination of search and rescue efforts, combating piracy and armed robbery, protecting and preserving marine environment, conducting marine scientific research; (3) considering the establishment of joint development for mutual benefit in areas where territorial conflict exist; (4) resolving any territorial and jurisdictional dispute by peaceful means; (5) avoiding using force and encouraging the exercise self-restraint (Report of the Second Workshop, 1991). The Bandung Statement indicated the rapprochement among participants, the obtaining basic principles, and the common platform to manage the dispute. In a way, the Workshop created a tradition of talking and taking decision by consensus instead of adopting the use of force in settling disputes.

Prior to the Third Workshop in 1992, there were three incidents that caused tensions to escalate in the SCS. The first was on February 25, 1992, when the National People‟s Congress – China‟s parliament, passed the Law of People‟s Republic of China on Its Territorial Waters and Contiguous Areas. In this piece of legislation, China reaffirmed its position that the SCS was under China's territorial sovereignty and as such it explicitly reserved the right to use military force in the region ("China testing the water", 1992). Unsurprisingly, ASEAN members were worried about this new law which would impact negatively on the promising dialogue process conducted under the Workshop process. Rightly so, Indonesia felt that Beijing wanted to sabotage Jakarta‟s initiative on managing the conflict in the SCS (Hamzah, 1992). Second, Vietnam protested to China when the Chinese National Offshore Oil Company in May 1992 offered a concession to the United States Crestone Energy Corporation to explore oil and gas in the Spratly Islands area, an area which was also claimed by Vietnam. Third, Malaysia accorded the Terumbu Layang Layang Island in the contested water in the SCS as a tourist destination.

Against a background of escalating tensions, the Workshop was convened in Yogyakarta from June 28 to July 2, 1992. At the meeting, Ali Alatas expressed his anxiety concerning the situation in the SCS. He urged all claimants to exercise extra self-restraint. In this regard he said: "To this plea for self-restraint, I should like to

add my fervent hope that the situation shall not be complicated any further and that the region be spared from yet another violent and debilitating conflict" (Alatas, 1992, transcript of the opening speech, Report of Third Workshop, p. 76).

Considering the background of the participants, who were mostly diplomats and legal experts, it was clear that they were incapable of producing concrete proposals on substantive cooperation. On the other hand, the high tensions in the SCS required urgent de-escalation through establishing cooperation in the region. Consequently, starting from the Third Workshop, participants agreed to set-up various TWGs and GEs. Five TWGs were established during the Workshop process, namely, the TWG on Marine Scientific Research; the TWG on Marine Environment Protection; the TWG on Resources Assessment and Ways of Development; the TWG on Safety of Navigation, Shipping and Communication; and the TWG on Legal Matters.

Due to the sensitiveness of political issue and budget limitation, only TWG on Marine Scientific Research obtained significant progress when it submitted three proposals namely Database Information Exchange Networking Project; Sea Level tide Monitoring Project, and Biodiversity Project. However, only research cooperation project on biodiversity was implemented through Anambas Expedition in March 2002. This expedition, the first cooperation activity under the Workshop had two objectives: First, to promote the spirit of cooperation and understanding among the participants of the program, hoping that this spirit would spread to the community of marine scientists around the SCS; Second, to establish scientific collection of the biological specimens as the basis for further studies of biodiversity and other relevant researches in the region (Ng, 2004). The Expedition took place in Anambas water successfully collected approximately 300 kilogram of biological specimen consisting of about 1000 species of various marine organisms from 60 sites including fish, crabs, shrimps, squids, octopus, and worms (Ng, 2004). In addition, the team discovered eleven new species that had never been identified before (Sivasothi, 2003).

The Workshop also recommended to the authorities surrounds the SCS to ratify United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and accede the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (ASEAN-TAC). These two documents are important instruments to encourage cooperation as well as to manage dispute in the SCS. UNCLOS provides a legal framework governing the rights and obligations of

states related to the ocean space and its resources. It also asserted the states to find peaceful solution to disagreements regarding sovereignty over disputed territories. Concerning the SCS as a semi enclosed sea, article 123 of the UNCLOS mentions that states bordering the closed or semi enclosed sea should cooperate with one another in the exercise of their rights and in the performance of their duties. The article also stipulates that the states bordering the enclosed or semi-enclosed sea shall endeavor, directly or through an appropriate regional organization to firstly, coordinate scientific research policies and undertake where appropriate joint program of scientific research in the area; secondly, coordinate the management, conservation, exploration and exploitation of the living resources of the sea; and thirdly, coordinate the implementation of their rights and duties with respect to the protection and preservation of the marine environment. In other words, the UNCLOS demanded that the states surrounding the SCS should build cooperation in various fields in order to make peace in the region.

ASEAN-TAC is a document was signed at the first ASEAN summit in Bali 1976. It guides behavior of ASEAN members or states that accede this document. Article 2 of ASEAN-TAC for example, consists of some basic principles as follows: non-interference in the internal affairs of one another; mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; the „settlement of differences by peaceful means"; the renunciation of the threat or use of force; and effective cooperation among themselves (ASEAN Secretariat, 1976).

Starting from 1995 at the Sixth Workshop, participants discussed Confidence Building Measures (CBM) and formulated a draft of Code of Conduct (CoC) in the SCS. The CoC is a set of principles, rules, norms, values or standards of behavior that guide the decisions or procedures which is sanctioned by enforcement authorities. It can be unilateral, bilateral or multilateral (Kittichaisaree, 1998). Unfortunately, China reluctant to execute implementation of CBM and CoC regarding the Workshop was not the right place to discuss. Only formal negotiation is able to raise CBM and CoC (Report of the Seventh Workshop, 1996).

Even though some projects could not be implemented due to number of reasons, situation in the SCS from 1990 to 2001 was relatively stable indicated by the absence of military skirmish. Government of Canada, therefore, terminated its financial fund through CIDA to support the Workshop. According to Canadian government, the Workshop funded by CIDA has so far been successful in giving so

much positive contribution to the mutual trust-building efforts among the participants that the stability of the SCS was maintained. Therefore, financial donor was no more highly demanded, and Canadian government may allocated it for other projects which was more demanding fund donor (Djalal, interview, March 1, 2012). The Workshop then continued with self-funding from participants and voluntary donors.

Outcomes of the Workshop

As mentioned before on research cooperation, the Workshop was success to conduct research on biodiversity namely Anambas Expedition. This success story inspired the Philippines to continue research cooperation in its water while upgraded from informal into formal activity. The Philippines then proposed Exercise of Luzon Sea and conducted in March 2004.

Prior Exercise of Luzon Sea, under the spirit of the Workshop, the Philippines and Vietnam in 1994 signed bilateral cooperation on marine scientific expedition in the SCS, coincidence with the UNCLOS going into force. The activity entitled Joint Oceanographic Marine Scientific Research Expedition was designed for a long-term period, from 1996 to 2007 and concentrated its research in the southern part of the SCS (Hoesslin, 2005). This implied that the Workshop process had a positive effect in encouraging formal bilateral cooperation.

Concerning the impact of the Workshop mechanism, it applied a procedure in decision-making that stressed consultation and consensus-building. Before decisions were made, certain matters were discussed by involving all participants. All views coming from participants were accommodated and discussed and decisions were adopted by consensus. The highest forum to make decisions was the Workshop, the annual meeting that was convened in Indonesia. Therefore, the decisions taken in lower levels such as at the TWG meetings were to be approved in the Workshop meetings. Such a procedure of taking decisions by consultation and consensus is now known as the ASEAN Way.

In line with the principles of conduct and behavior, the Workshop participants agreed to adopt two aspects outlined in the Bandung Statement at the Second Workshop in 1991. The first aspect is related to dispute management, stating that disputes should be settled by peaceful means through dialogue and negotiations; avoid using force; and the exercise of self-restraint among parties involved in the

dispute. The second aspect is concerned with how to promote cooperation in various areas as a step towards building confidence measures.

The first aspect of the Bandung Statement was extracted from the ASEAN-TAC article 2 and the second aspect was adopted from UNCLOS article 123 concerning the arrangements of cooperation among states bordering enclosed or semi-enclosed seas. Furthermore, Dr. Djalal explained that Bandung Statement was a significant achievement resulted from the Workshop, which played a pathway for dialogue and further cooperation on conflict management. Moreover, Bandung Statement was Indonesian effort in introducing the norms within the ASEAN Way, ASEAN-TAC and UNCLOS to the countries outside ASEAN (Djalal, interview, March 1, 2012). As consequences, the Workshops" participants were urged to persuade their governments to accede the ASEAN-TAC and UNCLOS. In fact, four participants become member of ASEAN and automatically acceded the ASEAN-TAC. Vietnam became member of ASEAN in 1995, Laos and Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999. Then, China acceded the ASEAN-TAC in 2003.

In the same way of the ASEAN-TAC, authorities of the Workshop participants ratified UNCLOS. Indonesia and the Philippines ratified prior the Workshop; Vietnam and Singapore ratified in 1994; and at last in 1996, Brunei, China, Malaysia and Myanmar ratified UNCLOS.

It can be said that the Workshops have contribution on the acceding and ratifying the ASEAN-TAC and the UNCLOS. Only Taiwan did not sign the ASEAN-TAC and the UNCLOS since it did not member of ASEAN and the UN. However, Taiwan agreed in principle to the content of the two documents (Satyawan, 2015).

The Workshop process also contributed to norms building in the formal institution, especially in ASEAN. For instance, ASEAN started to pay attention to the SCS dispute in 1992 when China passed the Law of the People"s Republic of China on the Territorial Waters and Contiguous Areas. The law reiterated China"s claim over the SCS and the right to use force to protect its claim. ASEAN members were worried about the intentions of China and took necessary actions in response to the new law. The 25ᵗʰ ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM), an annual meeting of ASEAN foreign ministers, in Manila July 1992, gave priority to the SCS dispute and promulgated a common stance. They signed the Declaration on the SCS which is also called the Manila Declaration on July 22, 1992. The Manila Declaration contains three aspects. The first aspect emphasizes how to resolve sovereign and

jurisdictional issues by peaceful means as well as how to apply self-restraint to prevent the situation from worsening. The second aspect concerns how to promote cooperation in various issues and the third is an invitation to all parties concerned to apply ASEAN-TAC as the basis for conducting behavior over the SCS (Satyawan, 2015).

The essence of the Declaration is similar to the Bandung Statement. At the AMM, the Philippine foreign minister took an active role to urge his counterparts to declare support to a document explicitly highlighting the ASEAN"s stance on the SCS dispute (Severino, 2010). At that time, the Bandung Statement was the only document containing principles on dispute settlement as well as recommendation in conducting cooperation in the SCS which was agreed by ASEAN members" participant, Vietnam, Taiwan and China in informal meeting. Most principles of the Bandung Statements, then, were adapted to the Manila Declaration. It should be noted that some participants of the Workshops also took active in the formal forum as delegation of their countries such as in ASEAN meetings (Djalal, interview, March 1, 2012). Meanwhile, in line with the spirit of friendship developed by the Workshops, in 1995 the Philippines and China as well as the Philippines and Vietnam signed bilateral Code of Conduct (CoC) to reduce tensions in the SCS. The content of the two CoCs were also adopted from the Bandung Statement (Song, 2000).

Besides the Manila Declaration, the workshop also contributed to the making of a multilateral CoC. In line with the importance of the CoC on the SCS as a part of CBMs which was discussed at the workshop in 1993, ASEAN started to discuss the issue in 1996. At the 29th AMM in Jakarta, the idea of CoC was officially endorsed in order to provide the foundation for long-term peace and stability in the region as well as to promote understanding among the parties concerned (Thuy, 2010). Subsequently, at the Sixth ASEAN Summit in Hanoi in 1998 and at the ASEAN – China Senior Officials Meeting in Kumming in1999, the idea of a regional CoC was raised again. Since then, ASEAN and China developed a consolidated draft of a CoC. However, debate concerning the content of the code was inevitable. For instance, the code should explicitly mention features like the Paracel and the Spratly Islands instead of only mentioning the SCS in general. Vietnam wanted to include the Paracel Islands to the code but China refused the idea. Another controversy was the characteristic of the code whether it was legally binding or legally non-binding. As to avoid deadlock, it was agreed that the CoC was a non-binding political

document entitled „Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the SCS" (DoC) which was signed by ASEAN and China in Phnom Penh on November 4, 2002 (Severino, 2010).

The DoC was a milestone for the relation between ASEAN and China because it was the first time for China to sign a multilateral agreement with its counterparts in Southeast Asia. It was also the first political document related to the SCS accomplished by ASEAN and China (Thao, 2009). It indicated that China has changed its policy over the dispute from strictly adhering to the bilateral approach to accommodating the multilateral approach. It also indicated a success of cooperation between ASEAN and China.

It should be noted that the DoC was only a political document so it was not legally binding. Consequently, it did not possess the capacity to resolve the competing claims of territorial sovereignty issues in the SCS. However, the DoC showed the commitment of the parties concerned to maintain peace and stability which were requisites for regional development. The DoC was also the first step in the drive towards the establishment of a legally-binding CoC (Bautista, 2007).

The DoC is composed of three main aspects namely basic norms in governing state to state relations as well as dispute settlement; CBMs; and cooperation activities. On the basic norms it stipulates an affirmation in using international law, UNCLOS and ASEAN-TAC as the foundation of states relations as well as resolving the dispute by peaceful means through consultations and negotiations. On CBMs, the document demands that the parties concerned should exercise self-restraint in conducting activities that could escalate the dispute. On cooperation activities, the DoC underlines five fields of cooperation, namely, marine environmental protection; scientific research; safety of navigation and communication at sea; search and rescue operation; and combating transnational crime at sea (http://asean.org/?static_post=declaration-on-the-conduct-of-parties-in-the-south-china-sea).

Even though the DoC is more detail than the Manila Declarations, the essence of the DoC is the same as the Bandung Statement. The principle issues of the DoC had already discussed in the Workshops. Therefore, it can be said the DoC is development from the Bandung Statement (Pramono, interview, February 27, 2012). The two ASEAN documents, the Manila Declaration and the DoC, indicate strong connection with the Bandung Statement produced by the Workshops.

In addition, ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), a forum established after the Cold War in 1993 with fostering dialogue and consultation on political and security issues surround Asia-Pacific region, praised the effort of the Workshop in managing conflict in the SCS. In its statements produced after annual meeting in 1995-97 respectively, ARF welcomed positive contribution of the Workshop in promoting dialogue and cooperation (The ASEAN Secretariat, 2007).

Conclusion

Track Two Diplomacy is applied as an instrument that enhances dialogue among the conflicting parties. It enables participants to enjoy certain privileges in conflict management that cannot be conducted through Track One Diplomacy. Deciding to tackle the complicated and sensitive issues of the SCS conflict, the Workshop process started with an invitation to participants from ASEAN members at the first meeting. After getting support from the participants at the first meeting, the Workshop engaged all the claimants by inviting them to the subsequent meetings. Starting from the Second Workshop, all claimants and non-claimants surrounding the SCS attended the subsequent multilateral informal meetings.

The exchange of ideas on various issues marked the constructive dialogues as well as avoiding sensitive matters such as sovereignty and jurisdiction claims. Premised on the dialogue approach that deepened mutual understanding and consensus building in the decision making, the workshop produced recommendations, statements, principles on conflict management, and proposals for cooperation activities.

During the Workshop dialogue process, participants also exchanged their views on various items of CBMs. Unfortunately, the discussion on concrete items of CBMs was not concluded since some participants felt that it was proper to carry out the task via Track One Diplomacy. However, since the whole process of the Workshop was aimed at reducing tensions and enhancing mutual trust, the workshop was also a kind of CBM. The participants felt comfortable with one another and, were able to develop a personal network. When CIDA terminated its financial support, the whole Workshop process was under threat of dissolution. Nevertheless, participants banded together and agreed to continue the workshop through self-funding.

Besides exchanging ideas through dialogue, the workshop produced various proposals on cooperation activities in which all parties would participate. These activities were designed on the principle of the step-by-step approach, that focused on cost-effectiveness and implementing the least controversial issues. Under those circumstances, four proposals were approved by the workshop but only one focusing on marine scientific research was carried out through the Anambas Expedition.

Generally speaking, the workshop succeeded in fulfilling its objectives. However, the most important objective was on how Track Two Diplomacy could lead to the employment of Track One Diplomacy. From the beginning, the workshop was not projected to transform into Track One Diplomacy, but to manage the conflict by preventing it from escalating. In fact, starting from 1990 the situation of the SCS was relatively stable and was marked by an absence of military skirmishes or other actions in which the use of forces occurred. Notably, the workshop only provided some outcomes that could be adopted into formal negotiations. First, the content of the principles on managing conflict as represented in the Bandung Statement was adopted in ASEAN documents, namely, the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea in 1992 and the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in 2002. Second, the workshops recommended that the participants" governments ratify UNCLOS and other international regulations as well as acceding to ASEAN TAC. By 2002, all the states surrounding the SCS had acceded to ASEAN TAC and mostly ratified UNCLOS, with the only exception being Taiwan. Third, cooperation activities on marine scientific research have enlarged and transformed into formal cooperation. Fourth, conducive atmosphere developed by the workshop encouraged the participants" governments to undertake bilateral negotiations. In 1995, the Philippines and China as well as the Philippines and Vietnam signed CoC concerning their bilateral relations in the SCS. Hence, the workshop process was useful and effective as mechanism of managing conflict in the SCS from 1990 to 2002.

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PART 13: FOREIGN POLICY

MALAYSIA-SINGAPORE RELATIONS UNDER NAJIB RAZAK: MALAYSIAN PERSPECTIVES

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Abstract

Malaysia and Singapore enjoy and share a special relationship due to their geographical, historical, familial, cultural, political, economic and strategic features. Their relationship is characterized by competition and interdependence. The competitive world has brought about a close neighborly cooperation between the two nations to build resilience and strength. This article will examine the state of bilateral relations between these two countries under Malaysia's Prime Minister Najib from Malaysian perspectives, which focusing on political-socio-economic aspects and will analyze the future prospect of Malaysia and Singapore under his era. Looking at the history of relations between the two countries, the role of leadership has played important role in the up and down of relationship. Leaders of both countries play a significant role in overcoming conflicts and finding solutions to the problems that besieged the relations between the two countries. If both countries could maintain the momentum and capitalize the benefits of the initiatives that had been done by both countries, we foresee that both countries will not enter into troubled relationships like the previous periods, but it augurs well for strengthened relationships in the future.

Keywords: Malaysia, Singapore, Bilateral Relations

YEMEN-CHINA RELATIONS: HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT IN BILATERAL RELATIONS

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Abstract

Yemen has a long diplomatic relationship with China since the middle of 20th Century. North Yemen established the diplomatic relationship with China in 1956 and South Yemen had diplomatic ties with China in 1967. The diplomatic relationship between Yemen and China well continued even after the unification of North and South as the Republic of Yemen in 1990 in 1990. During Ali Abdullah Saleh (then the Leader of the Republic of Yemen) period from 1990 to 2012, China is interested to make good relations with Yemen in specific and other Arab countries in general due to the old trade exchanges and open market between Yemen and China. Besides that, the strategic location of Yemen and natural resources make the relations stronger. China has many projects in Yemen such as oil, gas and so on. Nevertheless, there has been a very negligible amount of development in Yemen in terms of infrastructure and living standards of the people. From the interviews that have undertaken with many diplomatic people who regarded to work closely with China representing Yemen from 1990-2012. It has been found that, there are many reasons that contributed to weak and slow development in Yemen which can be categorized into internal and external factors. The internal factors comprise corruption in every side of the governmental system, resources management, political instability, internal wars with Al-Qaedah and other insurgent groups (i.e. the Houthis, the Islah Party, the civil war 1994, is one of the more complex events after that the start of the Arab Spring and the southern movement) and tribalism. The external factors are the interventions of some friendly and brotherly countries on the internal affairs of Yemen and the phenomenon of AQAP (Al-Qaedah in Arabian Peninsula). All these internal and external factors participated to make the relationship between Yemen and China unbalanced and affects the development as well. Therefore, in this study, the historical background of the Yemen-China relations and the reasons of weak development in Yemen are presented and investigated.

Keywords: Yemen-China Relations, Development, Factors, Mismanagement, Leader Strategic, Diplomatic and Economic

MALAYSIAN PEACEBUILDING CONTRIBUTION IN THE POST-MAHATHIR ERA AND THE MIDDLE POWER MOTIVATION

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Abstract

As a UN member, Malaysia is considered as one of the prominent participant and troop contributor to peacekeeping operations. The country peacekeeping began in 1960s in Congo. In the Mahathir era, Malaysian peacekeeping contribution reached its peak. However, in the post-Mahathir era, Malaysian peacekeeping contribution had undergone a dramatic change. The number of UN missions participated and troop contributed were decreased to almost half compared to the previous era. Meanwhile, Malaysian government under the current prime minister, Najib Razak, in its capacity as a non-permanent member in the UNSC and also a Chairman of ASEAN for 2015, had expressed its un-ending support to the UN and its peacekeeping initiatives. This includes a pledge to promote peacekeeping at the UNSC, supporting the establishment of an ASEAN Peacekeeping Force (APF) and a contributing of 800 troops, mostly police, to UN peacekeeping forces. This paper examines the Malaysian peacekeeping contribution in the post-Mahathir era. It attempts to identify and explain the primary factors which underlie the Malaysian peacekeeping motivations in the period under study. It uses the middle power concept as its framework of analysis. This paper proceeds in four major sections. The first section explains the concepts of peacekeeping and middle power. The second section explains the background and history of Malaysian peacekeeping contribution since 1960s to the present time. The third section identifies and explains the Malaysian middle power approach and the role UN peacekeeping in the post-Mahathir era. Finally, this paper concludes that the Malaysian peacekeeping contributions in the post-Mahathir era are highly motivated by the desire to become a middle power country. It further argues that, by acquiring this status, Malaysia will be able to play a bigger role in global affairs.

Keywords: Malaysia, Foreign Policy, United Nations, Peacekeeping Operations, Post-Mahathir Era, Najib Razak, Middle Power.

SHIITE IDEOLOGY AND ITS IMPLICATION FOR MALAYSIA

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Abstract

Iran's nuclear program has been hotly debated by the international community. The United States charges that it is a threat to the stability of the region, labelling Iran as one of the Axis of Evils and a threat to her national interests in the Middle East. Iran's nuclear program which was started in the 1950s was supported by the United States but was briefly abandoned when Ayatollah Khomeini led the revolution and came to power in 1979. The revolution gained supports from almost all Muslim countries throughout the world. Khomeini was seen as Mullah who brought back Islam to Iran, specifically Shiite Islam. This article is neither designed to explain Iran's nuclear threat nor designed to discuss about Shiite ideology from Ulama's perspectives. Rather the article proposed that at least two important events in Iran – namely Iran's Revolution and Iran's nuclear power – have overshadowed our understanding of Shiite ideology, which may have serious implication to a Muslim Sunni country like Malaysia. To explain the phenomenon, this article has collected both secondary and primary data. Secondary data was gathered from published academic articles and books. While primary data was partly mainly collected from interviews which is important to validate the research. Preliminary findings suggest that Shiite ideology is very complex and a long overdue issue yet it is important for Malaysia'.

Keywords: Foreign Policy, Iran, Nuclear Program, Shiite, Security

PART 12: MARITIME AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

LANDSKAP POLITIK KAMPUS: SATU TINJAUAN DI UNIVERSITI UTARA MALAYSIA

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Abstrak

Tinjauan terhadap politik kampus amnya di Universiti Awam (UA) dan khususnya di Universiti Utara Malaysia (UUM) merupakan satu tinjauan yang penting kerana ianya bukan setakat akan melantik perwakilan mahasiswa namun keputusannya akan dinantikan oleh pelbagai pihak seperti Kementerian Pengajian Tinggi, pihak Pengurusan Universiti, mahasiswa, ahli politik dan pemberita kerana keputusan Pemilihan Majlis Perwakilan Pelajar (PMPP) seringkali dikait dengan pengaruh parti politik dan isu-isu nasional. Perjuangan kumpulan atau individu yang bertanding dalam PMPP pasti akan mewujudkan keadaan yang harmoni atau tegang berikutan daripada perbezaan manifesto yang diperjuangkan. Kempen kumpulan-kumpulan dan individu-individu yang bertangding pada ketika ini ditinjau semakin rancak seperti kempen pilihanraya national memandangkan pelbagai method telah digunapakai termasuklah dengan adanya jentera pilihanraya, cybertrooper dan pemakaian baju atau logo lencana semasa hari pengundian. Pemasangan poster calon juga digantung dikawasan pengundian demi menarik pengundi disamping terhadapnya tempat ucap kepada calon-calon untuk menyampaikan manifesto setiap calon.

Pengenalan

> Peraturan-peraturan UUM, Pemilihan MPP 2012, telah termaktub bahawa '…MPP merupakan wakil pelajar bagi kawasan Kolej dan kawasan Umum yang dipilih oleh pelajar melalui undi rahsia bagi mentadbir Kesatuan Pelajar…' (Garis Panduan Pemilihan MPP 2015: 1)

Politik kampus dan mahasiswa sudah pasti sukar dipisahkan memandangkan Pemilihan Majlis Perwakilan Pelajar (PMPP) pada saban tahun senantiasa dinantikan oleh mahasiswa untuk memilih perwakilan mereka. Malahan keputusan PMPP ini saban tahun juga akan dinantikan oleh parti politik di peringkat nasional kerana diperkatakan bahawa kumpulan yang bertanding bukan sekadar menyokong satu-satu parti politik, namun juga keputusannya mampu menunjukkan tahap sokongan pada kerajaan semasa atau sebaliknya dan juga terhadap kepekaan

mahasiswa terhadap isu nasional atau sebaliknya. Namun demikian sehingga hari ini masing-masing kem yang bertanding menafikan menerima bantuan dari pihak luar. Penyataan tersebut juga dikuatkan apabila tidak semestinya mahasiswa yang menyokong dasar Universiti akan pada masa yang sama menyokong dasar Kerajaan/Parti Politik semasa. Ini kerana, dasar Universiti dan dasar Kerajaan/Parti Politik merupakan dua instrument yang berlainan. Penyataan ini telah disokong oleh Dr Azzizudin yang beranggapan bahawa mahasiswa mampu berubah ideologi apabila berhadapan dengan pilihanraya umum diperingkat nasional. (http://www.sinarharian.com.my/mobile/nasional/pilihan-raya-kampus-tidak-kena-mengena-pru13-1.89977).

Malahan Profesor Dr Jayum beranggapan bahawa PMPP tidak seharunya dikaitkan dengan pilihan raya umum memandangkan keputusan PMPP tidak mencerminkan sokongan mahasiswa terhadap mana-mana parti politik. Walaubagaimanapun pandangan tersebut tidak dipersetujui oleh Profesor Mohd Bustaman dari Universiti Penguruan Sultan Idris (UPSI) yang beranggapan bahawa setiap keputusan PMPP adalah sebagai 'petunjuk' kepada pilihanraya umum (http://www.sinarharian.com.my/mobile/nasional/pilihan-raya-kampus-tidak-kena-mengena-pru13-1.89977).

Akta Universiti dan Kolej Universiti (AUKU) 1971 yang digubal telah mentarifkan bahawa Majlis Perwakilan Pelajar (MPP) dalam Perkara 48, Perlembagaan Universiti Jadual Pertama (Seksyen 8) untuk membantu Universiti menambahbaik perkhidmatan dan kemudahan mahasiswa demi keselesaan pembelajaran di kampus. Namun demikian, dimensi untuk menambahbaik perkhidmatan dan kemudahan mahasiswa tersebut telah mula dipolitikkan sehingga berlakunya kumpulan-kumpulan yang beringinkan untuk menjadi perjuang kepada mahasiswa sehinggalah tertubuhnya dua kem mahasiswa di kebanyakkan Universiti Awam (UA) yang boleh dikenali sebagai kem Pro-Aspirasi (PA) dan kem Pro-Mahasiswa (PM). Kepimpinan tersebut seringkali bertukar tangan terutamanya di beberapa Universiti di kawasan Lembah Klang iaitu Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia (UKM), Universiti Malaya (UM) dan Universiti Antarabangsa Malaysia (UIAM).

Pada PMPP 2015, persaingan tersebut telah berpihak kepada PA di kesemua UA dengan kejayaan penuh berlaku di beberapa universiti seperti Universiti Sultan Zainal Abidin (Uniszha), Universiti Teknologi Mara (UiTM), Universiti Malaysia Perlis (UniMAP), Universiti Islam Sains Malaysia (USIM),

Universiti Malaysia Sabah (UMS), Universiti Malaysia Sarawak (UNIMAS) dan Universiti Teknikal Melaka Malaysia (UTEM). Namun demikian, PA menghadapi saingan yang sangat sengit di UIAM apabila hanya memenangi 12 kerusi berbanding 11 kerusi pada pihak PM dan di Universiti Tun Hussein Onn Malaysia (UTHM) PA memenangi 18 kerusi berbanding 15 kerusi kepada PM. Malahan di Universiti Utara Malaysia (UUM), PA hanya berjaya menguasai 23 kerusi berbanding 13 kerusi kepada PM.

Pemilihan Majlis Perwakilan Pelajar (PMPP)

Secara umumnya, PMPP telah dijalankan oleh kesemua UA sebagai satu wardah untuk melahirkan pemimpin di masa hadapan dan mewakili mahasiswa dalam isu-isu yang berkaitan dengan perkhidmatan dan kemudahan mahasiswa. Malahan, bagi pendapat Ahli Majlis Profesor Negara, Prof Dr Jayum Jawan, PMPP ini merupakan platform untuk mahasiswa mengasah bakat untuk menjadi pemimpin (http://www.sinarharian.com.my/mobile/nasional/pilihan-raya-kampus-tidak-kena-mengena pru13-1.89977). Namun demikian, hanya mahasiswa sepenuh masa Pasca Siswazah, Ijazah Sarjana Muda dan Diploma sahaja yang layak untuk terlibat didalam proses PMPP tersebut. Manakala pelajar yang mengikuti pengajian jarak jauh (PJJ), pengajian jangka pendek, pengajian sambilan, pengajian kerjasama, pengajian eksekutif, pertukaran pelajar, pengajian asasi pengurusan dan yang telah tamat pengajian, sama sekali tidak layak untuk terlibat didalam PMPP termasuk untuk menjadi calon.

Manakala pihak yang dipertanggungjawabkan bagi menjayakan PMPP saban tahun telah diamanahkan kepada Jabatan Hal Ehwal Pelajar (JHEP) bagi merancang, mentadbir, menyelaras dan mengawal selia agar proses tersebut dapat berjalan dengan lancar dan teratur. Malahan sepanjang tempoh PMPP, JHEP juga akan menjadi tempat rujukan sekiranya berlaku sebarang kekeliruan di mata mahasiswa. Bagi memastikan setiap tahap perjalanan PMPP ini berjalan dengan lancar dan telus, empat jawatankuasa telah ditubuhkan iaitu,

1. Jawatankuasa Induk Pemilihan MPP (JIPM)
2. Jawatankuasa Pelaksanaan Pemilihan MPP (JPPM)
3. Jawatankuasa Audit Pemilihan MPP (JAPM)
4. Jawatankuasa Rayuan Pemilihan MPP (JRPM)

Dan untuk mengelakkan daripada sebarang pertindihan keputusan, jawatankuasa-jawatankuasa tersebut akan dianggotai oleh individu yang berlainan.

Pada ketika ini, jumlah kerusi yang dipertandingkan di PMPP UUM adalah sebanyak 36 kerusi, dimana sebanyak lapan kerusi umum dan 28 kerusi di Peringkat Kolej Akademik. Pecahan kerusi diperingkat Kolej Akademik tersebut adalah dimana setiap pusat pengajian akan mewakili dua kerusi,

1. Kolej Sastera dan Sains yang mempunyai lima pusat pengajian akan menyaksikan persaingan 10 kerusi,
2. Kolej Perniagaan yang mempunyai lima pusat pengajian juga akan menyaksikan persaingan sebanyak 10 kerusi, dan
3. Kolej Undang-undang, Kerajaan dan Pengajian Antarabangsa yang hanya mempunyai empat pusat pengajian akan mempertandingkan lapan kerusi.

Di UUM, PMPP telah disertai oleh kem PA atau juga dikenali sebagai kem Perubahan, PM atau juga dikenali sebagai kem Transformasi, calon bebas dan yang terbaru adalah dari kem Hijrah.

Secara umumnya, gerak kerja kem PA mahupun kem PM dipercayai semakin mengikut trend gerak kerja politik luar dengan adanya jentera, himpunan penyokong di hari penamaan calon, cara berkempen, pemilihan manifesto dan pemilihan isu-isu yang diperjuangkan. Keadaan ini berlaku sudah pastinya dengan tujuan untuk meraih undi mahasiswa. Ini adalah kerana, kem yang memenangi kerusi majoriti akan diberikan 'hak' bukan sekadar memegang portfolio sebagai Yang DiPertua MPP, tetapi juga mengatur portfolio MPP lain dan sudah pastinya kem yang memenangi kerusi majoriti akan memilih untuk mengisi portfolio utama dari sudut mata kem yang menang. Namun demikian, hanya empat portfolio sahaja yang wajib dipenuhi iaitu seorang Yang DiPetua, seorang Naib Yang DiPertua, seorang Setiausaha, seorang Bendahari dan mana-mana jawatan lain yang dibenarkan secara bertulis oleh Naib Cansellor.

PERANAN MPP

Selain daripada menambahbaik perkhidmatan dan kemudahan mahasiswa demi keselesaan pembelajaran di kampus disamping menyusun program-program universiti berpandukan kepada AUKU, MPP juga berperanan sebagai 'suara mahasiswa' ke peringkat pengurusan tertinggi Universiti berlandaskan saluran yang betul. Ini adalah agar, MPP yang dipilih oleh mahasiswa tidak sama sekali dilabel

sebagai 'yes man group'. Secara umumnya, fungsi utama MPP yang telah termaktub adalah seperti berikut,

1. Bagi memupuk semangat hidup sebagai satu perbadanan dikalangan pelajar-pelajar Universiti,

2. Tertakluk kepada arahan Naib Canselor, untuk merancang dan menyelia kemudahan-kemudahan kebajikan pelajar di Universiti termasuk kemudahan-kemudahan rekreasi, aktiviti-aktiviti kerohanian dan keagamaan dan bekalan makanan dan minuman,

3. Bagi membuat *representasi* kepada Naib Canselor mengenai segara perkara berhubungan atau berkenaan dengan, keadaan tempat tinggal dan kehidupan pelajar-pelajar Universiti,

4. Untuk diwakili dalam mana-mana badan yang boleh, mengikut kaedah-kaedah yang dibuat oleh Lembaga Pengurusan Universiti bagi maksud itu, dilantik untuk menjalankan aktiviti-aktiviti kebajikan pelajar Universiti dan,

5. Untuk menjalankan apa-apa aktiviti lain yang ditentukan oleh Lembaga Pengurusan Universiti dari semasa ke semasa.

Kem Perubahan

Di UUM, kem Pro-Aspirasi ini dikenali sebagai kem Perubahan dimana cara perjuangan kem Perubahan ini dalam pelbagai isu dilihat diselesaikan melalui cara perbincangan dengan pihak pengurusan Universiti berikutan daripada agenda utama kem Perubahan dalam memperjuangkan kebajikan mahasiswa. Bagi pandangan peribadi penulis, kem Perubahan ini tidak 'menyerang' pihak pengurusan Universiti dengan teguran yang kasar atau yang mampu dilihat sebagai mengadakan cerita tanpa usul periksa. Tindakan yang baik ini telah disalah erti oleh kem Pro-Mahasiswa atau Transformasi yang melihat bahawa kem Perubahan merupakan pro-dasar Universiti. Bagi penulis, method sedemikian seharusnya dipuji demi menyelesaikan isu-isu mahasiswa atau menambahbaik sesuatu kelemahan. Ini juga secara tidak langsung menunjukan bahawa kem Perubahan lebih rasional dalam membawa suara mahasiswa walaupun ada ketikanya kem Perubahan ini berbeza pendapat dengan dasar Universiti.

Walaupun ada dakwaan yang menyatakan bahawa Perubahan ini mempunyai hubungkait dengan Barisan Nasional (BN) seperti dakwaan Datuk Seri Najib selepas kemenangan besar PA pada PMPP 2015, namun ianya kurang dipersetujui oleh

beberapa   pemimpin   pelajar
(http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/bahasa/article/pilihan-raya-kampus-bukan-petunjuk-sokongan-bn-kata-pemimpin-pelajar#sthash.IDSFHkeo.dpuf).   Malahan
menurut Bekas Presiden Persatuan Anak Felda (Persada) UKM, dakwaan tersebut
mampu memberikan persepsi negatif. Ini kerana mahasiswa itu bergerak secara
sendiri dalam memperjuangkan isu mahasiswa seiring dengan dasar Universiti tanpa
dipengaruhi   oleh   mana-mana   anasir   dari   luar
(http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/bahasa/article/pilihan-raya-kampus-bukan-petunjuk-sokongan-bn-kata-pemimpin-pelajar).

Malahan Dr Azzizudin dari Universiti Utara Malaysia juga berpendapat
bahawa kemenangan Pro-Aspirasi bukanlah jaminan kepada BN dapat memperolehi
sokongan pada pilihan raya umum, kerana pilihan raya merupakan perkara yang
sukar untuk diramal (http://www.sinarharian.com.my/mobile/nasional/pilihan-raya-kampus-tidak-kena-mengena-pru13-1.89977)

Kem Transformasi

Di UUM, kem Pro-Mahasiswa dikenali sebagai kem Transformasi yang juga
melaungkan mengenai perjuangan kebajikan mahasiswa seperti kem Perubahan.
Namun, method yang digunakan oleh kem Transformasi ini lebih 'menyerang seperti
nada pembangkang' melalui media-media sosial seperti Facebook tanpa mencari
jawapan melalui berbincang dengan pihak pengurusan Universiti. Bagi pandangan
penulis, method yang terlalu berani, agresif, vocal ini harus dibuang sama sekali dan
digantikan dengan method perbincangan dan menggunakan saluran yang lebih
tepat. Bagi pendapat peribadi penulis, di Universiti semua pihak sudah pastinya
mahukan yang terbaik didalam menyediakan perkhidmatan, oleh itu, tidak salah
sekiranya teguran itu dapat diselesaikan dengan cara perbincangan, kerana
sekiranya niat kita itu demi untuk menambahbaik mengapa harus digunakan method
'menyerang' yang tidak mendatangkan hasil yang baik pada imej Universiti secara
amnya.

Malahan, tingkah laku Pro-Mahasiswa di beberapa UA memperlihatkan Pro-Mahasiswa ini sebagai kem yang 'radikal dan melampau' apabila bertindak
membakar patung Timbalan Naib Canselor UM, Prof Datuk Dr Rohana.
(http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/bahasa/article/pilihan-raya-kampus-bukan-petunjuk-sokongan-bn-kata-pemimpin-pelajar#sthash.IDSFHkeo.dpuf).   Namun di

UUM, pendekatan yang digunakan oleh kem Tranformasi adalah lebih lembut dan berhemah dibandingkan dengan kem Pro-Mahasiswa di UA lain. Tindakan ini patut dipuji dan dikekalkan untuk menunjukkan mahasiswa UUM lebih rasional demi menyelesaikan sesuatu isu kebajikan pada saluran yang lebih tepat.

KEM HIJRAH

Kem Hijrah yang terbentuk pada PMPP 2013 merupakan serpihan daripada Kem Perubahan apabila berlakunya perbezaan pendapatan antara Kem Perubahan terhadap pihak pengurusan. Kem Hijrah terbentuk apabila mantan MPP dari Kem Perubahan 2012/2013 berhasrat untuk bertanding semula bagi memperjuangkan beberapa isu yang dipercayai tidak sehaluan dengan pihak pengurusan Universiti (http://anginperubahan.blogspot.my/2013/10/perubahan-tumpas-di-uum-angkara.html).

Walaupun usia Kem Hijrah ini muda dibandingkan dengan Kem Perubahan dan Kem Transformasi, namun pengaruh Kem Hijrah ini pada 2012/2013 dilihat mampu memberikan saingan yang hebat kepada Kem Perubahan dan Kem Transformasi pada PMPP 2012/2013. Ini terbukti apabila pada PMPP 2012/2013, Kem Hijrah berjaya memenangi satu kerusi umum dan lima kerusi pusat pengajian. Walaupun jumlah kemenangan tersebut tidaklah sebesar kerusi yang dimenangi Kem Perubahan sebanyak 15 kerusi dan Kem Transformasi sebanyak 13 kerusi, namun pergabungan Kem Hijrah dengan mana-mana kem lain mampu memberikan kemenangan *simple majority*. Kemunculan Kem Hijrah sememangnya membuka mata Kem Perubahan yang mana pada tahun sebelumnya berjaya memenangi 34 kerusi PMPP.

CALON BEBAS

Pada pandangan peribadi penulis, calon bebas ini patut disegani oleh mahasiswa, atas tiket bebas tersebut, calon-calon sudah pastinya tidak mempunyai jentera yang lebih ramai di banding Kem Perubahan atau Kem Transformasi, namun penyertaan mereka tidak harus dipandang dengan sebelah mata terutamanya sekiranya wujudnya ramai mahasiswa yang mengundi diatas pagar atau bosan dengan manifesto-manifesto dan pertelingkahan diantara Kem Perubahan atau Kem Transformasi. Situasi ini telah terbukti pada PMPP 2012/2013, pepecahan dalam Kem Perubahan dan pertelingkahan Kem Perubahan dan Kem Transformasi

menyebabkan calon bebas berjaya memenangi kerusi pada PMPP 2012/2013. Dan apa yang lebih menarik lagi calon bebas berada di tangga ke-tiga dengan pungutan undi sebanyak 6438 undi mengalahkan calon dari Kem Perubahan, Kem Transformasi dan Kem Hijrah yang sememangnya mempunyai kekuatan jentera yang kuat.

Bagi pandangan penulis, amnya di UUM, calon bebas ini dapat dibahagikan kepada empat kategori iaitu,

1. Bebas tanpa menyokong mana-mana kem,
2. Bebas namun menyokong kepada Kem Perubahan,
3. Bebas namun menyokong kepada Kem Transformasi dan,
4. Bebas namun menyokong kepada Kem Hijrah.

Situasi ini berlaku disebabkan oleh beberapa alasan, sebagai contoh ianya berkemungkinan untuk memecahkan undi demi kepentingan kem-kem tertentu, sebagai undi protes dimana calon bebas tidak bersetuju dengan mana-mana manifesto kem-kem tertentu, tiada kem yang dilihat mampu menang di sesuatu pusat pengajian memandangkan mahasiswa pusat pengajian tersebut mahu dilabel sebagai 'neutral', tiada calon yang sesuai untuk mewakili kem di pusat pengajian tersebut, calon mahu dilihat 'neutral' atau mahu menguji tahap penerimaan mahasiswa terhadap dirinya sendiri, calon bebas hanya akan bertindak memilih berpihak pada satu-satu kem apabila sesudah keputusan PMPP diumum, calon tidak mahu terikat dengan kem-kem tertentu dan lebih berminat untuk menyokong atau terlibat sama menolak isu-isu khusus.

Malahan di beberapa UA, calon bebas ini juga diterima oleh mahasiswa. Sebagai contoh, pada PMPP UKM 2013, calon bebas berjaya memenangi satu kerusi, pada PMPP USM 2013/2014 calon bebas memenangi lapan kerusi, di PMPP UIAM 2008/2009 calon bebas memenangi tujuh kerusi. Dan pada PMPP 2015/2016, penerimaan calon bebas masih diterima oleh mahasiswa apabila di beberapa UA, calon bebas berjaya memenangi beberapa kerusi, misalnya, lapan kerusi di UM, dua kerusi di UUM, dan satu kerusi di USM.

KESIMPULAN

Mahasiswa dan PMPP sememangnya dua instrumen yang sukar untuk dipisahkan, ini bukanlah hanya kerana dengan tujuan untuk mengasah bakat pemimpin di UA, namun juga untuk memilih mereka yang mampu untuk membawa suara mahasiswa.

Di UUM secara amnya, persaingan PMPP ini berlaku dalam keadaan yang sengit walau dalam keadaan yang lebih terurus dan harmoni jika dibandingkan dengan UA lain. Ini mungkin disebabkan oleh lokasi UUM yang terletak jauh di Utara atau mungkin mahasiswanya lebih rasional dan mungkin juga disebabkan banyak kemudahan dan perkhidmatan telah berjaya disediakan untuk pihak pengurusan Universiti. Dengan kemudahan penginapan yang memuaskan pada kadar penyewaan yang rendah, perkhidmatan bas yang memuaskan, harga makanan yang lebih murah dibandingkan di kawasan UA lain, ianya memberikan satu kelebihan kepada pihak UUM didalam menangani isu-isu tertentu.

Persaingan antara Kem Perubahan, Kem Transformasi, calon bebas dan Kem Hijrah, masing-masing sudah pasti mahu menjadi 'juara' dimata mahasiswa, walaupun penulis percaya dengan satu matlamat yang sama iaitu memberikan perkhidmatan kepada mahasiswa. Namun yang membezakan antara kem-kem tersebut adalah method didalam menyelesaikan isu-isu khusus, samaada berbincang dengan pihak pengurusan atau 'menyerang' pihak pengurusan tanpa usul perikasa. Bagi penulis, pilihan ditangan mahasiswa. Namun penulis berminat untuk menasihati mahasiswa untuk menggunakan saluran yang betul dan tepat agar penambahbaik perkhidmatan dapat dilakukan dengan lebih segera. Mengapa perlu kita memburukkan institusi yang memberikan ilmu kepada kita, institusi dimana kita akan berkonvokesyen, institusi dimana kita mengenali sahabat dari pelbagai negeri, institusi dimana kita mengenal erti kehidupan dan pelbagai.

Tidak perlulah melabel mahasiswa itu berpaksi kepada mana-mana parti politik, ini kerana selagi dasar Universiti itu tidak menganiya mahasiswa, penulis beranggapan motto UUM 'Ilmu, Budi, Bakti' patut kita sanjungi.

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Abstrak

Krisis ekonomi 1997/98 belaku secara mengejut bagi Malaysia dan menerusi proses pemulihan dilaksanakan kerajaan, ia berjaya dilakukan dengan pantas kerana wujudnya polisi yang dijanakan oleh pengurusan Malaysia sendiri. Mahathirisasi dan elemen pengurusan yang jelas, ditunjangi kekuatan kepimpinan Tun Dr Mahathir bersama pasukan pengurusan dan gaya kepimpinan yang berkesan telah menzahirkan formula Malaysia dalam menangani krisis ekonomi 1997/98 menerusi pendekatan Mahathiriskonomism. Tekanan memuncak krisis ekonomi yang melanda Malaysia adalah pada Ogos 1998 di mana berlakunya penurunan tertinggi kadar tukaran matawang bagi ringgit Malaysia, tekanan ke atas rizab asing dan juga kenaikan kadar faedah pada paras yang tinggi. Kemelut menangani krisis ekonomi yang berlaku sejak Julai 1997 dengan berpunca dari kejatuhan nilai ringgit telah dilihat menjadi punca ketegangan politik di antara Tun Dr. Mahathir dan Timbalan Perdana Menteri ketika itu, Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim sehingga menyebabkan hubungan politik kedua pemimpin itu semakin renggang di tambah pula oleh tindakan pemecatan Anwar sebagai anggota kabinet dan keahlian UMNO pada September 1998 sehingga di sabitkan kesalahan penyalahgunaan kuasa oleh Mahkamah kemudiaannya. Krisis ekonomi yang berlaku memberikan impak terhadap Malaysia dengan menjejaskan wawasan serta perancangan pembangunan ekonomi serta menyebabkan gangguan terhadap perancangan untuk mencapai kemajuan yang disasarkan kerajaan. Krisis ekonomi 1997/98 memberikan kesan besar kepada kebanyakan bank dan sektor korporat, dan ini merunsingkan pihak kerajaan. Dalam proses menangani kegawatan ekonomi dan melaksanakan pemulihan ekonomi, kerajaan semasa pemerintahan Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad telah berjaya bertindak balas terhadap krisis tersebut dan memperkenalkan sistem yang berlawanan seperti yang dipraktikkan oleh Thailand dan Indonesia yang menerima bantuan IMF. Penubuhan Majlis Tindakan Ekonomi Negara (MTEN) pada 7 Januari 1998 untuk menguruskan krisis ekonomi dan mengurangkan jurang antara sektor kerajaan dan swasta. Langkah MTEN yang diperkenalkan oleh tindakan kepimpinan Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad dengan penghasilan satu kerangka tindakan di namakan sebagai Pelan Pemulihan Ekonomi Negara (PPEN) yang diwujudkan berasaskan orientasi ke arah penstabilan nilai Ringgit di pasaran mata wang antarabangsa telah memberikan kesan positif iaitu ia telah terbukti berjaya mengembalikan keyakinan pelabur terhadap pasaran dan

kedudukan ekonomi Malaysia, selain itu MTEN menerusi PPEN yang juga berorientasikan kepada usaha mengekalkan kestabilan kewangan, mengukuhkan asas ekonomi dan ekuiti di dapati berjaya dilaksanakan dengan berkesan. Kertas kerja ini akan melihat secara khusus pengamalan dan pendekatan serta peranan dimainkan Tun Dr Mahathir dalam penyelesaian krisis ekonomi 1997/98 dengan konsep dinamakan sebagai Mahathiriskonomism. Secara jelas, Tun Dr Mahathir memainkan peranan dan pembinaan "ism" berasaskan corak pemikiran dan model kepimpinan beliau membantu Malaysia keluar dari kemelut kegawatan krisis ekonomi tersebut tanpa memerlukan bantuan asing yang membelenggu sistem politik dan ekonomi negara.

Kata kunci: Mahathiriskonomism, Mahathir, Mahathirisasi, MTEN, krisis ekonomi 1997/98

Pengenalan

Wujud pelbagai kajian mengenai cara Malaysia menghadapi dan menangani krisis ekonomi 1997/98, tetapi ianya hanya berkisar soal mekanisme dan cara semata-mata tanpa melibatkan fokus yang khusus mengenai peranan Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad sebagai Perdana Menteri yang mengetuai usaha menangani permasalahan yang berlaku. Mengkaji fenomena dan hasil tanpa mempedulikan aktor yang bertanggungjawab dalam memimpin negara berhadapan krisis ekonomi 1997/98 itu adalah satu usaha yang belum lengkap secara akademiknya. Kertas kerja ini melihat dimensi peranan Tun Dr Mahathir dalam menguruskan negara dari sudut ekonomi dan politik serta mengkaji impak yang diterima hasil dari cara pengurusan beliau semasa krisis tersebut.

Menurut *Institute for International Economics*, di kalangan empat buah negara Asia yang dilanda krisis ekonomi 1997/98 kajian mendapati bahawa hanya Malaysia sahaja yang mencatatkan sejarah politik ekonomi di mana kerajaan semasa tidak berubah akibat dari kesan peristiwa krisis ekonomi 1997/98 yang berlaku. Indonesia, Thailand serta Korea Selatan yang juga dikaji dalam kajian institut berkenaan mengalami perubahan rejim pemerintah. Persoalan timbul adalah berkaitan dengan kaedah yang digunapakai oleh Dr. Mahathir dalam menyelesaikan permasalahan ekonomi dan pergolakan politik secara serentak.

Kertas kerja ini secara khususnya memfokuskan kepada satu hipotesis bahawa peranan yang dilaksanakan oleh Dr Mahathir Mohamad dalam memimpin Malaysia menghadapi krisis ekonomi yang melanda Asia serta Malaysia pada 1997-1998 adalah begitu signifikan. Kedudukan Dr Mahathir selaku Perdana Menteri pada ketika itu telah membolehkan beliau bertindak sebagai pemikir dan pencetus kepada solusi atau mekanisme penyelesaian krisis, dan juga mampu menggunakan

kedudukan eksekutifnya dalam membentuk pasukan khusus bagi bekerjasama sebagai pemikir (think-tank) serta bertindak balas dengan pembentukan polisi serta tindakan yang bersesuaian.

Apa itu Krisis Ekonomi 1997/98?

Krisis ekonomi yang melanda Asia termasuk Malaysia pada 1997/98 itu telah mengalihkan pandangan dunia yang turut sama melihat kepada aspek keterlibatan pasaran dan sistem kewangan antarabangsa melibatkan peranan dan keberkesanan dalam menangani krisis ekonomi. Krisis ekonomi yang melanda juga menunjukkan bahawa ia juga disebabkan oleh perubahan dalam arah aliran modal antarabangsa di pasaran modal tempatan sehingga menyebabkan keadaan yang tidak stabil kepada pasaran disebabkan oleh tindakan drastik untuk mengubah haluan pasaran sehingga mewujudkan peralihan dalam keyakinan pasaran (Radelet dan Sachs, 1998).

Krisis ekonomi yang melanda Malaysia dan negara serantau di Asia Timur masih diingati sebagai satu peristiwa terpenting dunia dan negara, ini dapat dilihat dengan jelas menerusi ucapan Y.A.B Perdana Menteri Malaysia, Datuk Sri Mohd Najib Tun Haji Abdul Razak pada 29 November 2014 dengan menyatakan bahawa dalam tahun 1997 ekonomi Malaysia merudum yang mengakibatkan kewangan negara menjadi lemah dan prestasi pembangunan juga merosot (Mingguan Malaysia, 30 November 2014: 7). Kegawatan ekonomi yang melanda Malaysia pada 1997 memberikan beberapa kesan kepada Malaysia dalam aspek ekonomi, sosial dan juga aspek politik.

Sebelum Julai 1997, kedudukan ekonomi negara-negara Asia Timur berkembang pesat dan maju. Kejatuhan nilai matawang kemudiaannya menjadikan kedudukan ekonomi dan kewangan negara-negara terlibat di Asia Timur semakin terjejas. Bath iaitu matawang Thailand mula mengalami susutan nilai berbanding matawang asing yang begitu ketara bermula Julai 1997 menjadikan petanda kemerosotan nilai matawang satu persatu negara-negara Asia Timur. Krisis kewangan yang melanda Asia bermula 14 Mei 1997 apabila berlakunya serangan spekulasi ke atas mata wang Baht dan kegagalan kerajaan Thailand mempertahankan kedudukan nilai mata wang Baht sehingga menyebabkan berlakunya kegagalan beberapa buah syarikat kewangan di negara tersebut pada 23 Mei tahun yang sama (Aaron Nematnejad, 2000: 2).

Menurut Prema-Chandra Athukorala (2010), tekanan ke atas ringgit Malaysia sejak Julai 1997 hingga 7 Januari 1998 sehingga menyusutkan matawang Malaysia ke paras 50 peratus lebih rendah berbanding dollar Amerika Syarikat. Pada penghujung 1997, nilai saham komposit di BSKL juga telah menurun sebanyak 50 peratus dan menyebabkan pasaran saham Malaysia kehilangan AS$225 bilion, sedangkan Malaysia pada tahun 1990 hingga 1995, direkodkan memperolehi US$26.7 bilion pelaburan langsung asing (FDI) iaitu merangkumi 31.3 peratus dari keseluruhan jumlah FDI yang mengalir ke kalangan negara ASEAN (Dhillon, 2009). Dalam konteks ini, Prema-chandra Athukorala (2010), telah menegaskan bahawa walaupun Malaysia dilanda kegawatan, pembuat dasar Malaysia dapat menghadapi situasi getir tersebut dengan cara tersendiri berbanding Thailand dan Indonesia yang lebih pantas beralih kepada IMF sebagai alternatif. Ini menunjukkan bahawa kepimpinan dan juga pembuat dasar negara menainkan Usaha Tun Dr. Mahathir yang paling diingati masyarakat Malaysia dan antarabangsa ialah ketika kejayaan beliau membawa Malaysia keluar dari Krisis Kewangan Asia pada 1997. Ketika krisis itu, Tun Dr. Mahathir telah menolak cadangan dan dana bantuan daripada Dana Kewangan Antarabangsa (IMF) yang beliau sifatkan akan memburukkan lagi krisis itu (pandangan Amin Iskandar di dalam Kebebasan bawa erti besar bagi negara, Berita Harian, 23 Ogos 2013: 31). Inilah yang saya rangkumkan sebagai Mahathiriskonomism, iaitu pendekatan khusus secara ilmiah memperincikan impak hasil usaha kerajaan pimpinan Tun Dr Mahathir dan pemimpin bersamanya dalam memulihkan negara dari kesan buruk krisis ekonomi 1997/98.

Impak Krisis Ekonomi 1997/98

Krisis ekonomi yang melanda Asia pada tahun 1997 memberikan impak yang panjang dan hampir meruntuhkan negara-negara ASEAN. Tambahan pula, krisis ekonomi yang melanda bukanlah disebabkan faktor kegagalan kerajaan semata-mata dalam menguruskan sistem kewangan dan ekonomi sesebuah negara. Krisis ekonomi yang melanda pada 1997/98 telah menyebabkan:-

1. Timbulnya kesedaran negara-negara terlibat bahawa dalam era globalisasi, kawalan negara ke atas setiap perkara adalah terbatas.

2. Tekanan memuncak krisis ekonomi yang melanda Malaysia adalah pada Ogos 1998 di mana berlakunya penurunan tertinggi kadar tukaran matawang bagi ringgit Malaysia. Nilai Ringgit Malaysia (RM) menyusut berbanding dollar

Amerika Syarikat sebanyak 50 peratus hingga mencecah kadar tukaran bagi AS$1 kepada RM4.88 pada 7 Januari, 1997 berbanding pada April 1997 di mana kadar ringgit berbanding dollar Amerika Syarikat hanya pada kadar RM2.42 kepada AS$1 (Zaherawati et. al, 2010).

3. Tekanan ke atas rizab asing dan juga kenaikan kadar faedah pada paras yang tinggi (Meyer 1994; Mahani 2012:240).

4. Pengaliran keluar modal secara mendadak dengan jumlah yang banyak hingga menyusutkan kedudukan pasaran dan ekonomi serta mengurangkan kadar nilaian bursa saham hingga menyebabkan negara menuju ke arah kemiskinan. Malaysia kehilangan US$290 bilion akibat krisis ekonomi 1997/98.

5. Tempoh waktu di antara bulan Julai 1997 hingga pertengahan Januari 1998, nilai saham sebanyak AS$225 bilion telah lenyap akibat penyusutan nilai matawang RM (Zaherawati et. all, 2010).

6. Kedudukan bursa saham dan pasaran mata wang Malaysia hampir runtuh akibat krisis yang melanda. Kadar GDP juga menurun dari 7.3 peratus pada 1997 kepada – 7.4 peratus pada 1998, dan ini adalah kadar terburuk sejak kemerdekaan negara pada 1957 (Mahani, 2009; Goh dan Michael, 2010).

7. BSKL pada 1997 adalah bursa saham ketiga terbesar di rantau Asia Timur selepas Tokyo dan Hong Kong mengalami penurunan mendadak nilaian indeks kompositnya dari 1,077.3 mata pada Jun 1997 ke paras 262.7 mata pada 1 September 1997 (Zaherawati et. al, 2010).

8. Kadar pendapatan perkapita Malaysia telah susut sebanyak 70 peratus, harga nilaian pasaran di bursa saham juga susut sehingga 90 peratus dan menyebabkan banyak perniagaan di Malaysia mengalami gugatan kenaikan kadar hutang yang tinggi (Dhillon, 2009: 123).

9. Gugatan kepada kebanyakan bank dan sektor korporat, dan ini merunsingkan pihak kerajaan (Sulaiman Mahbob, 2013).

10. Malaysia secara anggarannya telah kehilangan US$ 40 bilion dalam aspek kuasa beli, dan ini dinyatakan oleh Dr Mahathir dalam ucapannya pada 28 November 1997 semasa majlis dialog bersama pemimpin perniagaan di Tokyo, Jepun, dan ini mengakibatkan Malaysia lebih miskin dari sebelum kejatuhan mata wang berlaku dan memberikan kesan kepada rakyat Malaysia secara keseluruhannya (Dhillon, 2009: 123).

11. Krisis ekonomi yang berlaku telah menjejaskan wawasan serta perancangan pembangunan ekonomi serta menyebabkan gangguan terhadap perancangan untuk mencapai kemajuan yang disasarkan kerajaan (Mahani, 2002: 267).

12. Malaysia mengalami defisit kewangan serta membawa kepada pertumbuhan negara pada kadar negatif (Mohd. Akbal dan Ahmad Zaidi, 2003:38).

13. Kesan ketara dari kegawatan ekonomi 1997/98 dapat dilihat secara jelas menerusi beberapa indikator utama, iaitu (Massa, 17-23 Januari 1998):-

    i. Ringgit menjunam ke paras 4.8800 berbanding AS$1.00

    ii. Pasaran saham merudum di bawah paras indeks 500 mata

    iii. Bank-bank membekukan pinjaman

    iv. Harga baragan keperluan melambung tinggi

    v. Daya tahan syarikat mula tergugat

14. Impak politik berpunca dari kejatuhan nilai ringgit telah dilihat menjadi antara punca ketegangan politik di antara Tun Dr. Mahathir dan Timbalan Perdana Menteri ketika itu, Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim sehingga menyebabkan hubungan politik kedua pemimpin itu semakin renggang di tambah pula oleh tindakan pemecatan Anwar sebagai anggota kabinet dan keahlian UMNO pada 1998 sehingga di sabitkan kesalahan penyalahgunaan kuasa oleh Mahkamah kemudiaannya. Ketegangan antara dua pemimpin itu telah kemudiaannya merebakkan gerakan Reformasi yang dipelopori oleh Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim yang dilihat seperti yang turut berlaku di Indonesia, dan gerakan Reformasi tersebut telah kehilangan taringnya setelah keadaan ekonomi Malaysia kembali pulih di bawah pemerintahan Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad (Zakaria & Goshal, 1999).

Konsep Mahathiriskonomism

Pengistilahan Mahathiriskonomism terbit dari kombinasi nama 'Mahathir', iaitu mantan Perdana Menteri Malaysia keempat, dan digabungkan dengan kata 'risiko ekonomi' bersama 'ism' yang membawa erti pemikiran atau ideologi (Md. Shukri Shuib, 2007). Mahathiriskonomism sebagai satu konsep ilmiah telah diketengahkan yang secara umumnya didefinisikan sebagai paradigma atau pemikiran Mahathir berkaitan dalam pengurusan risiko ekonomi yang dihadapi Malaysia semasa pentadbiran beliau sebagai Perdana Menteri Malaysia, terutama ketika melakukan tindakan pemulihan krisis ekonomi 1997/98 (Md.Shukri Shuib, Mohamad Faisol

Keling dan Mohd Na'eim Ajis, 2008). Mahathiriskonomism adalah satu pendekatan mengurus dan menangani risiko ekonomi secara khususnya, dan merupakan pendekatan lebih luas menjangkau pemikiran dan kerangka ideologi konsep politik, ekonomi dan sosial yang sering dinyatakan oleh Md. Shukri Shuib (2007) sebagai elemen penting disebut 'trifungsi sejagat'. Pentingnya Mahathiriskonomism ialah ia bercirikan keberanian mengambil risiko dengan konsep pantang berundur.

Mahathiriskonomism dalam tindakan menangani krisis ekonomi 1997/98 semestinya mencirikan pendekatan Mahathirism sebagai teras, iaitu pendekatan berasaskan gaya kepimpinan dan pemikiran Dr. Mahathir yang tersendiri dan bebas dari pengaruh asing. Pandangan ini disesuaikan juga menerusi pengamatan Dr Rais Yatim (2011) yang mengemukakan rumusan berkenaan dengan usaha dan langkah yang dilaksanakan serta dasar termasuk aspek kepimpinan Tun Dr Mahathir bahawa istilah Mahathirism itu adalah istilah yang boleh digunakan dalam menyatakan segala hal berkaitan Mahathir. "*Despite his golden years of nearing 90, Mahathir and indeed Mahathirism – if there be such a term that can be used to describe all things Mahathir*" (Rais Yatim, 2011: 237).

Aspek Mahathirism ini secara jelas diperincikan bahawa ia tidak mempunyai batasan dalam waktu dan tindakan, bahkan apa sahaja tindakan Dr. Mahathir dalam pentadbiran dan tingkah laku beliau mampu dikategorikan sebagai Mahathirism (Rais Yatim, 2011:245),

> *Mahathir became Mahathirism in many ways. He had his own way of doing things and not many had the dash of mind and psysical vigoutr to achieve what he achieved.*

Tun Dr. Mahathir di kenali sebagai Perdana Menteri dan pemimpin yang begitu rajin bekerja. Rais Yatim menyatakan hal ini di dalam penulisan beliau dengan tulisannya "*In Abdullah's psyche is the determination of how to continue a job that has been synonymous with a methodical workaholic, a methaphor which Mahathir has been well known for*" (Rais Yatim, 2011: 239). Mahathiriskonomism dengan ciri terasnya iaitu Mahathirism dalam konteks tindakan dan tingkah laku dilaksanakan bagi mendepani krisis ekonomi 1997/98 dapat dilihat menerusi tindakan drastik yang dilaksanakan, antaranya dengan pertentangan politik dan perbezaan pendekatan ekonomi dalam antara Dr. Mahathir dengan Timbalan Perdana Menteri yang juga menteri kewangan ketika itu Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim, dan Dr Mahathir dengan sifat Mahathirism tersendiri dengan gaya dan

pendekatannya mengambil tindakan drastik bukan sahaja melakukan perubahan dasar, tetapi bertindak menyingkirkan timbalan beliau sendiri, dan kemudian-nya bertindak dengan gaya tersendiri bagi menyelesaikan krisis ekonomi yang dihadapi negara. Rais Yatim (2011:245) menyatakan bahawa:-

> *In 1997 in the midst of the world's worst financial crisis Mahathir, contrary to the stand of his deputy, Anwar Ibrahim, introduced a sea of change in Malaysia's economic and fiscal basics. He caused to be mopped the Malaysian ringgit overseas so as rendering it to be non legal tender. The ringgit poured back into the country. As incentive, he even chose not to tax anyone who brought back huge sums of money into the country. He then disallowed capital outflow.*

Menurut Md. Shukri Shuib (Berita Harian, 11 Disember 2008), menerusi model Mahathiriskonomism, wujud keberkesanan yang efektif dalam pengurusan stress ekonomi, dan ini dibuktikan dengan keupayaan aplikasi model Mahathiriskonomism di Malaysia. Menerusi aplikasi Mahathiriskonomism, ia telah melonjakkan pertumbuhan Malaysia dari -7.5 peratus pada 1997 dengan pertumbuhan sebanyak 13.3 peratus kepada 5.8 peratus pada 1999. Pertumbuhan itu mengulangi kejayaan pimpinan Tun Dr. Mahathir semasa menangani krisis ekonomi 1985 dengan kadar pertumbuhan mencecah -1 peratus kepada 1.2 peratus (1986) dan 8.7 peratus (1988).

Krisis ekonomi 1997/98 belaku secara mengejut bagi Malaysia dan menerusi proses pemulihan dilaksanakan kerajaan, ia berjaya dilakukan dengan pantas kerana wujudnya polisi yang dijanakan oleh pengurusan Malaysia sendiri (Mahani, 2002:267). Dr. Mahathir berjaya memahami situasi yang berlaku dan cepat bertindak ke arah penyelesaian krisis. Malaysia dibawah pentadbiran diketuai Dr. Mahathir berjaya menyediakan negara dengan kaedah tersendiri penyelesaian krisis ekonomi tanpa perlu mengikut terma dan syarat yang ditawarkan IMF melalui kaedah pemulihan ekonomi yang disediakan (Mahani, 2002:253), ini menunjukkan dengan jelas dan tepat bahawa pendekatan Mahathiriskonomism adalah satu kaedah unik dalam membantu pemulihan negara dari krisis ekonomi yang melanda.

Dapat dikenalpasti bahawa wujud beberapa ciri asas kepada pemikiran Mahathir di dalam penentuan sesuatu keputusan, menurut Adnan Alias (2003; Md. Shukri, 2007; Md.Shukri Shuib, Mohamad Faisol Keling dan Mohd Na'eim Ajis, 2008), asas pemikiran Mahathir tersebut adalah meliputi elemen pemikiran yang merangkumi aspek-aspek berikut:-

1. Kembali kepada asas, iaitu menyoal fundalmental dan mencari penjelasan paling mudah kepada sesuatu masalah

2. Menongkah arus, suatu berbekalkan kefahaman kuat tentang fundamental, beliau berani mengutarakan idea yang jelas berbeza dari sedia ada atau tidak bersifat konvensional semasa.

3. Membuat keputusan betul, yakni sifat ini terterap sebagai sifat usahawan yang berjaya dan setiap keputusan yang dijanakan adalah juga berpaksikan kepada tidak hanya bersifat betul atau terbaik tetapi ianya lebih menekankan kepada elemen bahawa keputusan yang dilakukan adalah perlu direalisasikan sehingga membuahkan hasil.

Langkah Mahathirikonomisme dalam penyelesaian krisis ekonomi 197/98 dapat dilihat secara ketara menerusi langkah-langkah berikut:-

1. Mahathir mengambil alih posisi sebagai Menteri Kewangan dan mengawal keseluruhan fungsi penting sistem ekonomi dan kewangan negara. Konsep perdana menteri sebagai menteri kewangan mula menjadi tradisi dalam sistem eksekutif di Malaysia sejak 1998 hingga kini.

2. Pemusatan proses pembuatan keputusan secara kolektif dengan penubuhan sebuah majlis tindakan khusus iaitu Majlis Tindakan Ekonomi Negara (MTEN) bersama kewujudan Pelan Pemulihan Ekonomi Negara (PPEN). Ini adalah langkah penginstitusian yang menguasai langkah ekonomi yang diambil kerajaan.Kawalan modal dan penetapan kadar tukaran mata wang asing berbanding RM adalah satu senjata utama yang berjaya di formulasikan dengan berkesan. Langkah ini seolah menyimpan deposit asing untuk jangka masa tertentu dan mengelakkan pengunduran dana asing secara mendadak dari pasaran kewangan Malaysia. Ia membantu per unjuran wang dan dana sedia ada dalam pasaran oleh kerajaan.

3. Penggabungan bank serta kewujudan insitusi insuran pendeposit mewujudkan keyakinan pasaran awam kepada institusi kewangan semasa.

4. Kewujudan Dana Harta dan Dana Modal sebagai langkah pro aktif melindungi modal dan harta peniaga di Malaysia dari jatuh ke tangan asing telah memberi kesan nasionalisme ekonomi yang positif.

Oleh itu, konsep dan pendekatan Mahathiriskonomism ini merupakan satu kerangka yang universal dan mampu diaplikasikan di dalam semua lapangan pendekatan pembangunan bukan sahaja di Malaysia, namun ia mampu memberikan model

kepada negara-negara ekonomi sedang membangun termasuk juga kepada dunia maju sendiri.

Kaedah Aplikasi Mahathiriskonomism Semasa Berhadapan Krisis Ekonomi

Pengukuhan Kewibawaan Kepimpinan Kerajaan

Semasa berlaku krisis ekonomi, Malaysia memerlukan kepimpinan yang berani dan Dr. Mahathir telah berjaya melakukan yang terbaik dalam kepimpinannya mengharungi krisis yang melanda. Ini menunjukkan peranan Dr. Mahathir sebagai pemimpin yang tepat semasa Malaysia dilanda krisis menjadi satu angkubah penting dalam penyelesaian krisis (Mahani, 2002: 253).

Menurut Ahmad Faiz Abdul Hamid (Johan, 2010), Dr. Mahathir lebih mengamalkan proses pembuatan keputusan yang dinamakan "top-*down process*", di mana kehadiran kepimpinan dalam proses membuat keputusan itu dapat dirasai kewujudannya secara lebih dominan. Secara asasnya, pembinaan dasar di Malaysia ditentukan oleh beberapa angkubah dan angkubah ini juga kekal sama pengaruhnya di era pentadbiran Dr. Mahathir sebagai Perdana Menteri, angkubah itu ialah meliputi aspek sejarah, luaran, dalaman dan juga faktor idiosinkritik atau wibawa ketokohan (*idiosyncratic*) (Johan, 2010: 201).

Mana-mana negara yang sedang berhadpaan dengan pergolakan termasuk dalam soal kemelut ekonomi haruslah mempunyai pemimpin yang dinamik bagi memulihkan keadaan dan membina semula keyakinan serta memimpin ke arah hala tuju penyelesaian (Mahani, 2002: 253). Mahani (2002: 253) menyatakan bahawa semasa berlaku krisis ekonomi, Malaysia memerlukan kepimpinan yang berani dan Dr. Mahathir telah berjaya melakukan yang terbaik dalam kepimpinannya mengharungi krisis yang melanda. Ini menunjukkan peranan Dr. Mahathir sebagai pemimpin yang tepat semasa Malaysia dilanda krisis menjadi satu angkubah penting dalam penyelesaian krisis.

Terdapat dua faktor utama di kategorikan Dhillon (2008; Johan, 2010) dalam perkiraan Dr. Mahathir menjana polisi negara, iaitu faktor dalaman (domestic) dan faktor luaran (external), dan ini menjadikan elemen idiosinkritik (*idiosyncracies*) atau kewibawaan ketokohan Dr. Mahathir itu sendiri memberi kesan besar terhadap pembinaan dasar serta polisi yang kukuh bagi Malaysia berhadapan dengan masyarakat Malaysia dan antarabangsa.

Johan (2010: 184) menyatakan bahawa Dr. Mahathir telah membawa elemen dikenali sebagai 'iconoclasm' sebagai elemen peneraju terhadap pembikinan dasar di Malaysia yang berkisar terhadap wawasan yang beliau sendiri janakan. Penggubalan dasar dan pengubah suaian sesuatu polisi adalah menjadi satu keutamaan di era Dr. Mahathir dengan mengambil kira beberapa aspek seperti perubahan era dengan mengambil kira aspek yang tidak dapat dielakkan seperti globalisasi. Sesuatu dasar di Malaysia yang dijanakan juga mengambil kira peranan kepimpinan Dr. Mahathir yang berwatak agresif dalam mencapai matlamat kepentingan nasional (Johan, 2010: 185). Ini disebutkan Dhillon (2008) sebagai *Mahathir's idiosyncracies*.

Pada era Dr. Mahathir sebagai perdana menteri, gaya pentadbiran beliau secara ilmiahnya dikategorikan sebagai *authoritarian capitalist political regime* bagi memenuhi *authoritarian capitalist political regime* dan ianya dilakukan adalah bagi disesuaikan dengan cabaran baru pasca perang dingin, pendekatan Dr Mahathir digambarkan "*seeking its "neo-mercantilist" niche in the rapidly changing international division of labour of a post- Cold War regional and global political*" *realignment* (Johan, 2010: 185).

Dr. Mahathir berjaya memahami situasi yang berlaku dan cepat bertindak ke arah penyelesaian krisis. Malaysia dibawah pentadbiran diketuai Dr. Mahathir berjaya menyediakan negara dengan kaedah tersendiri penyelesaian krisis ekonomi tanpa perlu mengikut terma dan syarat yang ditawarkan IMF melalui kaedah pemulihan ekonomi yang disediakan. Dr. Mahathir sanggup mengadakan penerangan awam ke serata Malaysia sepanjang Julai 1998 bagi menerangkan situasi yang berlaku akibat krisis ekonomi yang melanda negara kepada pemimpin dan rakyat untuk difahami. Selain dari perhimpunan rakyat, Dr. Mahathir juga bertemu dengan kebanyakan pemimpin, menjelajah serata bandar sebelum langkah seterusnya dilakukan bagi menangani krisis ekonomi terutamanya apabila kawalan modal dan matawang hendak dilaksanakan kerajaan (Mahani, 2002:253).

Jomo (2007) membahagikan era pentadbiran Tun Dr Mahathir kepada tiga fasa, iaitu:-

i) fasa pembangunan industri berat (heavy industrialization) (1981-1985),

ii) fasa liberalisasi ekonomi (1986-1997) dan seterusnya

iii) fasa pengurusan krisis (crisis management) (1997-2003).

Menurut Jomo (2007; Johan, 2010:299), pentadbiran Tun Dr Mahathir sebagai Perdana Menteri Malaysia pada tahun 1997 hingga tahun 2003 disebutkan sebagai fasa "pengurusan krisis" (*crisis management*, 1997-2003). Krisis ekonomi 1997/98 memberikan kesan pengucapan ke atas agenda mentransformasikan politik ekonomi Malaysia, dan ianya juga memberikan kesan yang sama ke atas kebanyakkan negara Asia Tenggara (Johan, 2010:300).

Menurut Johan Saravanamuttu (2010: 335), semasa pentadbiran Tun Mahathir, kesan kegawatan ekonomi yang turut sama berlaku serentak dengan pemecatan Anwar Ibrahim telah juga memberikan kesan kepada hubungan antarabangsa, termasuk mengeruhkan hubungan baik Malaysia-Washington di era pentadbiran George W. Bush. Sekaligus menunjukkan secara khusus bahawa peristiwa krisis ekonomi yang berlaku pada 1997/98 memberikan impak hubungan antarabangsa kepada Malaysia.

Mahani (2002:253-255) menggariskan beberapa faktor penting dalam aspek kepimpinan yang membawa kejayaan Dr. Mahathir sebagai pengurus yang baik dalam menyelesaikan krisis ekonomi 1997/98. Antara faktor-faktor itu ialah:-

1. Legitimasi
2. Kemahiran berfikir secara strategic (*strategic thinking skill*)
3. Visi dan misi (*vision and mission*)
4. Rekod pencapaian yang terbukti (*proven track record*)
5. Pengorganisasian mekanisme pengurusan krisis (*Organisation of Crisis Response Machinery*)

Polisi atau dasar sesebuah pentadbiran negara perlulah bersesuai dengan era pelaksanaannya, berasaskan permintaan dan juga diperlukan oleh masyarakat (Mahani, 2002: 267). Antara angkubah perubahan ekonomi negara dari kesan negatif krisis ekonomi ke arah pertumbuhan yang semakin pulih dilihat dari perkembangan pasaran positif di sektor penjualan kenderaan. Pada Oktober 1997, jualan kenderaan sebanyak 41,500 buah kepada hanya 12,000 unit pada Januari 1998 iaitu susutan sebanyak 71 peratus. Pasaran kenderaan dalam negara terus statik pada jumlah berkenaan sehingga September 1998. Peningkatan jualan mula berlaku pada Oktober 1998 dengan jumlah jualan sebanyak 14,000 unit, dan terus meningkat mencecah jumlah jualan sebanyak 20,000 unit pada Disember 1998 sehingga ia mencecah 25,000 unit setiap bulan pada penghujung 1999 (Mahani, 2002: 184).

Memantapkan Pendekatan Keberdikarian (Self-Suffience) dan Pertahanan Menyeluruh

Dalam konteks Malaysia, sejak 1970, kerajaan telah mengambil pendekatan self-suffience sebagai sebahagian daripada langkah negara menghadapi sebarang perubahan di peringkat global. Pengamalan pendekatan *self-suffience* dilakukan Malaysia membabitkan dalam hal dasar industri dan proses industrilisasi negara serta juga dalam mengadakan kerjasama di peringkat antarabangsa dalam mempertahankan kepentingan nasional. Kenyataan mengenai tindakan kerajaan Malaysia mengutamakan dasar nasional dan antarabangsa dengan disesuaikan menerusi adaptasi realism dan *self-suffience* dinyatakan pertama kali secara langsung pada persidangan tahunan IMF dan IBRD oleh Menteri Kewangan pada ketika itu (Johan, 2010: 131).

Aspek pembangunan di Malaysia dilihat sebagai sebahagian elemen dalam aspek keselamatan menyeluruh (*comprehensive security*) negara dan menjadi tema utama kepada kerajaan, dan ianya telah dinyatakan oleh Datuk Musa Hitam pada 1984 (Mohd Yusof, 1990: 144). Tun Dr. Mahathir berpendirian bahawa di Malaysia eleman ketahanan negara dilihat bukan semata berasaskan kepada kekuatan ketenteraan. Bagi Dr. Mahathir, elemen awal pertahanan ialah ketahanan nasional (*national resilience*) (Mohd Yusof, 1990:144). Pernyataan Dr. Mahathir tersebut dapat dilihat jelas menerusi ucapannya pada majlis pembukaan Global Community Forum di Kuala Lumpur pada Disember 1984 yang menyatakan:-

> *We in Malaysia believe that the first line of defence of any country is not its military capability. The first line of defence is its national resilience and in shaping a strategic enviroment where threats are minimised* (Mohd Yusof, 1990; *The Star*, 4 Disember 1984)*.*

Nordin Sophiee menyatakan bahawa di Malaysia, elemen memperkasakan perpaduan nasional, keharmonian kaum, keselamatan sosial, kestabilan politik beserta dengan pertumbuhan ekonomi dilihat sebagai elemen keselamatan negara (Mohd Yusof, 1990: 145). Untuk itu, usaha mempertingkatkan tahap pembangunan dan sekaligus memberikan rakyat peluang menikmati tahap kehidupan (*living standards*) yang lebih baik diutamakan kepimpinan Malaysia sebagai salah satu strategi keselamatan negara (Mohd Yusof, 1990: 145; *The Star*, 14 Disember 1984).

Untuk itu, melihat pembangunan sebagai salah satu strategi kepimpinan Malaysia di era Dr. Mahathir sebagai satu elemen penting yang amatlah perlu.

Melakukan Proses Mahathirisasi Kepimpinan

Mahathiriskonomism juga berasaskan kepada tindakan Mahathirisasi. Mahathirisasi kepimpinan secara jelas adalah tindak balas Dr Mahathir dalam mendepani krisis ekonomi 1997/98 yang melanda negara ketika itu adalah mengambil kira aspek ekonomi dan politik secara bersama. Aspek ekonomi dan politik tidak dapat dipisahkan. Ini menunjukkan dengan jelas bahawa peranan Dr Mahathir dalam pengurusan situasi semasa krisis ekonomi sedang melanda Malaysia mengambil berat terhadap keseimbangan antara impak politik dan ekonomi dalam proses mengurus serta melaksanakan kerangka tindakan yang bersesuaian dengan situasi Malaysia. Menurut Sivamurugan Pandian (2005: 116), kesan krisis ekonomi yang berlaku telah menyebabkan berlakunya ketegangan politik. Ia memberikan kesan ketara dan merubah aspek suasana kepimpinan politik dalam negara hingga membawa kepada pemecatan Anwar Ibrahim yang pada ketika itu Timbalan Perdana Menteri yang juga merangkap Menteri Kewangan, di mana pemecatan Anwar itu turut melibatkan jawatan sebagai Timbalan Presiden UMNO yang disandangnya, selain tindakan pelucutan keahlian UMNO yang dilakukan atas keputusan yang dicapai dalam mesyuarat Majlis Tertinggi UMNO pada September 1998 (Sivamurugan Pandian, 2005: 121), ini kerana Anwar kelihatan bersedia untuk memberikan kerjasama dan menyokong dasar IMF yang cuba diperkenalkan di Malaysia dan rantau Asia Tenggara ini (Sivamurugan Pandian, 2005).

Mahathirisasi di era menghadapi krisis ekonomi 1997/98 dapat juga diamati menerusi pengamatan Jomo (2004) bahawa sejak Julai 1997, terdapat beberapa fasa dan keadaan yang rumit dalam aspek perbincangan mengenai krisis ekonomi yang melanda Malaysia. Pada fasa awal krisis, berlaku perubahan perhubungan antara aspek 'high politics' dengan aspek pengurusan krisis. Bahkan menerusi pendekatan yang dilaksanakan semasa menangani krisis ekonomi sejak Julai 1997 hingga September 1998, kelihatan jelas ketidak serasian di antara Mahathir selaku Perdana Menteri dan Anwar yang merupakan Timbalan Perdana Menteri merangkap Menteri Kewangan pada ketika itu. Umum mengetahui bahawa berlakunya pendekatan berbeza dalam soal dasar ekonomi dalam usaha menangani krisis ekonomi yang melanda (Jomo, 2004). Menurut Jomo (2004), krisis politik yang

melanda Malaysia sejak September 1998 adalah berkaitan langsung dengan kesan krisis ekonomi 1997-98 yang melanda Malaysia. Ini bermakna krisis ekonomi 1997-98 juga membawa dimensi krisis politik di antara tokoh politik dalam kerajaan, dan ini juga menarik perhatian Zaherawati et. all (2010) yang menyimpulkan pandangan bahawa disebalik berlakunya krisis ekonomi ini, maka pertelingkahan antara Dr. Mahathir dan Anwar menyebabkan berlakunya ketidakstabilan dalam arena politik di kala negara sedang berhadapan krisis ekonomi ini.

Secara signifikannya, perhubungan elemen ekonomi dan politik jelas memberikan satu huraian yang jelas betapa unsur itu memberikan signifikasi utama dalam penerusan aspek kepimpinan dan keutuhan legasi pemerintahan. Hubungan ekonomi-politik mempunyai hubungan resiprokal dalam membantu memberikan kekuatan kepada aspek kepimpinan dan ianya merupakan elemen yang sangat penting bagi membantu dalam kepimpinan terus menjana sokongan dan meneruskan legitimasi sesuatu rejim pemerintahan negara.

Menurut Hwang (2003: 280), telah berlaku pertentangan pandangan antara Dr Mahathir dan Anwar Ibrahim dalam menangani krisis ekonomi yang melanda Malaysia. Dr Mahathir lebih menyalahkan faktor luaran sebagai penyebab kepada berlakunya gugatan ekonomi menerusi kejatuhan nilai RM di pasaran mata wang antarabangsa, serta cenderung kepada usaha melonggarkan polisi mata wang dan fiskal negara bertujuan bagi menggalakkan serta meningkatkan kadar pertumbuhan serta mengelakkan kedudukan ekonomi dari terjebak ke kancah kemelesetan. Barry Wain (2009:277) melihat tindakan pemecatan Anwar dari kerajaan sehari selepas Dr Mahathir melaksanakan kawalan modal dalam menangani krisis ekonomi yang berlaku dilihat signifikan bahawa wujud pertentangan pendapat antara mereka berdua. Sebaliknya, Anwar yang merupakan Timbalan Perdana Menteri merangkap menteri kewangan Malaysia pada ketika itu pula lebih berfokus kepada masalah dalaman yang dihadapi sebagai punca berlakunya krisis ekonomi yang melanda negara. Anwar juga cenderung kepada langkah mengetatkan kawalan kepada polisi mata wang dan mengambil langkah yang dicadangkan oleh IMF (Hwang, 2003). Pada ketika itu juga, Anwar dan para penyokongnya mengkritik pembangunan yang dilaksanakan kerajaan yang dikenali dengan istilah 'projek mega' dan mengkritik gaya pengurusan Dr Mahathir pada ketika itu sebagai kurang telus dalam soal penswastaan perniagaan milik negara, dan wujud 'patronage' yang dikatakan Anwar sebagai memenuhi kehendak Dr Mahathir (Hwang, 2003: 281), media asing melihat

bahawa pertentangan dalam soal menguruskan polisi ekonomi dalam mengatasi krisis ekonomi 1997/98 tersebut adalah penyebab utama berlakunya pertentangan antara kedua pemimpin kerajaan pada ketika itu iaitu antara Dr Mahathir dan Anwar. Ia ketara berlangsung sejak pertengahan tahun 1997 hinggalah membawa kepada pemecatan Anwar dari kerajaan dan UMNO pada September 1998 (Hwang, 2003: 281). Langkah diambil Dr Mahathir ini seolah satu usaha menunjukkan bahawa Anwarisasi ke atas Malaysia berjaya di atasi dengan memperlihatkan agenda Mahathirisasi sebagai satu kaedah kepada Mahathiriskonomism dalam mengatasi krisis ekonomi ketika itu.

Secara rumusannya, Sivamurugan Pandian (2005) jelas menegaskan bahawa kedua-dua elemen politik dan ekonomi adalah unsur yang saling perlu-memerlukan antara satu sama lain dalam membina jaminan kukuh terhadap kesinambungan kuasa. Pengukuhan kuasa dalam konteks menghadapi pembinaan pentadbiran dan pengurusan krisis yang berkesan, maka proses Mahathirisasi politik-ekonomi yang dilakukan oleh Dr Mahathir jelas menjadikan ianya sebagai elemen Mahathiriskonomism.

Nilai Nasionalisme Kepimpinan

Langkah dan tindakan yang dilaksanakan oleh Dr Mahathir dan pentadbiran yang diketuai beliau semasa menghadapi ancaman kesan dari krisis ekonomi yang melanda dibuat juga berasaskan kepada beberapa aspek penting, seperti yang dinyatakan Sivamurugan Pandian (2005), eksperimen dasar yang bercorakkan IMF telah menyebabkan kedudukan atau kondisi ekonomi domestik di Malaysia dilihat tidak berganjak dan ianya juga tidak membantu dalam mendapatkan serta memulihkan sokongan pasaran dalam kerangka mengatasi masalah yang menimpa Malaysia ketika krisis ekonomi 1997/98 tersebut. Untuk itu, pada ketika merangka pelan tindakan mengatasi krisis ekonomi yang melanda ketika itu, maka elemen nasionalisme dan sikap anti-Amerika Syarikat termasuk IMF menyebabkan Dr Mahathir memikirkan alternatif yang perlu dilaksana bersesuaian dengan keadaan semasa negara. Ini sekaligus mengesahkan bahawa secara nyata, elemen pengurusan semasa menghadapi krisis ekonomi yang melanda Malaysia dirangka sendiri oleh idea dan kecekapan pemikiran serta pengurusan cara Malaysia tanpa perlu terjebak dengan belenggu syarat ketat oleh pihak IMF dan institusi Barat. Elemen sifat kebangsaan atau cintakan negara yang juga disebutkan sebagai

nasionalis jelas menjadi elemen mempengaruhi proses pembuatan keputusan di dalam konteks penyelesaian krisis ekonomi dan pengurusan ekonomi serta politik di Malaysia ketika itu oleh Dr Mahathir.

Dalam menghadapi kemelut ekonomi yang tidak menentu ketika itu, Dr Mahathir pada 9 Januari 1998 mengetengahkan beberapa kaedah yang difikirkan perlu bagi rakyat bersama kerajaan laksanakan bagi membantu menghadapi krisis ekonomi yang melanda negara. Kaedah ini menunjukkan komitmen kebangssaan yang jitu secara khusus tersirat di dalam cara pengurusan Dr Mahathir. Langkah yang dicadangkan ini lebih kepada apalikasi pendidikan nasionalisme semasa krisis kepada rakyat untuk diterapkan dalam kehidupan. Kaedah-kaedah itu ialah (Massa, 17-23 Januari 1998):-

i.   Meyakini ringgit dan pasaran saham negara

ii.   Menabung lebih banyak

iii.   Mengurangkan bahan import

iv.   Pendeposit harus tidak bimbang

v.   Membeli saham

vi.   Memahami situasi ekonomi

vii.   Suri rumah perlu berdisiplin

viii.   Memiliki wang perlu dibelanjakan, tetapi perlu bijak

ix.   Jual gelang tangan kalau tak perlu

x.   Jangan simpan duit bawah bantal

xi.   Tak salah makan marjerin ganti mentega

xii.   Jual harta di luar negara

xiii.   Sanggup terima pendapatan lebih rendah

xiv.   Kukuh semangat hadapi cabaran

xv.   Didik anak belanja berhemat

Semangat nasionalisme atau betapa jelas sikap kebangsaan Dr Mahathir dapat diperlihatkan dengan pernyataan beliau bahawa Malaysia berjaya keluar daripada kolonialisme baru yang beliau dapati dilakukan menerusi manipulasi pasaran kewangan yang membawa kesan buruk kepada Malaysia. Usaha dilaksanakan Dr Mahathir jelas berjaya mengekalkan autonomi tersendiri bagi Malaysia dalam pasaran ekonomi antarabangsa ketika menghadapi krisis yang berlaku (Sivamurugan Pandian, 2005:120). Pencapaian Dr Mahathir dalam

menguruskan krisis ekonomi 1997/98 yang melanda Malaysia juga mendapat pengiktirafan global dan dibanggakan sebagai satu pencapaian orang Muslim sedunia (Sivamurugan Pandian, 2005:122), dan organisasi kewangan Islam Amerika telah memberikan satu anugerah 'pencapaian seumur hidup' kepada Dr Mahathir atas kejayaan mengatasi krisis ekonomi yang melanda, serta melambangkan supaya corak kepimpinan sebegini menjadi contoh kepada kepimpinan lain.

Memperkukuhkan Model Pertumbuhan Ekonomi

Model pembangunan dan pengurusan yang kukuh membantu sesebuah negara maju dan terpimpin pelaksanaan polisi serta kemajuannya. Sejak 1993-1997, Malaysia telah merekodkan pertumbuhan ekonomi yang tinggi, dan berjaya mengekalkan dasar fiskal negara di tahap lebihan (*surplus*) (Ariff, 2009; Goh dan Michael, 2010). Apabila sahaja terjadinya krisis ekonomi 1997/98, maka Malaysia mula mengalami bajet defisit yang bertujuan bagi meransang kedudukan ekonomi supaya berkembang, dan ini berterusan sehingga kini (Goh dan Michael, 2010). Ini menunjukkan bahawa kesan dari kejadian krisis ekonomi 1997/98 memberikan impak ketara dari segi perancangan pembangunan dan mempengaruhi bajet kerajaan sehingga wujud keperluan mengadakan bajet defisit bagi tujuan pemulihan dan merancakkan pertumbuhan ekonomi negara. Walaupun negara berhadapan dengan bajet defisit, namun, ianya tidak melibatkan aspek seperti pinjaman asing yang banyak dan juga tidak sama sekali melibatkan cetakan wang bagi pembiayaan kerajaan, tetapi ianya dilaksanakan secara berhemah menerusi pinjaman bersumberkan dana dalam negara kerana kedudukan tahap simpanan wang bagi penduduk di Malaysia berada pada kedudukan yang tinggi, ianya membolehkan institusi yang wujud di Malaysia sendiri berupaya memberikan pinjaman kepada kerajaan dalam bentuk sekuriti yang terjamin (Goh dan Michael, 2010)

Ramon V. Navaratnam (1997: 123) secara jelas mengaitkan faktor kepimpinan yang bersesuaian (leadership ideals) dengan keupayaan untuk membantu Malaysia dalam menghadapi krisis ekonomi adalah merupakan satu faktor terpenting. Di Malaysia, dari sudut politiknya, Malaysia bertuah kerana mempunyai pemimpin yang berdaya saing serta sesuai dengan zaman. Dari sudut perniagaan, kepimpinan negara dilihat sebagai tokoh yang mampu membawa kesesuaian dan penerimaan baik dari kalangan kakitangan awam serta juga para ahli perniagaan, dan ini menunjukkan bahawa setiap perdana menteri Malaysia

memiliki daya kepimpinan yang sesuai dengan situasi negara (Navaratnam, 1997: 123-124). Navaratnam (1997: 7) juga kerapkali menyebutkan betapa bertuahnya Malaysia kerana dalam setiap pengurusan ekonomi negara, peranan Perdana Menteri dan Menteri Kewangan dilihat menjadi faktor peneraju utama dalam memastikan keseimbangan fiskal yang kukuh dan disiplin pengurusan kewangan negara tercapai dengan baik.

Schuman (2009: 245) menegaskan bahawa pendekatan Dr Mahathir banyak dipengaruhi oleh pendekatan dan pengamalan pembangunan yang diamalkan oleh Jepun dan Korea Selatan. Menerusi pendekatan yang dikenali sebagai 'model asia' yang dipelopori Jepun telah juga diadaptasi oleh Dr Mahathir dalam konteks Malaysia bagi memberikan satu model yang menggambarkan hubungan kesaling bergantungan antara kerajaan dan perniagaan dalam sistem ekonomi negara dengan istilah "Malaysia Inc" atau "Pensyarikatan Malaysia". Pendekatan yang dilaksanakan Malaysia pada pentadbiran Dr Mahathir secara jelas adalah berkaitan rapat dengan personaliti Dr Mahathir sendiri (Schuman, 2009: 245). Secara kesimpulannya, model pembangunan Malaysia adalah berasaskan kepada kekuatan Dr Mahathir dalam memberikan inspirasi dan hala tuju hingga membolehkan beberapa model dan dasar pembangunan Malaysia diperkenalkan pada era pentadbiran beliau. Schuman (2009) menyifatkan Dr Mahathir dalam penulisan beliau sebagai '*leaders of Miracle*' (pemimpin ajaib) dan menyatakan Dr Mahathir bukan sahaja seorang nasionalis tetapi juga merupakan aktivis Melayu. Hujahan Schuman (2009:246) itu memperjelaskan bahawa Dr Mahathir ini seorang yang berprinsip yang kuat berpegang dengan usaha kuat bagi membawa Malaysia berubah kepada sebuah negara berdaya saing yang maju. Dr Mahathir berjaya membawa Malaysia sebagai sebuah negara Islam di dunia yang berbeza dengan lain-lain negara Islam di mana Malaysia sebagai sebuah negara yang didominasi secara majoritinya oleh umat Islam tetapi memiliki keupayaan ekonomi yang mapan serta mampu mendepani kemajuan dan diiktiraf peringkat antarabangsa (Schuman, 2009:247).

Menurut Dhillon (2009: 95), kejayaan Malaysia yang diistilahkan sebagai '*Malaysian miracle*' dicapai menerusi 'formula Mahathir' yang dilaksanakan menerusi pelbagai dimensi usaha termasuklah dalam aspek memodenkan negara, pengindustrialisasi, keterbukaan atau liberalisasi serta penswastaan dalam aspek pembangunan dan pertumbuhan ekonomi negara. Bahkan Dhillon (2009) turut

menegaskan bahawa aspek polisi serta dasar yang dijalankan Malaysia pada era kepimpinan Dr Mahathir juga banyak tertumpu kepada penumpuan usaha kepada aspek pembangunan.

Mahathiriskonomism dalam Pentadbiran Malaysia semasa mengatasi Krisis Ekonomi menerusi Majlis Tindakan Ekonomi Negara (MTEN)

Dalam konteks Malaysia wujud perkaitan yang rapat antara kerangka politik Malaysia dengan pengurusan krisis kewangan yang berlaku. Kekuatan kepimpinan politik Malaysia menjadi asas kukuh kepada kejayaan mengurus krisis ekonomi dengan lebih mantap, dan situasi ini tidak dimilik Filipina dan juga Thailand. Kedudukan institusi di Malaysia termasuk dalam aspek kestabilan kepimpinan politik menambahkan keyakinan pengurusan krisis ekonomi walaupun polisi yang dilaksanakan itu bersifat fleksible tetapi ianya tetap memiliki tindakan yang kukuh dengan halatuju yang jelas. Menurut MacIntyre (2001), dalam penulisannya bertajuk *institutions and investors: the politics of economic crisis in southeast asia* menyatakan bahawa politik mempunyai perkaitan dengan krisis ekonomi, dan teori institutional dikemukakan sebagai asas, dan di Malaysia menerusi Mahathiriskonomism yang mengambil langkah meMahathirisasikan pengurusan kerajaan dan juga pendekatan semasa pengurusan krisis ekonomi, ia menunjukkan dengan jelas bahawa kepimpinan dan juga keterlibatan politik dalam menangani krisis ekonomi adalah jelas. Ciri yang dinyatakan MacIntyre (2001) iaitu dengan tidak berlaku penarikan semula polisi kerajaan telah menyakinkan pelabur dan peniaga di pasaran. Ini menunjukkan betapa pengukuhan institusi yang jelas berkait antara elemen politik dan ekonomi sebagai mekanisme pengurusan dan badan bertindak adalah penting bagi menghadapi krisis ekonomi yang dilalui sesebuah negara. Kecekapan kepimpinan dan pengurusan negara dikendalikan ahli politik kerajaan adalah elemen penting. Pemantapan institusi juga satu Akedah digunapakai Dr Mahathir semassa krisis ekonomi. Langkah pentadbiran pengurusan ekonomi era Dr Mahathir menangani kegawatan ekonomi 1997/98 dengan mengadakan satu badan penasihatan dan tindakan pengurusan ekonomi negara. Penubuhan Majlis Tindakan Ekonomi Negara (MTEN) dijadikan platform sebagai badan perunding kepada Jemaah Menteri (*cabinet*) bagi tujuan menyediakan kerangka pengurusan ekonomi negara semasa gawat. Justeru, agenda Mahathiriskonomism juga telah bertindak secara kolektif dan bukan bersifat individualis semata, tetapi bersifat kolektifism.

Secara tersiratnya, bagi saya, MTEN ditubuhkan sebagai satu sumber kuasa yang luas dalam mendapatkan maklum balas dari segenap kementerian dan agensi, menyediakan daya pemikiran, membina polisi serta mengarahkan tindakan dan menilai kesan tindakan kepada kedudukan semasa ekonomi negara. Ianya adalah satu Majlis yang menjadi "kabinet khas" yang bukan sahaja dianggotai oleh menteri yang terpilih, tetapi melibatkan juga para birokrat terpenting negara bersama tokoh-tokoh penting di sektor korporat dan para ilmuan yang arif. MTEN ini secara jelas dikawal penuh oleh Perdana Menteri selaku Pengerusi Majlis iaitu Dr Mahathir Mohamad. Jadi, ianya adalah satu "punca kuasa' yang khas dijanakan Dr Mahathir sebagai mekanisme profesional dalam "mencipta" formula khusus bagi memulihkan kedudukan ekonomi negara semasa krisis ekonomi 1997/98 melanda.

Dalam proses menangani kegawatan ekonomi dan melaksanakan pemulihan ekonomi, kerajaan semasa pemerintahan Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad telah berjaya bertindak balas terhadap krisis tersebut dan memperkenalkan sistem yang berlawanan seperti yang dipraktikkan oleh Thailand dan Indonesia yang menerima bantuan IMF. Pihak kerajaan bertindak menginstitusikan gerak kerja menangani kesan krisis dan melaksanakan formula khusus bagi egenda pemulihan ekonomi dengan menubuhkan MTEN pada 7 Januari 1998 untuk menguruskan krisis ekonomi dan mengurangkan jurang antara sektor kerajaan dan swasta. Penginstitusian gerak kerja menangani krisis ekonomi membolehkan struktur kuasa dan juga pengarahan kepada semua sektor untuk diaplikasi adalah satu langkah tepat kerana ia mendapat restu dan sokongan kukuh institusi Perdana Menteri dan Kerajaan Malaysia secara holistik. MTEN jelas berfungsi sebagai "kabinet professional" berbanding fungsi Kabinet sedia ada yang dianggotai ahli politik. MTEN adalah "kabinet professional" yang dianggotai pelbagai latar belakang kepakaran yang dipayungi oleh ahli politik yang jitu matlamatnya mahu membendung kesan negatif krisis ekonomi yang melanda ketika itu.

Langkah MTEN yang diperkenalkan oleh tindakan kepimpinan Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad dengan penghasilan satu kerangka tindakan di namakan sebagai Pelan Pemulihan Ekonomi Negara (PPEN) yang berorientasikan kepada usaha mengekalkan kestabilan kewangan, mengukuhkan asas ekonomi dan ekuiti di dapati berjaya dilaksanakan dengan berkesan. Hasil dari implementasi tersebut, ia berjaya mengeluarkan Malaysia dari krisis ekonomi tersebut dan pertumbuhan ekonomi negara pada tahun 1999 telah melonjak ke 6.1 peratus berbanding -7.4

peratus pada tahun 1998 (Wong Sulong, 2011). Duta dan Ketua Delegasi Kesatuan Eropah ke Malaysia, Vincent Pike telah mengiktiraf penyelesaian dan pendekatan yang dilaksanakan Malaysia ketika mengharungi krisis kewangan Asia pada tahun 1997/1998 (Che Wan Badrul, 2011). Malaysia berjaya mengharungi gugatan ekonomi dan juga berjaya mengekalkan kerajaan sedia ada semasa krisis ekonomi 1997/98 dan tidak berlaku *regime change* sepertimana berlaku ke atas negara-negara lain.

Tugas MTEN yang ditubuhkan pada era kepimpinan Tun Dr.Mahathir telah digunapakai sebagai satu platform yang berperanan menyediakan pelan tindakan komprehensif bagi memulihkan semula daya ekonomi negara dari terus dibadai kegawatan. MTEN dilihat sebagai satu badan pelaksana, pemantau dan penilaian negara (Hasmiah Kasimin, 2007: 214). Walaupun krisis ekonomi yang membadai negara pada 1997 telah berjaya dipulihkan, namun MTEN yang ditubuhkan pada masa gawat tahun 1997 berterusan fungsinya sepanjang pentabiran Tun Dr. Mahathir sehingga 31 Oktober 2003.

Menurut Hasmiah Kasimin (2007: 214), MTEN yang diwujudkan juga berperanan sebenarnya dalam melicinkan pengurusan sektor awam, proses birokrasi yang rumit dan berperingkat serta memakan masa panjang untuk kelulusan telah berjaya dipintas dan dikurangkan. Ini sekaligus mengefisyenkan pengurusan dan pelaksaan tindakan ransangan ekonomi bagi pemulihan semasa ekonomi dalam stress telah dapat dilakukan oleh pentadbiran Tun Dr. Mahathir. Harus disedari bahawa dalam usaha pemulihan ekonomi semasa gawat, proses birokrasi yang rumit dan memakan masa panjang serta tidak efisyen akan menyebabkan pembangunan tersekat dan penjanaan pasaran akan tidak dapat segera diaktifkan. Untuk itu, dalam hal pembangunan negara, resepi kejayaan Mahathiriskonomism juga dilihat atas sokongan penasihatan yang komprehensif dan berkualiti.

Sebagai langkah bagi menjadikan aktiviti pemulihan ekonomi yang efektif dan efisyen terutamanya dalam menjayakan pelaksanaan PPEN, pihak MTEN telah mengambil langkah seprti yang dinyatakan Hasmiah Kasimin (2007: 224; MTEN, 1998) telah menjemput menteri dan ketua-ketua bagi kerajaan setiap negeri di Malaysia untuk menghadiri mesyuarat penghasilan rangka program bagi pemulihan ekonomi, khususnya yang membabitkan hal-hal berkaitan kuasa negeri seperti tanah, pertanian dan sumber asas. Melalui MTEN, koordinasi permuafakatan dan komitmen bersama secara berpusat telah dapat dibina dalam usaha menangani

kesan kegawatan ekonomi dari terus membadai persekitaran geo ekonomi, politik dan sosial negara. Ini menunjukkan bahawa model pengurusan ekonomi diwujudkan sebagai penyelarasan dan juga buah fikiran bersama secara kolektif adalah penting dan sihat dalam menghadapi gugatan akibat krisis ekonomi yang berlaku.

Menerusi MTEN, dalam usaha membendung kegawatan ekonomi semasa krisis ekonomi 1997, satu kerangka pelan tindakan telah dijanakan. PPEN telah dirangka dan diluluskan oleh Jemaah Menteri sebagai satu pelan dan kerangka tindakan pemulihan ekonomi (Hasmiah Kasimin, 2007: 214). Enam matlamat utama PPEN dirangka adalah bagi (1) menstabilkan nilai ringgit, (2) mengembalikan keyakinan pasaran, (3) mengekalkan kestabilan pasaran kewangan, (4) Memperkukuh asas-asas ekonomi, (5) merancakkan semula sektor yang terjejas, dan ke enam, bagi meneruskan agenda ekuiti dan sosioekonomi.

Selain itu juga, dalam hal memastikan tahap kemiskinan negara terkawal, maka PPEN menerusi butiran yang terkandung dalam aspek kelima agendanya telah turut sama mencirikan beberapa langkah yang perlu diambil dalam memastikan struktur meneruskan agenda ekuiti dan sosioekonomi dapat dijayakan. Menurut Nor Aini Haji Idris (2007:248), sembilan agenda dibawah matlamat tersebut ialah

1. Menghapuskan kesulitan akibat kemiskinan
2. Mengatasi isu-isu berkaitan pemilikan ekuti bumiputera
3. Memperluas peluang pekerjaan
4. Memenuhi keperluan pelajaran tinggi yang pesat berkembang
5. Mengatasi masalah pengangguran siswazah
6. mengawal kemasukan pekerja asing
7. Membolehkan perbadanan-perbadanan negeri menghadapi krisis
8. Menyusun semula koperasi dan bank-bank
9. Melindungi alam sekitar bagi pembangunan yang berkekalan

Keberkesanan langkah dilaksanakan kerajaan menerusi MTEN jelas dapat dilihat secara jelas menerusi perkembangan kedudukan pasaran dan ekonomi Malaysia mula pulih dan pada tahun 2000, ekonomi negara mula mengalami pertumbuhan semula. Sejak krisis ekonomi yang melanda, proses pemulihan mula Nampak ketara, di mana paras pertumbuhan GDP telah mencatatkan purata 5.3 peratus dari 2001 hingga 2007. Walaupun ianya lebih rendah berbanding kadar pertumbuhan GDP sebelum krisis ekonomi berlaku, iaitu pada kadar purata 8.1 peratus dari tempoh 1990 hingga 1997, namun, ekonomi Malaysia yang pulih dan

berkembang telah memperlihatkan betapa proses pemulihan semula pasca krisis ekonomi 1997/98 berlaku dalam keadaan yang pantas dan cukup baik bagi mencapai tahap pertumbuhan yang tinggi (Mahani, 2009; Goh dan Michael, 2010).

Kesimpulan

Kejayaan Dr. Mahathir membawa Malaysia memulihkan negara pasca krisis ekonomi 1997/98 adalah satu formula yang penting dalam mengubah lanskap pengurusan ekonomi negara. Ia membuka perspektif baru dunia pengurusan politik-ekonomi antarabangsa dengan kejayaan Malaysia menangani krisis ekonomi tanpa perlu sandaran kebergantungan kuat terhadap institusi kewangan antarabangsa seperti IMF dan Bank Dunia. Ia membawa perbezaan, tetapi berjaya melakukan keajaiban. Elemen Mahathiriskonomism yang bercirikan Mahathirisasi dan gabungan kekuatan serta kewibawaan individu dan perundingan secara kolektif membawa impak formulasi yang berkesan kepada Malaysia era pemulihan kegawatan ekonomi 1997/98. Kini masih tidak terdapat dengan jelas pengkajian mengenai cara pengurusan Dr. Mahathir yang menjurus secara jitu peranan utama Dr. Mahathir itu sendiri sebagai tokoh yang memacukan pengurusan negara ke arah mencapai sasaran penyelesaian masalah krisis ekonomi yang berlaku. Ini perlukan kajian lanjutan berterusan oleh para akademia. Pandangan seringkali banyak tertumpu kepada dasar yang dilaksana, tanpa secara holistik menumpu sepenuhnya kepada aspek kepimpinan Dr. Mahathir secara khusus adalah perlu diperkemaskan. Hipotesis yang boleh dinyatakan hasil pengamatan kertas kerja ini, Dr Mahathir adalah pemimpin utama yang bertanggungjawab membawa kejayaan dengan memperkenal dan menggunakan dasar-dasar serta teori pengurusan dalam persekitaran politik ekonomi semasa bagi menyelamatkan Malaysia dari kesan tragis krisis ekonomi 1997/98. Kewujudan karya dan penyelidikan berkaitan Dr. Mahathir sebagai pencetus

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DISCOURSE ANALYSIS ON THE BUDGETARY DEBATES AMONG THE FEMALE MPS IN THE 12TH *DEWAN RAKYAT*: ISSUES AND MOTIVATION

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Abstract

This paper analyses the budget debates among the female MPs in the 12th *Dewan Rakyat* (the present Malaysian lower house). Budget session reckons as one of the most important sessions in the parliament as it is the blueprint for a country's socioeconomic policies each fiscal year. It is, therefore, the fundamental indicator of what government wanted to do and for what purposes. Thus, it is crucial to examine what issues have been raised by the female MPs during the budgetary sessions. Previous literature suggests that female MPs exerts more issues that are women friendly than the male MPs. Byusing critical discourse analysis, this paper also tries to understand the motivation behind each issue proposed by the female MPs. This paper provides insights into the *Dewan Rakyat* as an avenue for female MPs to exert dominance over feminist and social issues. This paper contributes to the literature on the use of critical discourse analysis in examining the issues raised during the budgetary sessions and the motivation behind the issues proposed.

Keywords: Discourse Analysis, Budgetary Debates, Women MPs, Parliament

Introduction

Women representation in the parliament is crucial in making the women voices heard. Women representatives are expected to represent women voices more dominantly as compared to male representatives. Previous studies have shown that women representatives contributed much in debating women issues in the parliament, providing female perspectives in certain issues and supporting policies that are women friendly. Hence, women representatives actions in parliament matter and it is the act of representing the women in general (Walsh, 2002).

Using the budgetary session in the 12th Malaysian Parliament, this paper seeks to investigate what are the issues proposed by the women MPs, and what are the motivation behind it. The budgetary session is crucial, as it is the session which the government cums the ruling parties, table the blueprint of financial planning for the whole nation in the next fiscal year. The financial allocation is crucial as it affects

the lives of the people. Thus, what issues projected during this session is significant. In specific, this paper seeks to answer the following research questions:

- What are the issues raised by female MPs during budget debates?
- What are the motivations behind the issues proposed by the female MPs?

This study adopted critical discourse analysis as to provide an in-depth of the parliamentary budget with emphasis on both the structure of texts and the social context in order to perceive issues and motivation during debates from April 2008 until November 2012 by women MPs in the Supply Bill, the budget of 2009 until 2013.

The Concept of Female Representation

Anne Phillips (1998) who introduced the "Politics of Presence," explains that, the identity of a representative is important. The representation will be more effective when it comes from the specific group itself, such as the indigenous groups, women or minorities. Only those who come from these groups are able to represent the needs, interests or problems within the group more effectively. They make effective advocates. Hence, in the parliament representation context, women are seen as more effective to represent their group (Curtin, 2008).

Hanna Fenichel Pitkin (1967), a theorist of representation, explained that substantive representation involves specific behavior and obligations, where the representative will act based on the expectations, needs or interests of those they represent like their own. Pitkin also said there is also a relationship between the representatives and represented. This opinion is also supported by other scholars of whom can be viewed through a statement made by Manon Tremblay (1998, p.436), namely:

> " ... The difference in perception between women and men is a result of the psycho-social development, socialization and gender roles are different, this is because women are discriminated against in society, then they will have a political agenda that is more friendly to women than men and will easily support fair perspective to the issues of social and political".

It can be clearly seen the importance of having women in political decision-making level as in the parliament or in any government bodies. This is to ensure that women's interests can be heard and used as input in the policy or the law. However, the number of women in the parliament or local government and political party

leadership are still at the low level. Therefore not only the visibility of women is vital in politics but the act of representing by the women MPs in the parliament is paramount. The effectiveness of the substantive representation helps to mainstream women's input and perspective in any policy making.

Previous studies have found that there are various constraints that encountered by women representatives in Parliament such as party discipline. Party discipline signifies a representative from a party must vote or express argument which does not contradict to the philosophy of struggle of that party (Fox, 1994). For example, a female senator in Canada legislature was being penalized when she pressed for the migrant issue which not in line with her political party policy (Mullen, 2006). In the *Dewan Rakyat* Malaysia, women MPs from the ruling party are not able to make objections outright when the men from their party issued sexist statement towards the women representatives from the opposition front. The consequences of not objecting had invited various criticisms from the public and the non-governmental organizations to the women MPs from the ruling parties. The women MPs stated that they did not support the statement but had to abide by the party discipline (Ummu Atiyah, 2014). In addition to the party discipline, there are also other constraints such as lack of exposure in terms of the debating procedure and the nature of women themselves, and ….. The studies in India and Pakistan have shown women that were less aggressive in the parliament. They are limited by the nature and local customs which sees politics as men's domain, while women rightful places are families and home. Male politicians are more aggressive politics and perceived as leaders (Minault, 1981).

Women Representation in Malaysia Parliament: An Overview

Since independence in 1957, the number of women representatives in the *Dewan Rakyat*, had started with a very low number with only 3 women elected. Gradually, the number increased slightly over double after 10 years, in the 70s. The 1990s had witnessed the number increased significantly and in the year 2000 and over, it slightly over 20 representatives. Nevertheless, the representation of women is much lower than male representatives as shown in the following Table I.

Table 1: Women in Parliament, the House of Representatives 1959-2013

Year	No. of Seats	No. of women nominated	No. of women elected	Percentage of Women (%)
1959	104	4	3	2.88
1964	104	7	3	2.88
1969	144	4	2	1.38
1974	154	9	5	3.24
1978	154	11	7	4.54
1982	154	8	8	5.19
1986	177	7	7	3.95
1990	180	15	11	6.11
1995	192	25	15	7.81
1999	193	30	20	10.36
2004	219	34	23	10.50
2008	222	45	23	10.36
2013	222	56	23	10.4

Source: Ummu Atiyah (2014: 103); IPU (2016)

Findings and Analysis

In the 12[th] *Dewan Rakyat,* there were 15 out of 23 women MPs took part in the budget debate over the term of the 12th Parliament. Table 2 shows their names, political affiliations and the year whereby the MPs were given a chance to participate in the debates which are in 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012, the 12[th] *Dewan Rakyat*. The table also showed that the ruling party had the highest number of women in the budget debates. In the opposition front, DAP has a relatively similar number women throughout the years and the party had the highest number of women as compared to other opposition coalition parties such as PKR and PAS. This can be perceived as the positive sign for political transformation in the country. The women MPs are more active and engage in the debates.

Table 2: Women MPs Who Involved in the 12th Parliamentary Budget Debate

Year/Party	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
BN	1. Tan Ah Eng 2. Nancy Shukri	1. Nancy Shukri 2. Noraini Ahmad 3. Tan Ah Eng 4. Halimah Sadique	1. Nancy Shukri 2. Tan Ah Eng 3. Noraini Ahmad 4. Azalina Othman Said	1. Azalina Othman Said 2. Nancy Shukri 3. Halimah Sadique 4. Noraini Ahmad 5. Linda Tsen 6. Tan Ah Eng	1. Linda Tsen 2. Nancy Shukri 3.Azalina Othman Said 4. Halimah Sadique 5. Noraini Ahmad 6. Tan Ah Eng
DAP	3. Fong Po Kuan 4. Teo Nie Ching 5. Teresa Kok 6. Chong Eng	5. Chong Eng 6. Fong Po Kuan 7. Teresa Kok 8. Teo Nie Ching	5. Chong Eng 6. Fong Po Kuan 7. Teresa Kok	7. Fong Po Kuan 8. Chong Eng 9. Teo Nie Ching 10. Teresa Kok	7. Chong Eng 8. Fong Po Kuan 9. Teo Nie Ching 10. Teresa Kok
PKR	7. Nurul Izzah	9. Nurul Izzah 10. Fuziah Salleh 11. Zuraida Kamaruddin	8. Nurul Izzah 9. Zuraida Kamaruddin	11. Nurul Izzah 12. Fuziah Salleh 13. Zuraida Kamaruddin	11. Zuraida Kamaruddin 12. Fuziah Salleh 13. Nurul Izzah
PAS	8. Lo'Lo' Mohamad Ghazali	12. Siti Zailah Mohd Yusoff 13. Siti Mariah Mahmud 14. Lo'Lo' Mohamad Ghazali	10. Siti Mariah Mahmud	14. Siti Zailah Mohd Yusoff 15. Siti Mariah Mahmud	14. Siti Zailah Mohd Yusoff 15. Siti Mariah Mahmud

The analysis adopted qualitative data analysis (Qualitative Data Analysis Software / MAXQDA) for examining the themes raised by the women MPs. There are seven themes namely;

1) Development
2) Social
3) Standing orders and administration
4) Politics
5) Religion
6) Education
7) Environment.

Table 3 below showed seven major themes raised by the women MPs in the budgetary session together with the sub-themes relating to the major ones.

Table 3: Themes raised by the women MPs in the 12th Parliament (2008-2012) budget debates.

No.	Main themes	Frequences uttered	Sub-themes
1.	Development	74	Infrastructure (60), Tourism (2), Skills and Practice (11)
2.	Social	139	Health (3), Public security (8), Education (27), Financial assistance (21), Gender (39), Rights (41)
3.	Standing orders and administration	42	Critics (37), Participation/attendance during budget debates (5)
4.	Politics	3	Election (3)
5.	Religion	2	
6.	Economy	22	
7.	Environment	9	

Overall, infrastructure emerged as the highest concerned issue raised by most of women MPs, followed by rights, gender and critics (see Table 3). In the context of this paper, infrastructure, rights and gender will be the focus of the discussion.

The issues raised under infrastructure included the responsibility of government to providing public facilities as a development and contentment for the society. Among the public facilities mentioned were the development of schools and kindergartens, clinics, police and fire departments, post office, supermarket, playground, roads, public transport and bridges. Women MPs also discussed on the infrastructure of their local constituency which they represented. By referring to the local constituencies, the women MPs have shown that they were aware of the issues in their respective constituencies and committed to highlight these afore-mentioned issues at the parliament.

It is evident that the women MPs are very responsive to their constituencies as infrastructure was mentioned 60 times in which 47 times (78%) was referring to the problems of the local region where they belong. An example is Tan Ah Eng (BN), who represented the Gelang Patah constituency, frequently brought the problems faced by the community such as power failure, application for new hospital and construction of the telecommunication tower which was too close to the residential areas. Micro-infrastructure problems also sometimes spawned social impact to the

local community. For example, Lo' Lo' (PAS) expressed her concerns on the shifting residents issues under the Project Parcel S which was not settled since the year 2000. Even more distressing, the old flat become a gathering place for drug addicts and immoral activities.

Infrastructure is also categorized under criticism because there are women MPs who did not agree with the construction or project for development which they perceived as a waste. However, it is categorized as infrastructure because the construction meant for the 'public' and generated national income. For instance, the multi-billion project Menara Warisan Merdeka was criticized intensely by Fong Po Kuan (DAP) and Siti Mariah Mahmud (PAS). Both were from the opposition parties, and objected the government-linked project which they perceived as a waste and not significant at that time.

The second theme which received serious attention from the representation of women in this budget debates is rights with the frequency of 41 times. Despite coming from different political parties, the study found that the women MPs from both fronts, were united in raising issues relating to women's rights and other gender related issues. They raised issues relating to improving the status of women in the public sector, private sector as well as the housewives. One of the example was call for support for maternity leave for 90 days by Nancy Shukri from the ruling front (BN) and Zuraida Kamaruddin, from the opposition party (PKR). In addition, Noraini Ahmad (BN) had suggested that maternity leave should be extended to 450 days. Among other issues which gained attention was the support or assistance for women at work such as to provide more child-care centers, forwarded by various women MPs, ruling and opposition alike. They were Chong Eng (DAP), Noraini Ahmad (BN), Siti Zailah Mohd Yusoff (PAS) and Siti Mariah Mahmud (PAS). These women MPs also projected concerns towards the group of people with disability and maids.

From the issues raised by the women MPs in the context of these two sub-themes, it can be perceived that women MPs are highly concerned on their respective constituency's needs and demands. At the same time, they also alert with women's well-being. Nevertheless, not all women MPs are prone to raise gender issues as the study found that in this 12th Parliamentary budget debates, MPs like Nurul Izzah (PKR), Lo'Lo' (PAS), Teo Nie Ching (DAP), Azalina Othman Said (BN), Halimah Sadique (BN) dan Linda Tsen (BN) did not project any issues relating to gender.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this study found that women MPs in the 12th *Dewan Rakyat* raised various issues in the budgetary session including major themes like development, social, standing order and administration, politics, religion and environment. Of all issues, infrastructure is the most uttered by women MPs from both front, ruling and opposition alike. It is evident from the discourse analysis of the budgetary session that, the main motivation for the women MPs to raise the issues is due to their role as the people's representatives. They indeed forwarded their constituencies issues into the parliament. In addition, the women MPs also are perceived to represent the women in general. Although they come from different political parties, be it from the ruling or opposition front, they professed on similar women-related issues such as child care centers and balancing between work and family which in the end making the primacy of representation of women MPs in the Parliament.

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THE PROCESS OF NATIONAL BUILDING AMONG YOUTH IN MALAYSIA: A CASE STUDY OF THE NATIONAL SERVICE PROGRAMME (NSP) IN NORTHERN REGION OF PENINSULAR MALAYSIA

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Abstract

The implementation of National Service Programme (NSP) is one of the tools to achieve nation-building goals among Malaysian's youth.The objectives of the NSP are to build good personality and develop the spirit of nationalism among adolescents, improve national integration and increase positive attitude towards the programs. This study aims to provide an understanding of the problems that led to the establishment of nation-building in Malaysia. This study is important for the government to evaluate the effectiveness of a nation-building approach among youth groups. More importantly, this research will identify the uses of the NSP as a tool in achieving nation-building goals. The study objectives include to evaluate the effectiveness of the NSP, to identify the impact of the NSP to the trainees and to investigate various challenges faced by authorities in developing the nation-building process among NSP trainees. This study aims to provide an understanding of the problems that led to the establishment of nation-building in Malaysia. This study is important for the government to evaluate the effectiveness of a nation-building approach among youth groups. More importantly, this research will identify the uses of the NSP as a tool in achieving nation-building goals. The findings shown the effectiveness of implementing the NSP and the impacts of NSP towards the trainee were positive. Besides, the study also able to overcome the various challenges in the NSP. In addition, all these aspects will provide several fresh dimensions to examining the process of nation-building among the youth in Malaysia. This study able to contribute to the existing literature on the politics of nation-building in Malaysia, and add to the existing knowledge about the NSP in general

Keywords: National Service Programme (NSP), effectiveness, nation-building

Introduction

On 16th February 2004, the Youth Training Programme, which is better known as National Service Training Programme was launched by the government. This programme is commonly known as *Program Latihan Khidmat Negara (PLKN)* among Malaysians. national service program, first proposed in late 2002, came to committee the following year, and was finally implemented in 2004. Initial proposals envisaged drafting all youths of a certain age, but later lack of resources led to restricting the numbers of the intake. The program was designed for a three-month length.

This study aims to provide an understanding of the problems that led to the establishment of nation-building in Malaysia. This study is important for the government to evaluate the effectiveness of a nation-building approach among youth groups. More importantly, this research will identify the uses of the National Service Programme (NSP) as a tool in achieving nation-building goals. The findings also look at the effectiveness of implementing the NSP. In addition, all these aspects will provide several fresh dimensions to examining the process of nation-building among the youth in Malaysia. It is hoped that this study will contribute to the existing literature on the politics of nation-building in Malaysia, and add to the existing knowledge about the National Service Programme in general.

In addition, the study attempts to re-evaluate whether or not the NSP is an appropriate tool in achieving nation-building goals among youth groups. The findings of this study will help the government to re-think and re-organize the programme. This study employ quantitative research strategy, which a self-administered questionnaire developed based on a thorough literature review.

The study also used the purposive sampling from different ethnicities among the NSP trainees. The sample should represent the ethnic diversity in Malaysia, Malays, Chinese, Indians and others. In this respect, the study focus on the effectiveness of the NSP in achieving nation-building goals which inculcate the spirit of patriotism and nationalism, promote national unity and integration, develop positive characteristics, foster the spirit of caring and volunteerism, and instil active, intelligent and confident attitudes among the trainees in order to achieve the national unity goals. The structured, closed-ended questionnaires are constructed in order to determine the effectiveness of the nation-building process among the youth who participate in the NSP.

The Findings

CHART 1 : NS DO NOT DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THEM AND ALL OF THEM GET THE SAME SERVICE TO ALL TRAINEES


Based on the questions asked, the majority of respondents agree that as much as 41.8%, followed by a very agreeable represent as much as 39% , and finally the uncertainty of 13.5%. From this data it can be concluded that the majority of respondents are aware and understand that they do not distinguish between them and all of them get the same service to all trainees.

CHART 2 : I HAVE HIGH MOTIVATION TO SERVE THE COUNTRY THROUGH SERVING IN THE SECURITY FORCES


Based on the questions asked in Chart 2 shown the majority of respondents agree that as much as 38.2%, followed by a very agreeable represent as much as 34.6%, and finally the uncertainty of 19.8%. From this data it can be concluded that the majority of respondents have a high motivation to serve the country through serving in the security forces. This spirit of dedication and important in maintaining the country's sovereignty.

CHART 3 : I HAVE HIGH SPIRITS, TRAIN HARD AND MAKE THE BEST AND EARNESTLY FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS


Next respondents were asked questions about the culture according to the instructions. Based on the questions asked, the majority of respondents strongly agreed that as much as 51.8%, followed by those agreeing to represent as much as 30.8% , and finally the uncertainty of 15.8% . From this data it can be concluded that the majority of respondents have high spirits, train hard and make the best and earnestly follow instructions. This is a good value that exists within this group.

CHART 4 : I CAN COMPLETE THE TASK THAT WITHIN A GIVEN TIME

Next respondents were asked questions about the culture over time. Based on the questions asked (Chart 4) , the majority of respondents strongly agreed that as much as 48.2%, followed by those agreeing to represent as much as 32.8%, and finally the uncertainty of 15.6%. From this data it can be concluded that the majority of respondents have high morale , training hard and doing their best and working very hard in ensuring they can completed the task that within a given time. This indicates that they do not squander your time and make full use of the time given to them.

**CHART 5 : I HAVE HIGH MORALE IN THE DEFENSE
OF THE COUNTRY**

The respondents were asked questions about the spirit of unity among the participants. Based on the questions asked , the majority of respondents strongly agreed that as much as 63.4% , followed by those agreeing represent as much as 24.8% , and finally the uncertainty of 10.7%. From this data it can be concluded that the majority of respondents have a high spirit of unity for the country. The spirit of unity is essential in creating the diverse communities who live in a country who had are multiracial community.

CHART 7 : I AM PROUD TO BE A NS's TRAINEE

Next respondents were asked questions about the effectiveness of the challenges in this national service program . Based on the questions that being asked (Chart 7) , the majority of respondents strongly agreed that 62.3% , followed by participants who agreeing that represent as much as 24.4 % , and lastly the participants who answers not sure by 9.3% . From this data it can be concluded that the majority of the respondents have a strong sense that the NS program is successful by creating a participants who understands and be able to face the challenges in the NS program. The majority of trainees are proud to be a trainee.

CHART 8 : I AM READY DEFENDING THE COUNTRY IF THREATENED BY AN ENEMY

Next, the respondents were asked questions stated the readiness in defending the country if threatened by an enemy. Based on the questions asked , the majority of respondents 67.80% choose strongly agreed, followed by participants who agreeing represent as much as 22.10% , and lastly not sure by 8.30% . From this data it can be concluded that the majority of respondents are aware the readiness in defending the country if threatened by an enemy.

CHART 9 : I WILL PRACTICED DILIGENTLY ACCORDING TO INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN

Next, the respondents were asked questions thats said "I practiced diligently according to instructions". Based on the questions asked (Chart 9) has shown the majority of respondents 51.80% choose strongly agree, followed by participants who agreeing represent as much as 30.80% , and lastly not sure by 15.80% . From this data it can be concluded that the majority of respondents just agree that they will diligently practice as per given instruction.

CHART 10 : I HAD BEEN GIVEN VERY SUITABLE TIME

Next, the respondents were asked questions about the "time are given to me was very suitable". Based on the questions asked , the majority of respondents 48.20% choose strongly agreed, followed by participants who agreeing represent as much as 32.80%, and lastly not sure by 15.60% . From this data it can be concluded that the majority of respondents agree that they had been given very suitable time

**CHART 11 : I FEEL MORE EAGER TO DEFEND OUR
BELOVED COUNTRY**

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
Next, the respondents were asked questions: "I am more eager to defend the country". Based on the questions asked , the majority of respondents 48.20% choose strongly agreed, followed by participants who agreeing represent as much as 32.80 %, and lastly not sure by 15.60% . From this data it can be concluded that the majority of respondents agree that they feel more eager to defend their beloved country.

CHART 12 : I AM PROUD TO BE NS TRAINEE

Next, the respondents were asked question about proudness in becoming trainees. Based on the questions asked , the majority of respondents 62.30% choose strongly agreed, followed by participants who agreeing represent as much as 24.40% , and lastly not sure by 9.30%. From this data it can be concluded that the majority of respondents agree with the statement about how proud they are in as the NS trainees.

The findings from the effectiveness of implementing the NSP perspectives shown all these aspects provided several fresh dimensions to examining the process of nation-building amongst the youth in Malaysia. Most of the findings demonstrate positive perception towards the implementation of NSP program.

PARTY-POLITICAL (IN)CONGRUENCE AND FEDERAL-STATE FISCAL RELATIONS

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Abstract

Since the first election held in 1955, the National Front (*Barisan National* and also known as the BN) has won the mandate to rule Malaya/Malaysia. However, the political domination of the BN was shaken with its worst perfornance in the 2008 general election. BN suffered massive losses; losing its two-third majority in parliament and mandate to rule five state governments out of the 13 contested states. Consequently, the 2008 general election transformed the landscape of Malaysia politics including the restructuring of federal-state relations. This paper argues that the changes in political party strength were resulted from the changed voting pattern and the transformed political opposition has the potential to alter federal-states relations notably the federal transfers. In the case of Malaysia, centralisation offers the federal government considerable scope to provide different treatment towards those states that are governed by the dominant major political party and others that are governed by the major opposition party.

Keywords: Malaysian politics, fiscal federalism, discretionary federal transfers

Introduction

The era of twenty-first century shows that two-thirds of world countries are governed by the federal government (Feeley and Rubin, 2008); including Malaysia, Switzerland, Belgium, Australia, the United States, India, Nigeria and Canada. The adoption and the exercise of federalism by a country are not only subject to the institutional design, the foundational values and the propensities of federalism. The underlying economic, political, and social structures also influence the context of federalism in a nation-state. The study, therefore, examines the political structure as to gain a better understanding of the federal system in Malaysia operates.

The complex relationships between a federal society, its political institutions and political are not static but involve continual interaction. Due to the dynamic characters of federalism, it requires us to understand the different patterns of continuity and change as a result of party-political incongruence in federal systems. In the case of Malaysia, centralisation offers the federal government considerable

scope to provide different treatment towards those states that are governed by the dominant major political party and others that are governed by the major opposition party. The state of Kelantan and Terengganu will be used as case study to examine how party-political (in)congruence influence the fiscal relations between the federal and states government specifically in terms of discretionary federal transfers.

Malaysia as a centralised federal system

Federalism is a form of government that provides scope for two levels of government to exercise some degree of constitutionally guaranteed authority. It is this very nature of the design that provides the main source of possible tension, especially when different political parties govern the two levels of government.

Malaysia is often characterised as a centralised federal system (Bakar, 2004, Ng, 2012, Watts, 2008, Wah, 2009; 2010, Hutchinson, 2014). In this federation, the state governments play relatively limited roles compared to those performed by the constituent units of other federation. For example, Watts (2008: 39) argues that the Malaysian federation was initially characterised by a high degree of centralisation. Similarly, Wah (2009: 3; 2010) also claims that Malaysia is one of the most centralised federal systems in the world. The manner of how the ruling party deals with opposition-led states are always a fundamental issue in a federal system. Thus, this study argues that the changes in the strength of political party, which was resulted from the changes in voting pattern and the transformation of the political opposition, have potential to alter federal-states fiscal relations. Such changes in the strength of political party refer to situations in a highly centralised federation where a dominant ruling party has been challenged by the opposition in the electoral arena and where the party-political (in)congruence has been reshaped. The next section will briefly describe the elections process and how votes are converted to seats in elections.

Elections and voting system in Malaysia

Election is an important instrument in modern democracy. The main function of election is to provide competition for office and to serve as a means of holding the government to account Malaysian political parties contest elections to win votes and seats. The election also determines the extent to which participated political parties to be the ruling government or to be the opposition in the legislature. These political

parties try to gain the widest possible support from the electorate by aggregating the interests of voters. Malaysia is considered to have a dominant party system, i.e. in which one political party either by itself or in a coalition with other parties continually forms the government. The system enables other political parties to participate in the general election with smaller possibility to win the election as compared to the dominant political coalition.

Electoral performance is the indicator of party strength. As is the case in other federal systems, Malaysian federalism provides an opportunity for federal and state governments to be controlled by the same or different (combinations of) parties. What matters, a candidate needs to win more votes than other contested candidates in order to win the electoral jurisdiction. Similarly, the wining political party/coalition which garners the highest number of electoral parliamentary seats will lead the federal government and the same principle applies to the state government. The interaction also can occur in different arenas of a political system, including the parliamentary arena and the governmental arena.

The study focuses on the party system change in the governmental arenas. This is because the governmental is the crucial arena for parties to exhibit their capabilities and more importantly to increase support and the chances of winning in the next elections. The next section briefly illustrates the interactions of ruling and opposition parties in Malaysia during the year 2004 until 2012.

Malaysian politics and party system

Since the first election held in 1955, the National Front (*Barisan National* and also known as the BN) has won the mandate to rule Malaya/Malaysia. However, the political domination of the BN was shaken with its worst performamance in the 2008 general election. BN suffered massive losses; losing its two-third majority in parliament and mandate to rule five state governments out of the 13 contested states. Consequently, the 2008 general election transformed the landscape of Malaysia politics including the restructuring of federal-state relations. The factors which contributed to the massive losses of BN were the leadership of the fifth Prime Minister of Malaysia, Abdullah Badawi when dealing with political, social and economic issues; the eroding legitimacy of the ruling party; the impact of new media; and the voting pattern of the multiethnic society and young generation (Pandian, 2010).

It will be interesting to investigate whether the party political incongruence as a result of the 2008 general elections has significant impact on the federal-state relations; notably, the fiscal federalism in Malaysia. The three aspects of fiscal federalism are revenue powers, expenditure powers, and financial distribution. The political incongruence could not affect revenue powers and expenditure powers because these power are regulated. However, the political incongruence could affect the financial distribution within the framework of federalism. The paper, therefore, attempts to examine the financial distribution by analysing the amount allocated by the federal to the state government both discretionary and non-discretionary.

Fiscal federalism: discretionary federal transfers

Different federal government exercises varied degree of federal influence towards the state governments. In the context of Malaysia, there is strong federal influence towards the state governments because of the centralisation of political power since the independence (Elazar, 1987: 75; Shah, 2007: 6; Watts, 2008: 39, Jomo, 2014: 135; Hutchinson, 2014: 422). As noted earlier, centralisation is reflected in the allocation of federal and state government revenues and expenditures. Changes in the total financial resource allocation as between the federal and the states will be used as a key indicator of the impact of party-political incongruence. How the federal transfers can help us to understand the partisan-political influence in intergovernmental relations? Theoretically federal transfers have a significantly redistributive character. Thus, they are aimed at minimising the effects of the country's deep economic gap between government and among states. However, what can be said of the discretionary transfers or discretionary federal transfers? (Gordin 2006: 262) argues that discretionary transfers are more vulnerable to the political influence than non-discretionary federal transfers. In this respect, discretionary federal transfers are within the competence of the federal government, which has freedom to set amounts they provide and recipient states for these discretionary allocations.

In the case of Malaysia, there is less publicly available information about these transfers. To examine how the federal government treats state government in the case of congruence and incongruence in intergovernmental arena two states have been selected as cases from consistently party-political congruent state category. The overall findings show that the federal government has a greater

capacity to determine the amount granted to the state government and to impose conditionality that fits the interest of federal government.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the paper has discussed whether party-political (in)congruence influences the fiscal relations between the federal and states government. Further research should be undertaken to investigate if party-political (in) congruence associated with discretionary federal transfers, favouring states ruled by the national ruling party.

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PART 15: THE ASEAN COMMUNITY

ASEAN COMMUNITY: AN INTEGRATION FAVORABLE FOR AMERICA'S PACIFIC CENTURY

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Abstract

A well-established, stable, prosperous and rich region, Southeast Asia has so far received less attention than other regions. The region is a battlefield for the rivalry between the United States and the People's Republic of China (PRC). Both have started to deepen their relations with each of the states in the region and signed various agreements with the regional association to win the race. China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA) has shown tremendous impacts on the development of China's economic condition these five years. The US-ASEAN Trade and Investment Framework Agreement signed in 2006, Treaty of Amity and Cooperation that Obama signed in 2009, US annual presence in the East Asia Summit and US position as one of ASEAN Dialogue Partners with resident ambassador to ASEAN have shown the US continuing commitment to enhanced engagement with ASEAN. Moreover, America's Pacific century has decided that pivot of the future will be in Asia. Trade liberalization in the region provides the US abundant opportunities for trade, investment and technology to help America's economic recovery at home. Opportunely, ASEAN members have agreed to build a fully integrated community that involve political, security, economy and social realms by the end of 2015. By applying the concept of geopolitics, ASEAN Community is seen strongly favorable for American interests, especially to strengthen American influence in the region and to help to pertain American leadership. Hence, the paper will focus on the importance of ASEAN Community for the US and how the US supports the development of ASEAN Community. For ASEAN has so far been a US strategic bilateral partner in Southeast Asia, the deeper ASEAN member countries are integrated, the more benefits the US may obtain for the pursuit of maintaining its primacy.

Keywords: America's Pacific Century, ASEAN Community, CAFTA

Introduction

America's primacy terminologies have been widely accepted by the entire world post-Cold War. Its domination involves not only political and security but also economy, social, and culture. This becomes an evidence for the US to convince the rest of world that the US is special, a nation destined to perform special mission to hold leadership in the world. Such a belief is a legacy of American colonization era, that the United States of America is blessed as a city set upon a hillll for the whole world to see and admire as described in the sermon by John Winthrop in 18th century (Luedtke, 1992). Such a strong conviction has become a condition for the US to respond and act in accordance with either national or international issues.

A new form of conflict faced by the US post-Cold War came across the vast ocean and hit American land on September 11, 2001, in the form of terror, known as 9/11 attacks. Even thoughterrorism is not a new term, it woke up after the 9/11 boom blast over the WTC and Pentagon buildings, left thousands of civilians killed. Only within days after the occurrence, the US officials soon concluded that Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda terrorist organizations had been responsible for the attacks (Ross, 2003).

Bush's War on Terrorism as a response toward WTC boom blast in 2011 has been employed so obviously on earth, especially in Afghanistan & Iraq. Bush also categorized three nations as axis of evil, consisting of Iran, Iraq and North Korea. He saw the world in black and white vision, that there are only good people and bad ones. Those who support terrorists are American enemies. On America War on Terrorism, the US eyes focused on Middle East. The pivot of its political policies lies on the region. All these policies are relied on the basic belief of Project for the New American Century.

Similar with his predecessor, Obama put high priority on American primacy. However, he has slightly different point of view concerning the how to maintain it. His rebalance toward Asiall and the former Secretary of State, Hillary Rodham Clinton's remark America's Pacific Century seem to have shifted America's political eyes from Middle East to Asia Pacific region. Accomplishing its interests in Iraq, Afghanistan and even some Middle East countries, America has started to shift its political attention to Asia, a region believed to have promising opportunities ahead. In the Pacific Forum CSIS in 2009, Cossa and friends stated the shifting geopolitical power from the West to the East and how the US is demanded to deal with the phenomenon.

> Ongoing shifts in geopolitical power from West to East make the Asia-Pacific region more important to the United States today than ever before. The region is already an engine of the global economy, and major Asian countries are becoming global economic and political actors. Yet, as Asia's importance has grown over the last decade, Washington has often been focused elsewhere. The Obama administration needs a more active approach to the Asia-Pacific region that recognizes the new geopolitical realities and positions the United States to deal effectively with the challenges and opportunities that lie ahead. Such a strategy must build upon America's long-standing positive engagement in Asia and articulate a vision that can advance US interests and attract support from countries in the region. (Cossa, Glosserman, McDevitt, Patel, Przytup, & Roberts, 2009)

Correspondingly, Obama administration has long studied the significance of the region for America's national interests. A secretary of state, Hillary Clinton made public speech in 2011 that Asia turns to be a center of attention, with its potential markets, investment, and geopolitics.

> So many global trends point to Asia. It's home to nearly half the world's population, it boasts several of the largest and fastest-growing economies and some of the world's busiest ports and shipping lanes, and it also presents consequential challenges such as military buildups, concerns about the proliferation of nuclear weapons, natural disasters, and the world's worst levels of greenhouse gas emissions. It is becoming increasingly clear that in the 21st century, the world's strategic and economic center of gravity will be the Asia Pacific, from the Indian subcontinent to the western shores of the Americas. And one of the most important tasks of American statecraft over the next decades will be to lock in a substantially increased investment – diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise – in this region (Clinton, 2011).

The consequences of the emerging Asia is that America has supported the building of stronger and closer relations with the region, involving political and military leaders, traders and corporations, academicians, and developments experts.

In the region, the US is not the sole power having influence and engagement with ASEAN. There are also some other major powers increasing their influence there, such as European countries, Japan, South Korea, and China particularly. China's relations with ASEAN tend to be political and economic realms. Due to the competition for influence of major powers within the region and with the upcoming ASEAN Community, the US has intention to strengthen its engagement with ASEAN. Therefore, this writing aims to show the potential of ASEAN for the US, hence, deep integration would be favorable for the US to maintain its primacy in the world.

ASEAN tend to be political and economic realms. Due to the competition for influence of major powers within the region and with the upcoming ASEAN Community, the US has intention to strengthen its engagement with ASEAN. Therefore, this writing aims to show the potential of ASEAN for the US, hence, deep integration would be favorable for the US to maintain its primacy in the world.

Geopolitics

Dealing with the discussion concerning the US pivot to Asia strategy, it would be appropriate to apply the concept of classical geopolitics. The term is awfully difficult to define. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English defines geopolitics as the study of the effect of a country's position, population, etc. on its politics (Longman

Dictionary of Contemporary English). Hence, geographic location plays role in power relationship in international relations. In conventional academic understanding, geopolitics concerns the geography of international politics, particularly the relationship between the physical environment (location, resources, territory, etc.) and the conduct of foreign policy (Sprout and Sprout,1960). Rooting back the history, the term 'geopolitics' had a various meaning in the history, shifting from its original meaning by Rudolf Kjellen signifying a general concern with geography and politics. Today, giving specific definition of geopolitics is difficult for the meaning of the concepts tends to change following the dynamics of world order.

In the early twentieth century, Kjellen defined geopolitics within imperialist perspectives that relates physical earth and politics. This applied in the Nazi foreign policy *Lebernsraum*, which means the pursuit of more living space or area for the Germany. Later, during the Cold War, the term was understood as the global contest between the two blocks for influence over the states and strategic resources. In the 1970s, former US Secretary of State Henry Kissisnger revived the term by using it as a synonym for the superpower game of balance-of-power politics played out across the global political map (Hepple, 1986). Geopolitics has the ability to adjust in the dynamics of the world order and deals with comprehensive visions of the world political map.

Geopolitics serves statesmen in arranging and gaining their political objectives for it provides scientific and exact facts to consider. Karl Haushofer addressed that geopolitics represented the —dependence of all political events on the enduring conditions of the physical environment (Bassin, 1978:120). Further, Bassin translated Haushofer's radio remark in 1931 as follow:

> Geopolitics takes the place of political passion and development dictated by natural law reshapes the work of the arbitrary transgression of human will. The natural world, beaten back with sword or pitchfork, irrepressibly reasserts itself in the face of the earth. This is geopolitics! (Haushofer in Bassin, 1987:120).

Physical determinants of foreign policy, geography matters in international relations and in power and influence attainment. This is seen through American shifting distribution in Asia, which has been and will be one of the largest US geopolitical agendas at least in the next two decades. Asian countries, which were mostly under colonization, have been promising emerging powers. In January, the *Economist* reported that within five years, China would have a larger economy in purchasing power parity than the United States. No-one can deny that Asia is rapidly assuming

its place as the driver of the world economy for the 21st century….Japan remains the world's third-largest economy, while economies like India, Korea, Indonesia and Australia — all G20 members — are growing rapidly. Indonesia, under the policy direction of President Yudhoyono and his economic team, is likely to emerge as one of the top six economies in the world by 2030 (Carr, 2012). This economic growth in Asia has brought with it changing global power dynamics; thus, make the region a key driver of global politics.

American shifting focus to Asia embraces aspects, covering economy, security, and even ideology. The US strategic thinking and existence in region and participation in Asian regional forums displays the significance of the region for the US strategic interests, and has mainly been connected to the emergence of China and to contain the vast development of China's economy and political influence. Francis Fukuyama mentioned that the rise of China may be the most complex of all the challenges posed to the United States since it became a player in great power politics (Fukuyama & Ikenberry, 2005), even bigger than any wars the US has experienced. This understanding is heavily shaped by geopolitics.

ASEAN Community

Southeast Asia is a potential region in which the countries are committed to have a strong regional organization. It has promising geopolitical advantages for the US to pertain its primacy in the Asia Pacific. Looking at the geographical stance, Southeast Asia's strategic location astride sea-lanes connecting not only two oceans, the Indian and Pacific, but also North-South routes connecting Australia and New Zealand to the Northeast Asia. Besides, the region possesses strategic importance for international security and commerce (Sokolsky, Rabasa, & Neu, 2001).

By the end of 2015, ASEAN members have agreed to build a fully integrated community involving political, security, economy and social realms covered within three pillars of cooperation, namely the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC), the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC). Hence, ASEAN has shown a major milestone for deeper integration among the members. With its dedicated Plans of Actions and Protocols, ASEAN will move closer towards its goal of building the ASEAN Community. It would be portrayed by greater political and security interaction, a single production and market base, with free flow of goods, services, capital investment and skilled labor,

focusing on social development, education and human resources development, public health, culture and information, and environmental protection (Foreign Affairs Malaysia).

An important part of the ASEAN Community vision is the establishment of a globally integrated and competitive single market and production base, built on the principles of equitable economic development and shared prosperity, through the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) (AEC Blueprint), one of the largest markets in the world. Some people have the impression that ASEAN Community would be similar with European Union (EU), while some others think that the integration is about AEC, which undeniably, gets the most attention in public discourses. Though the AEC pillar overshadows the other two pillars, basically, all the three pillars have essential roles in deepening the integration within the Southeast Asian region.

Economic integration has been the main focus over these last several years, due to the disparate level of readiness among the members. The targets have been set, the questions arising are concerning whether the members can meet them. AEC requires not merely the exclusion of tariffs but also non-tariffs measures such as protectionism, the disproportion of infrastructures, manpower and transportation and communication lines. The AEC is an ambitious plan for deep market integration, characterized by freer flow of financial capital, a free flow of goods, services and investment, improved connectivity and larger opportunities for labor workers for the pursuit of shared prosperity and accelerated growth of economy (ILO, 2014).

In ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC), language and education are two basic points which need thinking and preparation. It is about whether education is standardized and what language is used for communication. Among all the ASEAN member states, not all the citizens are English speakers. ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) aims to keep the region peaceful and ASEAN all the members cooperate to keep the harmony among them and with the world in a just and democratic environment. The APSC Blueprint envisages ASEAN to be a rules-based Community of shared values and norms; a cohesive, peaceful, stable and resilient region with shared responsibility for comprehensive security; as well as a dynamic and outward-looking region in an increasingly integrated and interdependent world.

The US and ASEAN Geopolitical Advantages

America's presence in Asia is not a new phenomenon. Talking about America's frontier in the region takes historical overview. It was begun by Commodore Perry's sailing into Japan in 1853. The US embedded economic and political motives characterized its presence in the region during the Pacific War, Korean War and Vietnam War. Undeniably, America has played significant role in security stabilization in the region. Since the 1950s, relations between Southeast Asia and the US have been around the security realm. Southeast Asia played essential part in the Cold War, with its potential sea lanes. Consequently, the US became the sub-region's security guarantor (Acharya & Tan, 2006).

The end of the Cold War resulted the emergence of America's primacy and the change or world order. The threat was no longer concerning the communist and the US has proven to be the world ideological hegemony. Hence, the US was considering its military employment. The emergence of new global powers such as China and US War on terror since 9/11 attacks made the strategic importance of Southeast Asia increase (Ganesan, 2000). The withdrawal of US security support for Southeast Asia would result in the increase China's influence in the sub-region (Jürgen, 2003).

As a Pacific power, the US cannot opt not to get involved in the trading or not to be part of Asia-Pacific issues. There are a lot of phenomena in the region nowadays, such as the emergence of China, North Korea's nuclear weapons ambition, Burma's social change, complicated South China Sea dispute, migrant issues and the Western competition for Asian markets. Among all these issues, the most dynamic issues happen in the Southeast Asia, where the ten countries are members of ASEAN. These ten members stand with each significances and national issues, and they differ from one another in many aspects. Though, they have a belief that they are stronger, develop faster, and achieve more when they are bound than apart.

ASEAN was born when Vietnam War was heating up in 1967. It was the time when Cold War seemed to escalate and the world politics were full of uncertainties and insecure place to live. Due to the uncertainties, ASEAN was founded by five nations in the region by signing a declaration that they would help and support each other to build prosperous and independent states. The US presence in the region at

the time played essential role in the founding for the security of the region was shrinking. Today, with the development of ASEAN and rise ASEAN GDP, the significance of the region toward Western states is undeniably skyrocketing. Likewise, the engagement between ASEAN and the US is developing.

Mutually beneficial development of the relations between ASEAN and the US will be able to bear significantly promising future engagement. ASEAN has geostrategic importance for the US, covering several facets; political, economic and diplomatic. Due to the geostrategic importance, the US and ASEAN members are committed together to ensure the stability and security of the region, for the pursuit of both parties' development. Figure 1. shows how Southeast Asia offers potential advantages for the US, as well as for the states involved, at least five of ASEAN members. Most of the partnership is dealing with US defense power and influence in Asia Pacific.

Figure 1 Geostrategic Importance of ASEAN

Source: US Department of State, US Department of Defense, US Energy Information Administration, the White House

Southeast Asia has its dynamic and strategic importance for the US, which has made Obama administration come to a decision concerning rebalance toward Asia'. ASEAN's geostrategic importance stems from many factors, including the strategic location of member countries, the large shares of global trade that pass through regional waters, and the alliances and partnerships which the United States shares

with ASEAN member countries (The East West, 2014). ASEAN's perpetual security and economic growth is essentially desirable for the US interests. Deepened integration among ASEAN members and open market in Asia provide the US with enormous opportunities for trade, investment and market. The US domestic economic recovery depends on the export value and the ability of American traders to compete in Asian markets.

The relations between the US and ASEAN are covering several areas, such as trade, investment and economic, security, immigration, tourism, environmental, humanitarian and student exchange. There have been built some foundations for an ASEAN-US partnership. ASEAN – US Dialogue Partnership has grown progressively since its establishment in 1977. The Enterprise for ASEAN Initiative (EAI) of 2002 offers prospectus bilateral trade agreements between the United States and ASEAN countries, with the objective to increase the number of existing trade and investment. The EAI is dealing with ASEAN countries which are committed to economic reforms and openness, to encourage regional bilateral and regional cooperation such as to help APEC reach Bogor Goals (White House, 2002). The Enhanced Partnership Plan of Action of 2006 provides a means for envisioning cooperation in the political, security, economic, and social and educational areas. Trade and Investment Framework Agreement between the US and ASEAN was signed in 2006. The US has also acceded to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 2009, which means that the parties agree to deepen their ties on political realm. For the US signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in 2009, became the first non-ASEAN country sending ambassador to ASEAN, and the first country to have permanent mission to ASEAN in Jakarta, the US has been an important diplomatic, economic and security partner for ASEAN member countries. As the treaty has been extended to key neighbors of ASEAN, it suggests that the US is also committed to join the annual East Asia Summit (EAS). Pavin Chachavangpolpun uttered ASEAN members had agreed to invite the US and Russia to participate in the region-wide forum, the EAS, which encompasses ASEAN plus six: Japan, China, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and India (Chachavangpolpun, 2012). Washington favorably responded through the US Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific, Kurt Campbell, considering the US interest in Southeast Asia and South China Sea.

The US existence in EAS is determined by its interest in minimizing China's leading role in the EAS and ASEAN regional forum. Moreover, China's assertive

actions in the South China Sea and its military power escalated the US need to position in the region. South China Sea conflicts required the US existence to counterbalance China's military might and to become security guarantor for Southeast Asian countries. Indeed, China itself favored the US to be around in the region, chiefly to ensure Japan remains demilitarized. The US is also active in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus). Therefore, a deeper ASEAN integration would be favorably beneficial for the US.

On global economy issue, the US needs to intensify its cooperation with Southeast Asian countries. As an integrated region, Southeast Asia will have stronger influence on global economy. The natural resources, the flow of goods from and to the region, and the FDI will significantly give imperative encouragement for the global market and wealth. Therefore, the US and ASEAN members countries should convene more consistent and regular summit to discuss wide array of economic relevance and further cooperation, through APEC, World Trade Organization, and some other formats of regional partnership.

Moreover, the two parties partnership should be expanded to deal with social affair. The US can improve the relationships through —soft power.‖ The activities performed should target people-to-people relations to build trust throughout society. Thus, ASEAN and the United States should establish a substantial US-ASEAN Partnership Fund, providing support for a wide range of programs, projects and activities. The fund should be managed— independently of governments—by an international committee of distinguished citizens (Plummer n.d.).

ASEAN, with its total population of 626 million, is a potential market for the US goods and services. ASEAN also serves as a destination of US direct investment. The US-ASEAN Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) signed in 2006 enhances the economic engagement between two parties. Ranked 4th after Canada, Mexico and China, ASEAN is a goods export market for the United States. Likewise, the US is the 3rd largest trading partner for ASEAN. Since 2001 to 2012, the bilateral relations of trading goods and services have increased at an average rate of 5% annually (The East West, 2014). The huge amount of the US exports to ASEAN directly and indirectly supports the number of American jobs. Since then, ASEAN market is an essential guarantor in the number of unemployment and Americans' income. It clearly gives impression that ASEAN is the US valuable regional forum.

The US investment in ASEAN is the largest in Asian markets. It is nearly a third of total US investment in Asian markets, more than the combined US investment in China, India, South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and New Zealand (The East West, 2014). Likewise, the bilateral relations in direct investment seem to be mutually beneficial. Within about a decade, from 2001 to 2012, investment from ASEAN to the US is more than five times that from China (The East West, 2014). The following info graphic provides data concerning the US position as a major direct investment in Asia especially in ASEAN member-countries. It is the third largest economy in Asia and the world's seventh largest.

Figure 2 US – Asia Direct Investment

Source: Overview of the US – ASEAN Relations. November 10, 2015.
http://aseanup.com/overview-us-asean-relations/

Figure 3 presents the detailed information related to the US – Asia Foreign Direct Investment. Within 2001 to 2012, the increase on the number of investment from ASEAN in the US is at an average annual rate of 28%, while the number of US investment in ASEAN is at an average annual rate of 9% (The East West, 2014).

Figure 3 US Direct Investment to ASEAN

Source: Overview of the US – ASEAN Relations. November 10, 2015. http://aseanup.com/overview-us-asean-relations/

To give better understanding concerning ASEAN economic potential, Figure 4 shows the strength of ASEAN economy compared to some global major powers in 2012.

Figure 4 ASEAN Economy

Source: ASEAN infographics: Population, Market, Economy. September, 17, 2014. http://aseanup.com/asean-infographics-population-market-economy/

Within the last ten years, ASEAN's economy has been the fastest growth in Asia after China, exceeding the global growth average. In 2014, ASEAN has a combined GDP of $2.4 trillion and a consumer base of 626 million (The East West, 2014). With the growing middle class, trade, and purchasing power, the sub-region appears as a magnetic place for

the US for it plays significant part in the global economic growth. Moreover, ASEAN's free trade agreements with some other significant powers make the regionalism more promising.

ASEAN huge number of population makes ASEAN potential market for US products and culture. As seen on Figure 5. the combined population of all ASEAN members reach more than 6 million people, almost twice as the US population and about a hundred more than the European Union population. What makes interesting is that even when ASEAN is becoming more integrated, cultural sensitivities remain. Investors cannot apply a one-size-fits-all strategy in dealing with each of the countries.

Figure 5 ASEAN Market

Source: ASEAN market compared to the EU, US, China, Japan and India. http://aseanup.com/asean-infographics-population-market-economy/

Favourable for America's Pacific Century

The concept of America's Pacific Century by Hillary R. Clinton expressed the urgency of US commitment to build translantic cooperation and relationship in Asia Pacific region. Washington interpreted the commitment by Obama's Pivot to Asia's strategy, that the future of politics is in Asia and the US stands at the center of it.

> At a time when the region is building a more mature security and economic architecture to promote stability and prosperity, US commitment there is essential. It will help build that architecture and pay dividends for continued American leadership well into this century, just as our post-World War II commitment to building a comprehensive and lasting transatlantic network of institutions and relationships has paid off many times over -- and continues to do so. The time has come for the United States to make similar investments as a Pacific power, a strategic course set by President Barack Obama from the outset of his administration and one that is already yielding benefits (Clinton, 2011).

Samuel Huntington asserted the importance of the US hegemony power standing in Southeast Asia, due to the security and democracy aspects. The US guarantees the security stability of the region for the US itself lays its strategic interests in its relations with ASEAN. With the secured interests, the US would last its primacy over the world and the international order it had shaped post the Cold war. Therefore, maintaining the US stance in Asian regional forums is favorable to halt any probable emerging competitor of US economic, political and security primacy.

> A world without US primacy will be a world with more violence and disorder and less democracy and economic growth than a world where the United States continues to have more influence than any other country in shaping global affairs. The sustained international primacy of the United States is central to the welfare and security of Americans and to the future of freedom, democracy, open economies, and international order in the world (Huntington, 1993).

The US has been consistently performed its commitment to regional security stability and peace. Partnerships, alliances building and reinforcement and further cooperation helped maintaining its commitment. To promote and protect US national interests in Asia-Pacific region, it is imperatives that the US take some decision as follow:

> Articulate a statement of purpose and vision for the US role in the region that reaffirms US leadership and commitment to restoring its moral authority; reaffirm and reinvigorate the network of US alliances that continue to serve as the foundation upon which a broader strategy must be built; maintain strategic equilibrium while integrating rising powers — not only China, but Japan, India, and Russia as well — in ways compatible with US interests; retard the proliferation of WMD; and actively participate in the region's multilateral economic, political, and security structures to address both traditional and non-traditional security challenges (Cossa, Glosserman, McDevitt, Patel, Przytup, & Roberts, 2009).

Undeniably, the US competition with Asian rising powers such as China is not merely trivial issue. It scopes not only economic but also political and security realms. China's economic, political influence and military power development is undeniably alarming the US. This is the core reason why the US is shifting its attention from War on Terrorism, which came into force under Bush administration, to Asia Pacific issues. The shift is based on the changing global phenomenon, referring to the emergence of potential global powers, particularly China. Both China and the US are struggling over the expanding of their economic influence in the region, through their strengthening relations with ASEAN. China has engaged itself with Southeast Asian countries and also with ASEAN within ASEAN plus three forums. In dealing

with economic sector, China and ASEAN have been interconnected through China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA), which has been opened in 2010. Likewise, due to the data provided, the US has had close economic relations with ASEAN. With the deeper integration among the members of ASEAN, Southeast Asia would be a significant sub-region with the magnetic attraction. The US engagement with ASEAN is mainly to deal with its competition with China, especially in the Asia Pacific region. The more cooperation and treaty the US builds with ASEAN, the more favorable outcome the US grasps.

Michael Plummer argued that to achieve successful a unified market by 2015, political supports both from internal and external sources are highly demanded (Plummer n.d.). It is empirical that the US gives support to the ASEAN Economic Community, for at least three main reasons (Plummer). Firstly, the AEC will significantly boost US-ASEAN trade and economic relations. Besides becoming prospective markets for US manufactures, ASEAN is also a favorite for US MNCs. Secondly, the Bush's Doctrine had put ASEAN a strategic partner in its ―war on terrism‖. US assistance in dealing with terrorism and other uprisings can be performed either at domestic or regional levels. Hence, integration will make it easy to contract US assistance and will make the region safer due to the reduction of development gaps and tensions among ASEAN members. Finally, ASEAN integration would become a major player in Asia Pacific region, balancing the economic power of India and China. This is crucially needed to bring symmetry to manage the transition period of economic super power, for individual ASEAN member countries are too weak to become important players in the game (Plummer n.d.).

Ultimately, ASEAN has so far been a strategic bilateral partner in Southeast Asia. For all rationales discussed above, the deeper ASEAN member countries are integrated, the more benefits the US may obtain for the pursuit of maintaining its primacy and influence on security, politic, social and mainly economic sectors. Hence, it is imperative that Washington support and give any favor for the establishment of ASEAN Community.

Conclusion

Southeast Asia has transformed from a sub-region with poverty to one with significant development. The establishment of ASEAN and the commitment to build a deep integration through ASEAN Community shows a significant milestone. The sub-region's potential market, foreign direct investment opportunity, strategic location, rapid economic growth, and its relation with China make ASEAN an attractive partner for the US to pertain its primacy and to respond to the emergence of China as a global power. It is important to note that in the US-China relationship, ASEAN plays intertwined relations with the two competing parties. ASEAN-China close relations undermine US influence in the sub-region. Likewise, US-ASEAN stronger relation limit China's influence in ASEAN. For both powers, containing each other's power and influence in Southeast Asia is driven by a major geostrategic interest.

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ASEAN SUMMIT:

A DRIVER OF ASEAN COMMUNITY-BUILDING?

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Abstract

Article 7.2 (b) of the ASEAN Charter (2008, p. 10) states that 'ASEAN Summit shall be the supreme-policy making body of ASEAN'. This indicates the central importance of ASEAN Summit in ASEAN decision-making processes as well as in the development of an ASEAN Community. This paper argues that ASEAN Summit is either a driver of, or, an impediment to ASEAN regional community-building efforts. It seeks to analyse the significance of ASEAN Summit meetings in steering the pace of ASEAN community-building. It provides a working definition of summitry, before an examination of the significant role of the summit in regional community-building can be carried out. In doing so, this paper utilises both primary and secondary documents related to ASEAN Summit such as declarations, reports, data published by ASEAN Secretariat, leaders' speeches, journals, and newspaper articles.

Keywords: ASEAN Summit, ASEAN Community-Building, Historical-institutionalism Approach

Introduction

Article 7.2(a) of the ASEAN Charter stipulates that the ASEAN Summit is 'the supreme policy-making body of ASEAN'. ASEAN Summit is the highest decision-making body of ASEAN. The role and functions of the Summit are to 'deliberate, provide policy guidance and take decisions on key issues pertaining to the realization of the objectives of ASEAN' (Article 7.2(b), ASEAN Charter). The heads of government or state are responsible for 'instructing the relevant ministers in each of the councils concerned to hold ad hoc inter-ministerial meetings, address important issues concerning ASEAN that cut across the Community Council' and 'addressing emergency situations affecting ASEAN' (Article 7.2(d), ASEAN Charter). However, a systematic appraisal of its role and functions is yet to be undertaken (Amador III, 2009). Nevertheless, a number of recent studies on ASEAN indicate that scholars have started to examine the achievement(s) or limitation(s) of particular ASEAN member states in hosting the ASEAN Summit (see for example Hang, 2013; Thuzar, 2015).

This paper seeks to address this lacuna by examining the significance of the ASEAN Summit in steering the progress of ASEAN community-building efforts. It argues that ASEAN Summit is either a driver of, or, an impediment to the success of ASEAN over time. This paper is divided into four subsections. It proceeds with an overview of the ASEAN Summit. Drawing on previous scholarly works, this paper then, offers a working definition of summitry. Next, it examines the degree to which summitry can either be a driver of, or, an impediment to ASEAN community-building over time. The paper then concludes with an assessment whether summitry is an irrelevant, or, an indispensible avenue to the development of regional community building.

Summitry: a working definition

The term 'summit' was first coined by Winston Churchill in a speech in Soviet Union in 14 February 1950, when he talked about the need to debate the issues of Europe 'at the highest level' (Caramerli, 2012: 24). In May 1953, he repeated his call for a 'conference at the highest level', appealing for a will to peace 'at the *summit* of the nations' (Reynolds, 2009: 115, emphasis added).

Encouraged at the great power level and especially by Winston Churchill, summitry began to take off in the decade after Second World War (Berridge, 2010). That said, summitry was a rare occurrence in international affairs before the Second World War. The frequency of summit meetings were dramatically increased, stimulated by, first, the political and technological trends of promoting multilateral diplomacy, and second, and the calculation of political leaders that Cold War could lead to a battlefield war between the superpowers (Berridge, 2010: 166). The establishment of regional organisation that were becoming fashionable after the success of the European Coal and Steel Community gave summitry a natural focus too (Dinan, 2010: 207-208). Today, an astonishing amount of agreements, dialogues, cooperation, and consultation take place at the highest level of political authority between heads of state and government, head of international organisations, or even the leaders of faction in civil wars (Berridge, 2015: 184). This is because summitry provides an avenue for political actors at the highest influence of political authority to shape the outcome of politics and policies (Caramerli, 2012: 27).

Melissen (2003: 4) defines summitry as meetings between incumbent heads of government and/or heads of state, or political leaders and the highest representative of an international organisation. This paper concurs with Melissen's definition, and as argues in this paper, political leaders are the main actors of summitry, which will determine the overall development of regional community-building. However, summitry is more than the leaders (Alexandroff & Brean, 2015: 3). Indeed, leaders form a vital element of summitry, but they do not fully describe it (Alexandroff & Brean, 2015: 3). For each summitry beneath underlies governance capacity which includes advantages in terms of economic and at the same time a commitment to implement policy; significant domestic, regional and international bureaucratic machinery: a system of meetings and the work of ministers, and their ministries, working groups, international institutions, transgovernmental organisations and regulatory networks with formal and informal regulatory actors (Alexandroff & Brean, 2015: 10).

Our definition goes beyond the definition offered by Melissen (2003) as we considered that summitry is embedded in a context of national, regional, and international decision-making that involves a web of actors concerned with security, economic, and politics, and the common pursuit of peace and prosperity. At the same time, we accept that the contemporary order is complex, whereby, sharp boundaries of international, regional and national policy are blurring. Nevertheless, we maintain that leaders form a vital element of summitry (Alexandroff & Brean, 2015: 3). Having said that, we argue that political leaders' behaviour, personality, experience, mediation and persuasion skills, as well as commitment and dedication towards regional community-building, influence the outcome of particular summit meeting. Additionally, governance capacity and the support from other fellow member state can either enhance or impede the success of hosting chairing summit meeting, which in turn, determine the progress of regional community-building. Our working definition of summitry, therefore,

> Summitry refers to high-level meetings of the heads of government and/or the heads of state of a regional body. These meetings, which set the agenda for the future development of the organisation, also provide policy guidance to achieve the stated vision as well as responding to current regional and global developments. Furthermore, summitry involves the interaction of the fundamental factors that underlie regional political dynamics and policies, namely, political behaviour of the leaders, their skills and idiosyncrasies, and governance capacity. Collectively, these factors shape the regional

policymaking processes encompassing the following key phases: policy formulation, policy implementation and policy evaluation.

Drawing on the offered working definition, this paper examines the degree to which summitry has been a driver of regional community-building over time, that is, at itsinception, in sustaining and advancing a community. At the same time, it seeks to identify the conditions that are not conducive for a summit to be a driver of ASEAN Community, if any.

By doing so, it is hoped that this paper will fill a gap in the current literature of ASEAN studies, in which a number of scholars have argued that there are insufficient studies on ASEAN's highest decision-making body – summitry – have been conducted, thus far (Amador III, 2009; Thuzar, 2015). This is perhaps due to the complexity of decision-making processes that prevail in the Association. In addition, the secrecy element grounded in ASEAN, such as the difficulty in having access to its archive to some extent has obstructed scholars' interest to understand further how political leaders interact, exert influence, and guide ASEAN at the Summit meetings, and during their chairmanship period.

Based on data collected during interviews conducted mainly in 2011 but followed up in subsequent years until early 2016 in ASEAN capitals, as well as document analysis of primary and secondary resources, this paper seeks to examine the degree to which summitry has been a key driver to the development of ASEAN community-building. It utilises the above-mentioned working definition as a lens so as to analyse the central importance of summitry in ASEAN community-building over the years. When such analysis is viewed drawing on the proposed working definition, the evolution can be largely understood by its political leaders' behaviours and decisions, its historical context, the issues which it has had, and has to address, the internal nature of its member states, which have subsequently influenced the overall progress of ASEAN. The following sections examine the degree to which summitry has been a driver in the formation and the advancement of ASEAN, as well as in responding to prevailing challenges from outside the region, that is, the affirmative and assertive role of China in Southeast Asia in these recent years.

ASEAN Summit: An Overview

ASEAN was founded by the gathering of foreign ministers, and that forum has remained central to the Association since its inception in 1967. It took nine years

before ASEAN was able to convene its first summit meeting in Bali from 23 to 25 February 1976. The delay was due to the presence of a number of contentious issues, such as the 1968 dispute between Malaysia and the Philippines over Sabah. Through the utilisation of quiet diplomacy in the form of both formal and informal discussions, the issue was discussed and managed (*The New Straits Times,* 1968). Also, with the US withdrawal from South Vietnam in 1975, the victory of North Vietnam's communist regime over South Vietnam, the establishment of communist regimes in Laos and Cambodia, and uncertainty with China's policies, ASEAN leaders believed it was time to show their solidarity (Antolik, 1989: 364; *The New Straits Times,* 1975).

After almost a decade of focusing on building trust through bilateral discussions, ASEAN's founding fathers believed that joint discussions at the highest level were now imperative (Indorf, 1978: 36). Indonesia took the lead in convening the first ASEAN summit (*New Nation,* 1975). The then Indonesian Foreign Minister emphasised the importance of convening a summit because 'there are problems affecting the vital interest of the region and they can be discussed at the highest level. After eight years, it would be quite appropriate for heads of state to meet' (*The New Straits Times,* 1975). Thus, in February 1976, all five heads of government met at the first ASEAN summit meeting and signed the Declaration of Bali Concord (I) (ASEAN Secretariat, 1976).

From 1976 to 1992, the summit meetings had been held on an irregular and infrequent basis. Necessity had been the major consideration for ASEAN leaders to convene their summit meetings, especially in between the first ASEAN Summit meeting in 1976 and the fourth ASEAN Summit meeting in 1992. The first ASEAN Summit was a product of two sheer necessities: firstly, there was the need to provide a solid foundation of ASEAN friendship and solidarity, and secondly, the meeting provided meaningful direction on future economic and functional cooperation as well as external relations (ASEAN Secretariat, 1976).

With regard to the first necessity, the US defeat in the Vietnam War, to an extent, provided impetus for ASEAN leaders to strengthen their friendship through cooperation at the highest-level of decision-making (Indorf, 1978). Tun Abdul Razak, the then Malaysian Prime Minister in his opening speech of the Eighth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in 1975 stated that the peoples of Southeast Asia have the opportunity (with the defeat of the U.S in Indochina) to create and establish for

themselves a new world of peace free from foreign domination and influence, in which the countries of the region could cooperate with one another for the common good (ASEAN Secretariat, 1976).

Regarding the second necessity, the summit meeting was necessary to provide the future direction of increasing functional cooperation among ASEAN member states. In its first decade, ASEAN completed hundreds of functional regional projects, although the pace of the progress and the quality of its cooperative enterprise were not entirely satisfactory (Indorf, 1978: 36). Frequent consultations at almost any level including between heads of government of the ASEAN member states were, therefore, necessary to provide meaningful direction to ASEAN's economic cooperation, functional cooperation, and external relations.

Meanwhile, the third ASEAN Summit was only convened ten years after the 1977 Second Summit in Kuala Lumpur. The main reason for not having had a summit meeting for a decade was that there was no general feeling among ASEAN's heads of government that summits were necessary for the maintenance of ASEAN peace and stability (Antolik, 1989: 369). ASEAN's organisational procedures, especially regarding the matter relating to states' honouring their neighbour's sovereignty and refraining from interference had been proven successful to ensure peace and stability in the region (Solidum, 2003). The heads of government's major concerns during those periods were related to domestic economic growth and poverty alleviation (Phanit, 1980). This provided them with a stable neighbouring society, and thus, ASEAN heads of government held the view that Summitry was not necessary at this primary level (Antolik, 1989: 370).

The necessity to respond to the rapid changes in the international political milieu provided the impetus for ASEAN heads of government to hold their fourth summit meeting in 1992. The dismantling of the Berlin Wall, the democratisation of the East European countries, German unification, and the undergoing rapid changes between the Warsaw Pact and NATO were among the major events that made the fourth ASEAN Summit desirable (ASEAN Secretariat, 1992). Additionally, the ASEAN foreign ministers believed that it 'was timely to convene another Summit to chart new directions to enhance intra-ASEAN cooperation' (ASEAN Secretariat, 1992). Indeed, it was at the 1992 ASEAN Summit that the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) was established, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was initiated, consultative relations with interested non-dialogue partners were established, and

the restructuring of ASEAN institutions was carried out. All these initiatives were in mere response to the necessity that prevailed during the convening of the Summit meeting back then in 1992.

It was starting from the year 2000 that the ASEAN Summit meeting became an annual event. In 2003, ASEAN officially declared a commitment to create an ASEAN Community in 2020. The historic and remarkable event was materialised during the chairmanship of Indonesia at the 2003 Bali Summit, and ever since, community-building has become the main focus of the ASEAN leaders. The growing conviction among ASEAN leaders during that time was that the creation of a community would help resolve conflicts inside countries and manage threats coming from the region and beyond (Solidum 1974) . Therefore, ASEAN was trying (and still is) to strengthen its unity and coherence through building the ASEAN Community.

In so doing, ASEAN Summit has been utilized by ASEAN member-states as an indispensable avenue in the process of ASEAN community-building over time. This includes in the formative stage of the ASEAN Community, as well as in speeding-up the process of community-building. Also, ASEAN Summit is an important avenue for ASEAN leaders to maintain ASEAN's driver seat in the region. Indeed, according to one prominent Indonesian politician, 'if the ASEAN Community is materialized, ASEAN countries will be the key players in the international economy and politics in the competition with the European Union, China and East Asia' (cited in *Xinhua*, 2008). The following sections examine in details the degree to which summitry has been a driver of, or, an impediment to the regional community-building of ASEAN by looking at specific ASEAN Summit(s), and the influenced that they had on the development of ASEAN during particular time as well as on the overall development of ASEAN at the moment.

The formation of ASEAN Community

This section examines the extent to which the Ninth ASEAN Summit (2003) has been a driver during the inception of the ASEAN Community.

The 9th ASEAN Summit, 2003 Bali Summit: Shaping and Sharing Norms

In a bid to remain the leader in ASEAN after its leadership capacity was eroded following the 1997 financial crisis, Indonesia, has since 2003, focused on the promotion of democratisation and human rights. Indonesia, for example, proposed

the establishment of ASEAN Security Community (ASC) at the June 2003 ASEAN Senior Officials' Meeting in Phnom Penh (Sukma, 2009: 5). The ASC, according to its advocate, Rizal Sukma, 'would provide a sense of purpose, a practical goal, and a future condition that all member states should strive for', including the need for greater cooperative involvement between ASEAN member states when human rights issue at stake (cited in Wirajuda 2014: 122). Furthermore, Indonesian diplomats and officials claimed that the ASC was necessary as a framework for political and security cooperation as it would align with the 2003 proposal for the establishment of an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), championed by Singapore and Thailand.

Indonesia has formally proposed the ASC at the 9th ASEAN Summit meeting held in Bali on 7-8 October 2003 so as to introduce the concept of shaping and sharing norms as an attempt to have a common understanding of democratisation and human rights (Burrell, 2003). Cognisant on the sensitivity of other member states in discussion the notion of democracy and human rights, the two concepts was not mentioned in the ASC proposal that was presented at the 36th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in June 2003 in Phnom Penh. Instead, Hassan Wirajuda, the then Indonesian Foreign Minister proposed the concept of shaping and sharing norms as an attempt to promote the importance of ASEAN for having common understanding of democratisation and human rights (Djani 2009: 139). As Djani (2009: 139) argues, 'it would be hard to build an ASEAN Community without a single set of rules that represent ASEAN norms/values and principles within legal framework acceptable to all' (Djani 2009, p. 139). According to Carolina Hernandez (2011), Chairman and the Founder of Institute of Strategic and Development Studies, Philippines, 'we have to credit Indonesians for being creative and imaginative' as 'they proposed the APSC and put all the political development, shaping and sharing norms, conflict prevention, conflict resolution, post-conflict peace building, and then institution building' (Interview).

Most of ASEAN's other member states did not share Indonesia's human rights and democratic aspirations. The rejection of human rights and democratic principles did not only come from the newer members of ASEAN, such as Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam, which emphasised state sovereignty, non-interference, and non-intervention. Even the older ASEAN member states (Malaysia, Thailand, Brunei and Singapore, and the Philippines to some extent) were not as willing as Indonesia to push for the inclusion of human rights, freedom of expression and democracy in

ASEAN agreements (Sukma, 2009; 6). 'Why should there be a security community when ASEAN already has the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) which calls for peace in the region? Furthermore, ASEAN has already declared Southeast Asia a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality', said a diplomat who was cited in *The News Straits Times* (cited in Abdullah, 2003). Indonesia had to therefore water down its vision to accommodate the national interests of those member states who were not willing to follow the path that Indonesia had recommended for ASEAN integration (Emmers, 2011). At the end of the Summit meeting, the ASEAN heads of government and state officially stated that the ASC aimed to 'ensure that countries in the region live ... in a just, democratic and harmonious environment' (Declaration of ASEAN Concord II, 2003). The Declaration of the Bali Concord II contained the encompassing vision for a democratic ASEAN through the ASC, but limited it to only providing a '*democratic environment*' (Declaration of Bali Concord II 2003, emphasis added).

This shows that summitry has been an important avenue to: first, in the formation of an ASEAN Community, and second, in setting parameters for what is possible and acceptable within the context of a particular region. In this regard, although Indonesia's attempt to make Southeast Asia democratic region through ASC faced numerous resistance, the 2003 Declaration of Bali Concord II, was the first document in which the word 'democratic' appear in ASEAN official statement.

Speeding-up the process of establishing the ASEAN Community

This section examines a case study of ASEAN Summit which has provided an important avenue in advancing the establishment of the ASEAN Community, that is, the 11th ASEAN Summit, Kuala Lumpur.

11th Summit Meeting: Malaysia and the road to the ASEAN Charter

In 2005 at the 11th ASEAN summit meeting in Kuala Lumpur, the ten leaders of the ASEAN member states agreed on the need to establish an ASEAN Charter – a document that would confer on ASEAN a legal personality. The idea of having an ASEAN Charter officially appeared in ASEAN official documents as early as 1974, when the 7th AMM joint communiqué stated that 'the ministers [foreign ministers of the ASEAN member states] noted the proposal of the Philippines for the adoption of a Charter for ASEAN as part of the current efforts to institutionalise the function and

structure of ASEAN' (ASEAN Secretariat, 1974). At that time however, the proposal was considered inappropriate due to the ASEAN practice of informal, flexible processes as well as its principle of consensus (Anwar, 1994: 113-144). It was only in the early 2000s that the idea of a Charter was brought up again. According to Syed Hamid Albar, Malaysia proposed a paper - *the Review of ASEAN Institutional Framework: Proposal for Change* - in 2004 (Interview 2011). The Foreign Ministers of the ASEAN member states supported the Malaysian proposal, stating 'we agreed towards the development of the ASEAN Charter, and we expressed appreciation to Malaysia for its paper, 'Review of ASEAN Institutional Framework: Proposal for Change' (ASEAN Secretariat, 2004b).

However, the idea of having the Charter was not listed as a main priority at the following 10th ASEAN summit held in November 2004 under the Laos chairmanship. 'They [Laos] did not go and establish a very ambitious agenda' (Ong Keng Yong interview, 2011). Instead, the development of the Vientiane Action Programme (VAP) became the main agenda of the summit, which was a plan that focused on capacity-building through deepening regional integration and narrowing the development gap within ASEAN (ASEAN Secretariat 2005). Laos, due to their lack of experience, was receiving substantial logistical support and advice from abroad, including from Japan, to host the summit (Nazri 2004). This indicates that the Laos government lacked the capacity to hold the ASEAN Summit meeting without outside assistance. Furthermore, although the idea of having a Charter appeared in the VAP as an important step towards building an ASEAN Community by 2020, there was no further discussion of it (ASEAN Secretariat, 2004). Laos' decision to omit the ASEAN Charter from the agenda of the 2004 summit is one example of the power of 'decisions and non-decisions' as expounded by Bachrach and Baratz (1963), whereby a leader's deliberate decision not to act is a second element of power in decision-making processes (Bachrach & Baratz, 1962). A leader's decisions and non-decisions, therefore, can either 'make policies happen, or prevent anything from happening' (Peters, 1994: 9).

Malaysia took the opportunity during its chairmanship of the 11th ASEAN summit in 2005 to proceed with the proposed Charter. A formal declaration calling for the 'Establishment of the ASEAN Charter' was signed in Kuala Lumpur in 2005. Ong Keng Yong (Interview 2011) mentioned Malaysia's role in this regard: 'We [ASEAN] agreed on the idea of the ASEAN Charter. This is surely a very big matter. But

Malaysia had officials at every level to propagate this idea, to draft the Charter: this is the way to do it, this is the way to talk it'. At the summit meeting, the ASEAN leaders agreed on the appointment of an Eminent Persons Group (EPG) tasked to gather recommendations on guidelines leading towards a Charter (Koh, Manalo & Woon, 2009: xix). Although many of the recommendations of the EPG, such as the suggestion that regional solidarity should be based on democracy and human rights, were not adopted in the final text of the ASEAN Charter (Dosch, 2008; 79), the ratification of the ASEAN Charter demonstrates the role of summitry as a venue for leaders to promote new sets of norms and values, and to 'set parameters for what is possible and acceptable' within the context of a regional body (Fawcett, 2015: 38).

The capacity of individual leaders, and especially their organisational knowledge and experience and mediation and persuasion skills, also contribute in facilitating a summit meeting, and therefore, are very likely to advance the progress of ASEAN. Abdullah Badawi himself was a very experienced public servant before assuming the Premiership, and this made it easy for him to deal with bureaucracy both at the national and regional levels (Mohd Ridzam, 2009: 24). Furthermore, his extensive experience as Malaysia's Foreign Affairs Minister between 1991 and 1999 provided him with the skills to liaise with his ASEAN counterparts. Thus, his experience enabled him to propose ideas that were both visionary and pragmatic, and that could be accepted by the other ASEAN member states (Mohd Ridzam, 2009: 28). The proposed ASEAN Charter, in part, represented the epitome of his understanding of what was needed to enhance the progress of ASEAN community-building. Yet, Abdullah Badawi ensured that the development of ASEAN as a regional body is aligned with its traditional values and norms such as the non-interference principle and respect for sovereignty at the very same time.

This confirms that summitry is not all about the leaders, although leaders and leadership are vital elements of a summit meeting. The Chair of the ASEAN Summit certainly has leverage to influence the agenda, both as an individual leader, and through consensual leadership in the role of the Chair, which involves co-ordinating discussions and generating and evaluating alternatives with the other ASEAN leaders. In addition, the resources that a state possesses have been crucial in translating agenda proposals into successful outcomes during summit meetings.

China's rising, and, the US's pivotal role in Asia

This section analyses the extent to ASEAN Summit meetings have been utilized by ASEAN member states to show their solidarity and coherence in providing political responses and policy feedback on China's rising and the US's pivotal role in the region. In particular, it examines two case studies pertinent so as to understand the degree to which summitry can either be a driver or, an impediment to the development of ASEAN, namely, the 45th ASEAN Foreign Ministerial Meeting, which was held in Cambodia in 2012; and the 27th ASEAN Summit, held in Kuala Lumpur in 2015.

Although the 45th ASEAN Foreign Ministerial Meeting was not a meeting of the heads of government and state of the ASEAN member states, and thus does not technically meet the definition of summitry used in this paper, it is significant in the narrative of ASEAN community-building efforts. It was the first time the ASEAN foreign ministers failed to agree on and sign a joint communiqué. In addition, although it was a meeting of the ASEAN foreign ministers, hosted and chaired by Cambodia's Foreign Minister Hor Namhong, Hun Sen, the Prime Minister of Cambodia was behind Namhong's insistence that the South China Sea issue be addressed as 'a bilateral concern' (Gamas & Harvey, 2014: 38) rather than an ASEAN issue.

The 45th ASEAN Foreign Ministerial Meeting

For the very first time since its inception, ASEAN has failed to issue a joint communiqué due to the 'inability to reach consensus on the issue of the South China Sea' (Chheang, 2012: 2). Several issues arose as a result of the failure to issue the joint communiqué. For example, the failure put into question the significance of summitry in charting the direction of ASEAN and the central role of the Chair in ensuring the success of a summit meeting. This is especially so in providing a common position in the matter concerning to the China's assertive role, on the one hand, and the US's pivotal role in the region on another.

The failure to issue a joint communique revealed and confirmed the emerging rift in the region, which was reflected by the alliances that the ASEAN member states have with countries outside and within the region in order to maintain their national interests. The Philippines and Vietnam called for ASEAN solidarity to act against China's belligerent actions on the South China Sea issue – a position favoured by

the US (Ahmad Apandi & Mohamed Pero, 2014: 9). In contrast, Cambodia, due to its close relationship with China and other ASEAN member states such as Singapore (the US's closest ally in the region), opted for the direct involvement of the claimant states through bilateral relations. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the Philippines, Alberto del Rosario stated that 'the Philippines would like to see ASEAN united and question the definition and reason' for China's claims as the first step towards transforming the South China Sea into a Zone of Peace, Freedom, Friendship and Cooperation' (cited in Storey, 2011: 11). Tommy Koh, Ambassador-At-Large at Singapore's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in response to del Rosario, stated that 'ASEAN as a group does not support the claims of the four ASEAN states. The group has also not taken [a] position on the merits of the disputes between China and the ASEAN claimant states' (Koh, 2011: 3). This posed (and still poses) a formidable challenge for ASEAN community-building. As one expert stated, 'if the ASEAN members cannot take a united stance on a matter that affects one of its members, then it [has] indicated it has not yet built up a sense of community among its members' (Thayer, 2012 cited in Barta & Tejada, 2012).

This event is a useful example, which demonstrates the role of ASEAN summit, in influencing the overall progress of ASEAN. In particular, it confirms that the ASEAN Summit can be an impediment to the progress of ASEAN Community, if the host leader and the Chair country, put his or her personal and national interest above regional interests. One of the roles of the Chair of the ASEAN summit, as stipulated in Article 32(b) of the ASEAN Charter is to 'ensure the centrality of ASEAN'. Yet Cambodia failed to play a proactive role and was unsuccessful in establishing a compromise among the ASEAN national leaders.

The 27th ASEAN Summit, Kuala Lumpur

South China Sea (SCS) dispute continues to be a challenging issue for the Chairs of ASEAN summits, including Malaysia which hosted the 27th ASEAN Summit and related meetings. In fact, the ASEAN Defence Ministers, along with their counterparts from eight other countries – Australia, China, India, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Russia and the US failed to sign a joint communiqué at the third ASEAN Defence Minister Plus (ADMM-Plus) meeting in November 2015, which was chaired by Malaysia's Defence Minister, Hishamuddin Onn.

Although the failure in signing a joint communiqué at the 2012 AMM chaired by Cambodia was seen by scholars as clear evidence of ASEAN disunity (see for examples Chheang 2012; Thayer 2012), the decision of the ASEAN Defence Ministers not issuing a joint communiqué is evidence of ASEAN's continued role in the complex geo-strategic environment and institutional setting of the East Asian region. Neither succumbing to China's considerable influence, nor submitting to the pressure from the US (and its allies), the ASEAN member states decided not to issue a joint statement at the end of the ADMM-Plus meeting in November 2015.

According to an official at the Information Office of China's Ministry of National Defence, China closely coordinated and communicated with Malaysia on the draft of the declaration for the ADMM-Plus meeting, and the contents of the draft were approved by China, Malaysia and the other ASEAN member states (Tan, 2015; Tao, 2015). The US delegation, however, showed its displeasure and refused to support the draft version of the declaration (Tan 2015). In particular, China and the US disagreed on how to address rival claims in the SCS. While the US and its allies pushed for the disputes in the SCS, and especially China's construction of artificial islands in the SCS to be mentioned, China lobbied the ASEAN member states against such references (Ahmad, 2015).

Despite the initial agreement between China and the ten ASEAN member states prior to the meeting, the ASEAN Defence Ministers took bold decision not to issue a declaration that avoids mention of the SCS (Tan, 2015). According to Tang Siew Mun (2016), Head of the ASEAN Studies Center at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, 'it is no secret that some other member states would prefer to dilute or dispense altogether with any mention of the South China Sea, but acceded to the larger interest of the group and respected the positions of the ASEAN claimant states' – that was – the decision not to issue a joint declaration that would not mention the SCS. At the same time, Malaysia, as the Chairman of the meeting, released a chairman's statement that does mention the current conditions at the SCS but suggested the potential solutions to ease the conflict in the area (Tan, 2015). Malaysia's Chairman statement urged for 'effective implementation' of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the SCS and the 'early conclusion' of the Code of Conduct in the SCS (ASEAN Secretariat 2015a). Malaysia's and other fellow member states decisions, according to an outside observer, 'proves that ASEAN centrality is still there [existed] (EUAO interview, 2016). ASEAN centrality,

according to Tsjeng (2016; 1) is 'the principle by which ASEAN countries maintain their leadership role in the regional architecture, envisions that the 10 – member grouping can and should act with extra regional powers, while always upholding ASEAN interests, and never allowing external powers to push their own agendas in the region'. The ASEAN centrality has been challenged by the assertive roles of the US and China in the Asian region of late, in which, ASEAN has been increasingly pulled in different directions by the two major power rivalries (Tsjeng, 2016; 1). ASEAN centrality, however, is evidently still alive and workable as has been demonstrated by ASEAN member states decision not to issue a joint statement without the inclusion of the SCS issue.

The consensus on not issuing a joint communiqué demonstrated the commitment and dedication of the ASEAN leaders to maintain ASEAN unity and credibility in the face of a prospective and protracted fight between the Plus countries on whether the joint declaration should have made reference to the SCS dispute (Tan, 2015; Tsjeng, 2016). Malaysia's role in ensuring the ASEAN-10 stayed firmly united, which threatened by the irreconcilable differences between China and US, was crucial, by placing the common regional good at parity with that of its national interest (Tang, 2016). China is Malaysia's largest trade partner, in which China accounted for 12 percent exports and 16.9 per cent imports (Tang, 2016). Malaysia's decision for not issuing a joint communiqué, which was not in line with Beijing's interest, might disappoint China, and therefore, could possibly jeopardise the economic relationship between the two countries. By representing ASEAN's collective will and interest, and not its own, Malaysia had gained trust among other ASEAN member states (Tang, 2016), which later justified the mutual consensus among ASEAN-10 for not issuing a joint communiqué. Indeed, the decision for not issuing a joint communiqué, according to Teoh (2015), 'was a powerful signal to Beijing that it will not have it all its own way and be able to bully Southeast Asian nations reliant on trade with the Asian giant'. For Singapore's Defence Minister, Ng Eng Hen, the failure for issuing a joint communiqué was not necessarily bad for ASEAN progress as there was recognition of different points of view: 'We would have all preferred for us to be able to sign off on the joint declaration. But I don't think necessarily that it's a bad thing' (cited in Channel News Asia 2015). This shows the importance of role of the ASEAN Chair to enhance ASEAN credibility, first, by facilitating intra-ASEAN consensus building although there is prevailing

disagreement among member states to deal with a particular issue or crisis, and second, by serving as an effective interlocutor with external parties.

Conclusion

The analysis within this paper suggests that summitry is crucial for the success of ASEAN. It is a forum for heads of state and government in providing meaningful direction for the development of ASEAN, through the inclusion or exclusion of agendas. It helps set the future political direction of a regional body. It provides an opportunity to respond to the prevailing challenges at both the regional and international levels. It allows leaders to manage the divergent views of member states. It is an important symbol of engagement among heads of government and states (Murray, 2010; 31), conducted based on trust, which can materially contribute to the progress of regional community-building efforts. Summitry, therefore, as has found in this paper, can determine the success or failure of leadership in a regional context.

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RE-THINKING OF ASEAN REGIONAL INTEGRATION:

PEOPLE-ORIENTED TOWARDS COMMUNITARIAN

APPROACHES

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Abstract

Most recent discussions about regional integration among ASEAN members led to the collective agenda called ASEAN Community whose goals are to create a productive multilateral program. The program has been divided into three sectors which are ASEAN Economic Community, ASEAN Political-Security Community, and ASEAN Socio-Culture Community. The ASEAN integration process at least involves three internal actors. First is political actors (governments, political elite, who get benefits from security cooperation to avoid conflict among SEA states, etc.).Second is business actors (economy elite, corporations, who run businesses and get benefits from trade agreements) and third is people actors (society, communities, who receive direct benefits from ASEAN integration). The first and second groups have direct benefits from ASEAN integration, but for the third group, especially those from grassroots (middle and low level society), they have lack of understanding on what ASEAN is all about, and what are benefits and advantages of having ASEAN integration to their life. This paper aims at three folds, first is to discuss, how relevant the concept of communitarianism that bring ideas about the importance role of communities in term of regional political aspects, especially to create a 'real' regional community and regional identity. Second is to discuss how the ASEAN's idea of people-oriented can be implemented through the communitarianism approach. Third is to discuss how states-oriented integration can move towards people-oriented integration. The findings show that in creating regional integration, i.e. ASEAN Community agenda, ASEAN should consider the role of communities and acknowledge their existences in the ASEAN agenda so that it can be more integrated society. Second, the legitimate role of the communities in ASEAN would able to cope and helping some of social issues which occur in the society by using direct community to community approach. Third, the communitarianism perspective is very much relevant to the ASEAN's idea about people-oriented approach, because communitarianism offers the importance of community in a nation as a co-actor in the regional integration process in helping mutual consciousness among the actors. Fourth, the mix of ASEAN's state oriented and people-oriented should be applied by the organization to fulfill the agenda of ASEAN Community, by using both the top-bottom model and the bottom-up model. Fifth, ASEAN should convince and deliver

benefits to the community, so that the community can support the integration agenda.

Keywords: Regional Integration; ASEAN Community; Communitarianism; Community Involvement

Introduction: Regional Integration as a States Cooperation Model

The concept of regional integration has brought different ideas about the changing of states behavior, from conflict and war relationship to be more collective and used cooperative way in maintaining their connections. In some state-controlled domains such as political-military, socio-economy aspects are remained as the main reason why states need to be integrated with other adjacent areas or regions through common institutions, agenda and rules.

The common acts are basically about mutual initiative in making collective decision to determine the goals. Hence, the regional integration process cannot be separated from Mitrany's approach of functionalism theory and Hass approach of neo-functionalism theory, which explain deep understanding and basic model of states regional integration theory. These approaches believed that inter-states integration should be able to share their government as one of institutional governance and to create a 'material interdependence' (Mitrany, 1933). Another assumption of these approaches stated that the development of world system is influenced by the states and non-state actors which believed about the common interest, shared needs, and mutual understanding of peace (Caporaso, 1998), refuse the ideas of state power and political influence (Ziring, Riggs, and Plano, 2005), rather than the idea of states self-interest that is believed by the realists (Rosamond, 2000).

In fact, inter-state regional integration cannot be separated from political and military aspects (i.e. NATO, Warsaw Pact). From military alliance's perspective they believed that the basic understanding in the creation of a state's regional institution is to organize themselves against possible threats by other countries, and to protect their shared territories. Even so, the ambition of states integration based on the ideas of functionalism and neo-functionalism has brought about some specific issues that need to be solved among state members, such as non-traditional security issues such as economic, trade zone, border dispute, cultural issues, natural disasters, etc. Regional integration can be seen as the extended process of individual state's

national interest into inter-state interest level (institutions with formal norms and rules) with a 'voluntarily mingle' (Haas, 1971) or sometime use a coercive act through transnational manner. Such Haas's views about European Union (EU) regional integration, he believed that the context of 'spill over' effects occurred in EU integration process, from economic area then spread into other areas such as political spectrum, and became a supra-national body. The EU integration shows about the dialectics of common interest among European countries, where the egoism of individual states by what the realist viewed about state's authority and sovereignty has slightly sidelined.

According to Lombaerde and Langenhove (2007), there are at least eight important points of regional integration initiatives: (1) Strengthening of trade, (2) Private sector development, (3) Economic and infrastructure growth, (4) Strong public sector institutions and good governance, (5) Development of an inclusive civil society, (6) contribution to peace and security, (7) Environment programs, and (8) Inter-region interaction. The above structure of regional initiatives shows that the global political shifted after post-war period, mutual cooperation needs to be undertaken within the framework of multilateral projects and agenda to develop and maintain the national interest and long peace. States leaders are also considered as main contributors to the evolution of international relations subject with valid empirical evidence and have created the phenomenon become more complex to be analyzed especially with regards to the discussion about regional trade blocs, regional politics, and economic development or crisis, and so forth.

In practice, the state's regional integration are basically run by government and political actors which represent national (society-people) views and ideas to get more benefits and advantages from their cooperation. It can be seen that regional integration is as a cooperative model created among the states involved in making positive possibilities and opportunities to fulfill their national agenda. In short, integration is not an end in itself, but a process to support economic growth strategies, greater social equality and promote democratization process (Haokip, 2012). In fact, the level of integration depends upon the willingness and commitment of independent sovereign states to share their sovereignty and common values.

Based on these facts, there are some of questions that need to be addressed. First, if the regional integration inside the institution is a cooperative model among states to create more profits or advantages to their own country, will the people and

communities in these countries get direct benefit from it? Is there any part of the regional integration that needs to be played by the communities to assist the states relationship through people to people interaction?

In the case of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), it is another example where states regional integration is planned to be more tight (or highly integrated) in their relationship. Today, ASEAN's main agenda is to create and build ASEAN Community which reflects into three sectors, namely ASEAN Economic Community, ASEAN Political-Security Community, and ASEAN Socio-Culture Community. From the terminology of 'community', it seems that ASEAN wanted to develop the doctrine or the utterance of 'community' as used by the EU during 1950s-1990s in creating more 'intimate' relationship among their members. Then the next question to be addressed is that, Do the 'communities' (people/society) in SEA region really know and understand what ASEAN is all about? Or is it a necessary action for betterment of their future life?

According to the article written by analysts Michael H. Fuchs and Stefanie Merchant on *www.thediplomat.com*, dated 1 July 2016 titled "*What ASEAN Can Learn From Brexit",* they highlighted several things. First, they stated that 'leave campaign' or Brexit voters tended to be older, less educated, and live in rural areas, but in that case, these groups are ironically benefit the most from EU integration, however their concerns focused on the loss of jobs, rising inequality, etc. Second, Brexit shows that citizen's education about regional institutions is vital, where it can be seen from the lack of accurate knowledge about the EU and its relationship with Great Britain. An EU Survey found that nearly half of EU citizens said that they did not understand how the EU works.

In their article, Michaels H. Fuchs and Stefanie Merchant said that, there was one study found that only a quarter of Southeast Asian citizens know what ASEAN is all about, and while the study did not ask about the ASEAN Economic Community, one can infer that the understanding of the AEC would be far less. By looking to the EU case – Brexit issue above, then what makes ASEAN is very confident to introduce and promote ASEAN's regional integration as using 'community' term? A quick survey about the 'people understanding about ASEAN' has been conducted to support this study. A pilot survey held in Medan, Indonesia towards thirty participants found that ten person of participants know what ASEAN is (but they did not know what the real benefit or what the effect of ASEAN to their life), fifteen participants did

not know what ASEAN is all about, and only small portion of the participants quite understand about the ASEAN and AEC.

During Kuala Lumpur Declaration on a People-Oriented, People-Centered ASEAN on 27 April 2015, the ASEAN wanted to shift their orientation from state-oriented to people-oriented approach. The change in ASEAN approach seems will bring less impact to the society unless a massive effort needs to be conducted to campaign to the people on ASEAN agenda and how ASEAN will benefit their life. This paper is trying to understand more about the key role, function of communities in making real regional integration of ASEAN.

Regional Integration through Communitarian Approach

As aforementioned, the regional integration concept can be seen from liberalism, functionalism, and neo-functionalism school of thoughts. Another perspective to understand the phenomenon is to observe regional integration and its correlation to communitarianism theory. The terminology of communitarianism has been coined into scholarly discourses since 20th Century. However, the 'word' of communitarian itself was introduced by Goodwyn Barmby in 1840s. This understanding shifted attention to the community and society and dissociate individuals.

As what Amitai Etzioni views on communitarianism theory that communities have two characteristics: first, relationships among a group of individuals, relationships that often crisscross and reinforce one another; and secondly, a measure of commitment to a set of shared values, norms, and meanings, and a shared history and identity or culture. The communitarianism has criticized classic liberalism in several areas such as autonomy of individuals and universalism. The theory has made several assumptions. First, it emphasizes the ethical and psychological value of community members, and second, communitarianism is rated as anti-liberalism or it is a critique of the liberalism values. At this time, we can see that, inside the communities, there are individual autonomies existed that shares their common values to be one flexible represented entity. Communitarianism wanted to play important role in the state levels, because they believed that mutual goal cannot be achieved by individual act, but it should be achieved through integrated society.

There are similar ideas and features of integration between regional integration concept (for states interest) with community (which basically integrated

for society interest), where both are giving their 'hope' into one specific institution or agency which underline the functions of integrated system. However, in practice, states regional integrations conduct their interest based on political, economy, security and strategic agenda, while communities mostly address their interest based on ethical, norms, local wisdom, and humanitarian values. It's very much compatible with what Viola (2004) stated that the idea of community is closely linked to the reasons for the formation of a 'commonality', i.e. to the benefits that common life brings to the individuals participating therein. If there is a community, the common good must be significant, i.e. it must concern the benefits of those taking part in it.

What we can see from both concepts are that states regional integration should be able to put communities in line with the regional organization, because there is a similarity of character in term of process in making a mutual body or organization. In human life, communities played an important role in every single aspect, so then states need to collaborate with the people to unify and create same perceptions about states regional integration such as the case of ASEAN for instance. As mentioned earlier, ASEAN should learn from Brexit, especially in terms of developing the communities within ASEAN nations, and give communities places to play their strategic role, so that communities could deliver their knowledge, experiences, benefit to society at the grass-root level, then the communities can understand the important function of ASEAN to their life.

Communities are the sub-unit of a state where they can give a direction to a regional integration positively or negatively. The case of Brexit, the people of UK already decided their choice through votes, highlighting the immigrant issues, lack of job opportunities, economic gaps, and so forth which led their distrust to EU. In the context of ASEAN, even ASEAN does not have a 'vote form' by the people to determine their country in the organizational system like EU, yet ASEAN should learn from the Brexit issue, where behind all that structured organization, some groups of the people were not satisfied and were not putting adequate concerns on the regional organizations itself. Meaning that, even well-organized regional institutions are remained weak, if the organizations cannot fulfill and supply benefits to the people, especially the failure to deliver the organization's objectives to the public.

The concept of regional integration are usually focused on the development of economic growth in a region (intra-region) and/or inter-region. In many cases, the

functions of regional economic integration leads to the strengthening of modern liberalism ideas such as free trade zone, capital market, privatization, fiscal austerity, deregulation, etc., which attracted discrepancy views pertaining to the ideas of communitarianism, where the ideas of public participation was neglected.   In contrast, regional integration model believed that the more the states integrate one another, the easier the economic or other issues can be solved.

However in practice, some critiques have been arisen in response to the global economic development mechanism especially in term of market capitalism and individualism behavior. Many people believed that the benefits of global trade organizations or even regional trade organizations which use a neo-liberalism approach only go to limited groups of people or only to political elite groups or big business groups, whereas the economic consequences of the trade integration affect all people; as the socialists say the integration actually neglects the collective prosperity. Neo-liberalist such as Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman, believed that a free market will encourage market efficiency, economic growth, income distribution, and so forth that benefit to all people. However, if we look back into the Brexit issue for instance, as the vote's reflect, it shows that the benefits of the integration especially in terms of economy equality was not or rarely reached to the society or grass-root levels.

Although modern liberalism believes in cooperation and mutualism as an alternative tool in sustaining peaceful conditions among neighboring countries, but practically the ideas of classic liberalism which stressed on 'the power of individualism' and 'individual autonomy' are still dominating today's regional integration characteristics and they most of the time neglect the 'power' of communities. Sen (2009) argued that we should involve people in such an integration effort, not only to the distribution of goods, but also how to create a condition so that the people are able to use those goods to pursue their needs effectively.

However, in ASEAN context, there is a meeting to represent the ASEAN's people called as ASEAN Civil Society Conference / ASEAN People Forum (ACSC/APF) which invites civil society organizations, NGOs, people's organizations and people's movements. In 2015, APF addressed to strengthen its involvement in ASEAN within theme "Reclaiming the ASEAN Community for the People". However, we believe that, the meeting did not really impact to the public awareness and

people's knowledge about the ASEAN itself. The ASEAN communities perhaps admire a real platform, and not just a ceremonial meeting. ASEAN leaders will need to learn how to create more activities and platforms to attract grass-root to be involved directly in the ASEAN integration and finally get benefits from the integration.

ASEAN Case on Regional Integration: States-Oriented towards People Oriented??

By looking at the ASEAN integration, there are three groups who are directly involved in the development of the ASEAN regional integration. First is the "states" or governments. The states are the main actors in ASEAN integration that responsible for encouraging and regulating multilateral cooperation (government-to-government and business-to-business) which involved relationship among two or more countries within SEA region. For instance, ASEAN has a main agenda based on regional issues as in EU that begins with mutual needs and to create a regional stability and peace. In the integration of ASEAN, member countries have some common agreement which are not to interfere in the internal affairs of fellow members, non-intervention doctrine, the resolution of dispute by peaceful means, rejecting the use of deadly force, rejected use of forces or military forces and undertake effective cooperation among member countries through effective cooperation and collective decision.

The state as the main actor can feel many benefits and advantages derived from the embodiment of the organization, in particular to build trust among countries not to use military force in resolving an issue or problem, and also run the economic cooperation, political, socio-cultural to meet national interest with no single country dominates in it. The member countries have become an integral part in the ASEAN or already be ASEAN-*ized,* as its formation is based on common goals as reflected by the Bangkok Declaration, and to realize how important it is to develop ASEAN in creating Southeast Asian regional stability that can provide benefits to each member.

The second group is the businesses, industries, and trade players, where this group is considered as the implementing actors for the integration that run the cooperation and activities which had previously been agreed by the member countries of ASEAN as in the first group especially through economic agreement. As stated in the Blueprint for the AEC, there are some strategic work plan in the short,

medium and long-term towards the establishment of ASEAN economic integration, including (1) Single market and production base (current free trade the goods, services, investment, skilled labor and capital); (2) Creating economic region with high competitiveness (regional competition policy, IPRs action plan, infrastructure development, ICT, energy cooperation, taxation, and the development of Small and Medium Enterprises / SMEs); (3) Creating a region with equitable economic development (region of equitable economic development) through SME development and programs of the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI); and (4) Creating full integration in the global economy.

As aforementioned, business sectors play an important role in ASEAN integration in executing the economic agreement. Hence, the second group of ASEAN integration is said to really receive positive benefits from ASEAN integration. Before AEC was launched, the business and industrial sectors only focused on big business oriented, where today, the AEC integration has also put the small and medium enterprises or SMEs as a 'new player' in coloring the ASEAN economic integration. However, the following question: Does the SMEs as new players really understand how the AEC works? needs to be answered. The entanglement of major industrial sectors that were previously involved in the cooperation between ASEAN countries so far have shown that the second group of ASEAN integration is also aware that the cooperation between ASEAN could provide a positive impact to them, so they felt that ASEAN is an important regional organization in carrying out economic activities that provide more benefits.

However, there is another group usually forgotten, which does not belong to political and business elite group, it is society and community (grass-root) groups. A society is the main foundation in any community. If there is no society, then there will not be a country. Integrating some societies into a country may be an easier effort than integrating societies into a regional community, because the later involved more than one country or more cultures and systems to be integrated and it should become one regional identity. In fact, ASEAN Community agenda needs a new approach in consolidating the organization. ASEAN is trying to shift their approach from state-centered to people-centered approach. It seems that ASEAN wants to re-introduce and to reactivate their approach to be more direct people-action schemes.

Let us make it clear, if ASEAN wants to apply people-oriented scheme, then they should accommodate the people and communities interest. If they fail to evince

it, then the terminology of 'community' and the idea of people-oriented will only be a lip slogan or just like utopian ideas. ASEAN should give communities chances and spot to move freely and independently in supporting ASEAN integration. When communities in ASEAN have been carrying out its functions as *co-actors*, then automatically the awareness and sense of shared regional identity will arise, and it would contribute to solve some of social issues in ASEAN countries.

The Importance of Community in ASEAN Integration

In previous section, we have discussed about how the evolution of ASEAN integration has brought about the cultural changes and shifting role of states-oriented towards people-oriented scheme. As we mention earlier, ASEAN people are represented by several communities, and each community from any background can contribute to the ASEAN programs, such as educational program, healthy program, social program, or other issues to be solved. This paper tries to contribute in highlighting some importance roles of communities that ASEAN can use in developing their activities among members, and in creating real regional integration based on communities' actions. For instance, the Rohingya's issue, perhaps ASEAN should have an ASEAN Religious Scholars Forum or Meeting platform where the forum comprises of Muslims, Christians, Buddhist, Catholics, and any other recognized religion in ASEAN countries to talks about the humanity, discrimination, and other issues which are quite sensitive and a segregated discussion in publics in some ASEAN countries.

On the other hand, today ASEAN has an ASEAN Youth Cultural Forum under ASEAN University Network (AUN), but their strategic functions need to be clearer in its objectives and goals. The ASEAN Youth Cultural Forum cannot be an exclusive forum under AUN listed universities but it needs to be opened to other universities in ASEAN region. It is highly encouraged to some extend to include high school students in ASEAN youth programs. The ASEAN Youth Forum or other project should be delivered to all ASEAN youth generations. Because it is the way to distribute and share knowledge, building mutual consciousness and later creating a mutual trust and collective identity of ASEAN-ness.

All levels of communities in ASEAN should be given same chances and opportunities in an open space to meet and talk and solve any problem arises in the communities. Perhaps in the future ASEAN will have more forums or platforms for

different groups of communities such as teacher, academician, medical doctors, lawyers, fishermen, farmers, journalists, bloggers and so forth. If we have more rooms to specific groups of ASEAN community to join directly in the ASEAN integration process, we believe that many communities from different backgrounds can give their contributions to ASEAN integration.

From the discussion above, we conclude some of the importance of community in ASEAN integration process: (1) The community can create an alternative approach in responding to some of issues in ASEAN as 'direct' second track diplomacy; (2) The community can provide awareness and mutual identity for the public, and promoting, branding about ASEAN; (3) The community can contribute to strengthening the integration of ASEAN; (4) The community can implement and change ASEAN's perspective of state-oriented to the idea of people-oriented, (5) As what Putnam (2000) has pointed out, it is essential for ASEAN to have the collective value of all 'social networks' especially in maintaining democracy. However, afore-discussed, the main function of the community is on how the community can raise awareness to each people about ASEAN integration. Additional point is that the community role can push ASEAN regional governance to be more functional and benefits to the society.

ASEAN integration has run their objective very well especially in making potential business, and maintaining their regional economic growth. But in certain issues, in many cases, the doctrine of ASEAN non-intervention becomes obstacle in solving some socially sensitive issues. ASEAN is encouraged to involve communities groups at all levels as an 'extended hand' of the government in solving some unrest social problems in ASEAN.

Conclusion

In this part, we conclude that when states regional integration wants to be tighter and strong, then it should involve the people into the organization activities. States regional organization should also address people interests without no exception and all inclusive. To be a successful integration, ASEAN needs to create direct benefits, advantages of the organization to all communities. When liberalism believed in states cooperation, then states should believe in communities' interaction inside the organization to create balance position. Regional economic integration should be delivered equally to the people without discrimination.

Political actors, economic actors and community actors should able to communicate and collaborate their interest. These three actors play their own specific functions in ASEAN. The political actors or governments' function is to make an agreement and run their diplomatic agenda. The economic actors function is to execute and run the business and industrial sector, and lastly, the community actors' function is to support organization activities and serve as an social capital to run some of the programs in accordance with their capabilities. The other thing is, community can be a constructive activists in the region, to make check and balance to the organization.

When three actors above carry out their functions based on collective consciousness without ego-centric, the regional integration will automatically find its ways to create a one regional identity. This paper believes that communities and collective consciousness is not only factors that can promise long-term regional cooperation, but it might be the central focus of the organization. This paper argues that the communitarianism perspective might be useful in delivering the idea about the importance of community especially in regional integration process. However, as its limitation, this paper might not be able to explain comprehensive characteristics of communitarianism perspective, but it limits its discussion only to observe the linkage between the role of communities in state regional integration process.

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THE ASEAN COMMUNITY: ARE THE MALAYSIAN YOUTHS AWARE AND PREPARED?[1]

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Abstract

The ASEAN Community, which also consists of the Community blueprints - ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC), and ASEAN Social-Cultural Community (ASCC), is finally launched in 2016 after years of conceptualization, discussion, and debates about the viability of regional community formation in Southeast Asian. Yet, critics argue that the Southeast Asia's regional formation is a top-down process, where the idea of community identity is not shared by the majority of people. What's more important is, whether the younger generation could understand and even aware about the impending establishment of ASEAN Community. Henceforth, this article seeks to answer some pertinent questions regarding Malaysian youth's understanding, attitudes, awareness, and preparedness to the ASEAN Community. A survey was conducted between August and September 2015, to ascertain the Malaysian youth perception on the Community by testing four major variables:. The survey was conducted on 5,032 Malaysian youths in six different zones: the north, south, central, and eastern region of the peninsular Malaysia, Sabah, and Sarawak. The survey reveals some important findings. Firstly, the knowledge and understanding of the ASEAN Community among the Malaysian youths are still minimal. Secondly, Malaysian youths have a good perception of the relevancy and. benefits of ASEAN community. Although their level of awareness was low, they show some supports to the Community formation. Thirdly, Malaysian youth felt that they are in fact not ready for the ASEAN Community. Finally, the finding suggests that the government needs to embark upon various youth-inclusive programs to better socialize this new generation to the idea and concept of the ASEAN Community and, to prepare them for a closer regional integration.

Introduction

Emulating the initial success of European regionalism, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has set its objective to forge closer integration among member countries and embarked upon the ambitious project of creating an ASEAN Community. The idea for a regional community identity was first discussed during 1997 Informal ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur. The ASEAN community idea is also part of the ASEAN 2020 Vision. The ASEAN's Nineteenth Bali Summit signifies an important milestone for ASEAN since all member countries agreed to form a formal regional Community by 2015. The joint statement of the 2003 Summit emphasised the commitment of the ten-member countries by declaring that, "an ASEAN Community shall be established comprising three pillars, namely political and security cooperation, economic cooperation, and social-cultural cooperation…" (Declaration on ASEAN Concord II 2003). In 2015, Malaysia, as the chair of the twenty-sixth ASEAN Summit took the lead by the formally declaring the formation of the regional community. The slogan, "One People, One Community, One Vision", exhibits ASEAN's confidence to build a sustained regional identity years to come.

Nonetheless, it has been argued that ASEAN is an elitist and state-centric organization. It lacks public involvement in the process of regional identity formation. There is also a huge gap between the public and the elite in terms of decision-making process especially in regards to the formation of the ASEAN Community. (Benny, 2015; Abdullah & Benny, 2013; Benny & Abdullah, 2011; Moorthy & Benny, 2012, 2013; Collins, 2008; Lindberg & Scheingold, 1970; Hewstone, 1986) The European experience, for instance, has clearly shown that public opinion needs to be gauged and attended to for the success of the integration and for making effective decisions. Theories of regional integration have also shown that opinions and participation of the public determines the success of such efforts. Furthermore, given the current plurality of political, economic and social systems in the region, Moorthy & Benny (2012) argue that it is difficult to determine public opinion through a direct voting mechanism similar to that of the European. Thus, a more feasible measure needs to be used effectively. There were also lacks of comprehensive studies to measure people's understanding, opinion, attitude or even aspiration on the ASEAN Community. It cannot be denied some works have been conducted on the public

opinion on the ASEAN Community (Benny, 2015; Abdullah & Benny, 2013; Benny & Abdullah, 2011; Moorthy & Benny, 2012, 2013). But, there tends to be a vacuum in terms of understanding the youth perception on the regional community building. This is not to mention the absence of studies about public aspiration of the three pillars of the ASEAN Community.

The Study

In the case of Malaysia, there were almost none that attempted to gauge the youth's opinion on the subject. Studies on the ASEAN community are numerous, yet these studies were conducted by government officials and academics using an elite decision making approach for assessing establishment processes or social, political, and economic challenges of ASEAN (Acharya, 2003; Hew, Wah, & Lee, 2004; Hew, 2007; Guerrero, 2008), as well as the readiness of the business sector for the AEC (Abidin, Loh, & Aziz, 2012; Mugijayani & Kartika, 2012). Studies on public opinion about ASEAN are quite rare. There have only been a few studies so far involving public opinion about ASEAN (see Abdullah & Benny, 2013; Benny, 2014;, Benny & Abdullah, 2011; Benny, Moorthy, Daud, & Othman, 2015a, 2015b; Benny, Rashila & Tham, 2014; Benny, Siew Yean, & Ramli, 2015; Moorthy & Benny, 2012a, 2012b, 2013; Thompson & Thianthai, 2008), but those studies were based on the public opinion surveys conducted between 2009 and 2010 and do not discuss opinions, attitudes and aspirations for the ASEAN Community among Malaysian youths. Studies conducted by Benny (2015) investigate the awareness and perception of the relevancy of the ASEAN Community among the public in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Vietnam. Yet, his analysis was limited to the study on the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) aspect.

Therefore, this study is to fill those gaps. It is generally aimed to examine Malaysian youths' opinion especially on their understanding, attitude, awareness, and preparedness to the establishment of ASEAN Community. The youths – those who are in the age between 15 and 40 years old – are a very important segment of people not only in Malaysia but also the whole ASEAN region. It is expected that population of youths in Southeast Asia will increase to 55% by 2020.

This study differs from the previous studies in three ways: Firstly, none of past studies focused on the opinion and attitude of Malaysian youths on the ASEAN Community. Secondly, the object of this study is different since it involves data from

six different zones in Malaysia– the central, northern, south, Eastern part of peninsular Malaysia, Sabah, and Sarawak. Thirdly, the study involves quite a big number of respondents, with about 5,032 Malaysian youth were interviewed.

Research Variables and Indicators

Research variables used in this study are organized based on the three specific research objectives. In order to achieve the first research objective - to examine the extent which the Malaysian Youths know and understand about the ASEAN Community, we measure: firstly, the objective awareness of the ASEAN Community (four open-ended indicators); and secondly, the subjective awareness (measured with 6 six-scale Likert indicators). Most subjective awareness indicators were adapted from the public opinion study conducted by Abdullah, Benny, and Omar Din (2010) and Moorthy and Benny (2012b).

The study also attempts to investigate attitudes among the youth towards ASEAN Community. This objective is measured by using 17 six-scale Likert indicators that consist of four indicators of a perceived relevancy, six indicators of perceived benefits and seven indicators of supports. Details of the questions are presented in the appendix.

Finally, this study is to assess the readiness among Malaysian youth for the ASEAN Community. This variable is analysed by using five six-scale Likert indicators that was developed together by the research team through a series of focus group discussion (FGD).

Methodology

Survey Design

This study used a survey method in collecting responses based on the three major objectives highlighted earlier. A set of structured self-administered questionnaire in Bahasa Malaysia was used. The questions were tested during two pilot tests. Modifications were made after the pilot tests. Each pilot study involved 20 respondents. The pilot studies were conducted in Bangi, Selangor (representing urban area) and Changloon, Kedah (representing rural area).

The survey sampling utilized multi-stage purposive sampling method in twelve areas (six each in urban and rural areas) in six zones in Malaysia. The stages of sampling are as follows. Firstly, the survey was divided into six zones, where the

Peninsular Malaysia was divided into four zones – north, south, central, and east. Sabah and Sarawak were the remaining zones. Secondly, each zone was further divided into two areas – rural and urban. The study decided to select 60% respondents from urban area and 40% respondents from rural area: Kota Bahru and Kuala Krai in Kelantan representing the peninsular's eastern zone; Johor Bahru and Pontian in Johor representing the southern zone; and Alor Setar and Kodiang in Kedah representing the northern zone; Bangi and Kuala Selangor in Selangor representing the central region of the Peninsula. In Sabah and Sarawak, Kota Kinabalu, Keningau, Kuching and Serian represented the two states respectively. Finally, in each of the twelve areas, the respondents were selected by quota sampling based on major ethnic groups that represents the Malaysian population (48% Malay, 24% Chinese, 12% Indian, 16% Sabahan and Sarawakian indigenous groups).

The survey was conducted between August and September 2015. The study targeted 500 respondents in each urban area and 330 in each rural area. Enumerators from each area with the assistance of the local Youth and Sport office were assigned to collect and compile the date from the survey. The enumerators directly met and interviewed respondents each areas or zones assigned to them.

Methods for Analysis

The study used univariate statistics procedures to obtain a descriptive statistical profile of the respondents. Whenever relevant, data were analysed using the univariate analysis statistics such as frequency, percentage, and mean. To simplify the analysis, the frequency distributions of 6-point scales were regrouped into three response categories – tend to agree, tend to disagree and undecided. Thus, those who disagree and completely disagree were combined into one group of "disagree"; those who agree and completely agree were combined into one group of "agree"; and those who somewhat agree and somewhat agree were combined into one group of "undecided."

Respondent Profiles

The respondents involved in the study consisted of 5,032 Malaysian youths. About 3,009 respondents (59.8%) live in urban area while 2,032 respondents (40.2%) in rural area. In term of gender, 54.6% of respondents were male while 45.4% were

female. In urban areas, 55.1% respondents were male and 44.9% were female. In rural area, male respondents made up 53.8% of respondents, while the remaining 46.2% were female.

In term of age group, 24.8% of respondents came from 15-18 years old group, 20.8% in the 19-24 years old group, 16.8% were in 25-30 years old group and 37.6% were from 31-40 years old group. In urban area, 24.6% of respondents were from 15-18 years old group, 22.1% were from 19-24 years old group, 16.0% were from 25-30 years old group and 37.3% were from 31-40 years old group. In rural area, 25.0% of respondents were from 15-18 years old group, 18.8% were from 19-24 years old group, 17.9% were from 25-30 years old group and 38.3% were from 31-40 years old group.

For the type of occupation, 22.7% of respondents worked in the government sector, 25.3% in private sector, 23.0% doing business, 9.4% students, 5.2% university or college students, 12.9% housewives, 0.8% others and, 3.3% were not working. In urban area, 21.6% of respondents worked in the government sector, 24.8% in private sector, 23.4% doing business, 7.6% students, 3.5% university or college students, 15.0% housewives, 0.8% others, and 3.2% were not working. In rural area, 24.2% of respondents worked in the government sector, 19.8% in private sector, 22.3% doing business, 12.2% students, 7.7% university or college students, 9.8% housewives, 0.7% others and, 3.3% were not working.

The majority of respondents were SPM/SPMV school leavers; 20% has either Sijil Pelajaran Malaysia (SPM), Sijil Tinggil Agama Malaysia (STAM), other certificates or diplomas; 13.5% have bachelor degree, 3.6% master degree and 0.8% doctoral degree. However, there are also 22.6% of the respondent hold Sijil Rendah Pelajaran Malaysia (SRP) or Penilaian Menengah Rendah (PMR) certificate; 1.2% holds on Ujian Penilaian Sekolah rendah (UPSR); and 1.6% does not have formal education.

Table 1: Respondents Profile

Demography		Urban Areas (n = 3,009)	Rural Areas (n = 2,023)	Overall (n=5,032)
Gender	Male	44.9%	46.2%	45.4%
	Female	55.1%	53.8%	54.6%
Age group	15 – 18 years old	24.6%	25.0%	24.8%
	19 – 24 years old	22.1%	18.8%	20.8%
	25 – 30 years old	16.0%	17.9%	16.8%
	31 – 40 years old	37.2%	38.3%	37.7%
Occupational background	Government sector	21.6%	24.2%	22.7%
	Private sector	28.8%	19.8%	25.3%
	Student	11.1%	19.9%	14.7%
	Doing business	23.4%	22.3%	23.0%
	No job	3.2%	3.3%	3.3%
	Others	11.90%	10.50%	11.00%
Ethnicity	Malay	46.8%	48.8%	47.6%
	Chinese	24.5%	21.2%	23.1%
	Indian	12.7%	10.7%	11.9%
	Sabahan/ Sarawakian	14.6%	17.0%	15.6%
	Others	1.4%	2.4%	1.8%
Religion	Islam	56.3%	57.0%	56.6%
	Buddhism	21.1%	16.1%	19.1%
	Hinduism	11.3%	9.2%	10.5%
	Christianity	11.1%	17.7%	13.8%
	Others	0.2%	0.0%	0.1%

In term of ethnicity, 47.6% respondents were Malay, 23.1% were Chinese, 11.9% Indian, 10.9% Sabahan, 4.7% Sarawakian, and 1.8% from other ethnicities. In the cities, 46.8% respondents were Malay, 24.5% were Chinese, 12.7% Indian, 10.2% Sabahan, 4.4% Sarawakian, and 1.4% from other ethnicities. In the rural, 48.8% respondents were Malay, 21.2% Chinese, 10.7% Indian, 11.8% Sabahan, 5.2% Sarawakian, and 2.4% other ethnicities.

The majority of respondents (56.6%) were Muslims, 19.1% Buddhists, 10.5% Hindus, 13.8% Christians, and 0.1% others. In the urban areas, 56.3% of respondents were Muslims, 21.1% Buddhists, 16.3% Hindus, 11.1% Christians, and 0.2% others. In the rural areas, 57.0% of respondents were Muslims, 16.1% Buddhists, 9.2% and Hindus, 17.7% Christians.

Awareness and Knowledge of ASEAN Community

Subjective Awareness of the ASEAN Community

To measure the subjective awareness of the Malaysian youths on the ASEAN Community, four (4) six-scale Likert indicators were posed to respondents (see Table 2). The study found that majority respondents (59.8% in general, 59.9% in urban areas, and 59.7% in rural areas) claimed that they have heard or read about ASEAN Community. Only 7.0% (7.2% in urban and 6.6% in rural areas) was not aware of the ASEAN Community. However, nearly one-third of them (33.2% in general, 33.0% in urban, and 33.7% in rural areas) were not sure whether they have heard or read about the regional integration initiative.

The study also found that only slightly more than one-fourth of the respondents (27.4% in general, 27.6% in urban areas and 27.2% in rural areas) were aware of the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC). The largest portion of respondents (49.6% in general, 46.5% in urban areas and 54.3% in rural areas) was not sure if they are aware of the APSC.

Table 2: Awareness of the ASEAN Community

		Urban Areas (n = 3,009)	Rural Areas (n = 2,023)	Overall (n=5,032)
I have heard or read about the ASEAN Community	Tend to agree	59.9%	59.7%	59.8%
	Tend to disagree	7.2%	6.6%	7.0%
	Not sure	33.0%	33.7%	33.2%
I have heard or read about ASEAN Political Security Community	Tend to agree	27.60%	27.20%	27.40%
	Tend to disagree	25.90%	18.50%	22.90%
	Not sure	46.60%	54.40%	49.70%
I have heard or read about the ASEAN Economic Community	Tend to agree	30.9%	27.2%	29.4%
	Tend to disagree	21.5%	17.8%	20.1%
	Not sure	47.6%	55.0%	50.5%
I have heard or read about the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community	Tend to agree	22.6%	18.3%	20.9%
	Tend to disagree	48.4%	54.6%	50.9%
	Not sure	13.6%	11.8%	12.9%

Similar findings can also be found in the exposure of respondents the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC). The study found that only less than a third of respondents (29.4% in general, 30.9% in urban areas and 27.2% in rural areas)

were aware of the AEC. The majority of respondents (50.6% in general, 47.6% in urban areas and 55.0% in rural areas) were not sure if they are aware of the AEC.

For the awareness of the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC), the study found that less than a quarter of respondents (20.9% in general, 22.6% in urban areas and 18.3% in rural areas) were fully aware. The majority of respondents (50.9% in general, 48.4% in urban areas and 54.6% in rural areas) were not sure if they are aware of the AEC. Among the three pillars of the ASEAN Community, it seems that the unawareness of ASCC is the weakest among the Malaysian youth.

Objective Knowledge Pertaining to the ASEAN Community

To measure the objective knowledge of the Malaysian youths on the ASEAN Community, six open-ended objective questions were asked. The level of awareness was measured by the number of correct answers to the objective questions. Thus, if a respondent could not correctly answer the question or did not answer a question, the study categorized them as unaware respondents. The answers and level of awareness are displayed in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Objective Knowledge of the ASEAN Community

In addition, the study assessed the extent of objective knowledge by analysing the number of correct answers for the six objective questions. The study found that majority respondents (70% in general, 68% in urban and, 73% in rural areas) were weak in their objective knowledge that they could only answer maximum two correct answers. Only 16% among the Malaysian youths (18% in urban and 15% in rural areas) were able to answer three to four questions correctly, thus can be categorized having moderate knowledge. Finally, there were only 13% of the Malaysian youths (14% in urban and 13% in rural areas) were able to answer five to six questions correctly.

Attitude towards Establishment of the ASEAN Community

In this study, attitude of the Malaysian Youth towards the establishment of ASEAN Community is measured using three variables – perceived relevancy, perceived benefits and support for the ASEAN Community.

Perceived Relevancy of the ASEAN Community

The first variable of attitude – perceived relevancy – is measured using four (4) six-scale Likert indicators that assess the relevancy of ASEAN Community as well as each of its three pillars. In general, the majority of respondents perceived the ASEAN Community as relevant for them. However, the numbers of those who were not sure were quite significant.

Table 3: Perceived Relevancy of the ASEAN Community

		Urban Areas (n = 3,009)	Rural Areas (n = 2,023)	Overall (n=5,032)
The relevance of the ASEAN Community for Malaysia.	Tend to agree	47.6%	46.6%	47.2%
	Tend to disagree	7.7%	6.3%	7.2%
	Not sure	44.8%	47.1%	45.7%
The relevance of the ASEAN Community in ensuring national security.	Tend to agree	52.5%	48.9%	51.1%
	Tend to disagree	6.9%	5.1%	6.2%
	Not sure	40.5%	46.1%	42.8%
The relevance of the ASEAN Community for supporting sustainable economic growth.	Tend to agree	50.3%	46.5%	48.8%
	Tend to disagree	6.0%	5.1%	5.6%
	Not sure	43.6%	48.4%	45.5%
The relevance of the ASEAN Community for social and cultural development.	Tend to agree	47.8%	45.0%	46.8%
	Tend to disagree	7.2%	5.7%	6.6%
	Not sure	45.0%	49.2%	46.6%

The findings of the study are as follow. Firstly, the majority of respondents (47.2% in general, 47.6% in urban and 46.6% in rural areas) agreed that the ASEAN Community is relevant to Malaysia. Only 7.2% of respondents (7.7% in urban and 6.3% in rural areas) thought that it is not relevant. However, those who were unsure to the ASEAN Community's relevancy (45.6% in general, 44.7% in urban and 47.1% in rural areas) formed almost the same percentage with those who thought it as relevant.

Secondly, more than half of respondents (51.1% in general, 52.5% in urban and 48.9% in rural areas) agreed that the ASEAN Community is relevant to ensure Malaysia's security. Only 6.2% of the respondents (6.9% in urban and 5.1% in rural areas) thought that it was not. However, there were quite substantial number of those who unsure of this relevancy (42.7% in general, 40.6% in urban, and 46.0% in rural areas).

Thirdly, nearly half of respondents (48.8% in general, 50.3% in urban, and 46.5% in rural areas) agreed that the ASEAN Community could support sustainable economic growth for Malaysia. Only 5.6% of the respondents (6.0% in urban and 5.1% in rural areas) thought that it was not. However, there were quite substantial number of those who unsure of this relevancy (45.6% in general, 43.7% in urban, and 48.4% in rural areas).

Finally, almost the majority of respondents (46.8% in general, 47.8% in urban, and 45.0% in rural areas) agreed that the ASEAN Community could contribute to the Malaysia's social and cultural development. Only 6.6% of the respondents (7.2% in urban and 5.7% in rural areas) thought that it was not relevant. However, there is also quite a big percentage that was not sure with the statement (46.6% in general, 45.0% in urban and 49.3% in rural areas).

Perceived Benefits of the ASEAN Community

The second variable of attitude – perceived benefits – is measured by using six (6) six-scale Likert indicators that assess the benefits of ASEAN Community. In general, respondents were in favour of the ASEAN Community. They perceived that the community is beneficial to the country. However, the number of those who were not sure was also quite significant and in some indicators outnumbered those who perceived the benefit of ASEAN Community.

Table 3: Perceived Relevancy of the ASEAN Community

		Urban Areas (n = 3,009)	Rural Areas (n = 2,023)	Overall (n=5,032)
The relevance of the ASEAN Community for Malaysia.	Tend to agree	47.6%	46.6%	47.2%
	Tend to disagree	7.7%	6.3%	7.2%
	Not sure	44.8%	47.1%	45.7%
The relevance of the ASEAN Community in ensuring national security.	Tend to agree	52.5%	48.9%	51.1%
	Tend to disagree	6.9%	5.1%	6.2%
	Not sure	40.5%	46.1%	42.8%
The relevance of the ASEAN Community for supporting sustainable economic growth.	Tend to agree	50.3%	46.5%	48.8%
	Tend to disagree	6.0%	5.1%	5.6%
	Not sure	43.6%	48.4%	45.5%
The relevance of the ASEAN Community for social and cultural development.	Tend to agree	47.8%	45.0%	46.8%
	Tend to disagree	7.2%	5.7%	6.6%
	Not sure	45.0%	49.2%	46.6%

The findings of the study are as follow. Firstly, the majority of respondents (47.2% in general, 47.6% in urban and 46.6% in rural areas) agreed that the ASEAN Community is relevant to Malaysia. Only 7.2% of respondents (7.7% in urban and 6.3% in rural areas) thought that it is not relevant. However, those who were unsure to the ASEAN Community's relevancy (45.6% in general, 44.7% in urban and 47.1% in rural areas) formed almost the same percentage with those who thought it as relevant.

Secondly, more than half of respondents (51.1% in general, 52.5% in urban and 48.9% in rural areas) agreed that the ASEAN Community is relevant to ensure Malaysia's security. Only 6.2% of the respondents (6.9% in urban and 5.1% in rural areas) thought that it was not. However, there were quite substantial number of those who unsure of this relevancy (42.7% in general, 40.6% in urban, and 46.0% in rural areas).

Thirdly, nearly half of respondents (48.8% in general, 50.3% in urban, and 46.5% in rural areas) agreed that the ASEAN Community could support sustainable economic growth for Malaysia. Only 5.6% of the respondents (6.0% in urban and 5.1% in rural areas) thought that it was not. However, there were quite substantial number of those who unsure of this relevancy (45.6% in general, 43.7% in urban, and 48.4% in rural areas).

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Finally, almost the majority of respondents (46.8% in general, 47.8% in urban, and 45.0% in rural areas) agreed that the ASEAN Community could contribute to the Malaysia's social and cultural development. Only 6.6% of the respondents (7.2% in urban and 5.7% in rural areas) thought that it was not relevant. However, there is also quite a big percentage that was not sure with the statement (46.6% in general, 45.0% in urban and 49.3% in rural areas).

Perceived Benefits of the ASEAN Community

The second variable of attitude – perceived benefits – is measured by using six (6) six-scale Likert indicators that assess the benefits of ASEAN Community. In general, respondents were in favour of the ASEAN Community. They perceived that the community is beneficial to the country. However, the number of those who were not sure was also quite significant and in some indicators outnumbered those who perceived the benefit of ASEAN Community.

Table 4: Perceived Benefits of the ASEAN Community

		Urban Areas (n = 3,009)	Rural Areas (n = 2,023)	Overall (n=5,032)
Benefits of the ASEAN Community for the economic growth.	Tend to agree	35.30%	41.60%	37.80%
	Tend to disagree	9.80%	9.10%	9.50%
	Not sure	46.80%	44.20%	45.70%
Benefits of the ASEAN Community for strengthening business.	Tend to agree	46.4%	46.3%	46.4%
	Tend to disagree	7.3%	5.0%	6.4%
	Not sure	46.3%	48.7%	47.2%
Benefits of the ASEAN Community for a better security	Tend to agree	49.4%	46.8%	48.3%
	Tend to disagree	7.2%	5.9%	6.7%
	Not sure	43.3%	47.4%	44.9%
Benefits of the ASEAN Community for peace in the region.	Tend to agree	48.8%	47.2%	48.1%
	Tend to disagree	6.4%	5.3%	5.9%
	Not sure	44.8%	47.7%	45.9%
Benefits of ASEAN Community for conserving cultures in the region.	Tend to agree	48.6%	48.0%	48.3%
	Tend to disagree	6.6%	5.9%	6.3%
	Not sure	44.7%	46.1%	45.3%
I have seen benefits of ASEAN Community from the recent economic growth in Malaysia.	Tend to agree	47.7%	45.3%	46.8%
	Tend to disagree	6.6%	5.9%	6.3%
	Not sure	45.6%	48.8%	46.9%

Firstly, the study found that about 37.8% respondents (35.3% in urban and 41.6% in rural areas) agreed that the ASEAN Community could benefit the economic growth in Malaysia,. These figures are almost four times higher than those who thought that it would not beneficial (9.5% in general, 9.8% in urban and 9.1% in rural areas). However, the majority of the respondents were unsure of this benefit (52.7% in general, 54.9% in urban and 49.3% in rural areas).

Secondly, the study also found that about 46.8% respondents (47.7% in urban and 45.3% in rural areas) agreed that the ASEAN Community could strengthen businesses in Malaysia, it. These figures are more than seven times higher than those who disagree with the statement (5.9% in general, 6.6% in urban and 5.9% in rural areas). However, respondents who were unsure of the benefit (46.9% in general, 45.7% in urban and 48.8% in rural areas) outnumbered those who agreed it.

Thirdly, it is found that about 46.5% respondents (46.4% in urban, and 46.3% in rural areas) agreed that about the ASEAN Community provides better security for Malaysia,. These figures are seven times more than those who thought that it would not (6.4% in general, 7.3% in urban and 5.0% in rural areas). However, there are more respondents who were unsure of the benefit (47.2% in general, 46.3% in urban and 48.7% in rural areas).

Fourthly, about 48.3% respondents (49.4% in urban and 46.8% in rural areas) agreed that the ASEAN Community could create a more peaceful region. These figures are seven times more than those who disagree (6.4% in general, 7.3% in urban and 5.0% in rural areas). However, there are more respondents who were unsure (45.0% in general, 47.3% in urban and 43.4% in rural areas).

Fifthly, 48.1% respondents (48.8% in urban and 47.2% in rural areas) agreed that with the ASEAN Community could be an avenue to conserve cultures in the region. These figures superseded significantly with those who disagree (5.9% in general, 6.4% in urban and 5.3% in rural areas). However, numbers of respondents were unsure of this benefit are also quite substantial (46.0% in general, 47.5% in urban, and 44.8% in rural areas).

Finally, about 41.1% respondents (41.9% in urban and 39.8% in rural areas) perceived that they had seen the benefits of the ASEAN Community from the recent economic growth in Malaysia. The study found that those who agreed to this statement were more than four times of those who disagree (10.0% in general,

10.4% in urban and 9.5% in rural areas). However, numbers of respondents were unsure of this benefit outnumbered (48.9% in general, 50.7% in urban, and 47.7% in rural areas) those who agreed of the benefits.

Support for Establishment of the ASEAN Community

The third variable of attitude –supports for the establishment of the ASEAN Community– is measured by using seven (7) six-scale Likert indicators. In general, respondents showed their supports for the ASEAN Community and its major pillars. However, many of them were not sure whether to support the regional integration initiatives. In many cases, the percentage that was not sure about the statement is quite high.

Table 5: Support for the ASEAN Community

		Urban Areas (n = 3,009)	Rural Areas (n = 2,023)	Overall (n=5,032)
I support the establishment of ASEAN Community.	Tend to agree	14.4%	12.2%	13.5%
	Tend to disagree	7.4%	13.4%	9.8%
	Not sure	43.2%	42.1%	42.8%
I support the free trade aspect of the ASEAN Economic Community.	Tend to agree	39.3%	36.7%	38.3%
	Tend to disagree	11.2%	16.0%	13.1%
	Not sure	49.5%	47.4%	48.7%
I support the free movement of skilled professional workers in ASEAN	Tend to agree	39.0%	33.7%	36.9%
	Tend to disagree	12.1%	18.8%	14.8%
	Not sure	48.9%	47.6%	48.3%
I support the ASEAN principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states.	Tend to agree	41.0%	37.6%	39.7%
	Tend to disagree	12.8%	16.0%	14.1%
	Not sure	46.3%	46.4%	46.3%
I support that ASEAN should be more active in managing conflicts among member countries.	Tend to agree	46.1%	43.3%	44.9%
	Tend to disagree	7.9%	14.4%	10.5%
	Not sure	46.1%	42.5%	44.6%
I support the conservation of ASEAN cultural heritage	Tend to agree	52.0%	48.7%	50.7%
	Tend to disagree	7.7%	12.4%	9.5%
	Not sure	40.3%	39.1%	39.8%
I support the promotion of ASEAN cultural heritage	Tend to agree	49.9%	47.8%	49.0%
	Tend to disagree	8.2%	12.4%	9.9%
	Not sure	42.0%	39.9%	41.1%

Firstly, the establishment of ASEAN Community was supported by about 47.5% respondents (49.4% in urban and 44.7% in rural areas). However, the numbers of respondents who were not sure about their support are also quite substantial (42.7% in general, 43.2% in urban and 41.9% in rural areas). Those who did not were 9.8% in general; 7.4% in urban and 13.4% in rural areas.

Secondly, the majority of respondents were not sure whether they should support the free trade component of the AEC (48.6% in general, 49.5% in urban and 47.3% in rural areas). Only 38.3% respondents (39.3% in urban and 36.7% in rural areas) showed their support for the free trade. These figures are almost three times higher than those who did not support (13.1% in general, 11.2% in urban and 16.0% in rural areas).

Thirdly, there are a significant percentage of respondents who were unsure about the free movement of skilled professional workers in the AEC (48.3% in general, 47.5% in urban and 48.9% in rural areas). Only 36.9% respondents (39.0% in urban and 33.7% in rural areas) showed their support. These figures are more than twice of those who did not support (14.8% in general, 12.1% in urban and 18.8% in rural areas).

Fourthly, the majority of respondents were not sure about their support on the ASEAN principle of non-interference in internal affairs of member states (46.2% in general, 46.2% in urban and 46.4% in rural areas). The concept was supported by only 39.7% respondents (41.0% in urban and 37.6% in rural areas). Only 14.1% in general, 16.0% in urban, and 12.8% in rural areas, did not support.

Fifthly, there is almost an equal percentage for those who were agreed with those who were with no opinion on the role of ASEAN to be more active in managing conflict between member states. Respondents who agreed with the statement were 44.9% in general (46.1% in urban, and 43.3% in rural areas), while those who did not have an opinion were 44.6% in general (46.0% in urban and 42.3% in rural areas). Only 10.5% in general (7.9% in urban and 14.4% in rural areas) did not support.

Sixthly, the role of ASEAN to conserve of cultural heritage was supported by the majority of respondents (50.7% in general, 52.0% in urban, and 48.7% in rural areas). These figures are more than five times of those who did not support (9.5% in general, 7.7% in urban and 12.4% in rural areas). However, many of respondents were also not sure about their support (39.8% in general, 40.3% in urban and 38.9% in rural areas).

Finally, the majority of respondents supported the promotion of ASEAN cultural heritage (49.0% in general, 49.9% in urban and 47.8% in rural areas). However, the number of respondents who were not sure about their support (41.1% in general, 41.9% in urban and 39.8% in rural areas) are also quite considerable These figures are almost five times of those who did not support (9.9% in general, 8.2% in urban, and12.4% in rural areas).

Malaysian Youth Preparedness

The preparedness of the Malaysian Youths on the challenges posed by the establishment of the ASEAN Community was assessed using five (5) six-scale Likert indicators. The analysis of their answers is displayed in Figure 7. In general, it is found that the respondents were not optimistic regarding their preparedness. Approximately only one-third of respondents claimed that they are prepared or have made sufficient preparation. The largest group of respondents in fact were not sure of their preparedness.

Table 6: Preparedness for the ASEAN Community

		Urban Areas (n = 3,009)	Rural Areas (n = 2,023)	Overall (n=5,032)
I am prepared to face the ASEAN Community.	Tend to agree	14.4%	12.2%	13.5%
	Tend to disagree	7.4%	13.4%	9.8%
	Not sure	43.2%	42.1%	42.8%
I am prepared to compete with other ASEAN citizens for professional jobs.	Tend to agree	39.3%	36.7%	38.3%
	Tend to disagree	11.2%	16.0%	13.1%
	Not sure	49.5%	47.4%	48.7%
I have sufficient skills to work / do business in other ASEAN member states.	Tend to agree	39.0%	33.7%	36.9%
	Tend to disagree	12.1%	18.8%	14.8%
	Not sure	48.9%	47.6%	48.3%
I have made sufficient preparation to face challenges from ASEAN Economic Community.	Tend to agree	41.0%	37.6%	39.7%
	Tend to disagree	12.8%	16.0%	14.1%
	Not sure	46.3%	46.4%	46.3%
I have the advantage communicating in English.	Tend to agree	46.1%	43.3%	44.9%
	Tend to disagree	7.9%	14.4%	10.5%
	Not sure	46.1%	42.5%	44.6%

Firstly, the majority of respondents were not sure whether they were prepared for the challenges posed by the formation of the ASEAN Community (52.2% in general, 53.7% in urban and 49.9% in rural areas). The study found that there were only less than one-third of respondents confirmed that they had already prepared for the ASEAN Community, while about 15.3% respondents (13.8% in urban, and 17.6% in rural areas) contended that they were not prepared for it.

Secondly, majority of respondents were also not sure whether they were prepared to compete with other ASEAN citizens for professional jobs, (54.6% in general; 56.7% in urban and 51.3% in rural areas). The study found that there were only 26.7% respondents (16.9% in urban, and 21.2% in rural areas) confirmed that they had already prepared to compete, while the remaining 18.7% respondents (16.9% in urban, and 21.2% in rural areas) contended that they were not prepared.

Thirdly, the majority of respondents were not sure whether they have sufficient skills to work or do business in other ASEAN countries, (52.4% in general, 54.6% in urban, and 49.4% in rural areas). There were only 27.8% respondents (27.3% in urban, and 28.4% in rural areas) confirmed that they had already prepared to compete, while about 19.8% respondents (18.1% in urban, and 22.2% in rural areas) contended that they were not prepared for it.

Fourthly, the study found that majority of respondents was not sure whether they had made sufficient preparation to face challenges with ASEAN Economic Community (51.6% in general, 53.4% in urban and 49.0% in rural areas). Nearly only one-quarter of respondents (33.9% in general, 33.5% in urban, and 34.3% in rural areas) confirmed that they had already made sufficient preparation to compete, while about 14.5% respondents (13.1% in urban, and 16.7% in rural areas) contended that they did not.

Finally, the study has found that most Malaysian youths were not confident enough with their English communicating skill. Almost half the respondents were not sure whether they have the advantage in English communicate compared to those in the region (48.5% in general, 49.4% in urban and 47.3% in rural areas). It also found that nearly one-quarter of respondents (35.2% in general, 36.2% in urban and 33.6% in rural areas) agreed of this communication advantages, while 16.3% respondents (14.4% in urban, and 19.1% in rural areas) disagreed to it.

Analysis

Based on the data presented earlier, it can be argued that Malaysian youths exhibit weak awareness on the ASEAN Community and understanding on its three pillars. The majority of them did not have clear picture of the ASEAN regionalism initiatives. To test further whether the hypothesis is correct or not, the study analysed the data using Pearson correlation study by asserting the relations between the awareness, attitude and preparedness (refer to Table 8). The tests show the existence of a significant positive but rather weak relationship existed between the awareness of the ASEAN Community and perceived relevancy, perceived benefits, support, and preparedness. Thus, the study implies:

- The more Malaysian youths aware about the ASEAN Community, the more they perceive the relevancy of the regionalism.

- The more Malaysian youths aware about ASEAN Community, the more they see benefits from the regionalism.

- The more Malaysian youths aware about ASEAN Community, the more they show their support for the regionalism.

- The more Malaysian youths aware about the ASEAN Community, the more they prepare for the regionalism initiative and its three pillars.

Table 1: Pearson's Correlation Test Result of Awareness and Attitude and Preparedness

| Dependent variables: | Correlation with Awareness of the ASEAN Community | | |
	Sig. (2 tailed)	Pearson Correlation	Conclusion
(1) Perceived Relevancy			
i. The relevance of the establishment of ASEAN Community for Malaysia.	0.000	0.325	A significant positive but rather weak relationship exists among two variables.
ii. The relevance of the ASEAN Community for ensuring security in Malaysia.	0.000	0.330	A significant positive but rather weak relationship exists among two variables.
iii. The relevance of the ASEAN Community for supporting sustainable economic growth in Malaysia.	0.000	0.324	A significant positive but rather weak relationship exists among two variables.
iv. The relevance of the ASEAN Community for social and cultural development in Malaysia.	0.000	0.299	A significant positive but rather weak relationship exists among two variables.

Dependent variables:	Correlation with Awareness of the ASEAN Community		
	Sig. (2 tailed)	Pearson Correlation	Conclusion
(2) Perceived Benefits			
i. The benefits of ASEAN Community for Malaysia's economic growth.	0.000	0.346	A significant positive but rather weak relationship exists among two variables.
ii. The benefits of the ASEAN Community in strengthening Malaysian businesses.	0.000	0.292	A significant positive but rather weak relationship exists among two variables.
iii. The benefits of the ASEAN Community for a better security in Malaysia.	0.000	0.306	A significant positive but rather weak relationship exists among two variables.
iv. The benefits of the ASEAN Community for peace in the region.	0.000	0.332	A significant positive but rather weak relationship exists among two variables.
v. The benefits of the ASEAN Community for conserving cultures in the region.	0.000	0.344	A significant positive but rather weak relationship exists among two variables.
vi. I have seen the benefit of ASEAN Community from the recent economic growth in Malaysia.	0.000	0.271	A significant positive but rather weak relationship exists among two variables.
(3) Support			
i. I support the establishment of ASEAN Community.	0.000	0.355	A significant positive but rather weak relationship exists among two variables.
ii. I support the free trade aspect of the ASEAN Economic Community.	0.000	0.368	A significant positive but rather weak relationship exists among two variables.
iii. I support the free movement of skilled professional workers in ASEAN.	0.000	0.327	A significant positive but rather weak relationship exists among two variables.
iv. I support the ASEAN principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states.	0.000	0.276	A significant positive but rather weak relationship exists among two variables.
v. I support that ASEAN should be more active in managing conflicts among member countries.	0.000	0.325	A significant positive but rather weak relationship exists among two variables.
vi. I support the conservation of ASEAN cultural heritage	0.000	0.334	A significant positive but rather weak relationship exists among two variables.
vii. I support the promotion of ASEAN cultural heritage	0.000	0.340	A significant positive but rather weak relationship exists among two variables.
(4) Preparedness			
i. I am prepared to face the ASEAN Community.	0.000	0.340	A significant positive but rather weak relationship exists among two variables.
ii. I am prepared to compete with other ASEAN citizens in professional jobs.	0.000	0.298	A significant positive but rather weak relationship exists among two variables.
iii. I have sufficient skills to work / do business in other ASEAN	0.000	0.289	A significant positive but rather weak relationship exists among

Dependent variables:	Correlation with Awareness of the ASEAN Community		
	Sig. (2 tailed)	Pearson Correlation	Conclusion
member states.			two variables.
iv. I have made sufficient preparation to face challenges from ASEAN Economic Community.	0.000	0.302	A significant positive but rather weak relationship exists among two variables.
v. I have the ability communicating in English.	0.000	0.302	A significant positive but rather weak relationship exists among two variables.

The study also found that the awareness, attitude, and preparedness are generally higher in urban compared to that of rural areas. Having found that the level of objective awareness of respondents in urban is higher than that in rural areas, we conclude that the differences in perceived relevance, support, and preparedness may be attributable to the difference level of awareness between the Malaysian youths in urban and rural areas

Conclusion

The Malaysian youths generally had a good impression of and thought on the ASEAN Community. They perceived that the regional community concept is highly relevant, beneficial, and thus support for further integration. However, there were a high percentage of those who did have any opinions on the subject. The analysis also shows that there is significant relationship between awareness and perceived relevancy, benefits, and supports. Henceforth, the study concludes that the Malaysian youths are not ready to face with the challenges posed by the formation of the ASEAN Community. Therefore, there is an urgent need for the government especially for the responsible ministry to undertake all necessary strategies to ensure Malaysian youths' readiness and preparedness to the regional community building. More inclusive programs for the youth need to be planned to expose them with the challenges and opportunities of the ASEAN Community. Information should be continuously relayed through various means of information services, such as electronic and social media, as part of socializing process of the ASEAN Community among the Malaysian youths.

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ASEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY: CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS

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Abstract

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established to address political and security issues on 8 August 1967 in Thailand during the Cold War. Four decades la, in the late 2015, ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) launched to promote economic, political, social and cultural cooperation across the region. As third largest economy in Asia, ASEAN provided a huge market and benefit to over 600 million people in this continent. A single market and production, a competitive economic region, equitable economic development and integration into global economy are the four objectives of AEC. AEC Blueprint 2015 ensure that ten ASEAN Member States are economically integrated, shared prosperity, more proactive, responding to new developments, seizing new opportunities and cultivating its collective identity and strength to engage with the world. Besides the opportunities and strengths, AEC faces numerous challenges. Lack of similarity, development gaps, slow in action and weak ASEAN Secretariat are the weaknesses of ASEAN to achieve AEC's goals. ASEAN members embarked on a combination of multilateral and unilateral measures to reduce barriers to trade in goods, services and investments. These measures have made barriers ASEAN region is projected to rank as the fourth-largest economy in the world by 2050. ASEAN is often seen as an alternative for Chinese and Indian markets. This paper suggests that for ASEAN to become more globally competitive in a wide range of sectors and industries, it must invest in institutions, infrastructure, education, managing labor migration, boosting productivity and wages and improving job quality. AEC integration serves to promote good and services, investment, labor and capital mobilization.

Keywords: ASEAN, regional economic integration, finances, labor migrations, free trade.